chore: refactor network permissions to use explicit domain and unix socket rule maps (#15120)

## Summary

This PR replaces the legacy network allow/deny list model with explicit
rule maps for domains and unix sockets across managed requirements,
permissions profiles, the network proxy config, and the app server
protocol.

Concretely, it:

- introduces typed domain (`allow` / `deny`) and unix socket permission
(`allow` / `none`) entries instead of separate `allowed_domains`,
`denied_domains`, and `allow_unix_sockets` lists
- updates config loading, managed requirements merging, and exec-policy
overlays to read and upsert rule entries consistently
- exposes the new shape through protocol/schema outputs, debug surfaces,
and app-server config APIs
- rejects the legacy list-based keys and updates docs/tests to reflect
the new config format

## Why

The previous representation split related network policy across multiple
parallel lists, which made merging and overriding rules harder to reason
about. Moving to explicit keyed permission maps gives us a single source
of truth per host/socket entry, makes allow/deny precedence clearer, and
gives protocol consumers access to the full rule state instead of
derived projections only.

## Backward Compatibility

### Backward compatible

- Managed requirements still accept the legacy
`experimental_network.allowed_domains`,
`experimental_network.denied_domains`, and
`experimental_network.allow_unix_sockets` fields. They are normalized
into the new canonical `domains` and `unix_sockets` maps internally.
- App-server v2 still deserializes legacy `allowedDomains`,
`deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` payloads, so older clients can
continue reading managed network requirements.
- App-server v2 responses still populate `allowedDomains`,
`deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` as legacy compatibility views
derived from the canonical maps.
- `managed_allowed_domains_only` keeps the same behavior after
normalization. Legacy managed allowlists still participate in the same
enforcement path as canonical `domains` entries.

### Not backward compatible

- Permissions profiles under `[permissions.<profile>.network]` no longer
accept the legacy list-based keys. Those configs must use the canonical
`[domains]` and `[unix_sockets]` tables instead of `allowed_domains`,
`denied_domains`, or `allow_unix_sockets`.
- Managed `experimental_network` config cannot mix canonical and legacy
forms in the same block. For example, `domains` cannot be combined with
`allowed_domains` or `denied_domains`, and `unix_sockets` cannot be
combined with `allow_unix_sockets`.
- The canonical format can express explicit `"none"` entries for unix
sockets, but those entries do not round-trip through the legacy
compatibility fields because the legacy fields only represent allow/deny
lists.
## Testing
`/target/debug/codex sandbox macos --log-denials /bin/zsh -c 'curl
https://www.example.com' ` gives 200 with config
```
[permissions.workspace.network.domains]
"www.example.com" = "allow"
```
and fails when set to deny: `curl: (56) CONNECT tunnel failed, response
403`.

Also tested backward compatibility path by verifying that adding the
following to `/etc/codex/requirements.toml` works:
```
[experimental_network]
allowed_domains = ["www.example.com"]
```
This commit is contained in:
Celia Chen
2026-03-26 23:17:59 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 21a03f1671
commit dd30c8eedd
37 changed files with 2413 additions and 492 deletions

View File

@@ -866,12 +866,38 @@ pub struct NetworkRequirements {
pub allow_upstream_proxy: Option<bool>,
pub dangerously_allow_non_loopback_proxy: Option<bool>,
pub dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets: Option<bool>,
/// Canonical network permission map for `experimental_network`.
pub domains: Option<BTreeMap<String, NetworkDomainPermission>>,
/// When true, only managed allowlist entries are respected while managed
/// network enforcement is active.
pub managed_allowed_domains_only: Option<bool>,
/// Legacy compatibility view derived from `domains`.
pub allowed_domains: Option<Vec<String>>,
/// Legacy compatibility view derived from `domains`.
pub denied_domains: Option<Vec<String>>,
/// Canonical unix socket permission map for `experimental_network`.
pub unix_sockets: Option<BTreeMap<String, NetworkUnixSocketPermission>>,
/// Legacy compatibility view derived from `unix_sockets`.
pub allow_unix_sockets: Option<Vec<String>>,
pub allow_local_binding: Option<bool>,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
#[ts(export_to = "v2/")]
pub enum NetworkDomainPermission {
Allow,
Deny,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
#[ts(export_to = "v2/")]
pub enum NetworkUnixSocketPermission {
Allow,
None,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
#[ts(export_to = "v2/")]
@@ -7487,6 +7513,94 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[test]
fn network_requirements_deserializes_legacy_fields() {
let requirements: NetworkRequirements = serde_json::from_value(json!({
"allowedDomains": ["api.openai.com"],
"deniedDomains": ["blocked.example.com"],
"allowUnixSockets": ["/tmp/proxy.sock"]
}))
.expect("legacy network requirements should deserialize");
assert_eq!(
requirements,
NetworkRequirements {
enabled: None,
http_port: None,
socks_port: None,
allow_upstream_proxy: None,
dangerously_allow_non_loopback_proxy: None,
dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets: None,
domains: None,
managed_allowed_domains_only: None,
allowed_domains: Some(vec!["api.openai.com".to_string()]),
denied_domains: Some(vec!["blocked.example.com".to_string()]),
unix_sockets: None,
allow_unix_sockets: Some(vec!["/tmp/proxy.sock".to_string()]),
allow_local_binding: None,
}
);
}
#[test]
fn network_requirements_serializes_canonical_and_legacy_fields() {
let requirements = NetworkRequirements {
enabled: Some(true),
http_port: Some(8080),
socks_port: Some(1080),
allow_upstream_proxy: Some(false),
dangerously_allow_non_loopback_proxy: Some(false),
dangerously_allow_all_unix_sockets: Some(true),
domains: Some(BTreeMap::from([
("api.openai.com".to_string(), NetworkDomainPermission::Allow),
(
"blocked.example.com".to_string(),
NetworkDomainPermission::Deny,
),
])),
managed_allowed_domains_only: Some(true),
allowed_domains: Some(vec!["api.openai.com".to_string()]),
denied_domains: Some(vec!["blocked.example.com".to_string()]),
unix_sockets: Some(BTreeMap::from([
(
"/tmp/proxy.sock".to_string(),
NetworkUnixSocketPermission::Allow,
),
(
"/tmp/ignored.sock".to_string(),
NetworkUnixSocketPermission::None,
),
])),
allow_unix_sockets: Some(vec!["/tmp/proxy.sock".to_string()]),
allow_local_binding: Some(true),
};
assert_eq!(
serde_json::to_value(requirements).expect("network requirements should serialize"),
json!({
"enabled": true,
"httpPort": 8080,
"socksPort": 1080,
"allowUpstreamProxy": false,
"dangerouslyAllowNonLoopbackProxy": false,
"dangerouslyAllowAllUnixSockets": true,
"domains": {
"api.openai.com": "allow",
"blocked.example.com": "deny"
},
"managedAllowedDomainsOnly": true,
"allowedDomains": ["api.openai.com"],
"deniedDomains": ["blocked.example.com"],
"unixSockets": {
"/tmp/ignored.sock": "none",
"/tmp/proxy.sock": "allow"
},
"allowUnixSockets": ["/tmp/proxy.sock"],
"allowLocalBinding": true
})
);
}
#[test]
fn core_turn_item_into_thread_item_converts_supported_variants() {
let user_item = TurnItem::UserMessage(UserMessageItem {