## Summary
This updates the Windows elevated sandbox setup/refresh path to include
the legacy `compute_allow_paths(...).deny` protected children in the
same deny-write payload pipe added for split filesystem carveouts.
Concretely, elevated setup and elevated refresh now both build
deny-write payload paths from:
- explicit split-policy deny-write paths, preserving missing paths so
setup can materialize them before applying ACLs
- legacy `compute_allow_paths(...).deny`, which includes existing
`.git`, `.codex`, and `.agents` children under writable roots
This lets the elevated backend protect `.git` consistently with the
unelevated/restricted-token path, and removes the old janky hard-coded
`.codex` / `.agents` elevated setup helpers in favor of the shared
payload path.
## Root Cause
The landed split-carveout PR threaded a `deny_write_paths` pipe through
elevated setup/refresh, but the legacy workspace-write deny set from
`compute_allow_paths(...).deny` was not included in that payload. As a
result, elevated workspace-write did not apply the intended deny-write
ACLs for existing protected children like `<cwd>/.git`.
## Notes
The legacy protected children still only enter the deny set if they
already exist, because `compute_allow_paths` filters `.git`, `.codex`,
and `.agents` with `exists()`. Missing explicit split-policy deny paths
are preserved separately because setup intentionally materializes those
before applying ACLs.
## Validation
- `cargo fmt --check -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo build -p codex-cli -p codex-windows-sandbox --bins`
- Elevated `codex exec` smoke with `windows.sandbox='elevated'`: fresh
git repo, attempted append to `.git/config`, observed `Access is
denied`, marker not written, Deny ACE present on `.git`
- Unelevated `codex exec` smoke with `windows.sandbox='unelevated'`:
fresh git repo, attempted append to `.git/config`, observed `Access is
denied`, marker not written, Deny ACE present on `.git`
## Summary
- preserve legacy Windows elevated sandbox behavior for existing
policies
- add elevated-only support for split filesystem policies that can be
represented as readable-root overrides, writable-root overrides, and
extra deny-write carveouts
- resolve those elevated filesystem overrides during sandbox transform
and thread them through setup and policy refresh
- keep failing closed for explicit unreadable (`none`) carveouts and
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts
- for explicit read-only-under-writable-root carveouts, materialize
missing carveout directories during elevated setup before applying the
deny-write ACL
- document the elevated vs restricted-token support split in the core
README
## Example
Given a split filesystem policy like:
```toml
":root" = "read"
":cwd" = "write"
"./docs" = "read"
"C:/scratch" = "write"
```
the elevated backend now provisions the readable-root overrides,
writable-root overrides, and extra deny-write carveouts during setup and
refresh instead of collapsing back to the legacy workspace-only shape.
If a read-only carveout under a writable root is missing at setup time,
elevated setup creates that carveout as an empty directory before
applying its deny-write ACE; otherwise the sandboxed command could
create it later and bypass the carveout. This is only for explicit
policy carveouts. Best-effort workspace protections like `.codex/` and
`.agents/` still skip missing directories.
A policy like:
```toml
"/workspace" = "write"
"/workspace/docs" = "read"
"/workspace/docs/tmp" = "write"
```
still fails closed, because the elevated backend does not reopen
writable descendants under read-only carveouts yet.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- reduce public module visibility across Rust crates, preferring private
or crate-private modules with explicit crate-root public exports
- update external call sites and tests to use the intended public crate
APIs instead of reaching through module trees
- add the module visibility guideline to AGENTS.md
## Validation
- `cargo check --workspace --all-targets --message-format=short` passed
before the final fix/format pass
- `just fix` completed successfully
- `just fmt` completed successfully
- `git diff --check` passed
# Why this PR exists
This PR is trying to fix a coverage gap in the Windows Bazel Rust test
lane.
Before this change, the Windows `bazel test //...` job was nominally
part of PR CI, but a non-trivial set of `//codex-rs/...` Rust test
targets did not actually contribute test signal on Windows. In
particular, targets such as `//codex-rs/core:core-unit-tests`,
`//codex-rs/core:core-all-test`, and `//codex-rs/login:login-unit-tests`
were incompatible during Bazel analysis on the Windows gnullvm platform,
so they never reached test execution there. That is why the
Cargo-powered Windows CI job could surface Windows-only failures that
the Bazel-powered job did not report: Cargo was executing those tests,
while Bazel was silently dropping them from the runnable target set.
