Commit Graph

21 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
viyatb-oai
cb870a169a fix(sandboxing): reject WSL1 bubblewrap sandboxing (#17559)
## Summary

- detect WSL1 before Codex probes or invokes the Linux bubblewrap
sandbox
- fail early with a clear unsupported-operation message when a command
would require bubblewrap on WSL1
- document that WSL2 follows the normal Linux bubblewrap path while WSL1
is unsupported

## Why

Codex 0.115.0 made bubblewrap the default Linux sandbox. WSL1 cannot
create the user namespaces that bubblewrap needs, so shell commands
currently fail later with a raw bwrap namespace error. This makes the
unsupported environment explicit and keeps non-bubblewrap paths
unchanged.

The WSL detection reads /proc/version, lets an explicit WSL<version>
marker decide WSL1 vs WSL2+, and only treats a bare Microsoft marker as
WSL1 when no explicit WSL version is present.

addresses https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/16076

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-12 14:08:14 -07:00
viyatb-oai
8a474a6561 fix: unblock private DNS in macOS sandbox (#17370)
## Summary
- keep hostname targets proxied by default by removing hostname suffixes
from the managed `NO_PROXY` value while preserving private/link-local
CIDRs
- make the macOS `allow_local_binding` sandbox rules match the local
socket shape used by DNS tools by allowing wildcard local binds
- allow raw DNS egress to remote port 53 only when `allow_local_binding`
is enabled, without opening blanket outbound network access

## Root cause
Raw DNS tools do not honor `HTTP_PROXY` or `ALL_PROXY`, so the
proxy-only Seatbelt policy blocked their resolver traffic before it
could reach host DNS. In the affected managed config,
`allow_local_binding = true`, but the existing rule only allowed
`localhost:*` binds; `dig`/BIND can bind sockets in a way that needs
wildcard local binding. Separately, hostname suffixes in `NO_PROXY`
could force internal hostnames to resolve locally instead of through the
proxy path.

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-10 20:34:04 -07:00
viyatb-oai
b114781495 fix(permissions): fix symlinked writable roots in sandbox permissions (#15981)
## Summary
- preserve logical symlink paths during permission normalization and
config cwd handling
- bind real targets for symlinked readable/writable roots in bwrap and
remap carveouts and unreadable roots there
- add regressions for symlinked carveouts and nested symlink escape
masking

## Root cause
Permission normalization canonicalized symlinked writable roots and cwd
to their real targets too early. That drifted policy checks away from
the logical paths the sandboxed process can actually address, while
bwrap still needed the real targets for mounts. The mismatch caused
shell and apply_patch failures on symlinked writable roots.

## Impact
Fixes #15781.

Also fixes #17079:
- #17079 is the protected symlinked carveout side: bwrap now binds the
real symlinked writable-root target and remaps carveouts before masking.

Related to #15157:
- #15157 is the broader permission-check side of this path-identity
problem. This PR addresses the shared logical-vs-canonical normalization
issue, but the reported Darwin prompt behavior should be validated
separately before auto-closing it.

This should also fix #14672, #14694, #14715, and #15725:
- #14672, #14694, and #14715 are the same Linux
symlinked-writable-root/bwrap family as #15781.
- #15725 is the protected symlinked workspace path variant; the PR
preserves the protected logical path in policy space while bwrap applies
read-only or unreadable treatment to the resolved target so
file-vs-directory bind mismatches do not abort sandbox setup.

## Notes
- Added Linux-only regressions for symlinked writable ancestors and
protected symlinked directory targets, including nested symlink escape
masking without rebinding the escape target writable.

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-10 17:00:58 -07:00
pakrym-oai
35b5720e8d Use AbsolutePathBuf for exec cwd plumbing (#17063)
## Summary
- Carry `AbsolutePathBuf` through tool cwd parsing/resolution instead of
resolving workdirs to raw `PathBuf`s.
- Type exec/sandbox request cwd fields as `AbsolutePathBuf` through
`ExecParams`, `ExecRequest`, `SandboxCommand`, and unified exec runtime
requests.
- Keep `PathBuf` conversions at external/event boundaries and update
existing tests/fixtures for the typed cwd.

