Stacked on #16508.
This removes the temporary `codex-core` / `codex-login` re-export shims
from the ownership split and rewrites callsites to import directly from
`codex-model-provider-info`, `codex-models-manager`, `codex-api`,
`codex-protocol`, `codex-feedback`, and `codex-response-debug-context`.
No behavior change intended; this is the mechanical import cleanup layer
split out from the ownership move.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
This finishes the config-type move out of `codex-core` by removing the
temporary compatibility shim in `codex_core::config::types`. Callers now
depend on `codex-config` directly, which keeps these config model types
owned by the config crate instead of re-expanding `codex-core` as a
transitive API surface.
## What Changed
- Removed the `codex-rs/core/src/config/types.rs` re-export shim and the
`core::config::ApprovalsReviewer` re-export.
- Updated `codex-core`, `codex-cli`, `codex-tui`, `codex-app-server`,
`codex-mcp-server`, and `codex-linux-sandbox` call sites to import
`codex_config::types` directly.
- Added explicit `codex-config` dependencies to downstream crates that
previously relied on the `codex-core` re-export.
- Regenerated `codex-rs/core/config.schema.json` after updating the
config docs path reference.
## Why
Follow-up to #16106.
`argument-comment-lint` already runs as a native Bazel aspect on Linux
and macOS, but Windows is still the long pole in `rust-ci`. To move
Windows onto the same native Bazel lane, the toolchain split has to let
exec-side helper binaries build in an MSVC environment while still
linting repo crates as `windows-gnullvm`.
Pushing the Windows lane onto the native Bazel path exposed a second
round of Windows-only issues in the mixed exec-toolchain plumbing after
the initial wrapper/target fixes landed.
## What Changed
- keep the Windows lint lanes on the native Bazel/aspect path in
`rust-ci.yml` and `rust-ci-full.yml`
- add a dedicated `local_windows_msvc` platform for exec-side helper
binaries while keeping `local_windows` as the `windows-gnullvm` target
platform
- patch `rules_rust` so `repository_set(...)` preserves explicit
exec-platform constraints for the generated toolchains, keep the
Windows-specific bootstrap/direct-link fixes needed for the nightly lint
driver, and expose exec-side `rustc-dev` `.rlib`s to the MSVC sysroot
- register the custom Windows nightly toolchain set with MSVC exec
constraints while still exposing both `x86_64-pc-windows-msvc` and
`x86_64-pc-windows-gnullvm` targets
- enable `dev_components` on the custom Windows nightly repository set
so the MSVC exec helper toolchain actually downloads the
compiler-internal crates that `clippy_utils` needs
- teach `run-argument-comment-lint-bazel.sh` to enumerate concrete
Windows Rust rules, normalize the resulting labels, and skip explicitly
requested incompatible targets instead of failing before the lint run
starts
- patch `rules_rust` build-script env propagation so exec-side
`windows-msvc` helper crates drop forwarded MinGW include and linker
search paths as whole flag/path pairs instead of emitting malformed
`CFLAGS`, `CXXFLAGS`, and `LDFLAGS`
- export the Windows VS/MSVC SDK environment in `setup-bazel-ci` and
pass the relevant variables through `run-bazel-ci.sh` via `--action_env`
/ `--host_action_env` so Bazel build scripts can see the MSVC and UCRT
headers on native Windows runs
- add inline comments to the Windows `setup-bazel-ci` MSVC environment
export step so it is easier to audit how `vswhere`, `VsDevCmd.bat`, and
the filtered `GITHUB_ENV` export fit together
- patch `aws-lc-sys` to skip its standalone `memcmp` probe under Bazel
`windows-msvc` build-script environments, which avoids a Windows-native
toolchain mismatch that blocked the lint lane before it reached the
aspect execution
- patch `aws-lc-sys` to prefer its bundled `prebuilt-nasm` objects for
Bazel `windows-msvc` build-script runs, which avoids missing
`generated-src/win-x86_64/*.asm` runfiles in the exec-side helper
toolchain
- annotate the Linux test-only callsites in `codex-rs/linux-sandbox` and
`codex-rs/core` that the wider native lint coverage surfaced
## Patches
This PR introduces a large patch stack because the Windows Bazel lint
lane currently depends on behavior that upstream dependencies do not
provide out of the box in the mixed `windows-gnullvm` target /
`windows-msvc` exec-toolchain setup.
- Most of the `rules_rust` patches look like upstream candidates rather
than OpenAI-only policy. Preserving explicit exec-platform constraints,
forwarding the right MSVC/UCRT environment into exec-side build scripts,
exposing exec-side `rustc-dev` artifacts, and keeping the Windows
bootstrap/linker behavior coherent all look like fixes to the Bazel/Rust
integration layer itself.
- The two `aws-lc-sys` patches are more tactical. They special-case
Bazel `windows-msvc` build-script environments to avoid a `memcmp` probe
mismatch and missing NASM runfiles. Those may be harder to upstream
as-is because they rely on Bazel-specific detection instead of a general
Cargo/build-script contract.
- Short term, carrying these patches in-tree is reasonable because they
unblock a real CI lane and are still narrow enough to audit. Long term,
the goal should not be to keep growing a permanent local fork of either
dependency.
- My current expectation is that the `rules_rust` patches are less
controversial and should be broken out into focused upstream proposals,
while the `aws-lc-sys` patches are more likely to be temporary escape
hatches unless that crate wants a more general hook for hermetic build
systems.
Suggested follow-up plan:
1. Split the `rules_rust` deltas into upstream-sized PRs or issues with
minimized repros.
2. Revisit the `aws-lc-sys` patches during the next dependency bump and
see whether they can be replaced by an upstream fix, a crate upgrade, or
a cleaner opt-in mechanism.
3. Treat each dependency update as a chance to delete patches one by one
so the local patch set only contains still-needed deltas.
## Verification
- `./.github/scripts/run-argument-comment-lint-bazel.sh
--config=argument-comment-lint --keep_going`
- `RUNNER_OS=Windows
./.github/scripts/run-argument-comment-lint-bazel.sh --nobuild
--config=argument-comment-lint --platforms=//:local_windows
--keep_going`
- `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-core shell_snapshot_tests`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
## References
- #16106
## Why
The Bazel-backed `argument-comment-lint` CI path had two gaps:
- Bazel wildcard target expansion skipped inline unit-test crates from
`src/` modules because the generated `*-unit-tests-bin` `rust_test`
targets are tagged `manual`.
