Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Ollie Matthews
aaf88f1ba3 [codex] decode escaped bash words in safety parser 2026-04-29 15:01:54 -07:00
Owen Lin
2e598df6fc fix: don't auto approve git -C ... (#20085)
It's safer to make sure these commands go through approval flows.
2026-04-28 22:06:55 +00:00
Adrian
af04273778 [codex] Block unsafe git global options from safe allowlist (#15796)
## Summary
- block git global options that can redirect config, repository, or
helper lookup from being auto-approved as safe
- share the unsafe global-option predicate across the Unix and Windows
git safety checks
- add regression coverage for inline and split forms, including `bash
-lc` and PowerShell wrappers

## Root cause
The Unix safe-command gate only rejected `-c` and `--config-env`, even
though the shared git parser already knew how to skip additional
pre-subcommand globals such as `--git-dir`, `--work-tree`,
`--exec-path`, `--namespace`, and `--super-prefix`. That let those
arguments slip through safe-command classification on otherwise
read-only git invocations and bypass approval. The Windows-specific
safe-command path had the same trust-boundary gap for git global
options.
2026-03-26 10:46:04 -07:00
Michael Bolin
6a673e7339 core: resolve host_executable() rules during preflight (#13065)
## Why

[#12964](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12964) added
`host_executable()` support to `codex-execpolicy`, and
[#13046](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/13046) adopted it in the
zsh-fork interception path.

The remaining gap was the preflight execpolicy check in
`core/src/exec_policy.rs`. That path derives approval requirements
before execution for `shell`, `shell_command`, and `unified_exec`, but
it was still using the default exact-token matcher.

As a result, a command that already included an absolute executable
path, such as `/usr/bin/git status`, could still miss a basename rule
like `prefix_rule(pattern = ["git"], ...)` during preflight even when
the policy also defined a matching `host_executable(name = "git", ...)`
entry.

This PR brings the same opt-in `host_executable()` resolution to the
preflight approval path when an absolute program path is already present
in the parsed command.

## What Changed

- updated
`ExecPolicyManager::create_exec_approval_requirement_for_command()` in
`core/src/exec_policy.rs` to use `check_multiple_with_options(...)` with
`MatchOptions { resolve_host_executables: true }`
- kept the existing shell parsing flow for approval derivation, but now
allow basename rules to match absolute executable paths during preflight
when `host_executable()` permits it
- updated requested-prefix amendment evaluation to use the same
host-executable-aware matching mode, so suggested `prefix_rule()`
amendments are checked consistently for absolute-path commands
- added preflight coverage for:
- absolute-path commands that should match basename rules through
`host_executable()`
- absolute-path commands whose paths are not in the allowed
`host_executable()` mapping
  - requested prefix-rule amendments for absolute-path commands

## Verification

- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib exec_policy::tests::`
2026-02-28 17:25:30 +00:00
Michael Bolin
d44f4205fb chore: rename codex-command to codex-shell-command (#11378)
This addresses some post-merge feedback on
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/11361:

- crate rename
- reuse `detect_shell_type()` utility
2026-02-10 17:03:46 -08:00