## Validation
- `cargo check -p codex-core --tests`
- `cargo check -p codex-sandboxing --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib tools::handlers::`
- `just fix -p codex-sandboxing`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `just fmt`

Full `codex-core` test suite was not run locally; per repo guidance I
kept local validation targeted.
2026-04-08 10:54:12 -07:00
pakrym-oai
f1a2b920f9 [codex] Make AbsolutePathBuf joins infallible (#16981)
Having to check for errors every time join is called is painful and
unnecessary.
2026-04-07 10:52:08 -07:00
viyatb-oai
806e5f7c69 fix: warn when bwrap cannot create user namespaces (#15893)
## Summary
- add a Linux startup warning when system `bwrap` is present but cannot
create user namespaces
- keep the Linux-specific probe, sandbox-policy gate, and stderr
matching in `codex-sandboxing`
- polish the missing-`bwrap` warning to point users at the sandbox
prerequisites and OS package-manager install path

## Details
- probes system `bwrap` with `--unshare-user`, `--unshare-net`, and a
minimal bind before command execution
- detects known bubblewrap setup failures for `RTM_NEWADDR`,
`RTM_NEWLINK`, uid-map permission denial, and `No permissions to create
a new namespace`
- preserves the existing suppression for sandbox-bypassed policies such
as `danger-full-access` and `external-sandbox`
- updates the Linux sandbox docs to call out the user-namespace
requirement

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-06 19:19:35 -07:00
viyatb-oai
36cd163504 [codex] Allow PyTorch libomp shm in Seatbelt (#16945)
## Summary
- Add a targeted macOS Seatbelt allow rule for PyTorch/libomp KMP
registration shared-memory objects.
- Scope the rule to read/create/unlink operations on names matching
`^/__KMP_REGISTERED_LIB_[0-9]+$`.
- Add a base-policy regression assertion in `seatbelt_tests.rs`.

## Why
Importing PyTorch on macOS under the Codex sandbox can abort when libomp
attempts to create the KMP registration POSIX shm object and Seatbelt
denies `ipc-posix-shm-write-create`.

## Validation
- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-sandboxing --all-targets`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `git diff --check`
- End-to-end PyTorch import under `codex sandbox macos` exited `0` with
no KMP shm denial
- `cargo clean`
2026-04-06 22:12:30 +00:00
Eric Traut
0f7394883e Suppress bwrap warning when sandboxing is bypassed (#16667)
Addresses #15282

Problem: Codex warned about missing system bubblewrap even when
sandboxing was disabled.

Solution: Gate the bwrap warning on the active sandbox policy and skip
it for danger-full-access and external-sandbox modes.
2026-04-03 10:54:30 -07:00
Ahmed Ibrahim
6fff9955f1 extract models manager and related ownership from core (#16508)
## Summary
- split `models-manager` out of `core` and add `ModelsManagerConfig`
plus `Config::to_models_manager_config()` so model metadata paths stop
depending on `core::Config`
- move login-owned/auth-owned code out of `core` into `codex-login`,
move model provider config into `codex-model-provider-info`, move API
bridge mapping into `codex-api`, move protocol-owned types/impls into
`codex-protocol`, and move response debug helpers into a dedicated
`response-debug-context` crate
- move feedback tag emission into `codex-feedback`, relocate tests to
the crates that now own the code, and keep broad temporary re-exports so
this PR avoids a giant import-only rewrite

## Major moves and decisions
- created `codex-models-manager` as the owner for model
cache/catalog/config/model info logic, including the new
`ModelsManagerConfig` struct
- created `codex-model-provider-info` as the owner for provider config
parsing/defaults and kept temporary `codex-login`/`codex-core`
re-exports for old import paths
- moved `api_bridge` error mapping + `CoreAuthProvider` into
`codex-api`, while `codex-login::api_bridge` temporarily re-exports
those symbols and keeps the `auth_provider_from_auth` wrapper
- moved `auth_env_telemetry` and `provider_auth` ownership to
`codex-login`
- moved `CodexErr` ownership to `codex-protocol::error`, plus
`StreamOutput`, `bytes_to_string_smart`, and network policy helpers to
protocol-owned modules
- created `codex-response-debug-context` for
`extract_response_debug_context`, `telemetry_transport_error_message`,
and related response-debug plumbing instead of leaving that behavior in
`core`
- moved `FeedbackRequestTags`, `emit_feedback_request_tags`, and
`emit_feedback_request_tags_with_auth_env` to `codex-feedback`
- deferred removal of temporary re-exports and the mechanical import
rewrites to a stacked follow-up PR so this PR stays reviewable