- `argument-comment-mismatch` was still only a warning in the Bazel and
packaged-wrapper entrypoints, so a typoed `/*param_name*/` comment could
still pass CI even when the lint detected it.
That left CI blind to real linux-sandbox examples, including the missing
`/*local_port*/` comment in
`codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/proxy_routing.rs` and typoed argument
comments in `codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/landlock.rs`.
## What Changed
- Added `tools/argument-comment-lint/list-bazel-targets.sh` so Bazel
lint runs cover `//codex-rs/...` plus the manual `rust_test`
`*-unit-tests-bin` targets.
- Updated `just argument-comment-lint`, `rust-ci.yml`, and
`rust-ci-full.yml` to use that helper.
- Promoted both `argument-comment-mismatch` and
`uncommented-anonymous-literal-argument` to errors in every strict
entrypoint:
- `tools/argument-comment-lint/lint_aspect.bzl`
- `tools/argument-comment-lint/src/bin/argument-comment-lint.rs`
- `tools/argument-comment-lint/wrapper_common.py`
- Added wrapper/bin coverage for the stricter lint flags and documented
the behavior in `tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`.
- Fixed the now-covered callsites in
`codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/proxy_routing.rs`,
`codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/landlock.rs`, and
`codex-rs/core/src/shell_snapshot_tests.rs`.
This keeps the Bazel target expansion narrow while making the Bazel and
prebuilt-linter paths enforce the same strict lint set.
## Verification
- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tools/argument-comment-lint -p
'test_*.py'`
- `cargo +nightly-2025-09-18 test --manifest-path
tools/argument-comment-lint/Cargo.toml`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
## Why
`argument-comment-lint` was green in CI even though the repo still had
many uncommented literal arguments. The main gap was target coverage:
the repo wrapper did not force Cargo to inspect test-only call sites, so
examples like the `latest_session_lookup_params(true, ...)` tests in
`codex-rs/tui_app_server/src/lib.rs` never entered the blocking CI path.
This change cleans up the existing backlog, makes the default repo lint
path cover all Cargo targets, and starts rolling that stricter CI
enforcement out on the platform where it is currently validated.
## What changed
- mechanically fixed existing `argument-comment-lint` violations across
the `codex-rs` workspace, including tests, examples, and benches
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` and
`tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` so non-`--fix` runs default to
`--all-targets` unless the caller explicitly narrows the target set
- fixed both wrappers so forwarded cargo arguments after `--` are
preserved with a single separator
- documented the new default behavior in
`tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`
- updated `rust-ci` so the macOS lint lane keeps the plain wrapper
invocation and therefore enforces `--all-targets`, while Linux and
Windows temporarily pass `-- --lib --bins`
That temporary CI split keeps the stricter all-targets check where it is
already cleaned up, while leaving room to finish the remaining Linux-
and Windows-specific target-gated cleanup before enabling
`--all-targets` on those runners. The Linux and Windows failures on the
intermediate revision were caused by the wrapper forwarding bug, not by
additional lint findings in those lanes.
## Validation
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh`
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --lib --bins`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --tests`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test` in `tools/argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test -p codex-terminal-detection`
## Follow-up
- Clean up remaining Linux-only target-gated callsites, then switch the
Linux lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
- Clean up remaining Windows-only target-gated callsites, then switch
the Windows lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
## Summary
- move the bwrap PATH lookup and warning helpers out of config/mod.rs
- move the related tests into a dedicated bwrap_tests.rs file
## Validation
- git diff --check
- skipped heavier local tests per request
Follow-up to #15791.
## Problem
Codex already treated an existing top-level project `./.codex` directory
as protected, but there was a gap on first creation.
If `./.codex` did not exist yet, a turn could create files under it,
such as `./.codex/config.toml`, without going through the same approval
path as later modifications. That meant the initial write could bypass
the intended protection for project-local Codex state.
## What this changes
This PR closes that first-creation gap in the Unix enforcement layers:
- `codex-protocol`
- treat the top-level project `./.codex` path as a protected carveout
even when it does not exist yet
- avoid injecting the default carveout when the user already has an
explicit rule for that exact path
- macOS Seatbelt
- deny writes to both the exact protected path and anything beneath it,
so creating `./.codex` itself is blocked in addition to writes inside it
- Linux bubblewrap
- preserve the same protected-path behavior for first-time creation
under `./.codex`
- tests
- add protocol regressions for missing `./.codex` and explicit-rule
collisions
- add Unix sandbox coverage for blocking first-time `./.codex` creation
- tighten Seatbelt policy assertions around excluded subpaths
## Scope
This change is intentionally scoped to protecting the top-level project
`.codex` subtree from agent writes.
It does not make `.codex` unreadable, and it does not change the product
behavior around loading project skills from `.codex` when project config
is untrusted.
## Why this shape
The fix is pointed rather than broad:
- it preserves the current model of “project `.codex` is protected from
writes”
- it closes the security-relevant first-write hole
- it avoids folding a larger permissions-model redesign into this PR
## Validation
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing seatbelt`
- `cargo test -p codex-exec --test all
sandbox_blocks_first_time_dot_codex_creation -- --nocapture`
---------
Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
## Summary
- resolve system bwrap from PATH instead of hardcoding /usr/bin/bwrap
- skip PATH entries that resolve inside the current workspace before
launching the sandbox helper
- keep the vendored bubblewrap fallback when no trusted system bwrap is
found
## Validation
- cargo test -p codex-core bwrap --lib
- cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox
- just fix -p codex-core
- just fix -p codex-linux-sandbox
- just fmt
- just argument-comment-lint
- cargo clean
Fixes#15283.
## Summary
Older system bubblewrap builds reject `--argv0`, which makes our Linux
sandbox fail before the helper can re-exec. This PR keeps using system
`/usr/bin/bwrap` whenever it exists and only falls back to vendored
bwrap when the system binary is missing. That matters on stricter
AppArmor hosts, where the distro bwrap package also provides the policy
setup needed for user namespaces.
