## Why
`codex-core` was re-exporting APIs owned by sibling `codex-*` crates,
which made downstream crates depend on `codex-core` as a proxy module
instead of the actual owner crate.
Removing those forwards makes crate boundaries explicit and lets leaf
crates drop unnecessary `codex-core` dependencies. In this PR, this
reduces the dependency on `codex-core` to `codex-login` in the following
files:
```
codex-rs/backend-client/Cargo.toml
codex-rs/mcp-server/tests/common/Cargo.toml
```
## What
- Remove `codex-rs/core/src/lib.rs` re-exports for symbols owned by
`codex-login`, `codex-mcp`, `codex-rollout`, `codex-analytics`,
`codex-protocol`, `codex-shell-command`, `codex-sandboxing`,
`codex-tools`, and `codex-utils-path`.
- Delete the `default_client` forwarding shim in `codex-rs/core`.
- Update in-crate and downstream callsites to import directly from the
owning `codex-*` crate.
- Add direct Cargo dependencies where callsites now target the owner
crate, and remove `codex-core` from `codex-rs/backend-client`.
## Why
`codex-mcp` already owns the shared MCP API surface, including `auth`,
`McpConfig`, `CODEX_APPS_MCP_SERVER_NAME`, and tool-name helpers in
[`codex-rs/codex-mcp/src/mcp/mod.rs`](f61e85dbfb/codex-rs/codex-mcp/src/mcp/mod.rs (L1-L35)).
Re-exporting that surface from `codex_core::mcp` gives downstream crates
two import paths for the same API and hides the real crate dependency.
This PR keeps `codex_core::mcp` focused on the local `McpManager`
wrapper in
[`codex-rs/core/src/mcp.rs`](f61e85dbfb/codex-rs/core/src/mcp.rs (L13-L40))
and makes consumers import shared MCP APIs from `codex_mcp` directly.
## What
- Remove the `codex_mcp::mcp` re-export surface from `core/src/mcp.rs`.
- Update `codex-core` internals plus `codex-app-server`, `codex-cli`,
and `codex-tui` test code to import MCP APIs from `codex_mcp::mcp`
directly.
- Add explicit `codex-mcp` dependencies where those crates now use that
API surface, and refresh `Cargo.lock`.
## Verification
- `just bazel-lock-check`
- `cargo test -p codex-core -p codex-cli -p codex-tui`
- `codex-cli` passed.
- `codex-core` still fails five unrelated config tests in
`core/src/config/config_tests.rs` (`approvals_reviewer_*` and
`smart_approvals_alias_*`).
- A broader `cargo test -p codex-core -p codex-app-server -p codex-cli
-p codex-tui` run previously hung in `codex-app-server` test
`in_process_start_uses_requested_session_source_for_thread_start`.
- Split MCP runtime/server code out of `codex-core` into the new
`codex-mcp` crate. New/moved public structs/types include `McpConfig`,
`McpConnectionManager`, `ToolInfo`, `ToolPluginProvenance`,
`CodexAppsToolsCacheKey`, and the `McpManager` API
(`codex_mcp::mcp::McpManager` plus the `codex_core::mcp::McpManager`
wrapper/shim). New/moved functions include `with_codex_apps_mcp`,
`configured_mcp_servers`, `effective_mcp_servers`,
`collect_mcp_snapshot`, `collect_mcp_snapshot_from_manager`,
`qualified_mcp_tool_name_prefix`, and the MCP auth/skill-dependency
helpers. Why: this creates a focused MCP crate boundary and shrinks
`codex-core` without forcing every consumer to migrate in the same PR.
- Move MCP server config schema and persistence into `codex-config`.
New/moved structs/enums include `AppToolApproval`,
`McpServerToolConfig`, `McpServerConfig`, `RawMcpServerConfig`,
`McpServerTransportConfig`, `McpServerDisabledReason`, and
`codex_config::ConfigEditsBuilder`. New/moved functions include
`load_global_mcp_servers` and
`ConfigEditsBuilder::replace_mcp_servers`/`apply`. Why: MCP TOML
parsing/editing is config ownership, and this keeps config
validation/round-tripping (including per-tool approval overrides and
inline bearer-token rejection) in the config crate instead of
`codex-core`.
