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fix: Revert danger-full-access denylist-only mode (#17732)
## Summary - Reverts openai/codex#16946 and removes the danger-full-access denylist-only network mode. - Removes the corresponding config requirements, app-server protocol/schema, config API, TUI debug output, and network proxy behavior. - Drops stale tests that depended on the reverted mode while preserving newer managed allowlist-only coverage. ## Verification - `just write-app-server-schema` - `just fmt` - `cargo test -p codex-config network_requirements` - `cargo test -p codex-core network_proxy_spec` - `cargo test -p codex-core managed_network_proxy_decider_survives_full_access_start` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server map_requirements_toml_to_api` - `cargo test -p codex-tui debug_config_output` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `just fix -p codex-config -p codex-core -p codex-app-server-protocol -p codex-app-server -p codex-tui` - `git diff --cached --check` Not run: full workspace `cargo test` (repo instructions ask for confirmation before that broader run).
This commit is contained in:
@@ -237,8 +237,6 @@ pub struct NetworkRequirementsToml {
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/// When true, only managed `allowed_domains` are respected while managed
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/// network enforcement is active. User allowlist entries are ignored.
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pub managed_allowed_domains_only: Option<bool>,
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/// In danger-full-access mode, allow all network access and enforce managed deny entries.
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pub danger_full_access_denylist_only: Option<bool>,
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pub unix_sockets: Option<NetworkUnixSocketPermissionsToml>,
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pub allow_local_binding: Option<bool>,
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}
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@@ -257,8 +255,6 @@ struct RawNetworkRequirementsToml {
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/// When true, only managed `allowed_domains` are respected while managed
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/// network enforcement is active. User allowlist entries are ignored.
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managed_allowed_domains_only: Option<bool>,
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/// In danger-full-access mode, allow all network access and enforce managed deny entries.
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danger_full_access_denylist_only: Option<bool>,
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#[serde(default)]
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denied_domains: Option<Vec<String>>,
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unix_sockets: Option<NetworkUnixSocketPermissionsToml>,
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@@ -283,7 +279,6 @@ impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for NetworkRequirementsToml {
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domains,
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allowed_domains,
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managed_allowed_domains_only,
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danger_full_access_denylist_only,
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denied_domains,
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unix_sockets,
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allow_unix_sockets,
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@@ -312,7 +307,6 @@ impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for NetworkRequirementsToml {
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domains: domains
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.or_else(|| legacy_domain_permissions_from_lists(allowed_domains, denied_domains)),
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managed_allowed_domains_only,
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danger_full_access_denylist_only,
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unix_sockets: unix_sockets
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.or_else(|| legacy_unix_socket_permissions_from_list(allow_unix_sockets)),
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allow_local_binding,
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@@ -365,8 +359,6 @@ pub struct NetworkConstraints {
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/// When true, only managed `allowed_domains` are respected while managed
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/// network enforcement is active. User allowlist entries are ignored.
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pub managed_allowed_domains_only: Option<bool>,
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/// In danger-full-access mode, allow all network access and enforce managed deny entries.
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pub danger_full_access_denylist_only: Option<bool>,
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pub unix_sockets: Option<NetworkUnixSocketPermissionsToml>,
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pub allow_local_binding: Option<bool>,
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}
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@@ -392,7 +384,6 @@ impl From<NetworkRequirementsToml> for NetworkConstraints {
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dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets,
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domains,
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managed_allowed_domains_only,
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danger_full_access_denylist_only,
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unix_sockets,
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allow_local_binding,
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} = value;
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@@ -405,7 +396,6 @@ impl From<NetworkRequirementsToml> for NetworkConstraints {
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dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets,
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domains,
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managed_allowed_domains_only,
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danger_full_access_denylist_only,
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unix_sockets,
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allow_local_binding,
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}
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@@ -1811,7 +1801,6 @@ allowed_approvals_reviewers = ["user"]
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allow_upstream_proxy = false
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dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets = true
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managed_allowed_domains_only = true
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danger_full_access_denylist_only = true
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allow_local_binding = false
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[experimental_network.domains]
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@@ -1862,10 +1851,6 @@ allowed_approvals_reviewers = ["user"]
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sourced_network.value.managed_allowed_domains_only,
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Some(true)
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);
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assert_eq!(
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sourced_network.value.danger_full_access_denylist_only,
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Some(true)
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);
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assert_eq!(
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sourced_network.value.unix_sockets.as_ref(),
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Some(&NetworkUnixSocketPermissionsToml {
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@@ -1889,7 +1874,6 @@ allowed_approvals_reviewers = ["user"]
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dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets = true
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allowed_domains = ["api.example.com", "*.openai.com"]
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managed_allowed_domains_only = true
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danger_full_access_denylist_only = true
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denied_domains = ["blocked.example.com"]
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allow_unix_sockets = ["/tmp/example.sock"]
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allow_local_binding = false
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@@ -1934,10 +1918,6 @@ allowed_approvals_reviewers = ["user"]
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sourced_network.value.managed_allowed_domains_only,
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Some(true)
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);
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assert_eq!(
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sourced_network.value.danger_full_access_denylist_only,
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Some(true)
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);
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assert_eq!(
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sourced_network.value.unix_sockets.as_ref(),
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Some(&NetworkUnixSocketPermissionsToml {
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