For old system bwrap, we avoid `--argv0` instead of switching binaries:
- pass the sandbox helper a full-path `argv0`,
- keep the existing `current_exe() + --argv0` path when the selected
launcher supports it,
- otherwise omit `--argv0` and re-exec through the helper's own
`argv[0]` path, whose basename still dispatches as
`codex-linux-sandbox`.
Also updates the launcher/warning tests and docs so they match the new
behavior: present-but-old system bwrap uses the compatibility path, and
only absent system bwrap falls back to vendored.
### Validation
1. Install Ubuntu 20.04 in a VM
2. Compile codex and run without bubblewrap installed - see a warning
about falling back to the vendored bwrap
3. Install bwrap and verify version is 0.4.0 without `argv0` support
4. run codex and use apply_patch tool without errors
<img width="802" height="631" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 48 36 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/77248a29-aa38-4d7c-9833-496ec6a458b8"
/>
<img width="807" height="634" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 47 32 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5af8b850-a466-489b-95a6-455b76b5050f"
/>
<img width="812" height="635" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 45 45 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/438074f0-8435-4274-a667-332efdd5cb57"
/>
<img width="801" height="623" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 43 56 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0dc8d3f5-e8cf-4218-b4b4-a4f7d9bf02e3"
/>
---------
Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
## Why
Fixes [#15283](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/15283), where
sandboxed tool calls fail on older distro `bubblewrap` builds because
`/usr/bin/bwrap` does not understand `--argv0`. The upstream [bubblewrap
v0.9.0 release
notes](https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap/releases/tag/v0.9.0)
explicitly call out `Add --argv0`. Flipping `use_legacy_landlock`
globally works around that compatibility bug, but it also weakens the
default Linux sandbox and breaks proxy-routed and split-policy cases
called out in review.
The follow-up Linux CI failure was in the new launcher test rather than
the launcher logic: the fake `bwrap` helper stayed open for writing, so
Linux would not exec it. This update also closes the user-visibility gap
from review by surfacing the same startup warning when `/usr/bin/bwrap`
is present but too old for `--argv0`, not only when it is missing.
## What Changed
- keep `use_legacy_landlock` default-disabled
- teach `codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/launcher.rs` to fall back to the
vendored bubblewrap build when `/usr/bin/bwrap` does not advertise
`--argv0` support
- add launcher tests for supported, unsupported, and missing system
`bwrap`
- write the fake `bwrap` test helper to a closed temp path so the
supported-path launcher test works on Linux too
- extend the startup warning path so Codex warns when `/usr/bin/bwrap`
is missing or too old to support `--argv0`
- mirror the warning/fallback wording across
`codex-rs/linux-sandbox/README.md` and `codex-rs/core/README.md`,
including that the fallback is the vendored bubblewrap compiled into the
binary
- cite the upstream `bubblewrap` release that introduced `--argv0`
## Verification
- `bazel test --config=remote --platforms=//:rbe
//codex-rs/linux-sandbox:linux-sandbox-unit-tests
--test_filter=launcher::tests::prefers_system_bwrap_when_help_lists_argv0
--test_output=errors`
- `cargo test -p codex-core system_bwrap_warning`
- `cargo check -p codex-exec -p codex-tui -p codex-tui-app-server -p
codex-app-server`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
## Problem
Ubuntu/AppArmor hosts started failing in the default Linux sandbox path
after the switch to vendored/default bubblewrap in `0.115.0`.
The clearest report is in
[#14919](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919), especially [this
investigation
comment](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919#issuecomment-4076504751):
on affected Ubuntu systems, `/usr/bin/bwrap` works, but a copied or
vendored `bwrap` binary fails with errors like `bwrap: setting up uid
map: Permission denied` or `bwrap: loopback: Failed RTM_NEWADDR:
Operation not permitted`.
The root cause is Ubuntu's `/etc/apparmor.d/bwrap-userns-restrict`
profile, which grants `userns` access specifically to `/usr/bin/bwrap`.
Once Codex started using a vendored/internal bubblewrap path, that path
was no longer covered by the distro AppArmor exception, so sandbox
namespace setup could fail even when user namespaces were otherwise
enabled and `uidmap` was installed.
## What this PR changes
- prefer system `/usr/bin/bwrap` whenever it is available
- keep vendored bubblewrap as the fallback when `/usr/bin/bwrap` is
missing
- when `/usr/bin/bwrap` is missing, surface a Codex startup warning
through the app-server/TUI warning path instead of printing directly
from the sandbox helper with `eprintln!`
- use the same launcher decision for both the main sandbox execution
path and the `/proc` preflight path
- document the updated Linux bubblewrap behavior in the Linux sandbox
and core READMEs
## Why this fix
This still fixes the Ubuntu/AppArmor regression from
[#14919](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919), but it keeps the
runtime rule simple and platform-agnostic: if the standard system
bubblewrap is installed, use it; otherwise fall back to the vendored
helper.
The warning now follows that same simple rule. If Codex cannot find
`/usr/bin/bwrap`, it tells the user that it is falling back to the
vendored helper, and it does so through the existing startup warning
plumbing that reaches the TUI and app-server instead of low-level
sandbox stderr.
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server --lib`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server
tests::embedded_app_server_start_failure_is_returned`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox --all-targets`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-app-server --all-targets`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-tui-app-server --all-targets`
## Summary
- skip nonexistent `workspace-write` writable roots in the Linux
bubblewrap mount builder instead of aborting sandbox startup
- keep existing writable roots mounted normally so mixed Windows/WSL
configs continue to work
- add unit and Linux integration regression coverage for the
missing-root case
## Context
This addresses regression A from #14875. Regression B will be handled in
a separate PR.
The old bubblewrap integration added `ensure_mount_targets_exist` as a
preflight guard because bubblewrap bind targets must exist, and failing
early let Codex return a clearer error than a lower-level mount failure.
That policy turned out to be too strict once bubblewrap became the
default Linux sandbox: shared Windows/WSL or mixed-platform configs can
legitimately contain a well-formed writable root that does not exist on
the current machine. This PR keeps bubblewrap's existing-target
requirement, but changes Codex to skip missing writable roots instead of
treating them as fatal configuration errors.
## Problem
On Linux, Codex can be launched from a workspace path that is a symlink
(for example, a symlinked checkout or a symlinked parent directory).