- Rewire `codex-core`, app-server, and plugin call sites onto the new
crates. Updated `Config::to_mcp_config(&self, plugins_manager)`,
`codex-rs/core/src/mcp.rs`, `codex-rs/core/src/connectors.rs`,
`codex-rs/core/src/codex.rs`,
`CodexMessageProcessor::list_mcp_server_status_task`, and
`utils/plugins/src/mcp_connector.rs` to build/pass the new MCP
config/runtime types. Why: plugin-provided MCP servers still merge with
user-configured servers, and runtime auth (`CodexAuth`) is threaded into
`with_codex_apps_mcp` / `collect_mcp_snapshot` explicitly so `McpConfig`
stays config-only.
## Description
Previously the `action` field on `EventMsg::GuardianAssessment`, which
describes what Guardian is reviewing, was typed as an arbitrary JSON
blob. This PR cleans it up and defines a sum type representing all the
various actions that Guardian can review.
This is a breaking change (on purpose), which is fine because:
- the Codex app / VSCE does not actually use `action` at the moment
- the TUI code that consumes `action` is updated in this PR as well
- rollout files that serialized old `EventMsg::GuardianAssessment` will
just silently drop these guardian events
- the contract is defined as unstable, so other clients have a fair
warning :)
This will make things much easier for followup Guardian work.
## Why
The old guardian review payloads worked, but they pushed too much shape
knowledge into downstream consumers. The TUI had custom JSON parsing
logic for commands, patches, network requests, and MCP calls, and the
app-server protocol was effectively just passing through an opaque blob.
Typing this at the protocol boundary makes the contract clearer.
Makes fuzzy file search use case-insensitive matching instead of
smart-case in `codex-file-search`. I find smart-case to be a poor user
experience -using the wrong case for a letter drops its match so
significantly, it often drops off the results list, effectively making a
search case-sensitive.
## Why
Bazel clippy now catches lints that `cargo clippy` can still miss when a
crate under `codex-rs` forgets to opt into workspace lints. The concrete
example here was `codex-rs/app-server/tests/common/Cargo.toml`: Bazel
flagged a clippy violation in `models_cache.rs`, but Cargo did not
because that crate inherited workspace package metadata without
declaring `[lints] workspace = true`.
We already mirror the workspace clippy deny list into Bazel after
[#15955](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/15955), so we also need a
repo-side check that keeps every `codex-rs` manifest opted into the same
workspace settings.
## What changed
- add `.github/scripts/verify_cargo_workspace_manifests.py`, which
parses every `codex-rs/**/Cargo.toml` with `tomllib` and verifies:
- `version.workspace = true`
- `edition.workspace = true`
- `license.workspace = true`
- `[lints] workspace = true`
- top-level crate names follow the `codex-*` / `codex-utils-*`
conventions, with explicit exceptions for `windows-sandbox-rs` and
`utils/path-utils`
- run that script in `.github/workflows/ci.yml`
- update the current outlier manifests so the check is enforceable
immediately
- fix the newly exposed clippy violations in the affected crates
(`app-server/tests/common`, `file-search`, `feedback`,
`shell-escalation`, and `debug-client`)
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/16353).
* #16351
* __->__ #16353
## Summary
- Replace the separate external auth enum and refresher trait with a
single `ExternalAuth` trait in login auth flow
- Move bearer token auth behind `BearerTokenRefresher` and update
`AuthManager` and app-server wiring to use the generic external auth API
## Summary
`AuthManager` and `UnauthorizedRecovery` already own token resolution
and staged `401` recovery. The missing piece for provider auth was a
bearer-only mode that still fit that design, instead of pushing a second
auth abstraction into `codex-core`.
This PR keeps the design centered on `AuthManager`: it teaches
`codex-login` how to own external bearer auth directly so later provider
work can keep calling `AuthManager.auth()` and `UnauthorizedRecovery`.
## Motivation
This is the middle layer for #15189.
The intended design is still:
- `AuthManager` encapsulates token storage and refresh
- `UnauthorizedRecovery` powers staged `401` recovery
- all request tokens go through `AuthManager.auth()`
This PR makes that possible for provider-backed bearer tokens by adding
a bearer-only auth mode inside `AuthManager` instead of building
parallel request-auth plumbing in `core`.
## What Changed
- move `ModelProviderAuthInfo` into `codex-protocol` so `core` and
`login` share one config shape
- add `login/src/auth/external_bearer.rs`, which runs the configured
command, caches the bearer token in memory, and refreshes it after `401`
- add `AuthManager::external_bearer_only(...)` for provider-scoped
request paths that should use command-backed bearer auth without
mutating the shared OpenAI auth manager
- add `AuthManager::shared_with_external_chatgpt_auth_refresher(...)`
and rename the other `AuthManager` helpers that only apply to external
ChatGPT auth so the ChatGPT-only path is explicit at the call site
- keep external ChatGPT refresh behavior unchanged while ensuring
bearer-only external auth never persists to `auth.json`
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-login`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/16287).