The main goal of this PR is to make the Windows Bazel test lane execute
those Rust test targets instead of skipping them during analysis, while
still preserving `windows-gnullvm` as the target configuration for the
code under test. In other words: use an MSVC host/exec toolchain where
Bazel helper binaries and build scripts need it, but continue compiling
the actual crate targets with the Windows gnullvm cfgs that our current
Bazel matrix is supposed to exercise.
# Important scope note
This branch intentionally removes the non-resource-loading `.rs` test
and production-code changes from the earlier
`codex/windows-bazel-rust-test-coverage` branch. The only Rust source
changes kept here are runfiles/resource-loading fixes in TUI tests:
- `codex-rs/tui/src/chatwidget/tests.rs`
- `codex-rs/tui/tests/manager_dependency_regression.rs`
That is deliberate. Since the corresponding tests already pass under
Cargo, this PR is meant to test whether Bazel infrastructure/toolchain
fixes alone are enough to get a healthy Windows Bazel test signal,
without changing test behavior for Windows timing, shell output, or
SQLite file-locking.
# How this PR changes the Windows Bazel setup
## 1. Split Windows host/exec and target concerns in the Bazel test lane
The core change is that the Windows Bazel test job now opts into an MSVC
host platform for Bazel execution-time tools, but only for `bazel test`,
not for the Bazel clippy build.
Files:
- `.github/workflows/bazel.yml`
- `.github/scripts/run-bazel-ci.sh`
- `MODULE.bazel`
What changed:
- `run-bazel-ci.sh` now accepts `--windows-msvc-host-platform`.
- When that flag is present on Windows, the wrapper appends
`--host_platform=//:local_windows_msvc` unless the caller already
provided an explicit `--host_platform`.
- `bazel.yml` passes that wrapper flag only for the Windows `bazel test
//...` job.
- The Bazel clippy job intentionally does **not** pass that flag, so
clippy stays on the default Windows gnullvm host/exec path and continues
linting against the target cfgs we care about.
- `run-bazel-ci.sh` also now forwards `CODEX_JS_REPL_NODE_PATH` on
Windows and normalizes the `node` executable path with `cygpath -w`, so
tests that need Node resolve the runner's Node installation correctly
under the Windows Bazel test environment.
Why this helps:
- The original incompatibility chain was mostly on the **exec/tool**
side of the graph, not in the Rust test code itself. Moving host tools
to MSVC lets Bazel resolve helper binaries and generators that were not
viable on the gnullvm exec platform.
- Keeping the target platform on gnullvm preserves cfg coverage for the
crates under test, which is important because some Windows behavior
differs between `msvc` and `gnullvm`.
## 2. Teach the repo's Bazel Rust macro about Windows link flags and
integration-test knobs
Files:
- `defs.bzl`
- `codex-rs/core/BUILD.bazel`
- `codex-rs/otel/BUILD.bazel`
- `codex-rs/tui/BUILD.bazel`
What changed:
- Replaced the old gnullvm-only linker flag block with
`WINDOWS_RUSTC_LINK_FLAGS`, which now handles both Windows ABIs:
- gnullvm gets `-C link-arg=-Wl,--stack,8388608`
- MSVC gets `-C link-arg=/STACK:8388608`, `-C
link-arg=/NODEFAULTLIB:libucrt.lib`, and `-C link-arg=ucrt.lib`
- Threaded those Windows link flags into generated `rust_binary`,
unit-test binaries, and integration-test binaries.
- Extended `codex_rust_crate(...)` with:
- `integration_test_args`
- `integration_test_timeout`
- Used those new knobs to:
- mark `//codex-rs/core:core-all-test` as a long-running integration
test
- serialize `//codex-rs/otel:otel-all-test` with `--test-threads=1`
- Added `src/**/*.rs` to `codex-rs/tui` test runfiles, because one
regression test scans source files at runtime and Bazel does not expose
source-tree directories unless they are declared as data.
Why this helps:
- Once host-side MSVC tools are available, we still need the generated
Rust test binaries to link correctly on Windows. The MSVC-side
stack/UCRT flags make those binaries behave more like their Cargo-built
equivalents.
- The integration-test macro knobs avoid hardcoding one-off test
behavior in ad hoc BUILD rules and make the generated test targets more
expressive where Bazel and Cargo have different runtime defaults.