Our sandbox policy intentionally canonicalizes writable/readable roots
to the real filesystem path before building the bubblewrap mounts. That
part is correct and needed for safety.
The remaining bug was that bubblewrap could still inherit the helper
process's logical cwd, which might be the symlinked alias instead of the
mounted canonical path. In that case, the sandbox starts in a cwd that
does not exist inside the sandbox namespace even though the real
workspace is mounted. This can cause sandboxed commands to fail in
symlinked workspaces.
## Fix
This PR keeps the sandbox policy behavior the same, but separates two
concepts that were previously conflated:
- the canonical cwd used to define sandbox mounts and permissions
- the caller's logical cwd used when launching the command
On the Linux bubblewrap path, we now thread the logical command cwd
through the helper explicitly and only add `--chdir <canonical path>`
when the logical cwd differs from the mounted canonical path.
That means:
- permissions are still computed from canonical paths
- bubblewrap starts the command from a cwd that definitely exists inside
the sandbox
- we do not widen filesystem access or undo the earlier symlink
hardening
## Why This Is Safe
This is a narrow Linux-only launch fix, not a policy change.
- Writable/readable root canonicalization stays intact.
- Protected metadata carveouts still operate on canonical roots.
- We only override bubblewrap's inherited cwd when the logical path
would otherwise point at a symlink alias that is not mounted in the
sandbox.
## Tests
- kept the existing protocol/core regression coverage for symlink
canonicalization
- added regression coverage for symlinked cwd handling in the Linux
bubblewrap builder/helper path
Local validation:
- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
normalize_additional_permissions_canonicalizes_symlinked_write_paths`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-protocol -p codex-core
--tests -- -D warnings`
- `cargo build --bin codex`
## Context
This is related to #14694. The earlier writable-root symlink fix
addressed the mount/permission side; this PR fixes the remaining
symlinked-cwd launch mismatch in the Linux sandbox path.
## Why
Once the repo-local lint exists, `codex-rs` needs to follow the
checked-in convention and CI needs to keep it from drifting. This commit
applies the fallback `/*param*/` style consistently across existing
positional literal call sites without changing those APIs.
The longer-term preference is still to avoid APIs that require comments
by choosing clearer parameter types and call shapes. This PR is
intentionally the mechanical follow-through for the places where the
existing signatures stay in place.
After rebasing onto newer `main`, the rollout also had to cover newly
introduced `tui_app_server` call sites. That made it clear the first cut
of the CI job was too expensive for the common path: it was spending
almost as much time installing `cargo-dylint` and re-testing the lint
crate as a representative test job spends running product tests. The CI
update keeps the full workspace enforcement but trims that extra
overhead from ordinary `codex-rs` PRs.
## What changed
- keep a dedicated `argument_comment_lint` job in `rust-ci`
- mechanically annotate remaining opaque positional literals across
`codex-rs` with exact `/*param*/` comments, including the rebased
`tui_app_server` call sites that now fall under the lint
- keep the checked-in style aligned with the lint policy by using
`/*param*/` and leaving string and char literals uncommented
- cache `cargo-dylint`, `dylint-link`, and the relevant Cargo
registry/git metadata in the lint job
- split changed-path detection so the lint crate's own `cargo test` step
runs only when `tools/argument-comment-lint/*` or `rust-ci.yml` changes
- continue to run the repo wrapper over the `codex-rs` workspace, so
product-code enforcement is unchanged
Most of the code changes in this commit are intentionally mechanical
comment rewrites or insertions driven by the lint itself.
## Verification
- `./tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh --workspace`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server -p codex-tui`
- parsed `.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml` locally with PyYAML
---
* -> #14652
* #14651
## Summary
- launch Windows sandboxed children on a private desktop instead of
`Winsta0\Default`
- make private desktop the default while keeping
`windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false` as the escape hatch
- centralize process launch through the shared
`create_process_as_user(...)` path
- scope the private desktop ACL to the launching logon SID
## Why
Today sandboxed Windows commands run on the visible shared desktop. That
leaves an avoidable same-desktop attack surface for window interaction,
spoofing, and related UI/input issues. This change moves sandboxed
commands onto a dedicated per-launch desktop by default so the sandbox
no longer shares `Winsta0\Default` with the user session.
The implementation stays conservative on security with no silent
fallback back to `Winsta0\Default`
If private-desktop setup fails on a machine, users can still opt out
explicitly with `windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false`.
## Validation
- `cargo build -p codex-cli`
- elevated-path `codex exec` desktop-name probe returned
`CodexSandboxDesktop-*`
- elevated-path `codex exec` smoke sweep for shell commands, nested
`pwsh`, jobs, and hidden `notepad` launch
- unelevated-path full private-desktop compatibility sweep via `codex
exec` with `-c windows.sandbox=unelevated`
## Summary
- preserve Linux bubblewrap semantics for `write -> none -> write`
filesystem policies by recreating masked mount targets before rebinding
narrower writable descendants
- add a Linux runtime regression for `/repo = write`, `/repo/a = none`,
`/repo/a/b = write` so the nested writable child is exercised under
bubblewrap
- document the supported legacy Landlock fallback and the split-policy
bubblewrap behavior for overlapping carveouts
## Example
Given a split filesystem policy like:
```toml
"/repo" = "write"
"/repo/a" = "none"
"/repo/a/b" = "write"
```
this PR keeps `/repo` writable, masks `/repo/a`, and still reopens
`/repo/a/b` as writable again under bubblewrap.
## Testing
- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox --tests -- -D warnings`
## Stack
fix: fail closed for unsupported split windows sandboxing #14172
-> fix: preserve split filesystem semantics in linux sandbox #14173
fix: align core approvals with split sandbox policies #14171
refactor: centralize filesystem permissions precedence #14174
## Summary
## Summary
- Preserve Linux split filesystem carveouts in bubblewrap by applying
mount masks in the right order, so narrower rules still win under
broader writable roots.
- Preserve unreadable ancestors of writable roots by masking them first
and then rebinding the narrower writable descendants.
- Stop rejecting legacy-plus-split Linux configs that are
sandbox-equivalent after `cwd` resolution by comparing semantics instead
of raw legacy structs.