* #16288
* __->__ #16287
## Summary
`ExternalAuthRefresher` was still shaped around external ChatGPT auth:
`ExternalAuthTokens` always implied ChatGPT account metadata even when a
caller only needed a bearer token.
This PR generalizes that contract so bearer-only sources are
first-class, while keeping the existing ChatGPT paths strict anywhere we
persist or rebuild ChatGPT auth state.
## Motivation
This is the first step toward #15189.
The follow-on provider-auth work needs one shared external-auth contract
that can do both of these things:
- resolve the current bearer token before a request is sent
- return a refreshed bearer token after a `401`
That should not require a second token result type just because there is
no ChatGPT account metadata attached.
## What Changed
- change `ExternalAuthTokens` to carry `access_token` plus optional
`ExternalAuthChatgptMetadata`
- add helper constructors for bearer-only tokens and ChatGPT-backed
tokens
- add `ExternalAuthRefresher::resolve()` with a default no-op
implementation so refreshers can optionally provide the current token
before a request is sent
- keep ChatGPT-only persistence strict by continuing to require ChatGPT
metadata anywhere the login layer seeds or reloads ChatGPT auth state
- update the app-server bridge to construct the new token shape for
external ChatGPT auth refreshes
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-login`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/16286).
* #16288
* #16287
* __->__ #16286
## Why
`argument-comment-lint` was green in CI even though the repo still had
many uncommented literal arguments. The main gap was target coverage:
the repo wrapper did not force Cargo to inspect test-only call sites, so
examples like the `latest_session_lookup_params(true, ...)` tests in
`codex-rs/tui_app_server/src/lib.rs` never entered the blocking CI path.
This change cleans up the existing backlog, makes the default repo lint
path cover all Cargo targets, and starts rolling that stricter CI
enforcement out on the platform where it is currently validated.
## What changed
- mechanically fixed existing `argument-comment-lint` violations across
the `codex-rs` workspace, including tests, examples, and benches
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` and
`tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` so non-`--fix` runs default to
`--all-targets` unless the caller explicitly narrows the target set
- fixed both wrappers so forwarded cargo arguments after `--` are
preserved with a single separator
- documented the new default behavior in
`tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`
- updated `rust-ci` so the macOS lint lane keeps the plain wrapper
invocation and therefore enforces `--all-targets`, while Linux and
Windows temporarily pass `-- --lib --bins`
That temporary CI split keeps the stricter all-targets check where it is
already cleaned up, while leaving room to finish the remaining Linux-
and Windows-specific target-gated cleanup before enabling
`--all-targets` on those runners. The Linux and Windows failures on the
intermediate revision were caused by the wrapper forwarding bug, not by
additional lint findings in those lanes.
## Validation
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh`
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --lib --bins`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --tests`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test` in `tools/argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test -p codex-terminal-detection`
## Follow-up
- Clean up remaining Linux-only target-gated callsites, then switch the
Linux lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
- Clean up remaining Windows-only target-gated callsites, then switch
the Windows lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
This is the part 1 of 2 PRs that will delete the `tui` /
`tui_app_server` split. This part simply deletes the existing `tui`
directory and marks the `tui_app_server` feature flag as removed. I left
the `tui_app_server` feature flag in place for now so its presence
doesn't result in an error. It is simply ignored.
Part 2 will rename the `tui_app_server` directory `tui`. I did this as
two parts to reduce visible code churn.
## Problem
App-server clients could only initiate ChatGPT login through the browser
callback flow, even though the shared login crate already supports
device-code auth. That left VS Code, Codex App, and other app-server
clients without a first-class way to use the existing device-code
backend when browser redirects are brittle or when the client UX wants
to own the login ceremony.
## Mental model
This change adds a second ChatGPT login start path to app-server:
clients can now call `account/login/start` with `type:
"chatgptDeviceCode"`. App-server immediately returns a `loginId` plus
the device-code UX payload (`verificationUrl` and `userCode`), then
completes the login asynchronously in the background using the existing
`codex_login` polling flow. Successful device-code login still resolves
to ordinary `chatgpt` auth, and completion continues to flow through the
existing `account/login/completed` and `account/updated` notifications.
## Non-goals
This does not introduce a new auth mode, a new account shape, or a
device-code eligibility discovery API. It also does not add automatic
fallback to browser login in core; clients remain responsible for
choosing when to request device code and whether to retry with a
different UX if the backend/admin policy rejects it.
