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Merge origin/main into rhan/surface-updates to resolve PR #14374 conflicts

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This commit is contained in:
Roy Han
2026-03-12 10:31:10 -07:00
parent 1c435e54eb c0528b9bd9
commit d8b457c841
437 changed files with 65186 additions and 43385 deletions
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233
codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs
View File

@@ -240,6 +240,13 @@ pub enum ResponseInputItem {
call_id: String,
output: FunctionCallOutputPayload,
},
ToolSearchOutput {
call_id: String,
status: String,
execution: String,
#[ts(type = "unknown[]")]
tools: Vec<serde_json::Value>,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
@@ -320,12 +327,27 @@ pub enum ResponseItem {
#[ts(skip)]
id: Option<String>,
name: String,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
namespace: Option<String>,
// The Responses API returns the function call arguments as a *string* that contains
// JSON, not as an already‑parsed object. We keep it as a raw string here and let
// Session::handle_function_call parse it into a Value.
arguments: String,
call_id: String,
},
ToolSearchCall {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing)]
#[ts(skip)]
id: Option<String>,
call_id: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
status: Option<String>,
execution: String,
#[ts(type = "unknown")]
arguments: serde_json::Value,
},
// NOTE: The `output` field for `function_call_output` uses a dedicated payload type with
// custom serialization. On the wire it is either:
// - a plain string (`content`)
@@ -354,6 +376,13 @@ pub enum ResponseItem {
call_id: String,
output: FunctionCallOutputPayload,
},
ToolSearchOutput {
call_id: Option<String>,
status: String,
execution: String,
#[ts(type = "unknown[]")]
tools: Vec<serde_json::Value>,
},
// Emitted by the Responses API when the agent triggers a web search.
// Example payload (from SSE `response.output_item.done`):
// {
@@ -883,6 +912,17 @@ impl From<ResponseInputItem> for ResponseItem {
ResponseInputItem::CustomToolCallOutput { call_id, output } => {
Self::CustomToolCallOutput { call_id, output }
}
ResponseInputItem::ToolSearchOutput {
call_id,
status,
execution,
tools,
} => Self::ToolSearchOutput {
call_id: Some(call_id),
status,
execution,
tools,
},
}
}
}
@@ -988,6 +1028,13 @@ impl From<Vec<UserInput>> for ResponseInputItem {
}
}
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct SearchToolCallParams {
pub query: String,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
pub limit: Option<usize>,
}
/// If the `name` of a `ResponseItem::FunctionCall` is either `container.exec`
/// or `shell`, the `arguments` field should deserialize to this struct.
@@ -1721,6 +1768,29 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(text, Some("line 1".to_string()));
}
#[test]
fn function_call_deserializes_optional_namespace() {
let item: ResponseItem = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
"type": "function_call",
"name": "mcp__codex_apps__gmail_get_recent_emails",
"namespace": "mcp__codex_apps__gmail",
"arguments": "{\"top_k\":5}",
"call_id": "call-1",
}))
.expect("function_call should deserialize");
assert_eq!(
item,
ResponseItem::FunctionCall {
id: None,
name: "mcp__codex_apps__gmail_get_recent_emails".to_string(),
namespace: Some("mcp__codex_apps__gmail".to_string()),
arguments: "{\"top_k\":5}".to_string(),
call_id: "call-1".to_string(),
}
);
}
#[test]
fn converts_sandbox_mode_into_developer_instructions() {
let workspace_write: DeveloperInstructions = SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite.into();
@@ -2193,6 +2263,169 @@ mod tests {
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn tool_search_call_roundtrips() -> Result<()> {
let parsed: ResponseItem = serde_json::from_str(
r#"{
"type": "tool_search_call",
"call_id": "search-1",
"execution": "client",
"arguments": {
"query": "calendar create",
"limit": 1
}
}"#,
)?;
assert_eq!(
parsed,
ResponseItem::ToolSearchCall {
id: None,
call_id: Some("search-1".to_string()),
status: None,
execution: "client".to_string(),
arguments: serde_json::json!({
"query": "calendar create",
"limit": 1,
}),
}
);
assert_eq!(
serde_json::to_value(&parsed)?,
serde_json::json!({
"type": "tool_search_call",
"call_id": "search-1",
"execution": "client",
"arguments": {
"query": "calendar create",
"limit": 1,
}
})
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn tool_search_output_roundtrips() -> Result<()> {
let input = ResponseInputItem::ToolSearchOutput {
call_id: "search-1".to_string(),
status: "completed".to_string(),
execution: "client".to_string(),
tools: vec![serde_json::json!({
"type": "function",
"name": "mcp__codex_apps__calendar_create_event",