- Fail closed when callers provide partial split policies, mismatched
legacy-plus-split policies, or force `--use-legacy-landlock` for
split-only shapes that legacy Landlock cannot enforce.
- Add Linux regressions for overlapping writable, read-only, and denied
paths, and document the supported split-policy enforcement path.
## Example
Given a split filesystem policy like:
```toml
[permissions.dev.filesystem]
":root" = "read"
"/code" = "write"
"/code/.git" = "read"
"/code/secrets" = "none"
"/code/secrets/tmp" = "write"
```
this PR makes Linux enforce the intended result under bubblewrap:
- `/code` stays writable
- `/code/.git` stays read-only
- `/code/secrets` stays denied
- `/code/secrets/tmp` can still be reopened as writable if explicitly
allowed
Before this, Linux could lose one of those carveouts depending on mount
order or legacy-policy fallback. This PR keeps the split-policy
semantics intact and rejects configurations that legacy Landlock cannot
represent safely.
## Summary
- address the follow-up review nits from #13996 in a separate PR
- make the approvals test command a raw string and keep the
managed-network path using env proxy routing
- inline `--apply-seccomp-then-exec` in the Linux sandbox inner command
builder
- remove the bubblewrap-specific sandbox metric tag path and drop the
`use_legacy_landlock` shim from `sandbox_tag`/`TurnMetadataState::new`
- restore the `Feature` import that `origin/main` currently still needs
in `connectors.rs`
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox`
- focused `codex-core` tests were rerun/started, but the final
verification pass was interrupted when I pushed at request
## Summary
- make bubblewrap the default Linux sandbox and keep
`use_legacy_landlock` as the only override
- remove `use_linux_sandbox_bwrap` from feature, config, schema, and
docs surfaces
- update Linux sandbox selection, CLI/config plumbing, and related
tests/docs to match the new default
- fold in the follow-up CI fixes for request-permissions responses and
Linux read-only sandbox error text
## Summary
This is a fast follow to the initial `[permissions]` structure.
- keep the new split-policy carveout behavior for narrower non-write
entries under broader writable roots
- preserve legacy `WorkspaceWrite` semantics by using a cwd-aware bridge
that drops only redundant nested readable roots when projecting from
`SandboxPolicy`
- route the legacy macOS seatbelt adapter through that same legacy
bridge so redundant nested readable roots do not become read-only
carveouts on macOS
- derive the legacy bridge for `command_exec` using the sandbox root cwd
rather than the request cwd so policy derivation matches later sandbox
enforcement
- add regression coverage for the legacy macOS nested-readable-root case
## Examples
### Legacy `workspace-write` on macOS
A legacy `workspace-write` policy can redundantly list a nested readable
root under an already-writable workspace root.
For example, legacy config can effectively mean:
- workspace root (`.` / `cwd`) is writable
- `docs/` is also listed in `readable_roots`
The new shared split-policy helper intentionally treats a narrower
non-write entry under a broader writable root as a carveout for real
`[permissions]` configs. Without this fast follow, the unchanged macOS
seatbelt legacy adapter could project that legacy shape into a
`FileSystemSandboxPolicy` that treated `docs/` like a read-only carveout
under the writable workspace root. In practice, legacy callers on macOS
could unexpectedly lose write access inside `docs/`, even though that
path was writable before the `[permissions]` migration work.
This change fixes that by routing the legacy seatbelt path through the
cwd-aware legacy bridge, so:
- legacy `workspace-write` keeps `docs/` writable when `docs/` was only
a redundant readable root
- explicit `[permissions]` entries like `'.' = 'write'` and `'docs' =
'read'` still make `docs/` read-only, which is the new intended
split-policy behavior
### Legacy `command_exec` with a subdirectory cwd
`command_exec` can run a command from a request cwd that is narrower
than the sandbox root cwd.
For example:
- sandbox root cwd is `/repo`
- request cwd is `/repo/subdir`
- legacy policy is still `workspace-write` rooted at `/repo`
Before this fast follow, `command_exec` derived the legacy bridge using
the request cwd, but the sandbox was later built using the sandbox root
cwd. That mismatch could miss redundant legacy readable roots during
projection and accidentally reintroduce read-only carveouts for paths
that should still be writable under the legacy model.
This change fixes that by deriving the legacy bridge with the same
sandbox root cwd that sandbox enforcement later uses.
## Verification
- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
seatbelt_legacy_workspace_write_nested_readable_root_stays_writable`
- `cargo test -p codex-core test_sandbox_config_parsing`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-core -p codex-app-server --all-targets -- -D
warnings`
- `cargo clean`
## Why
After `#13449`, the Linux helper could receive split filesystem and
network policies, but the bubblewrap mount builder still reconstructed
filesystem access from the legacy `SandboxPolicy`.
That loses explicit unreadable carveouts under writable roots, and it
also mishandles `Root` read access paired with explicit deny carveouts.
In those cases bubblewrap could still expose paths that the split
filesystem policy intentionally blocked.
## What changed
- switched bubblewrap mount generation to consume
`FileSystemSandboxPolicy` directly at the implementation boundary;
legacy `SandboxPolicy` configs still flow through the existing
`FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy)` bridge before reaching
bwrap
- kept the Linux helper and preflight path on the split filesystem
policy all the way into bwrap
- re-applied explicit unreadable carveouts after readable and writable
mounts so blocked subpaths still win under bubblewrap
- masked denied directories with `--tmpfs` plus `--remount-ro` and
denied files with `--ro-bind-data`, preserving the backing fd until exec
- added comments in the unreadable-root masking block to explain why the
mount order and directory/file split are intentional
- updated Linux helper call sites and tests for the split-policy bwrap
path
## Verification
- added protocol coverage for root carveouts staying scoped
- added core coverage that root-write plus deny carveouts still requires
a platform sandbox
- added bwrap unit coverage for reapplying blocked carveouts after
writable binds
- added Linux integration coverage for explicit split-policy carveouts
under bubblewrap
- validated the final branch state with `cargo test -p
codex-linux-sandbox`, `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox --all-targets
-- -D warnings`, and the PR CI reruns
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13453).
* __->__ #13453
* #13452
* #13451
* #13449
* #13448
* #13445
* #13440
* #13439
---------
Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
## Why
The Linux sandbox helper still only accepted the legacy `SandboxPolicy`
payload.
