Stacked on #16508.
This removes the temporary `codex-core` / `codex-login` re-export shims
from the ownership split and rewrites callsites to import directly from
`codex-model-provider-info`, `codex-models-manager`, `codex-api`,
`codex-protocol`, `codex-feedback`, and `codex-response-debug-context`.
No behavior change intended; this is the mechanical import cleanup layer
split out from the ownership move.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- keep legacy Windows restricted-token sandboxing as the supported
baseline
- support the split-policy subset that restricted-token can enforce
directly today
- support full-disk read, the same writable root set as legacy
`WorkspaceWrite`, and extra read-only carveouts under those writable
roots via additional deny-write ACLs
- continue to fail closed for unsupported split-only shapes, including
explicit unreadable (`none`) carveouts, reopened writable descendants
under read-only carveouts, and writable root sets that do not match the
legacy workspace roots
## Example
Given a filesystem policy like:
```toml
":root" = "read"
":cwd" = "write"
"./docs" = "read"
```
the restricted-token backend can keep the workspace writable while
denying writes under `docs` by layering an extra deny-write carveout on
top of the legacy workspace-write roots.
A policy like:
```toml
"/workspace" = "write"
"/workspace/docs" = "read"
"/workspace/docs/tmp" = "write"
```
still fails closed, because the unelevated backend cannot reopen the
nested writable descendant safely.
## Stack
-> fix: support split carveouts in windows restricted-token sandbox
#14172
fix: support split carveouts in windows elevated sandbox #14568
## Summary
- drop `sandbox_permissions` from the sandboxing `ExecOptions` and
`ExecRequest` adapter types
- remove the now-unused plumbing from shell, unified exec, JS REPL, and
apply-patch runtime call sites
- default reconstructed `ExecParams` to `SandboxPermissions::UseDefault`
where the lower-level API still requires the field
## Testing
- `just fmt`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test -p codex-core` (still running locally; first failures
observed in `suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli`,
`suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli_supports_openai_base_url_config_override`,
and
`suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli_supports_openai_base_url_env_fallback`)
* Add
`OutgoingMessageSender::send_server_notification_to_connection_and_wait`
which returns only once message is written to websocket (or failed to do
so)
* Use this mechanism to apply back pressure to stdout/stderr streams of
processes spawned by `command/exec`, to limit them to at most one
message in-memory at a time
* Use back pressure signal to also batch smaller chunks into ≈64KiB ones
This should make commands execution more robust over
high-latency/low-throughput networks
## Why
Once the repo-local lint exists, `codex-rs` needs to follow the
checked-in convention and CI needs to keep it from drifting. This commit
applies the fallback `/*param*/` style consistently across existing
positional literal call sites without changing those APIs.
The longer-term preference is still to avoid APIs that require comments
by choosing clearer parameter types and call shapes. This PR is
intentionally the mechanical follow-through for the places where the
existing signatures stay in place.
After rebasing onto newer `main`, the rollout also had to cover newly
introduced `tui_app_server` call sites. That made it clear the first cut
of the CI job was too expensive for the common path: it was spending
almost as much time installing `cargo-dylint` and re-testing the lint
crate as a representative test job spends running product tests. The CI
update keeps the full workspace enforcement but trims that extra
overhead from ordinary `codex-rs` PRs.
## What changed
- keep a dedicated `argument_comment_lint` job in `rust-ci`
- mechanically annotate remaining opaque positional literals across
`codex-rs` with exact `/*param*/` comments, including the rebased
`tui_app_server` call sites that now fall under the lint
- keep the checked-in style aligned with the lint policy by using
`/*param*/` and leaving string and char literals uncommented
- cache `cargo-dylint`, `dylint-link`, and the relevant Cargo
registry/git metadata in the lint job
- split changed-path detection so the lint crate's own `cargo test` step
runs only when `tools/argument-comment-lint/*` or `rust-ci.yml` changes
- continue to run the repo wrapper over the `codex-rs` workspace, so
product-code enforcement is unchanged
Most of the code changes in this commit are intentionally mechanical
comment rewrites or insertions driven by the lint itself.
## Verification
- `./tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh --workspace`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server -p codex-tui`
- parsed `.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml` locally with PyYAML
---
* -> #14652
* #14651
## Summary
- launch Windows sandboxed children on a private desktop instead of
`Winsta0\Default`
- make private desktop the default while keeping
`windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false` as the escape hatch
- centralize process launch through the shared
`create_process_as_user(...)` path
- scope the private desktop ACL to the launching logon SID
## Why
Today sandboxed Windows commands run on the visible shared desktop. That
leaves an avoidable same-desktop attack surface for window interaction,
spoofing, and related UI/input issues. This change moves sandboxed
commands onto a dedicated per-launch desktop by default so the sandbox
no longer shares `Winsta0\Default` with the user session.
The implementation stays conservative on security with no silent
fallback back to `Winsta0\Default`
If private-desktop setup fails on a machine, users can still opt out
explicitly with `windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false`.
## Validation
- `cargo build -p codex-cli`
- elevated-path `codex exec` desktop-name probe returned
`CodexSandboxDesktop-*`
- elevated-path `codex exec` smoke sweep for shell commands, nested
`pwsh`, jobs, and hidden `notepad` launch
- unelevated-path full private-desktop compatibility sweep via `codex
exec` with `-c windows.sandbox=unelevated`
## Why
`#13434` introduces split `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and
`NetworkSandboxPolicy`, but the runtime still made most execution-time
sandbox decisions from the legacy `SandboxPolicy` projection.
That projection loses information about combinations like unrestricted
filesystem access with restricted network access. In practice, that
means the runtime can choose the wrong platform sandbox behavior or set
the wrong network-restriction environment for a command even when config
has already separated those concerns.
This PR carries the split policies through the runtime so sandbox
selection, process spawning, and exec handling can consult the policy
that actually matters.
## What changed
- threaded `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and `NetworkSandboxPolicy` through
`TurnContext`, `ExecRequest`, sandbox attempts, shell escalation state,
unified exec, and app-server exec overrides
- updated sandbox selection in `core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs` and
`core/src/exec.rs` to key off `FileSystemSandboxPolicy.kind` plus
`NetworkSandboxPolicy`, rather than inferring behavior only from the
legacy `SandboxPolicy`
- updated process spawning in `core/src/spawn.rs` and the platform
wrappers to use `NetworkSandboxPolicy` when deciding whether to set
`CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED`
- kept additional-permissions handling and legacy `ExternalSandbox`
compatibility projections aligned with the split policies, including
explicit user-shell execution and Windows restricted-token routing
- updated callers across `core`, `app-server`, and `linux-sandbox` to
pass the split policies explicitly
## Verification
- added regression coverage in `core/tests/suite/user_shell_cmd.rs` to
verify `RunUserShellCommand` does not inherit
`CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED` from the active turn
- added coverage in `core/src/exec.rs` for Windows restricted-token
sandbox selection when the legacy projection is `ExternalSandbox`
- updated Linux sandbox coverage in
`linux-sandbox/tests/suite/landlock.rs` to exercise the split-policy
exec path
- verified the current PR state with `just clippy`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13439).
* #13453
* #13452
* #13451
* #13449
* #13448
* #13445
* #13440
* __->__ #13439
---------
Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
* Add an ability to stream stdin, stdout, and stderr
* Streaming of stdout and stderr has a configurable cap for total amount
of transmitted bytes (with an ability to disable it)
* Add support for overriding environment variables
* Add an ability to terminate running applications (using
`command/exec/terminate`)
* Add TTY/PTY support, with an ability to resize the terminal (using
`command/exec/resize`)