## Test moves
- moved auth refresh coverage from `core/tests/suite/auth_refresh.rs` to
`login/tests/suite/auth_refresh.rs`
- moved text encoding coverage from
`core/tests/suite/text_encoding_fix.rs` to
`protocol/src/exec_output_tests.rs`
- moved model info override coverage from
`core/tests/suite/model_info_overrides.rs` to
`models-manager/src/model_info_overrides_tests.rs`

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-02 23:00:02 -07:00
Michael Bolin
61dfe0b86c chore: clean up argument-comment lint and roll out all-target CI on macOS (#16054)
## Why

`argument-comment-lint` was green in CI even though the repo still had
many uncommented literal arguments. The main gap was target coverage:
the repo wrapper did not force Cargo to inspect test-only call sites, so
examples like the `latest_session_lookup_params(true, ...)` tests in
`codex-rs/tui_app_server/src/lib.rs` never entered the blocking CI path.

This change cleans up the existing backlog, makes the default repo lint
path cover all Cargo targets, and starts rolling that stricter CI
enforcement out on the platform where it is currently validated.

## What changed

- mechanically fixed existing `argument-comment-lint` violations across
the `codex-rs` workspace, including tests, examples, and benches
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` and
`tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` so non-`--fix` runs default to
`--all-targets` unless the caller explicitly narrows the target set
- fixed both wrappers so forwarded cargo arguments after `--` are
preserved with a single separator
- documented the new default behavior in
`tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`
- updated `rust-ci` so the macOS lint lane keeps the plain wrapper
invocation and therefore enforces `--all-targets`, while Linux and
Windows temporarily pass `-- --lib --bins`

That temporary CI split keeps the stricter all-targets check where it is
already cleaned up, while leaving room to finish the remaining Linux-
and Windows-specific target-gated cleanup before enabling
`--all-targets` on those runners. The Linux and Windows failures on the
intermediate revision were caused by the wrapper forwarding bug, not by
additional lint findings in those lanes.

## Validation

- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh`
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --lib --bins`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --tests`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test` in `tools/argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test -p codex-terminal-detection`

## Follow-up

- Clean up remaining Linux-only target-gated callsites, then switch the
Linux lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
- Clean up remaining Windows-only target-gated callsites, then switch
the Windows lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
2026-03-27 19:00:44 -07:00
viyatb-oai
ec089fd22a fix(sandbox): fix bwrap lookup for multi-entry PATH (#15973)
## Summary
- split the joined `PATH` before running system `bwrap` lookup
- keep the existing workspace-local `bwrap` skip behavior intact
- add regression tests that exercise real multi-entry search paths

## Why
The PATH-based lookup added in #15791 still wrapped the raw `PATH`
environment value as a single `PathBuf` before passing it through
`join_paths()`. On Unix, a normal multi-entry `PATH` contains `:`, so
that wrapper path is invalid as one path element and the lookup returns
`None`.

That made Codex behave as if no system `bwrap` was installed even when
`bwrap` was available on `PATH`, which is what users in #15340 were
still hitting on `0.117.0-alpha.25`.

## Impact
System `bwrap` discovery now works with normal multi-entry `PATH` values
instead of silently falling back to the vendored binary.

Fixes #15340.

## Validation
- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
- `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox`
- `just fix -p codex-sandboxing`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
2026-03-27 08:41:06 -07:00
Michael Bolin
d76124d656 fix: make MACOS_DEFAULT_PREFERENCES_POLICY part of MACOS_SEATBELT_BASE_POLICY (#15931) 2026-03-26 18:23:14 -07:00
Michael Bolin
e6e2999209 permissions: remove macOS seatbelt extension profiles (#15918)
## Why

`PermissionProfile` should only describe the per-command permissions we
still want to grant dynamically. Keeping
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` in that surface forced extra macOS-only
approval, protocol, schema, and TUI branches for a capability we no
longer want to expose.