"description": "Create a calendar event.",
"defer_loading": true,
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"title": {"type": "string"}
},
"required": ["title"],
"additionalProperties": false,
}
})],
};
assert_eq!(
ResponseItem::from(input.clone()),
ResponseItem::ToolSearchOutput {
call_id: Some("search-1".to_string()),
status: "completed".to_string(),
execution: "client".to_string(),
tools: vec![serde_json::json!({
"type": "function",
"name": "mcp__codex_apps__calendar_create_event",
"description": "Create a calendar event.",
"defer_loading": true,
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"title": {"type": "string"}
},
"required": ["title"],
"additionalProperties": false,
}
})],
}
);
assert_eq!(
serde_json::to_value(input)?,
serde_json::json!({
"type": "tool_search_output",
"call_id": "search-1",
"status": "completed",
"execution": "client",
"tools": [{
"type": "function",
"name": "mcp__codex_apps__calendar_create_event",
"description": "Create a calendar event.",
"defer_loading": true,
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"title": {"type": "string"}
},
"required": ["title"],
"additionalProperties": false,
}
}]
})
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn tool_search_server_items_allow_null_call_id() -> Result<()> {
let parsed_call: ResponseItem = serde_json::from_str(
r#"{
"type": "tool_search_call",
"execution": "server",
"call_id": null,
"status": "completed",
"arguments": {
"paths": ["crm"]
}
}"#,
)?;
assert_eq!(
parsed_call,
ResponseItem::ToolSearchCall {
id: None,
call_id: None,
status: Some("completed".to_string()),
execution: "server".to_string(),
arguments: serde_json::json!({
"paths": ["crm"],
}),
}
);
let parsed_output: ResponseItem = serde_json::from_str(
r#"{
"type": "tool_search_output",
"execution": "server",
"call_id": null,
"status": "completed",
"tools": []
}"#,
)?;
assert_eq!(
parsed_output,
ResponseItem::ToolSearchOutput {
call_id: None,
status: "completed".to_string(),
execution: "server".to_string(),
tools: vec![],
}
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn mixed_remote_and_local_images_share_label_sequence() -> Result<()> {
let image_url = "".to_string();

513
codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs
View File

@@ -34,13 +34,31 @@ impl NetworkSandboxPolicy {
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Display, JsonSchema, TS)]
/// Access mode for a filesystem entry.
///
/// When two equally specific entries target the same path, we compare these by
/// conflict precedence rather than by capability breadth: `none` beats
/// `write`, and `write` beats `read`.
#[derive(
Debug,
Clone,
Copy,
PartialEq,
Eq,
PartialOrd,
Ord,
Serialize,
Deserialize,
Display,
JsonSchema,
TS,
)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
#[strum(serialize_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum FileSystemAccessMode {
None,
Read,
Write,
None,
}
impl FileSystemAccessMode {
@@ -121,6 +139,22 @@ pub struct FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
pub entries: Vec<FileSystemSandboxEntry>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct ResolvedFileSystemEntry {
path: AbsolutePathBuf,
access: FileSystemAccessMode,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct FileSystemSemanticSignature {
has_full_disk_read_access: bool,
has_full_disk_write_access: bool,
include_platform_defaults: bool,
readable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
writable_roots: Vec<WritableRoot>,
unreadable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[ts(tag = "type")]
@@ -163,6 +197,43 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
.any(|entry| entry.access == FileSystemAccessMode::None)
}
/// Returns true when a restricted policy contains any entry that really
/// reduces a broader `:root = write` grant.
///
/// Raw entry presence is not enough here: an equally specific `write`
/// entry for the same target wins under the normal precedence rules, so a
/// shadowed `read` entry must not downgrade the policy out of full-disk
/// write mode.
fn has_write_narrowing_entries(&self) -> bool {
matches!(self.kind, FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted)
&& self.entries.iter().any(|entry| {
if entry.access.can_write() {
return false;
}
match &entry.path {
FileSystemPath::Path { .. } => !self.has_same_target_write_override(entry),
FileSystemPath::Special { value } => match value {
FileSystemSpecialPath::Root => entry.access == FileSystemAccessMode::None,
FileSystemSpecialPath::Minimal | FileSystemSpecialPath::Unknown { .. } => {
false
}
_ => !self.has_same_target_write_override(entry),
},
}
})
}
/// Returns true when a higher-priority `write` entry targets the same
/// location as `entry`, so `entry` cannot narrow effective write access.