That meant the runtime could compute split filesystem and network
policies, but the helper would immediately collapse them back to the
compatibility projection before applying seccomp or staging the
bubblewrap inner command.
## What changed
- added hidden `--file-system-sandbox-policy` and
`--network-sandbox-policy` flags alongside the legacy `--sandbox-policy`
flag so the helper can migrate incrementally
- updated the core-side Landlock wrapper to pass the split policies
explicitly when launching `codex-linux-sandbox`
- added helper-side resolution logic that accepts either the legacy
policy alone or a complete split-policy pair and normalizes that into
one effective configuration
- switched Linux helper network decisions to use `NetworkSandboxPolicy`
directly
- added `FromStr` support for the split policy types so the helper can
parse them from CLI JSON
## Verification
- added helper coverage in `linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main_tests.rs`
for split-policy flags and policy resolution
- added CLI argument coverage in `core/src/landlock.rs`
- verified the current PR state with `just clippy`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13449).
* #13453
* #13452
* #13451
* __->__ #13449
* #13448
* #13445
* #13440
* #13439
---------
Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
## Why
`#13434` introduces split `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and
`NetworkSandboxPolicy`, but the runtime still made most execution-time
sandbox decisions from the legacy `SandboxPolicy` projection.
That projection loses information about combinations like unrestricted
filesystem access with restricted network access. In practice, that
means the runtime can choose the wrong platform sandbox behavior or set
the wrong network-restriction environment for a command even when config
has already separated those concerns.
This PR carries the split policies through the runtime so sandbox
selection, process spawning, and exec handling can consult the policy
that actually matters.
## What changed
- threaded `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and `NetworkSandboxPolicy` through
`TurnContext`, `ExecRequest`, sandbox attempts, shell escalation state,
unified exec, and app-server exec overrides
- updated sandbox selection in `core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs` and
`core/src/exec.rs` to key off `FileSystemSandboxPolicy.kind` plus
`NetworkSandboxPolicy`, rather than inferring behavior only from the
legacy `SandboxPolicy`
- updated process spawning in `core/src/spawn.rs` and the platform
wrappers to use `NetworkSandboxPolicy` when deciding whether to set
`CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED`
- kept additional-permissions handling and legacy `ExternalSandbox`
compatibility projections aligned with the split policies, including
explicit user-shell execution and Windows restricted-token routing
- updated callers across `core`, `app-server`, and `linux-sandbox` to
pass the split policies explicitly
## Verification
- added regression coverage in `core/tests/suite/user_shell_cmd.rs` to
verify `RunUserShellCommand` does not inherit
`CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED` from the active turn
- added coverage in `core/src/exec.rs` for Windows restricted-token
sandbox selection when the legacy projection is `ExternalSandbox`
- updated Linux sandbox coverage in
`linux-sandbox/tests/suite/landlock.rs` to exercise the split-policy
exec path
- verified the current PR state with `just clippy`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13439).
* #13453
* #13452
* #13451
* #13449
* #13448
* #13445
* #13440
* __->__ #13439
---------
Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
## Summary
- always pass `--unshare-user` in the Linux bubblewrap argv builders
- stop relying on bubblewrap's auto-userns behavior, which is skipped
for `uid 0`
- update argv expectations in tests and document the explicit user
namespace behavior
The installed Codex binary reproduced the same issue with:
- `codex -c features.use_linux_sandbox_bwrap=true sandbox linux -- true`
- `bwrap: Creating new namespace failed: Operation not permitted`
This happens because Codex asked bubblewrap for mount/pid/network
namespaces without explicitly asking for a user namespace. In a
root-inside-container environment without ambient `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, that
fails. Adding `--unshare-user` makes bubblewrap create the user
namespace first and then the remaining namespaces succeed.
## Summary
`PermissionProfile.network` could not be preserved when additional or
compiled permissions resolved to
`SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly`, because `ReadOnly` had no network_access
field. This change makes read-only + network
enabled representable directly and threads that through the protocol,
app-server v2 mirror, and permission-
merging logic.
## What changed
- Added `network_access: bool` to `SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` in the core
protocol and app-server v2 protocol.
- Kept backward compatibility by defaulting the new field to false, so
legacy read-only payloads still
deserialize unchanged.
- Updated `has_full_network_access()` and sandbox summaries to respect
read-only network access.
- Preserved PermissionProfile.network when:
- compiling skill permission profiles into sandbox policies
- normalizing additional permissions
- merging additional permissions into existing sandbox policies
- Updated the approval overlay to show network in the rendered
permission rule when requested.
- Regenerated app-server schema fixtures for the new v2 wire shape.
## Summary
Implements Linux bubblewrap support for restricted `ReadOnlyAccess`
(introduced in #11387) by honoring `readable_roots` and
`include_platform_defaults` instead of failing closed.
## What changed
- Added a Linux platform-default read allowlist for common
system/runtime paths (e.g. /usr, /etc, /lib*, Nix store roots).
- Updated the bwrap filesystem mount builder to support restricted read
access:
- Full-read policies still use `--ro-bind / /`
- Restricted-read policies now start from` --tmpfs `/ and add scoped
`--ro-bind` mounts
- Preserved existing writable-root and protected-subpath behavior
(`.git`, `.codex`, etc.).
`ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted` was already modeled in protocol, but Linux
bwrap still returned `UnsupportedOperation` for restricted read access.
This closes that gap for the active Linux filesystem backend.
## Notes
Legacy Linux Landlock fallback still fail-closes for restricted read
access (unchanged).
This reverts commit daf0f03ac8.
# External (non-OpenAI) Pull Request Requirements
Before opening this Pull Request, please read the dedicated
"Contributing" markdown file or your PR may be closed:
https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/main/docs/contributing.md
If your PR conforms to our contribution guidelines, replace this text
with a detailed and high quality description of your changes.
Include a link to a bug report or enhancement request.
Summary
- detect skill-invoking shell commands based on the original command
string, request approvals when needed, and cache positive decisions per
session
- keep implicit skill invocation emitted after approval and keep skill
approval decline messaging centralized to the shell handler
- expand and adjust skill approval tests to cover shell-based skill
scripts while matching the new detection expectations
Testing
- Not run (not requested)
## Why
`codex-rs/core/src/lib.rs` re-exported a broad set of types and modules
from `codex-protocol` and `codex-shell-command`. That made it easy for
workspace crates to import those APIs through `codex-core`, which in
turn hides dependency edges and makes it harder to reduce compile-time
coupling over time.