## Tradeoffs
We intentionally keep `login_chatgpt_common` as a local validation
helper instead of turning it into a capability probe. Device-code
eligibility is checked by actually calling `request_device_code`, which
means policy-disabled cases surface as an immediate request error rather
than an async completion event. We also keep the active-login state
machine minimal: browser and device-code logins share the same public
cancel contract, but device-code cancellation is implemented with a
local cancel token rather than a larger cross-crate refactor.
## Architecture
The protocol grows a new `chatgptDeviceCode` request/response variant in
app-server v2. On the server side, the new handler reuses the existing
ChatGPT login precondition checks, calls `request_device_code`, returns
the device-code payload, and then spawns a background task that waits on
either cancellation or `complete_device_code_login`. On success, it
reuses the existing auth reload and cloud-requirements refresh path
before emitting `account/login/completed` success and `account/updated`.
On failure or cancellation, it emits only `account/login/completed`
failure. The existing `account/login/cancel { loginId }` contract
remains unchanged and now works for both browser and device-code
attempts.
## Tests
Added protocol serialization coverage for the new request/response
variant, plus app-server tests for device-code success, failure, cancel,
and start-time rejection behavior. Existing browser ChatGPT login
coverage remains in place to show that the callback-based flow is
unchanged.
## Summary
This PR replaces the legacy network allow/deny list model with explicit
rule maps for domains and unix sockets across managed requirements,
permissions profiles, the network proxy config, and the app server
protocol.
Concretely, it:
- introduces typed domain (`allow` / `deny`) and unix socket permission
(`allow` / `none`) entries instead of separate `allowed_domains`,
`denied_domains`, and `allow_unix_sockets` lists
- updates config loading, managed requirements merging, and exec-policy
overlays to read and upsert rule entries consistently
- exposes the new shape through protocol/schema outputs, debug surfaces,
and app-server config APIs
- rejects the legacy list-based keys and updates docs/tests to reflect
the new config format
## Why
The previous representation split related network policy across multiple
parallel lists, which made merging and overriding rules harder to reason
about. Moving to explicit keyed permission maps gives us a single source
of truth per host/socket entry, makes allow/deny precedence clearer, and
gives protocol consumers access to the full rule state instead of
derived projections only.
## Backward Compatibility
### Backward compatible
- Managed requirements still accept the legacy
`experimental_network.allowed_domains`,
`experimental_network.denied_domains`, and
`experimental_network.allow_unix_sockets` fields. They are normalized
into the new canonical `domains` and `unix_sockets` maps internally.
- App-server v2 still deserializes legacy `allowedDomains`,
`deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` payloads, so older clients can
continue reading managed network requirements.
- App-server v2 responses still populate `allowedDomains`,
`deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` as legacy compatibility views
derived from the canonical maps.
- `managed_allowed_domains_only` keeps the same behavior after
normalization. Legacy managed allowlists still participate in the same
enforcement path as canonical `domains` entries.
### Not backward compatible
- Permissions profiles under `[permissions.<profile>.network]` no longer
accept the legacy list-based keys. Those configs must use the canonical
`[domains]` and `[unix_sockets]` tables instead of `allowed_domains`,
`denied_domains`, or `allow_unix_sockets`.
- Managed `experimental_network` config cannot mix canonical and legacy
forms in the same block. For example, `domains` cannot be combined with
`allowed_domains` or `denied_domains`, and `unix_sockets` cannot be
combined with `allow_unix_sockets`.
- The canonical format can express explicit `"none"` entries for unix
sockets, but those entries do not round-trip through the legacy
compatibility fields because the legacy fields only represent allow/deny
lists.
## Testing
`/target/debug/codex sandbox macos --log-denials /bin/zsh -c 'curl
https://www.example.com' ` gives 200 with config
```
[permissions.workspace.network.domains]
"www.example.com" = "allow"
```
and fails when set to deny: `curl: (56) CONNECT tunnel failed, response
403`.
Also tested backward compatibility path by verifying that adding the
following to `/etc/codex/requirements.toml` works:
```
[experimental_network]
allowed_domains = ["www.example.com"]
```
## Why
`PermissionProfile` should only describe the per-command permissions we
still want to grant dynamically. Keeping
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` in that surface forced extra macOS-only
approval, protocol, schema, and TUI branches for a capability we no
longer want to expose.
## What changed
- Removed the macOS-specific permission-profile types from
`codex-protocol`, the app-server v2 API, and the generated
schema/TypeScript artifacts.
- Deleted the core and sandboxing plumbing that threaded
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` through execution requests and seatbelt
construction.