fn has_same_target_write_override(&self, entry: &FileSystemSandboxEntry) -> bool {
self.entries.iter().any(|candidate| {
candidate.access.can_write()
&& candidate.access > entry.access
&& file_system_paths_share_target(&candidate.path, &entry.path)
})
}
pub fn unrestricted() -> Self {
Self {
kind: FileSystemSandboxKind::Unrestricted,
@@ -229,7 +300,7 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
FileSystemSandboxKind::Unrestricted | FileSystemSandboxKind::ExternalSandbox => true,
FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted => {
self.has_root_access(FileSystemAccessMode::can_write)
&& !self.has_explicit_deny_entries()
&& !self.has_write_narrowing_entries()
}
}
}
@@ -248,31 +319,64 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
})
}
pub fn resolve_access_with_cwd(&self, path: &Path, cwd: &Path) -> FileSystemAccessMode {
match self.kind {
FileSystemSandboxKind::Unrestricted | FileSystemSandboxKind::ExternalSandbox => {
return FileSystemAccessMode::Write;
}
FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted => {}
}
let Some(path) = resolve_candidate_path(path, cwd) else {
return FileSystemAccessMode::None;
};
self.resolved_entries_with_cwd(cwd)
.into_iter()
.filter(|entry| path.as_path().starts_with(entry.path.as_path()))
.max_by_key(resolved_entry_precedence)
.map(|entry| entry.access)
.unwrap_or(FileSystemAccessMode::None)
}
pub fn can_read_path_with_cwd(&self, path: &Path, cwd: &Path) -> bool {
self.resolve_access_with_cwd(path, cwd).can_read()
}
pub fn can_write_path_with_cwd(&self, path: &Path, cwd: &Path) -> bool {
self.resolve_access_with_cwd(path, cwd).can_write()
}
pub fn needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(
&self,
network_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
cwd: &Path,
) -> bool {
if !matches!(self.kind, FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted) {
return false;
}
let Ok(legacy_policy) = self.to_legacy_sandbox_policy(network_policy, cwd) else {
return true;
};
self.semantic_signature(cwd)
!= FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&legacy_policy, cwd)
.semantic_signature(cwd)
}
/// Returns the explicit readable roots resolved against the provided cwd.
pub fn get_readable_roots_with_cwd(&self, cwd: &Path) -> Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> {
if self.has_full_disk_read_access() {
return Vec::new();
}
let cwd_absolute = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd).ok();
let mut readable_roots = Vec::new();
if self.has_root_access(FileSystemAccessMode::can_read)
&& let Some(cwd_absolute) = cwd_absolute.as_ref()
{
readable_roots.push(absolute_root_path_for_cwd(cwd_absolute));
}
dedup_absolute_paths(
readable_roots
self.resolved_entries_with_cwd(cwd)
.into_iter()
.chain(
self.entries
.iter()
.filter(|entry| entry.access.can_read())
.filter_map(|entry| {
resolve_file_system_path(&entry.path, cwd_absolute.as_ref())
}),
)
.filter(|entry| entry.access.can_read())
.filter(|entry| self.can_read_path_with_cwd(entry.path.as_path(), cwd))
.map(|entry| entry.path)
.collect(),
)
}
@@ -284,32 +388,22 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
return Vec::new();
}
let cwd_absolute = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd).ok();
let resolved_entries = self.resolved_entries_with_cwd(cwd);
let read_only_roots = dedup_absolute_paths(
self.entries
resolved_entries
.iter()
.filter(|entry| !entry.access.can_write())
.filter_map(|entry| resolve_file_system_path(&entry.path, cwd_absolute.as_ref()))
.filter(|entry| !self.can_write_path_with_cwd(entry.path.as_path(), cwd))
.map(|entry| entry.path.clone())
.collect(),
);
let mut writable_roots = Vec::new();
if self.has_root_access(FileSystemAccessMode::can_write)
&& let Some(cwd_absolute) = cwd_absolute.as_ref()
{
writable_roots.push(absolute_root_path_for_cwd(cwd_absolute));
}
dedup_absolute_paths(
writable_roots
resolved_entries
.into_iter()
.chain(
self.entries
.iter()
.filter(|entry| entry.access.can_write())
.filter_map(|entry| {
resolve_file_system_path(&entry.path, cwd_absolute.as_ref())
}),
)
.filter(|entry| entry.access.can_write())
.filter(|entry| self.can_write_path_with_cwd(entry.path.as_path(), cwd))
.map(|entry| entry.path)
.collect(),
)
.into_iter()
@@ -339,12 +433,20 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
return Vec::new();
}
let cwd_absolute = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd).ok();
let root = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd)
.ok()
.map(|cwd| absolute_root_path_for_cwd(&cwd));
dedup_absolute_paths(
self.entries
self.resolved_entries_with_cwd(cwd)
.iter()
.filter(|entry| entry.access == FileSystemAccessMode::None)
.filter_map(|entry| resolve_file_system_path(&entry.path, cwd_absolute.as_ref()))
.filter(|entry| !self.can_read_path_with_cwd(entry.path.as_path(), cwd))
// Restricted policies already deny reads outside explicit allow roots,
// so materializing the filesystem root here would erase narrower
// readable carveouts when downstream sandboxes apply deny masks last.