## What changed

- Removed the macOS-specific permission-profile types from
`codex-protocol`, the app-server v2 API, and the generated
schema/TypeScript artifacts.
- Deleted the core and sandboxing plumbing that threaded
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` through execution requests and seatbelt
construction.
- Simplified macOS seatbelt generation so it always includes the fixed
read-only preferences allowlist instead of carrying a configurable
profile extension.
- Removed the macOS additional-permissions UI/docs/test coverage and
deleted the obsolete macOS permission modules.
- Tightened `request_permissions` intersection handling so explicitly
empty requested read lists are preserved only when that field was
actually granted, avoiding zero-grant responses being stored as active
permissions.
2026-03-26 17:12:45 -07:00
viyatb-oai
b52abff279 chore: move bwrap config helpers into dedicated module (#15898)
## Summary
- move the bwrap PATH lookup and warning helpers out of config/mod.rs
- move the related tests into a dedicated bwrap_tests.rs file

## Validation
- git diff --check
- skipped heavier local tests per request

Follow-up to #15791.
2026-03-26 15:15:59 -07:00
Michael Bolin
dfb36573cd sandboxing: use OsString for SandboxCommand.program (#15897)
## Why

`SandboxCommand.program` represents an executable path, but keeping it
as `String` forced path-backed callers to run `to_string_lossy()` before
the sandbox layer ever touched the command. That loses fidelity earlier
than necessary and adds avoidable conversions in runtimes that already
have a `PathBuf`.

## What changed

- Changed `SandboxCommand.program` to `OsString`.
- Updated `SandboxManager::transform` to keep the program and argv in
`OsString` form until the `SandboxExecRequest` conversion boundary.
- Switched the path-backed `apply_patch` and `js_repl` runtimes to pass
`into_os_string()` instead of `to_string_lossy()`.
- Updated the remaining string-backed builders and tests to match the
new type while preserving the existing Linux helper `arg0` behavior.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
- `just argument-comment-lint -p codex-core -p codex-sandboxing`
- `cargo test -p codex-core` currently fails in unrelated existing
config tests: `config::tests::approvals_reviewer_*` and
`config::tests::smart_approvals_alias_*`
2026-03-26 20:38:33 +00:00
rreichel3-oai
86764af684 Protect first-time project .codex creation across Linux and macOS sandboxes (#15067)
## Problem

Codex already treated an existing top-level project `./.codex` directory
as protected, but there was a gap on first creation.

If `./.codex` did not exist yet, a turn could create files under it,
such as `./.codex/config.toml`, without going through the same approval
path as later modifications. That meant the initial write could bypass
the intended protection for project-local Codex state.

## What this changes

This PR closes that first-creation gap in the Unix enforcement layers:

- `codex-protocol`
- treat the top-level project `./.codex` path as a protected carveout
even when it does not exist yet
- avoid injecting the default carveout when the user already has an
explicit rule for that exact path
- macOS Seatbelt
- deny writes to both the exact protected path and anything beneath it,
so creating `./.codex` itself is blocked in addition to writes inside it
- Linux bubblewrap
- preserve the same protected-path behavior for first-time creation
under `./.codex`
- tests
- add protocol regressions for missing `./.codex` and explicit-rule
collisions
- add Unix sandbox coverage for blocking first-time `./.codex` creation
  - tighten Seatbelt policy assertions around excluded subpaths

## Scope

This change is intentionally scoped to protecting the top-level project
`.codex` subtree from agent writes.

It does not make `.codex` unreadable, and it does not change the product
behavior around loading project skills from `.codex` when project config
is untrusted.

## Why this shape

The fix is pointed rather than broad:
- it preserves the current model of “project `.codex` is protected from
writes”
- it closes the security-relevant first-write hole
- it avoids folding a larger permissions-model redesign into this PR

## Validation

- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing seatbelt`
- `cargo test -p codex-exec --test all
sandbox_blocks_first_time_dot_codex_creation -- --nocapture`

---------

Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
2026-03-26 16:06:53 -04:00
viyatb-oai
937cb5081d fix: fix old system bubblewrap compatibility without falling back to vendored bwrap (#15693)
Fixes #15283.