- Simplified macOS seatbelt generation so it always includes the fixed
read-only preferences allowlist instead of carrying a configurable
profile extension.
- Removed the macOS additional-permissions UI/docs/test coverage and
deleted the obsolete macOS permission modules.
- Tightened `request_permissions` intersection handling so explicitly
empty requested read lists are preserved only when that field was
actually granted, avoiding zero-grant responses being stored as active
permissions.
## Why
`parse_tool_input_schema` and the supporting `JsonSchema` model were
living in `core/src/tools/spec.rs`, but they already serve callers
outside `codex-core`.
Keeping that shared schema parsing logic inside `codex-core` makes the
crate boundary harder to reason about and works against the guidance in
`AGENTS.md` to avoid growing `codex-core` when reusable code can live
elsewhere.
This change takes the first extraction step by moving the schema parsing
primitive into its own crate while keeping the rest of the tool-spec
assembly in `codex-core`.
## What changed
- added a new `codex-tools` crate under `codex-rs/tools`
- moved the shared tool input schema model and sanitizer/parser into
`tools/src/json_schema.rs`
- kept `tools/src/lib.rs` exports-only, with the module-level unit tests
split into `json_schema_tests.rs`
- updated `codex-core` to use `codex-tools::JsonSchema` and re-export
`parse_tool_input_schema`
- updated `codex-app-server` dynamic tool validation to depend on
`codex-tools` directly instead of reaching through `codex-core`
- wired the new crate into the Cargo workspace and Bazel build graph
## Why
This is effectively a follow-up to
[#15812](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/15812). That change
removed the special skill-script exec path, but `skill_metadata` was
still being threaded through command-approval payloads even though the
approval flow no longer uses it to render prompts or resolve decisions.
Keeping it around added extra protocol, schema, and client surface area
without changing behavior.
Removing it keeps the command-approval contract smaller and avoids
carrying a dead field through app-server, TUI, and MCP boundaries.
## What changed
- removed `ExecApprovalRequestSkillMetadata` and the corresponding
`skillMetadata` field from core approval events and the v2 app-server
protocol
- removed the generated JSON and TypeScript schema output for that field
- updated app-server, MCP server, TUI, and TUI app-server approval
plumbing to stop forwarding the field
- cleaned up tests that previously constructed or asserted
`skillMetadata`
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-test-client`
- `cargo test -p codex-mcp-server`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
## Why
`token_data` is owned by `codex-login`, but `codex-core` was still
re-exporting it. That let callers pull auth token types through
`codex-core`, which keeps otherwise unrelated crates coupled to
`codex-core` and makes `codex-core` more of a build-graph bottleneck.
## What changed
- remove the `codex-core` re-export of `codex_login::token_data`
- update the remaining `codex-core` internals that used
`crate::token_data` to import `codex_login::token_data` directly
- update downstream callers in `codex-rs/chatgpt`,
`codex-rs/tui_app_server`, `codex-rs/app-server/tests/common`, and
`codex-rs/core/tests` to import `codex_login::token_data` directly
- add explicit `codex-login` workspace dependencies and refresh lock
metadata for crates that now depend on it directly
## Validation
- `cargo test -p codex-chatgpt --locked`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `just bazel-lock-update`
- `just bazel-lock-check`
## Notes
- attempted `cargo test -p codex-core --locked` and `cargo test -p
codex-core auth_refresh --locked`, but both ran out of disk while
linking `codex-core` test binaries in the local environment
Fixes#15283.
## Summary
Older system bubblewrap builds reject `--argv0`, which makes our Linux
sandbox fail before the helper can re-exec. This PR keeps using system
`/usr/bin/bwrap` whenever it exists and only falls back to vendored
bwrap when the system binary is missing. That matters on stricter
AppArmor hosts, where the distro bwrap package also provides the policy
setup needed for user namespaces.
For old system bwrap, we avoid `--argv0` instead of switching binaries:
- pass the sandbox helper a full-path `argv0`,
- keep the existing `current_exe() + --argv0` path when the selected
launcher supports it,
- otherwise omit `--argv0` and re-exec through the helper's own
`argv[0]` path, whose basename still dispatches as
`codex-linux-sandbox`.
Also updates the launcher/warning tests and docs so they match the new
behavior: present-but-old system bwrap uses the compatibility path, and
only absent system bwrap falls back to vendored.