.filter(|entry| root.as_ref() != Some(&entry.path))
.map(|entry| entry.path.clone())
.collect(),
)
}
@@ -504,6 +606,32 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
}
})
}
fn resolved_entries_with_cwd(&self, cwd: &Path) -> Vec<ResolvedFileSystemEntry> {
let cwd_absolute = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd).ok();
self.entries
.iter()
.filter_map(|entry| {
resolve_entry_path(&entry.path, cwd_absolute.as_ref()).map(|path| {
ResolvedFileSystemEntry {
path,
access: entry.access,
}
})
})
.collect()
}
fn semantic_signature(&self, cwd: &Path) -> FileSystemSemanticSignature {
FileSystemSemanticSignature {
has_full_disk_read_access: self.has_full_disk_read_access(),
has_full_disk_write_access: self.has_full_disk_write_access(),
include_platform_defaults: self.include_platform_defaults(),
readable_roots: self.get_readable_roots_with_cwd(cwd),
writable_roots: self.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd),
unreadable_roots: self.get_unreadable_roots_with_cwd(cwd),
}
}
}
impl From<&SandboxPolicy> for NetworkSandboxPolicy {
@@ -641,6 +769,108 @@ fn resolve_file_system_path(
}
}
fn resolve_entry_path(
path: &FileSystemPath,
cwd: Option<&AbsolutePathBuf>,
) -> Option<AbsolutePathBuf> {
match path {
FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
} => cwd.map(absolute_root_path_for_cwd),
_ => resolve_file_system_path(path, cwd),
}
}
fn resolve_candidate_path(path: &Path, cwd: &Path) -> Option<AbsolutePathBuf> {
if path.is_absolute() {
AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(path).ok()
} else {
AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(path, cwd).ok()
}
}
/// Returns true when two config paths refer to the same exact target before
/// any prefix matching is applied.
///
/// This is intentionally narrower than full path resolution: it only answers
/// the "can one entry shadow another at the same specificity?" question used
/// by `has_write_narrowing_entries`.
fn file_system_paths_share_target(left: &FileSystemPath, right: &FileSystemPath) -> bool {
match (left, right) {
(FileSystemPath::Path { path: left }, FileSystemPath::Path { path: right }) => {
left == right
}
(FileSystemPath::Special { value: left }, FileSystemPath::Special { value: right }) => {
special_paths_share_target(left, right)
}
(FileSystemPath::Path { path }, FileSystemPath::Special { value })
| (FileSystemPath::Special { value }, FileSystemPath::Path { path }) => {
special_path_matches_absolute_path(value, path)
}
}
}
/// Compares special-path tokens that resolve to the same concrete target
/// without needing a cwd.
fn special_paths_share_target(left: &FileSystemSpecialPath, right: &FileSystemSpecialPath) -> bool {
match (left, right) {
(FileSystemSpecialPath::Root, FileSystemSpecialPath::Root)
| (FileSystemSpecialPath::Minimal, FileSystemSpecialPath::Minimal)
| (
FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
)
| (FileSystemSpecialPath::Tmpdir, FileSystemSpecialPath::Tmpdir)
| (FileSystemSpecialPath::SlashTmp, FileSystemSpecialPath::SlashTmp) => true,
(
FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots { subpath: None },
)
| (
FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots { subpath: None },
FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
) => true,
(
FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots { subpath: left },
FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots { subpath: right },
) => left == right,
(
FileSystemSpecialPath::Unknown {
path: left,
subpath: left_subpath,
},
FileSystemSpecialPath::Unknown {
path: right,
subpath: right_subpath,
},
) => left == right && left_subpath == right_subpath,
_ => false,
}
}
/// Matches cwd-independent special paths against absolute `Path` entries when
/// they name the same location.
