permissions: make runtime config profile-backed (#19606)

## Why

This supersedes #19391. During stack repair, GitHub marked #19391 as
merged into a temporary stack branch rather than into `main`, so the
runtime-config change needed a fresh PR.

`PermissionProfile` is now the canonical permissions shape after #19231
because it can distinguish `Managed`, `Disabled`, and `External`
enforcement while also carrying filesystem rules that legacy
`SandboxPolicy` cannot represent cleanly. Core config and session state
still needed to accept profile-backed permissions without forcing every
profile through the strict legacy bridge, which rejected valid runtime
profiles such as direct write roots.

The unrelated CI/test hardening that previously rode along with this PR
has been split into #19683 so this PR stays focused on the permissions
model migration.

## What Changed

- Adds `Permissions.permission_profile` and
`SessionConfiguration.permission_profile` as constrained runtime state,
while keeping `sandbox_policy` as a legacy compatibility projection.
- Introduces profile setters that keep `PermissionProfile`, split
filesystem/network policies, and legacy `SandboxPolicy` projections
synchronized.
- Uses a compatibility projection for requirement checks and legacy
consumers instead of rejecting profiles that cannot round-trip through
`SandboxPolicy` exactly.
- Updates config loading, config overrides, session updates, turn
context plumbing, prompt permission text, sandbox tags, and exec request
construction to carry profile-backed runtime permissions.
- Preserves configured deny-read entries and `glob_scan_max_depth` when
command/session profiles are narrowed.
- Adds `PermissionProfile::read_only()` and
`PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` presets that match legacy
defaults.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-core direct_write_roots`
- `cargo test -p codex-core runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server
requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent`




---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19606).
* #19395
* #19394
* #19393
* #19392
* __->__ #19606

codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/landlock.rs

@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ use codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel;
 use codex_protocol::error::CodexErr;
 use codex_protocol::error::Result;
 use codex_protocol::error::SandboxErr;
+use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
+use codex_protocol::models::SandboxEnforcement;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
@@ -132,12 +134,15 @@ async fn run_cmd_result_with_policies(
     };
     let sandbox_program = env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_codex-linux-sandbox");
     let codex_linux_sandbox_exe = Some(PathBuf::from(sandbox_program));
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
+        SandboxEnforcement::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&sandbox_policy),
+        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        network_sandbox_policy,
+    );
 
     process_exec_tool_call(
         params,
-        &sandbox_policy,
-        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
-        network_sandbox_policy,
+        &permission_profile,
         &sandbox_cwd,
         &codex_linux_sandbox_exe,
         use_legacy_landlock,
@@ -394,11 +399,10 @@ async fn assert_network_blocked(cmd: &[&str]) {
     let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
     let sandbox_program = env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_codex-linux-sandbox");
     let codex_linux_sandbox_exe: Option<PathBuf> = Some(PathBuf::from(sandbox_program));
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&sandbox_policy);
     let result = process_exec_tool_call(
         params,
-        &sandbox_policy,
-        &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
-        NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
+        &permission_profile,
         &sandbox_cwd,
         &codex_linux_sandbox_exe,
         /*use_legacy_landlock*/ false,