### Validation
1. Install Ubuntu 20.04 in a VM
2. Compile codex and run without bubblewrap installed - see a warning
about falling back to the vendored bwrap
3. Install bwrap and verify version is 0.4.0 without `argv0` support
4. run codex and use apply_patch tool without errors
<img width="802" height="631" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 48 36 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/77248a29-aa38-4d7c-9833-496ec6a458b8"
/>
<img width="807" height="634" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 47 32 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5af8b850-a466-489b-95a6-455b76b5050f"
/>
<img width="812" height="635" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 45 45 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/438074f0-8435-4274-a667-332efdd5cb57"
/>
<img width="801" height="623" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 43 56 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0dc8d3f5-e8cf-4218-b4b4-a4f7d9bf02e3"
/>
---------
Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
Add environment manager that is a singleton and is created early in
app-server (before skill manager, before config loading).
Use an environment variable to point to a running exec server.
I've seen several intermittent failures of
`get_auth_status_returns_token_after_proactive_refresh_recovery` today.
I investigated, and I found a couple of issues.
First, `getAuthStatus(refreshToken=true)` could refresh twice in one
request: once via `refresh_token_if_requested()` and again via the
proactive refresh path inside `auth_manager.auth()`. In the
permanent-failure case this produced an extra `/oauth/token` call and
made the app-server auth tests flaky. Use `auth_cached()` after an
explicit refresh request so the handler reuses the post-refresh auth
state instead of immediately re-entering proactive refresh logic. Keep
the existing proactive path for `refreshToken=false`.
Second, serialize auth refresh attempts in `AuthManager` have a
startup/request race. One proactive refresh could already be in flight
while a `getAuthStatus(refreshToken=false)` request entered
`auth().await`, causing a second `/oauth/token` call before the first
failure or refresh result had been recorded. Guarding the refresh flow
with a single async lock makes concurrent callers share one refresh
result, which prevents duplicate refreshes and stabilizes the
proactive-refresh auth tests.
## Summary
- move skill loading and management into codex-core-skills
- leave codex-core with the thin integration layer and shared wiring
## Testing
- CI
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
This change adds websocket authentication at the app-server transport
boundary and enforces it before JSON-RPC `initialize`, so authenticated
deployments reject unauthenticated clients during the websocket
handshake rather than after a connection has already been admitted.
During rollout, websocket auth is opt-in for non-loopback listeners so
we do not break existing remote clients. If `--ws-auth ...` is
configured, the server enforces auth during websocket upgrade. If auth
is not configured, non-loopback listeners still start, but app-server
logs a warning and the startup banner calls out that auth should be
configured before real remote use.
The server supports two auth modes: a file-backed capability token, and
a standard HMAC-signed JWT/JWS bearer token verified with the
`jsonwebtoken` crate, with optional issuer, audience, and clock-skew
validation. Capability tokens are normalized, hashed, and compared in
constant time. Short shared secrets for signed bearer tokens are
rejected at startup. Requests carrying an `Origin` header are rejected
with `403` by transport middleware, and authenticated clients present
credentials as `Authorization: Bearer <token>` during websocket upgrade.
## Validation
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server transport::auth`
- `cargo test -p codex-cli app_server_`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-app-server --all-targets -- -D warnings`
- `just bazel-lock-check`
Note: in the broad `cargo test -p codex-app-server
connection_handling_websocket` run, the touched websocket auth cases
passed, but unrelated Unix shutdown tests failed with a timeout in this
environment.
---------
Co-authored-by: Eric Traut <etraut@openai.com>
## Summary
- move the analytics events client into codex-analytics
- update codex-core and app-server callsites to use the new crate
## Testing
- CI
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Migrate `cwd` and related session/config state to `AbsolutePathBuf` so
downstream consumers consistently see absolute working directories.
Add test-only `.abs()` helpers for `Path`, `PathBuf`, and `TempDir`, and
update branch-local tests to use them instead of
`AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(...)`.
For the remaining TUI/app-server snapshot coverage that renders absolute
cwd values, keep the snapshots unchanged and skip the Windows-only cases
where the platform-specific absolute path layout differs.
## Summary
- keep legacy Windows restricted-token sandboxing as the supported
baseline
- support the split-policy subset that restricted-token can enforce
directly today
- support full-disk read, the same writable root set as legacy
`WorkspaceWrite`, and extra read-only carveouts under those writable
roots via additional deny-write ACLs
- continue to fail closed for unsupported split-only shapes, including
explicit unreadable (`none`) carveouts, reopened writable descendants
under read-only carveouts, and writable root sets that do not match the
legacy workspace roots
## Example
Given a filesystem policy like:
```toml
":root" = "read"
":cwd" = "write"
"./docs" = "read"
```
the restricted-token backend can keep the workspace writable while
denying writes under `docs` by layering an extra deny-write carveout on
top of the legacy workspace-write roots.