///
/// We intentionally only fold the special paths whose concrete meaning is
/// stable without a cwd, such as `/` and `/tmp`.
fn special_path_matches_absolute_path(
value: &FileSystemSpecialPath,
path: &AbsolutePathBuf,
) -> bool {
match value {
FileSystemSpecialPath::Root => path.as_path().parent().is_none(),
FileSystemSpecialPath::SlashTmp => path.as_path() == Path::new("/tmp"),
_ => false,
}
}
/// Orders resolved entries so the most specific path wins first, then applies
/// the access tie-breaker from [`FileSystemAccessMode`].
fn resolved_entry_precedence(entry: &ResolvedFileSystemEntry) -> (usize, FileSystemAccessMode) {
let specificity = entry.path.as_path().components().count();
(specificity, entry.access)
}
fn absolute_root_path_for_cwd(cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf) -> AbsolutePathBuf {
let root = cwd
.as_path()
@@ -808,6 +1038,7 @@ fn resolve_gitdir_from_file(dot_git: &AbsolutePathBuf) -> Option<AbsolutePathBuf
mod tests {
use super::*;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use tempfile::TempDir;
#[test]
fn unknown_special_paths_are_ignored_by_legacy_bridge() -> std::io::Result<()> {
@@ -835,4 +1066,204 @@ mod tests {
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn resolve_access_with_cwd_uses_most_specific_entry() {
let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let docs =
AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("docs", cwd.path()).expect("resolve docs");
let docs_private = AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("docs/private", cwd.path())
.expect("resolve docs/private");
let docs_private_public =
AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("docs/private/public", cwd.path())
.expect("resolve docs/private/public");
let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: docs.clone() },
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: docs_private.clone(),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: docs_private_public.clone(),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
]);
assert_eq!(
policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
FileSystemAccessMode::Write
);
assert_eq!(
policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(docs.as_path(), cwd.path()),
FileSystemAccessMode::Read
);
assert_eq!(
policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(docs_private.as_path(), cwd.path()),
FileSystemAccessMode::None
);
assert_eq!(
policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(docs_private_public.as_path(), cwd.path()),
FileSystemAccessMode::Write
);
}
#[test]
fn split_only_nested_carveouts_need_direct_runtime_enforcement() {
let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let docs =
AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("docs", cwd.path()).expect("resolve docs");
let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: docs },
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
]);
assert!(
policy.needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted, cwd.path(),)
);
let legacy_workspace_write =
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&SandboxPolicy::new_workspace_write_policy());
assert!(
!legacy_workspace_write
.needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted, cwd.path(),)
);
}
#[test]
fn root_write_with_read_only_child_is_not_full_disk_write() {
let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let docs =
AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("docs", cwd.path()).expect("resolve docs");
let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: docs.clone() },
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
]);
assert!(!policy.has_full_disk_write_access());
assert_eq!(
policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(docs.as_path(), cwd.path()),
FileSystemAccessMode::Read
);
assert!(
policy.needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted, cwd.path(),)
);
}
#[test]
fn root_deny_does_not_materialize_as_unreadable_root() {
let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let docs =
AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("docs", cwd.path()).expect("resolve docs");
let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: docs.clone() },
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
]);
assert_eq!(
policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(docs.as_path(), cwd.path()),
FileSystemAccessMode::Read
);
assert_eq!(policy.get_readable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path()), vec![docs]);
assert!(policy.get_unreadable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path()).is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn duplicate_root_deny_prevents_full_disk_write_access() {
let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let root = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd.path())
.map(|cwd| absolute_root_path_for_cwd(&cwd))
.expect("resolve filesystem root");
let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
},
]);
assert!(!policy.has_full_disk_write_access());
assert_eq!(
policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(root.as_path(), cwd.path()),
FileSystemAccessMode::None
);
}
#[test]
fn same_specificity_write_override_keeps_full_disk_write_access() {
let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let docs =
AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("docs", cwd.path()).expect("resolve docs");
let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: docs.clone() },
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: docs.clone() },
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
]);
assert!(policy.has_full_disk_write_access());
assert_eq!(
policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(docs.as_path(), cwd.path()),
FileSystemAccessMode::Write
);
}
#[test]
fn file_system_access_mode_orders_by_conflict_precedence() {
assert!(FileSystemAccessMode::Write > FileSystemAccessMode::Read);
assert!(FileSystemAccessMode::None > FileSystemAccessMode::Write);
}
}

4
codex-rs/protocol/src/protocol.rs
View File

@@ -3179,6 +3179,10 @@ pub struct CollabAgentSpawnEndEvent {
/// Initial prompt sent to the agent. Can be empty to prevent CoT leaking at the
/// beginning.
pub prompt: String,
/// Model requested for the spawned agent.
pub model: String,
/// Reasoning effort requested for the spawned agent.
pub reasoning_effort: ReasoningEffortConfig,
/// Last known status of the new agent reported to the sender agent.
pub status: AgentStatus,
}