core: adopt host_executable() rules in zsh-fork (#13046)

## Why

[#12964](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12964) added
`host_executable()` support to `codex-execpolicy`, but the zsh-fork
interception path in `unix_escalation.rs` was still evaluating commands
with the default exact-token matcher.

That meant an intercepted absolute executable such as `/usr/bin/git
status` could still miss basename rules like `prefix_rule(pattern =
["git", "status"])`, even when the policy also defined a matching
`host_executable(name = "git", ...)` entry.

This PR adopts the new matching behavior in the zsh-fork runtime only.
That keeps the rollout intentionally narrow: zsh-fork already requires
explicit user opt-in, so it is a safer first caller to exercise the new
`host_executable()` scheme before expanding it to other execpolicy call
sites.

It also brings zsh-fork back in line with the current `prefix_rule()`
execution model. Until prefix rules can carry their own permission
profiles, a matched `prefix_rule()` is expected to rerun the intercepted
command unsandboxed on `allow`, or after the user accepts `prompt`,
instead of merely continuing inside the inherited shell sandbox.

## What Changed

- added `evaluate_intercepted_exec_policy()` in
`core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs` to centralize
execpolicy evaluation for intercepted commands
- switched intercepted direct execs in the zsh-fork path to
`check_multiple_with_options(...)` with `MatchOptions {
resolve_host_executables: true }`
- added `commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy()` so zsh-fork policy
evaluation works from intercepted `(program, argv)` data instead of
reconstructing a synthetic command before matching
- left shell-wrapper parsing intentionally disabled by default behind
`ENABLE_INTERCEPTED_EXEC_POLICY_SHELL_WRAPPER_PARSING`, so
path-sensitive matching relies on later direct exec interception rather
than shell-script parsing
- made matched `prefix_rule()` decisions rerun intercepted commands with
`EscalationExecution::Unsandboxed`, while unmatched-command fallback
keeps the existing sandbox-preserving behavior
- extracted the zsh-fork test harness into
`core/tests/common/zsh_fork.rs` so both the skill-focused and
approval-focused integration suites can exercise the same runtime setup
- limited this change to the intercepted zsh-fork path rather than
changing every execpolicy caller at once
- added runtime coverage in
`core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation_tests.rs` for allowed and
disallowed `host_executable()` mappings and the wrapper-parsing modes
- added integration coverage in `core/tests/suite/approvals.rs` to
verify a saved `prefix_rule(pattern=["touch"], decision="allow")` reruns
under zsh-fork outside a restrictive `WorkspaceWrite` sandbox

---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13046).
* #13065
* __->__ #13046
This commit is contained in:
Michael Bolin
2026-02-27 17:41:23 -08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 8fa792868c
commit 1a8d930267
6 changed files with 517 additions and 145 deletions

View File

@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ use core_test_support::test_codex::TestCodex;
use core_test_support::test_codex::test_codex;
use core_test_support::wait_for_event;
use core_test_support::wait_for_event_with_timeout;
use core_test_support::zsh_fork::build_zsh_fork_test;
use core_test_support::zsh_fork::restrictive_workspace_write_policy;
use core_test_support::zsh_fork::zsh_fork_runtime;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use regex_lite::Regex;
use serde_json::Value;
@@ -1978,6 +1981,81 @@ async fn approving_execpolicy_amendment_persists_policy_and_skips_future_prompts
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn matched_prefix_rule_runs_unsandboxed_under_zsh_fork() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
let Some(runtime) = zsh_fork_runtime("zsh-fork prefix rule unsandboxed test")? else {
return Ok(());
};
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::Never;
let sandbox_policy = restrictive_workspace_write_policy();
let outside_dir = tempfile::tempdir_in(std::env::current_dir()?)?;
let outside_path = outside_dir
.path()
.join("zsh-fork-prefix-rule-unsandboxed.txt");
let command = format!("touch {outside_path:?}");
let rules = r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["touch"], decision="allow")"#.to_string();
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let outside_path_for_hook = outside_path.clone();
let test = build_zsh_fork_test(
&server,
runtime,
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
move |home| {
let _ = fs::remove_file(&outside_path_for_hook);
let rules_dir = home.join("rules");
fs::create_dir_all(&rules_dir).unwrap();
fs::write(rules_dir.join("default.rules"), &rules).unwrap();
},
)
.await?;
let call_id = "zsh-fork-prefix-rule-unsandboxed";
let event = shell_event(call_id, &command, 1_000, SandboxPermissions::UseDefault)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-zsh-fork-prefix-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-zsh-fork-prefix-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-zsh-fork-prefix-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-zsh-fork-prefix-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"run allowed touch under zsh fork",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy,
)
.await?;
wait_for_completion_without_approval(&test).await;
let result = parse_result(&results.single_request().function_call_output(call_id));
assert_eq!(result.exit_code.unwrap_or(0), 0);
assert!(
outside_path.exists(),
"expected matched prefix_rule to rerun touch unsandboxed; output: {}",
result.stdout
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn invalid_requested_prefix_rule_falls_back_for_compound_command() -> Result<()> {