A policy like:
```toml
"/workspace" = "write"
"/workspace/docs" = "read"
"/workspace/docs/tmp" = "write"
```
still fails closed, because the unelevated backend cannot reopen the
nested writable descendant safely.
## Stack
-> fix: support split carveouts in windows restricted-token sandbox
#14172
fix: support split carveouts in windows elevated sandbox #14568
### Summary
Add the v2 app-server filesystem watch RPCs and notifications, wire them
through the message processor, and implement connection-scoped watches
with notify-backed change delivery. This also updates the schema
fixtures, app-server documentation, and the v2 integration coverage for
watch and unwatch behavior.
This allows clients to efficiently watch for filesystem updates, e.g. to
react on branch changes.
### Testing
- exercise watch lifecycles for directory changes, atomic file
replacement, missing-file targets, and unwatch cleanup
## Summary
- drop `sandbox_permissions` from the sandboxing `ExecOptions` and
`ExecRequest` adapter types
- remove the now-unused plumbing from shell, unified exec, JS REPL, and
apply-patch runtime call sites
- default reconstructed `ExecParams` to `SandboxPermissions::UseDefault`
where the lower-level API still requires the field
## Testing
- `just fmt`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test -p codex-core` (still running locally; first failures
observed in `suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli`,
`suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli_supports_openai_base_url_config_override`,
and
`suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli_supports_openai_base_url_env_fallback`)
Switch plugin-install background MCP OAuth to a silent login path so the
raw authorization URL is no longer printed in normal success cases.
OAuth behavior is otherwise unchanged, with fallback URL output via
stderr still shown only if browser launch fails.
Before:
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4bf387af-afa8-4b83-bcd6-4ca6b55da8db
## Summary
Fixes slow `Ctrl+C` exit from the ChatGPT browser-login screen in
`tui_app_server`.
## Root cause
Onboarding-level `Ctrl+C` quit bypassed the auth widget's cancel path.
That let the active ChatGPT login keep running, and in-process
app-server shutdown then waited on the stale login attempt before
finishing.
## Changes
- Extract a shared `cancel_active_attempt()` path in the auth widget
- Use that path from onboarding-level `Ctrl+C` before exiting the TUI
- Add focused tests for canceling browser-login and device-code attempts
- Add app-server shutdown cleanup that explicitly drops any active login
before draining background work
- create `codex-git-utils` and move the shared git helpers into it with
file moves preserved for diff readability
- move the `GitInfo` helpers out of `core` so stacked rollout work can
depend on the shared crate without carrying its own git info module
---------
Co-authored-by: Ahmed Ibrahim <219906144+aibrahim-oai@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
`shell-tool-mcp` and the Bash fork are no longer needed, but the patched
zsh fork is still relevant for shell escalation and for the
DotSlash-backed zsh-fork integration tests.
Deleting the old `shell-tool-mcp` workflow also deleted the only
pipeline that rebuilt those patched zsh binaries. This keeps the package
removal, while preserving a small release path that can be reused
whenever `codex-rs/shell-escalation/patches/zsh-exec-wrapper.patch`
changes.
## What changed
- removed the `shell-tool-mcp` workspace package, its npm
packaging/release jobs, the Bash test fixture, and the remaining
Bash-specific compatibility wiring
- deleted the old `.github/workflows/shell-tool-mcp.yml` and
`.github/workflows/shell-tool-mcp-ci.yml` workflows now that their
responsibilities have been replaced or removed
- kept the zsh patch under
`codex-rs/shell-escalation/patches/zsh-exec-wrapper.patch` and updated
the `codex-rs/shell-escalation` docs/code to describe the zsh-based flow
directly
- added `.github/workflows/rust-release-zsh.yml` to build only the three
zsh binaries that `codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/zsh` needs today:
- `aarch64-apple-darwin` on `macos-15`
- `x86_64-unknown-linux-musl` on `ubuntu-24.04`
- `aarch64-unknown-linux-musl` on `ubuntu-24.04`
- extracted the shared zsh build/smoke-test/stage logic into
`.github/scripts/build-zsh-release-artifact.sh`, made that helper
directly executable, and now invoke it directly from the workflow so the
Linux and macOS jobs only keep the OS-specific setup in YAML
- wired those standalone `codex-zsh-*.tar.gz` assets into
`rust-release.yml` and added `.github/dotslash-zsh-config.json` so
releases also publish a `codex-zsh` DotSlash file
- updated the checked-in `codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/zsh` fixture
comments to explain that new releases come from the standalone zsh
assets, while the checked-in fixture remains pinned to the latest
historical release until a newer zsh artifact is published
- tightened a couple of follow-on cleanups in
`codex-rs/shell-escalation`: the `ExecParams::command` comment now
describes the shell `-c`/`-lc` string more clearly, and the README now
points at the same `git.code.sf.net` zsh source URL that the workflow
uses
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-shell-escalation`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `bash -n .github/scripts/build-zsh-release-artifact.sh`
- attempted `cargo test -p codex-core`; unrelated existing failures
remain, but the touched `tools::runtimes::shell::unix_escalation::*`
coverage passed during that run
built from #14256. PR description from @etraut-openai:
This PR addresses a hole in [PR
11802](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/11802). The previous PR
assumed that app server clients would respond to token refresh failures
by presenting the user with an error ("you must log in again") and then
not making further attempts to call network endpoints using the expired
token. While they do present the user with this error, they don't
prevent further attempts to call network endpoints and can repeatedly
call `getAuthStatus(refreshToken=true)` resulting in many failed calls
to the token refresh endpoint.