This change removes those public re-exports so call sites must import
from the source crates directly. Even when a crate still depends on
`codex-core` today, this makes dependency boundaries explicit and
unblocks future work to drop `codex-core` dependencies where possible.
## What Changed
- Removed public re-exports from `codex-rs/core/src/lib.rs` for:
- `codex_protocol::protocol` and related protocol/model types (including
`InitialHistory`)
- `codex_protocol::config_types` (`protocol_config_types`)
- `codex_shell_command::{bash, is_dangerous_command, is_safe_command,
parse_command, powershell}`
- Migrated workspace Rust call sites to import directly from:
- `codex_protocol::protocol`
- `codex_protocol::config_types`
- `codex_protocol::models`
- `codex_shell_command`
- Added explicit `Cargo.toml` dependencies (`codex-protocol` /
`codex-shell-command`) in crates that now import those crates directly.
- Kept `codex-core` internal modules compiling by using `pub(crate)`
aliases in `core/src/lib.rs` (internal-only, not part of the public
API).
- Updated the two utility crates that can already drop a `codex-core`
dependency edge entirely:
- `codex-utils-approval-presets`
- `codex-utils-cli`
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-utils-approval-presets`
- `cargo test -p codex-utils-cli`
- `cargo check --workspace --all-targets`
- `just clippy`
## Summary
Simplify network approvals by removing per-attempt proxy correlation and
moving to session-level approval dedupe keyed by (host, protocol, port).
Instead of encoding attempt IDs into proxy credentials/URLs, we now
treat approvals as a destination policy decision.
- Concurrent calls to the same destination share one approval prompt.
- Different destinations (or same host on different ports) get separate
prompts.
- Allow once approves the current queued request group only.
- Allow for session caches that (host, protocol, port) and auto-allows
future matching requests.
- Never policy continues to deny without prompting.
Example:
- 3 calls:
- a.com (line 443)
- b.com (line 443)
- a.com (line 443)
=> 2 prompts total (a, b), second a waits on the first decision.
- a.com:80 is treated separately from a.com line 443
## Testing
- `just fmt` (in `codex-rs`)
- `cargo test -p codex-core tools::network_approval::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-core` (unit tests pass; existing
integration-suite failures remain in this environment)
## Summary
- Updates the Linux bubblewrap sandbox args to mount a minimal `/dev`
using `--dev /dev` instead of only binding `/dev/null`. tools needing
entropy (git, crypto libs, etc.) can fail.
- Changed mount order so `--dev /dev` is added before writable-root
`--bind` mounts, preserving writable `/dev/*` submounts like `/dev/shm`
## Why
Fixes sandboxed command failures when reading `/dev/urandom` (and
similar standard device-node access).
Fixes https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/12056
### Description
#### Summary
Introduces the core plumbing required for structured network approvals
#### What changed
- Added structured network policy decision modeling in core.
- Added approval payload/context types needed for network approval
semantics.
- Wired shell/unified-exec runtime plumbing to consume structured
decisions.
- Updated related core error/event surfaces for structured handling.
- Updated protocol plumbing used by core approval flow.
- Included small CLI debug sandbox compatibility updates needed by this
layer.
#### Why
establishes the minimal backend foundation for network approvals without
yet changing high-level orchestration or TUI behavior.
#### Notes
- Behavior remains constrained by existing requirements/config gating.
- Follow-up PRs in the stack handle orchestration, UX, and app-server
integration.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
## Summary
This PR removes the temporary `CODEX_BWRAP_ENABLE_FFI` flag and makes
Linux builds always compile vendored bubblewrap support for
`codex-linux-sandbox`.
## Changes
- Removed `CODEX_BWRAP_ENABLE_FFI` gating from
`codex-rs/linux-sandbox/build.rs`.
- Linux builds now fail fast if vendored bubblewrap compilation fails
(instead of warning and continuing).
- Updated fallback/help text in
`codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/vendored_bwrap.rs` to remove references to
`CODEX_BWRAP_ENABLE_FFI`.
- Removed `CODEX_BWRAP_ENABLE_FFI` env wiring from:
- `.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml`
- `.github/workflows/bazel.yml`
- `.github/workflows/rust-release.yml`
---------
Co-authored-by: David Zbarsky <zbarsky@openai.com>
`SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` previously implied broad read access and could
not express a narrower read surface.
This change introduces an explicit read-access model so we can support
user-configurable read restrictions in follow-up work, while preserving
current behavior today.
It also ensures unsupported backends fail closed for restricted-read
policies instead of silently granting broader access than intended.
## What
- Added `ReadOnlyAccess` in protocol with:
- `Restricted { include_platform_defaults, readable_roots }`
- `FullAccess`
- Updated `SandboxPolicy` to carry read-access configuration:
- `ReadOnly { access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
- `WorkspaceWrite { ..., read_only_access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
- Preserved existing behavior by defaulting current construction paths
to `ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess`.
- Threaded the new fields through sandbox policy consumers and call
sites across `core`, `tui`, `linux-sandbox`, `windows-sandbox`, and
related tests.
- Updated Seatbelt policy generation to honor restricted read roots by
emitting scoped read rules when full read access is not granted.
- Added fail-closed behavior on Linux and Windows backends when
restricted read access is requested but not yet implemented there
(`UnsupportedOperation`).
- Regenerated app-server protocol schema and TypeScript artifacts,
including `ReadOnlyAccess`.
## Compatibility / rollout
- Runtime behavior remains unchanged by default (`FullAccess`).
- API/schema changes are in place so future config wiring can enable
restricted read access without another policy-shape migration.
This PR adds the following field to `Config`:
```rust
pub network: Option<NetworkProxy>,
```
Though for the moment, it will always be initialized as `None` (this
will be addressed in a subsequent PR).
This PR does the work to thread `network` through to `execute_exec_env()`, `process_exec_tool_call()`, and `UnifiedExecRuntime.run()` to ensure it is available whenever we span a process.