## 3. Patch `rules_rs` / `rules_rust` so Windows MSVC exec-side Rust and
build scripts are actually usable
Files:
- `MODULE.bazel`
- `patches/rules_rs_windows_exec_linker.patch`
- `patches/rules_rust_windows_bootstrap_process_wrapper_linker.patch`
- `patches/rules_rust_windows_build_script_runner_paths.patch`
- `patches/rules_rust_windows_exec_msvc_build_script_env.patch`
- `patches/rules_rust_windows_msvc_direct_link_args.patch`
- `patches/rules_rust_windows_process_wrapper_skip_temp_outputs.patch`
- `patches/BUILD.bazel`
What these patches do:
- `rules_rs_windows_exec_linker.patch`
- Adds a `rust-lld` filegroup for Windows Rust toolchain repos,
symlinked to `lld-link.exe` from `PATH`.
- Marks Windows toolchains as using a direct linker driver.
- Supplies Windows stdlib link flags for both gnullvm and MSVC.
- `rules_rust_windows_bootstrap_process_wrapper_linker.patch`
- For Windows MSVC Rust targets, prefers the Rust toolchain linker over
an inherited C++ linker path like `clang++`.
- This specifically avoids the broken mixed-mode command line where
rustc emits MSVC-style `/NOLOGO` / `/LIBPATH:` / `/OUT:` arguments but
Bazel still invokes `clang++.exe`.
- `rules_rust_windows_build_script_runner_paths.patch`
- Normalizes forward-slash execroot-relative paths into Windows path
separators before joining them on Windows.
- Uses short Windows paths for `RUSTC`, `OUT_DIR`, and the build-script
working directory to avoid path-length and quoting issues in third-party
build scripts.
- Exposes `RULES_RUST_BAZEL_BUILD_SCRIPT_RUNNER=1` to build scripts so
crate-local patches can detect "this is running under Bazel's
build-script runner".
- Fixes the Windows runfiles cleanup filter so generated files with
retained suffixes are actually retained.
- `rules_rust_windows_exec_msvc_build_script_env.patch`
- For exec-side Windows MSVC build scripts, stops force-injecting
Bazel's `CC`, `CXX`, `LD`, `CFLAGS`, and `CXXFLAGS` when that would send
GNU-flavored tool paths/flags into MSVC-oriented Cargo build scripts.
- Rewrites or strips GNU-only `--sysroot`, MinGW include/library paths,
stack-protector, and `_FORTIFY_SOURCE` flags on the MSVC exec path.
- The practical effect is that build scripts can fall back to the Visual
Studio toolchain environment already exported by CI instead of crashing
inside Bazel's hermetic `clang.exe` setup.
- `rules_rust_windows_msvc_direct_link_args.patch`
- When using a direct linker on Windows, stops forwarding GNU driver
flags such as `-L...` and `--sysroot=...` that `lld-link.exe` does not
understand.
- Passes non-`.lib` native artifacts as explicit `-Clink-arg=<path>`
entries when needed.
- Filters C++ runtime libraries to `.lib` artifacts on the Windows
direct-driver path.
- `rules_rust_windows_process_wrapper_skip_temp_outputs.patch`
- Excludes transient `*.tmp*` and `*.rcgu.o` files from process-wrapper
dependency search-path consolidation, so unstable compiler outputs do
not get treated as real link search-path inputs.
Why this helps:
- The host-platform split alone was not enough. Once Bazel started
analyzing/running previously incompatible Rust tests on Windows, the
next failures were in toolchain plumbing:
- MSVC-targeted Rust tests were being linked through `clang++` with
MSVC-style arguments.
- Cargo build scripts running under Bazel's Windows MSVC exec platform
were handed Unix/GNU-flavored path and flag shapes.
- Some generated paths were too long or had path-separator forms that
third-party Windows build scripts did not tolerate.
- These patches make that mixed Bazel/Cargo/Rust/MSVC path workable
enough for the test lane to actually build and run the affected crates.
## 4. Patch third-party crate build scripts that were not robust under
Bazel's Windows MSVC build-script path
Files:
- `MODULE.bazel`
- `patches/aws-lc-sys_windows_msvc_prebuilt_nasm.patch`
- `patches/ring_windows_msvc_include_dirs.patch`
- `patches/zstd-sys_windows_msvc_include_dirs.patch`
What changed:
- `aws-lc-sys`
- Detects Bazel's Windows MSVC build-script runner via
`RULES_RUST_BAZEL_BUILD_SCRIPT_RUNNER` or a `bazel-out` manifest-dir
path.
