Address exec-server sandbox review feedback

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
This commit is contained in:
starr-openai
2026-04-07 10:19:15 -07:00
parent 21ae6e9b3b
commit 2fb1b2de43
13 changed files with 212 additions and 203 deletions

View File

@@ -12,7 +12,15 @@ use codex_exec_server::ExecProcess;
use codex_exec_server::ProcessId;
use codex_exec_server::ReadResponse;
use codex_exec_server::StartedExecProcess;
use codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_sandboxing::SandboxLaunchConfig;
use codex_sandboxing::SandboxLaunchMode;
use codex_sandboxing::SandboxType;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use tempfile::TempDir;
use test_case::test_case;
use tokio::sync::watch;
use tokio::time::Duration;
@@ -213,6 +221,76 @@ async fn assert_exec_process_preserves_queued_events_before_subscribe(
Ok(())
}
fn platform_sandbox_type() -> SandboxType {
if cfg!(target_os = "macos") {
SandboxType::MacosSeatbelt
} else if cfg!(target_os = "linux") {
SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp
} else {
unreachable!("unix exec-server tests only run on macOS and Linux");
}
}
fn write_outside_workspace_sandbox(workspace_root: &std::path::Path) -> SandboxLaunchConfig {
let policy = SandboxPolicy::new_workspace_write_policy();
SandboxLaunchConfig {
mode: SandboxLaunchMode::Require,
policy: policy.clone(),
file_system_policy: FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(
&policy,
workspace_root,
),
network_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&policy),
sandbox_policy_cwd: workspace_root.to_path_buf(),
additional_permissions: None,
enforce_managed_network: false,
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
windows_sandbox_private_desktop: false,
use_legacy_landlock: false,
}
}
async fn assert_exec_process_sandbox_denies_write_outside_workspace(
use_remote: bool,
) -> Result<()> {
let temp_dir = TempDir::new()?;
let workspace_root = temp_dir.path().join("workspace");
std::fs::create_dir(&workspace_root)?;
let blocked_path = temp_dir.path().join("blocked.txt");
let context = create_process_context(use_remote).await?;
let session = context
.backend
.start(ExecParams {
process_id: ProcessId::from("proc-sandbox-denied"),
argv: vec![
"/usr/bin/python3".to_string(),
"-c".to_string(),
"from pathlib import Path; import sys; Path(sys.argv[1]).write_text('blocked')"
.to_string(),
blocked_path.to_string_lossy().into_owned(),
],
cwd: workspace_root.clone(),
env: Default::default(),
tty: false,
arg0: None,
sandbox: Some(write_outside_workspace_sandbox(&workspace_root)),
})
.await?;
assert_eq!(session.sandbox_type, platform_sandbox_type());
let StartedExecProcess { process, .. } = session;
let wake_rx = process.subscribe_wake();
let (_output, exit_code, closed) = collect_process_output_from_reads(process, wake_rx).await?;
assert_ne!(exit_code, Some(0));
assert!(closed);
assert!(
!blocked_path.exists(),
"sandboxed process unexpectedly wrote outside the workspace root"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn remote_exec_process_reports_transport_disconnect() -> Result<()> {
let mut context = create_process_context(/*use_remote*/ true).await?;
@@ -284,3 +362,10 @@ async fn exec_process_write_then_read(use_remote: bool) -> Result<()> {
async fn exec_process_preserves_queued_events_before_subscribe(use_remote: bool) -> Result<()> {
assert_exec_process_preserves_queued_events_before_subscribe(use_remote).await
}
#[test_case(false ; "local")]
#[test_case(true ; "remote")]
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn exec_process_sandbox_denies_write_outside_workspace(use_remote: bool) -> Result<()> {
assert_exec_process_sandbox_denies_write_outside_workspace(use_remote).await
}