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permissions: remove macOS seatbelt extension profiles (#15918)
## Why `PermissionProfile` should only describe the per-command permissions we still want to grant dynamically. Keeping `MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` in that surface forced extra macOS-only approval, protocol, schema, and TUI branches for a capability we no longer want to expose. ## What changed - Removed the macOS-specific permission-profile types from `codex-protocol`, the app-server v2 API, and the generated schema/TypeScript artifacts. - Deleted the core and sandboxing plumbing that threaded `MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` through execution requests and seatbelt construction. - Simplified macOS seatbelt generation so it always includes the fixed read-only preferences allowlist instead of carrying a configurable profile extension. - Removed the macOS additional-permissions UI/docs/test coverage and deleted the obsolete macOS permission modules. - Tightened `request_permissions` intersection handling so explicitly empty requested read lists are preserved only when that field was actually granted, avoiding zero-grant responses being stored as active permissions.
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@@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ the client can offer session-scoped and/or persistent approval choices.
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### Permission requests
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The built-in `request_permissions` tool sends an `item/permissions/requestApproval` JSON-RPC request to the client with the requested permission profile. This v2 payload mirrors the standalone tool's narrower permission shape, so it can request network access and additional filesystem access but does not include the broader `macos` branch used by command-execution `additionalPermissions`.
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The built-in `request_permissions` tool sends an `item/permissions/requestApproval` JSON-RPC request to the client with the requested permission profile. This v2 payload mirrors the command-execution `additionalPermissions` shape: it can request network access and additional filesystem access.
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```json
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{
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@@ -1055,7 +1055,7 @@ The client responds with `result.permissions`, which should be the granted subse
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}
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```
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Only the granted subset matters on the wire. Any permissions omitted from `result.permissions` are treated as denied, including omitted nested keys inside `result.permissions.macos`, so a sparse response like `{ "permissions": { "macos": { "accessibility": true } } }` grants only accessibility. Any permissions not present in the original request are ignored by the server.
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Only the granted subset matters on the wire. Any permissions omitted from `result.permissions` are treated as denied. Any permissions not present in the original request are ignored by the server.
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Within the same turn, granted permissions are sticky: later shell-like tool calls can automatically reuse the granted subset without reissuing a separate permission request.
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