- Uses `clang-cl` for Bazel Windows MSVC builds when no explicit
`CC`/`CXX` is set.
- Allows prebuilt NASM on the Bazel Windows MSVC path even when `nasm`
is not available directly in the runner environment.
- Avoids canonicalizing `CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR` in the Bazel Windows MSVC
case, because that path may point into Bazel output/runfiles state where
preserving the given path is more reliable than forcing a local
filesystem canonicalization.
- `ring`
- Under the Bazel Windows MSVC build-script runner, copies the
pregenerated source tree into `OUT_DIR` and uses that as the
generated-source root.
- Adds include paths needed by MSVC compilation for
Fiat/curve25519/P-256 generated headers.
- Rewrites a few relative includes in C sources so the added include
directories are sufficient.
- `zstd-sys`
- Adds MSVC-only include directories for `compress`, `decompress`, and
feature-gated dictionary/legacy/seekable sources.
- Skips `-fvisibility=hidden` on MSVC targets, where that
GCC/Clang-style flag is not the right mechanism.
Why this helps:
- After the `rules_rust` plumbing started running build scripts on the
Windows MSVC exec path, some third-party crates still failed for
crate-local reasons: wrong compiler choice, missing include directories,
build-script assumptions about manifest paths, or Unix-only C compiler
flags.
- These crate patches address those crate-local assumptions so the
larger toolchain change can actually reach first-party Rust test
execution.
## 5. Keep the only `.rs` test changes to Bazel/Cargo runfiles parity
Files:
- `codex-rs/tui/src/chatwidget/tests.rs`
- `codex-rs/tui/tests/manager_dependency_regression.rs`
What changed:
- Instead of asking `find_resource!` for a directory runfile like
`src/chatwidget/snapshots` or `src`, these tests now resolve one known
file runfile first and then walk to its parent directory.
Why this helps:
- Bazel runfiles are more reliable for explicitly declared files than
for source-tree directories that happen to exist in a Cargo checkout.
- This keeps the tests working under both Cargo and Bazel without
changing their actual assertions.
# What we tried before landing on this shape, and why those attempts did
not work
## Attempt 1: Force `--host_platform=//:local_windows_msvc` for all
Windows Bazel jobs
This did make the previously incompatible test targets show up during
analysis, but it also pushed the Bazel clippy job and some unrelated
build actions onto the MSVC exec path.
Why that was bad:
- Windows clippy started running third-party Cargo build scripts with
Bazel's MSVC exec settings and crashed in crates such as `tree-sitter`
and `libsqlite3-sys`.
- That was a regression in a job that was previously giving useful
gnullvm-targeted lint signal.
What this PR does instead:
- The wrapper flag is opt-in, and `bazel.yml` uses it only for the
Windows `bazel test` lane.
- The clippy lane stays on the default Windows gnullvm host/exec
configuration.
## Attempt 2: Broaden the `rules_rust` linker override to all Windows
Rust actions
This fixed the MSVC test-lane failure where normal `rust_test` targets
were linked through `clang++` with MSVC-style arguments, but it broke
the default gnullvm path.
Why that was bad:
-
`@@rules_rs++rules_rust+rules_rust//util/process_wrapper:process_wrapper`
on the gnullvm exec platform started linking with `lld-link.exe` and
then failed to resolve MinGW-style libraries such as `-lkernel32`,
`-luser32`, and `-lmingw32`.
What this PR does instead:
- The linker override is restricted to Windows MSVC targets only.
- The gnullvm path keeps its original linker behavior, while MSVC uses
the direct Windows linker.
## Attempt 3: Keep everything on pure Windows gnullvm and patch the V8 /
Python incompatibility chain instead
This would have preserved a single Windows ABI everywhere, but it is a
much larger project than this PR.
Why that was not the practical first step:
- The original incompatibility chain ran through exec-side generators
and helper tools, not only through crate code.
- `third_party/v8` is already special-cased on Windows gnullvm because
`rusty_v8` only publishes Windows prebuilts under MSVC names.
- Fixing that path likely means deeper changes in
V8/rules_python/rules_rust toolchain resolution and generator execution,
not just one local CI flag.
