feat: add Reject approval policy with granular prompt rejection controls (#12087)

## Why

We need a way to auto-reject specific approval prompt categories without
switching all approvals off.

The goal is to let users independently control:
- sandbox escalation approvals,
- execpolicy `prompt` rule approvals,
- MCP elicitation prompts.

## What changed

- Added a new primary approval mode in `protocol/src/protocol.rs`:

```rust
pub enum AskForApproval {
    // ...
    Reject(RejectConfig),
    // ...
}

pub struct RejectConfig {
    pub sandbox_approval: bool,
    pub rules: bool,
    pub mcp_elicitations: bool,
}
```

- Wired `RejectConfig` semantics through approval paths in `core`:
  - `core/src/exec_policy.rs`
    - rejects rule-driven prompts when `rules = true`
    - rejects sandbox/escalation prompts when `sandbox_approval = true`
- preserves rule priority when both rule and sandbox prompt conditions
are present
  - `core/src/tools/sandboxing.rs`
- applies `sandbox_approval` to default exec approval decisions and
sandbox-failure retry gating
  - `core/src/safety.rs`
- keeps `Reject { all false }` behavior aligned with `OnRequest` for
patch safety
    - rejects out-of-root patch approvals when `sandbox_approval = true`
  - `core/src/mcp_connection_manager.rs`
    - auto-declines MCP elicitations when `mcp_elicitations = true`

- Ensured approval policy used by MCP elicitation flow stays in sync
with constrained session policy updates.

- Updated app-server v2 conversions and generated schema/TypeScript
artifacts for the new `Reject` shape.

## Verification

Added focused unit coverage for the new behavior in:
- `core/src/exec_policy.rs`
- `core/src/tools/sandboxing.rs`
- `core/src/mcp_connection_manager.rs`
- `core/src/safety.rs`
- `core/src/tools/runtimes/apply_patch.rs`

Key cases covered include rule-vs-sandbox prompt precedence, MCP
auto-decline behavior, and patch/sandbox retry behavior under
`RejectConfig`.
This commit is contained in:
Michael Bolin
2026-02-19 11:41:49 -08:00
committed by GitHub
parent f6c06108b1
commit 425fff7ad6
37 changed files with 1490 additions and 117 deletions

View File

@@ -378,11 +378,41 @@ pub enum AskForApproval {
#[default]
OnRequest,
/// Fine-grained rejection controls for approval prompts.
///
/// When a field is `true`, prompts of that category are automatically
/// rejected instead of shown to the user.
Reject(RejectConfig),
/// Never ask the user to approve commands. Failures are immediately returned
/// to the model, and never escalated to the user for approval.
Never,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct RejectConfig {
/// Reject approval prompts related to sandbox escalation.
pub sandbox_approval: bool,
/// Reject prompts triggered by execpolicy `prompt` rules.
pub rules: bool,
/// Reject MCP elicitation prompts.
pub mcp_elicitations: bool,
}
impl RejectConfig {
pub const fn rejects_sandbox_approval(self) -> bool {
self.sandbox_approval
}
pub const fn rejects_rules_approval(self) -> bool {
self.rules
}
pub const fn rejects_mcp_elicitations(self) -> bool {
self.mcp_elicitations
}
}
/// Represents whether outbound network access is available to the agent.
#[derive(
Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Display, Default, JsonSchema, TS,
@@ -2818,6 +2848,26 @@ mod tests {
assert!(enabled.has_full_network_access());
}
#[test]
fn reject_config_mcp_elicitation_flag_is_field_driven() {
assert!(
RejectConfig {
sandbox_approval: false,
rules: false,
mcp_elicitations: true,
}
.rejects_mcp_elicitations()
);
assert!(
!RejectConfig {
sandbox_approval: false,
rules: false,
mcp_elicitations: false,
}
.rejects_mcp_elicitations()
);
}
#[test]
fn workspace_write_restricted_read_access_includes_effective_writable_roots() {
let cwd = if cfg!(windows) {