## Summary
This PR introduces a gated Bubblewrap (bwrap) Linux sandbox path. The
curent Linux sandbox path relies on in-process restrictions (including
Landlock). Bubblewrap gives us a more uniform filesystem isolation
model, especially explicit writable roots with the option to make some
directories read-only and granular network controls.
This is behind a feature flag so we can validate behavior safely before
making it the default.
- Added temporary rollout flag:
- `features.use_linux_sandbox_bwrap`
- Preserved existing default path when the flag is off.
- In Bubblewrap mode:
- Added internal retry without /proc when /proc mount is not permitted
by the host/container.
## Summary
Vendor Bubblewrap into the repo and add minimal build plumbing in
`codex-linux-sandbox` to compile/link it.
## Why
We want to move Linux sandboxing toward Bubblewrap, but in a safe
two-step rollout:
1) vendoring/build setup (this PR),
2) runtime integration (follow-up PR).
## Included
- Add `codex-rs/vendor/bubblewrap` sources.
- Add build-time FFI path in `codex-rs/linux-sandbox`.
- Update `build.rs` rerun tracking for vendored files.
- Small vendored compile warning fix (`sockaddr_nl` full init).
follow up in https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/9938
**Description**
This removes the pre‑Landlock read‑only bind‑mount step from the Linux
sandbox so filesystem restrictions rely solely on Landlock again.
`mounts.rs` is kept in place but left unused. The linux‑sandbox README
is updated to match the new behavior and manual test expectations.
fixes https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/9236
### Motivation
- Prevent sandbox setup from failing when unprivileged user namespaces
are denied so Landlock-only protections can still be applied.
- Ensure `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` is set before installing seccomp and
Landlock restrictions to avoid kernel `EPERM`/`LandlockRestrict`
ordering issues.
### Description
- Add `is_permission_denied` helper that detects `EPERM` /
`PermissionDenied` from `CodexErr` to drive fallback logic.
- In `apply_read_only_mounts` skip read-only bind-mount setup and return
`Ok(())` when `unshare_user_and_mount_namespaces()` fails with
permission-denied so Landlock rules can still be installed.
- Add `set_no_new_privs()` and call it from
`apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread` before installing seccomp
filters and Landlock rules when disk or network access is restricted.
### Motivation
- Landlock alone cannot prevent writes to sensitive in-repo files like
`.git/` when the repo root is writable, so explicit mount restrictions
are required for those paths.
- The sandbox must set up any mounts before calling Landlock so Landlock
can still be applied afterwards and the two mechanisms compose
correctly.
### Description
- Add a new `linux-sandbox` helper `apply_read_only_mounts` in
`linux-sandbox/src/mounts.rs` that: unshares namespaces, maps uids/gids
when required, makes mounts private, bind-mounts targets, and remounts
them read-only.
- Wire the mount step into the sandbox flow by calling
`apply_read_only_mounts(...)` before network/seccomp and before applying
Landlock rules in `linux-sandbox/src/landlock.rs`.
This PR configures Codex CLI so it can be built with
[Bazel](https://bazel.build) in addition to Cargo. The `.bazelrc`
includes configuration so that remote builds can be done using
[BuildBuddy](https://www.buildbuddy.io).
If you are familiar with Bazel, things should work as you expect, e.g.,
run `bazel test //... --keep-going` to run all the tests in the repo,
but we have also added some new aliases in the `justfile` for
convenience:
- `just bazel-test` to run tests locally
- `just bazel-remote-test` to run tests remotely (currently, the remote
build is for x86_64 Linux regardless of your host platform). Note we are
currently seeing the following test failures in the remote build, so we
still need to figure out what is happening here:
```
failures:
suite::compact::manual_compact_twice_preserves_latest_user_messages
suite::compact_resume_fork::compact_resume_after_second_compaction_preserves_history
suite::compact_resume_fork::compact_resume_and_fork_preserve_model_history_view
```
- `just build-for-release` to build release binaries for all
platforms/architectures remotely
To setup remote execution:
- [Create a buildbuddy account](https://app.buildbuddy.io/) (OpenAI
employees should also request org access at
https://openai.buildbuddy.io/join/ with their `@openai.com` email
address.)
- [Copy your API key](https://app.buildbuddy.io/docs/setup/) to
`~/.bazelrc` (add the line `build
--remote_header=x-buildbuddy-api-key=YOUR_KEY`)
- Use `--config=remote` in your `bazel` invocations (or add `common
--config=remote` to your `~/.bazelrc`, or use the `just` commands)
## CI
In terms of CI, this PR introduces `.github/workflows/bazel.yml`, which
uses Bazel to run the tests _locally_ on Mac and Linux GitHub runners
(we are working on supporting Windows, but that is not ready yet). Note
that the failures we are seeing in `just bazel-remote-test` do not occur
on these GitHub CI jobs, so everything in `.github/workflows/bazel.yml`
is green right now.
The `bazel.yml` uses extra config in `.github/workflows/ci.bazelrc` so
that macOS CI jobs build _remotely_ on Linux hosts (using the
`docker://docker.io/mbolin491/codex-bazel` Docker image declared in the
root `BUILD.bazel`) using cross-compilation to build the macOS
artifacts. Then these artifacts are downloaded locally to GitHub's macOS
runner so the tests can be executed natively. This is the relevant
config that enables this:
```
common:macos --config=remote
common:macos --strategy=remote
common:macos --strategy=TestRunner=darwin-sandbox,local
```
Because of the remote caching benefits we get from BuildBuddy, these new
CI jobs can be extremely fast! For example, consider these two jobs that
ran all the tests on Linux x86_64:
- Bazel 1m37s
https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/20861063212/job/59940545209?pr=8875
- Cargo 9m20s
https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/20861063192/job/59940559592?pr=8875
For now, we will continue to run both the Bazel and Cargo jobs for PRs,
but once we add support for Windows and running Clippy, we should be
able to cutover to using Bazel exclusively for PRs, which should still
speed things up considerably. We will probably continue to run the Cargo
jobs post-merge for commits that land on `main` as a sanity check.
Release builds will also continue to be done by Cargo for now.
Earlier attempt at this PR: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/8832
Earlier attempt to add support for Buck2, now abandoned:
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/8504
---------
Co-authored-by: David Zbarsky <dzbarsky@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