There are three solutions I considered here:
1. Change the getAuthStatus app server call to return a null auth if the
caller specified "refreshToken" on input and the refresh attempt fails.
This will cause clients to immediately log out the user and return them
to the log in screen. This is a really bad user experience. It's also a
breaking change in the app server contract that could break third-party
clients.
2. Augment the getAuthStatus app server call to return an additional
field that indicates the state of "token could not be refreshed". This
is a non-breaking change to the app server API, but it requires
non-trivial changes for all clients to properly handle this new field
properly.
3. Change the getAuthStatus implementation to handle the case where a
token refresh fails by marking the AuthManager's in-memory access and
refresh tokens as "poisoned" so it they are no longer used. This is the
simplest fix that requires no client changes.
I chose option 3.
Here's Codex's explanation of this change:
When an app-server client asks `getAuthStatus(refreshToken=true)`, we
may try to refresh a stale ChatGPT access token. If that refresh fails
permanently (for example `refresh_token_reused`, expired, or revoked),
the old behavior was bad in two ways:
1. We kept the in-memory auth snapshot alive as if it were still usable.
2. Later auth checks could retry refresh again and again, creating a
storm of doomed `/oauth/token` requests and repeatedly surfacing the
same failure.
This is especially painful for app-server clients because they poll auth
status and can keep driving the refresh path without any real chance of
recovery.
This change makes permanent refresh failures terminal for the current
managed auth snapshot without changing the app-server API contract.
What changed:
- `AuthManager` now poisons the current managed auth snapshot in memory
after a permanent refresh failure, keyed to the unchanged `AuthDotJson`.
- Once poisoned, later refresh attempts for that same snapshot fail fast
locally without calling the auth service again.
- The poison is cleared automatically when auth materially changes, such
as a new login, logout, or reload of different auth state from storage.
- `getAuthStatus(includeToken=true)` now omits `authToken` after a
permanent refresh failure instead of handing out the stale cached bearer
token.
This keeps the current auth method visible to clients, avoids forcing an
immediate logout flow, and stops repeated refresh attempts for
credentials that cannot recover.
---------
Co-authored-by: Eric Traut <etraut@openai.com>
* Add
`OutgoingMessageSender::send_server_notification_to_connection_and_wait`
which returns only once message is written to websocket (or failed to do
so)
* Use this mechanism to apply back pressure to stdout/stderr streams of
processes spawned by `command/exec`, to limit them to at most one
message in-memory at a time
* Use back pressure signal to also batch smaller chunks into ≈64KiB ones
This should make commands execution more robust over
high-latency/low-throughput networks
This PR completes the conversion of non-interactive `codex exec` to use
app server rather than directly using core events and methods.
### Summary
- move `codex-exec` off exec-owned `AuthManager` and `ThreadManager`
state
- route exec bootstrap, resume, and auth refresh through existing
app-server paths
- replace legacy `codex/event/*` decoding in exec with typed app-server
notification handling
- update human and JSONL exec output adapters to translate existing
app-server notifications only
- clean up "app server client" layer by eliminating support for legacy
notifications; this is no longer needed
- remove exposure of `authManager` and `threadManager` from "app server
client" layer
### Testing
- `exec` has pretty extensive unit and integration tests already, and
these all pass
- In addition, I asked Codex to put together a comprehensive manual set
of tests to cover all of the `codex exec` functionality (including
command-line options), and it successfully generated and ran these tests