## Summary
Older system bubblewrap builds reject `--argv0`, which makes our Linux
sandbox fail before the helper can re-exec. This PR keeps using system
`/usr/bin/bwrap` whenever it exists and only falls back to vendored
bwrap when the system binary is missing. That matters on stricter
AppArmor hosts, where the distro bwrap package also provides the policy
setup needed for user namespaces.

For old system bwrap, we avoid `--argv0` instead of switching binaries:
- pass the sandbox helper a full-path `argv0`,
- keep the existing `current_exe() + --argv0` path when the selected
launcher supports it,
- otherwise omit `--argv0` and re-exec through the helper's own
`argv[0]` path, whose basename still dispatches as
`codex-linux-sandbox`.

Also updates the launcher/warning tests and docs so they match the new
behavior: present-but-old system bwrap uses the compatibility path, and
only absent system bwrap falls back to vendored.

### Validation

1. Install Ubuntu 20.04 in a VM
2. Compile codex and run without bubblewrap installed - see a warning
about falling back to the vendored bwrap
3. Install bwrap and verify version is 0.4.0 without `argv0` support
4. run codex and use apply_patch tool without errors

<img width="802" height="631" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 48 36 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/77248a29-aa38-4d7c-9833-496ec6a458b8"
/>
<img width="807" height="634" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 47 32 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5af8b850-a466-489b-95a6-455b76b5050f"
/>
<img width="812" height="635" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 45 45 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/438074f0-8435-4274-a667-332efdd5cb57"
/>
<img width="801" height="623" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 43 56 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0dc8d3f5-e8cf-4218-b4b4-a4f7d9bf02e3"
/>

---------

Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
2026-03-25 23:51:39 -07:00
pakrym-oai
f49eb8e9d7 Extract sandbox manager and transforms into codex-sandboxing (#15603)
Extract sandbox manager
2026-03-24 08:20:57 -07:00
pakrym-oai
9deb8ce3fc Move sandbox policy transforms into codex-sandboxing (#15599)
## Summary
- move the pure sandbox policy transform helpers from `codex-core` into
`codex-sandboxing`
- move the corresponding unit tests with the extracted implementation
- update `core` and `app-server` callers to import the moved APIs
directly, without re-exports or proxy methods

## Testing
- cargo test -p codex-sandboxing
- cargo test -p codex-core sandboxing
- cargo test -p codex-app-server --lib
- just fix -p codex-sandboxing
- just fix -p codex-core
- just fix -p codex-app-server
- just fmt
- just argument-comment-lint
2026-03-23 22:22:44 -07:00
pakrym-oai
431af0807c Move macOS sandbox builders into codex-sandboxing (#15593)
## Summary
- move macOS permission merging/intersection logic and tests from
`codex-core` into `codex-sandboxing`
- move seatbelt policy builders, permissions logic, SBPL assets, and
their tests into `codex-sandboxing`
- keep `codex-core` owning only the seatbelt spawn wrapper and switch
call sites to import the moved APIs directly

## Notes
- no re-exports added
- moved the seatbelt tests with the implementation so internal helpers
could stay private
- local verification is still finishing while this PR is open
2026-03-23 21:26:35 -07:00
pakrym-oai
2227248cd6 Extract landlock helpers into codex-sandboxing (#15592)
## Summary
- add a new `codex-sandboxing` crate for sandboxing extraction work
- move the pure Linux sandbox argv builders and their unit tests out of
`codex-core`
- keep `core::landlock` as the spawn wrapper and update direct callers
to use `codex_sandboxing::landlock`

## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
- `cargo test -p codex-core landlock`
- `cargo test -p codex-cli debug_sandbox`
- `just argument-comment-lint`

## Notes
- this is step 1 of the move plan aimed at minimizing per-PR diffs
- no re-exports or no-op proxy methods were added
2026-03-23 20:56:15 -07:00