What this PR does instead:
- Keep gnullvm for the target cfgs we want to exercise.
- Move only the Windows test lane's host/exec platform to MSVC, then
patch the build-script/linker boundary enough for that split
configuration to work.
## Attempt 4: Validate compatibility with `bazel test --nobuild ...`
This turned out to be a misleading local validation command.
Why:
- `bazel test --nobuild ...` can successfully analyze targets and then
still exit 1 with "Couldn't start the build. Unable to run tests"
because there are no runnable test actions after `--nobuild`.
Better local check:
```powershell
bazel build --nobuild --keep_going --host_platform=//:local_windows_msvc //codex-rs/login:login-unit-tests //codex-rs/core:core-unit-tests //codex-rs/core:core-all-test
```
# Which patches probably deserve upstream follow-up
My rough take is that the `rules_rs` / `rules_rust` patches are the
highest-value upstream candidates, because they are fixing generic
Windows host/exec + MSVC direct-linker behavior rather than
Codex-specific test logic.
Strong upstream candidates:
- `patches/rules_rs_windows_exec_linker.patch`
- `patches/rules_rust_windows_bootstrap_process_wrapper_linker.patch`
- `patches/rules_rust_windows_build_script_runner_paths.patch`
- `patches/rules_rust_windows_exec_msvc_build_script_env.patch`
- `patches/rules_rust_windows_msvc_direct_link_args.patch`
- `patches/rules_rust_windows_process_wrapper_skip_temp_outputs.patch`
Why these seem upstreamable:
- They address general-purpose problems in the Windows MSVC exec path:
- missing direct-linker exposure for Rust toolchains
- wrong linker selection when rustc emits MSVC-style args
- Windows path normalization/short-path issues in the build-script
runner
- forwarding GNU-flavored CC/link flags into MSVC Cargo build scripts
- unstable temp outputs polluting process-wrapper search-path state
Potentially upstreamable crate patches, but likely with more care:
- `patches/zstd-sys_windows_msvc_include_dirs.patch`
- `patches/ring_windows_msvc_include_dirs.patch`
- `patches/aws-lc-sys_windows_msvc_prebuilt_nasm.patch`
Notes on those:
- The `zstd-sys` and `ring` include-path fixes look fairly generic for
MSVC/Bazel build-script environments and may be straightforward to
propose upstream after we confirm CI stability.
- The `aws-lc-sys` patch is useful, but it includes a Bazel-specific
environment probe and CI-specific compiler fallback behavior. That
probably needs a cleaner upstream-facing shape before sending it out, so
upstream maintainers are not forced to adopt Codex's exact CI
assumptions.
Probably not worth upstreaming as-is:
- The repo-local Starlark/test target changes in `defs.bzl`,
`codex-rs/*/BUILD.bazel`, and `.github/scripts/run-bazel-ci.sh` are
mostly Codex-specific policy and CI wiring, not generic rules changes.
# Validation notes for reviewers
On this branch, I ran the following local checks after dropping the
non-resource-loading Rust edits:
```powershell
cargo test -p codex-tui
just --shell 'C:\Program Files\Git\bin\bash.exe' --shell-arg -lc -- fix -p codex-tui
python .\tools\argument-comment-lint\run-prebuilt-linter.py -p codex-tui
just --shell 'C:\Program Files\Git\bin\bash.exe' --shell-arg -lc fmt
```
One local caveat:
- `just argument-comment-lint` still fails on this Windows machine for
an unrelated Bazel toolchain-resolution issue in
`//codex-rs/exec:exec-all-test`, so I used the direct prebuilt linter
for `codex-tui` as the local fallback.
# Expected reviewer takeaway
If this PR goes green, the important conclusion is that the Windows
Bazel test coverage gap was primarily a Bazel host/exec toolchain
problem, not a need to make the Rust tests themselves Windows-specific.
That would be a strong signal that the deleted non-resource-loading Rust
test edits from the earlier branch should stay out, and that future work
should focus on upstreaming the generic `rules_rs` / `rules_rust`
Windows fixes and reducing the crate-local patch surface.
## Why
Follow-up to #16345, the Bazel clippy rollout in #15955, and the cleanup
pass in #16353.
`cargo clippy` was enforcing the workspace deny-list from
`codex-rs/Cargo.toml` because the member crates opt into `[lints]
workspace = true`, but Bazel clippy was only using `rules_rust` plus
`clippy.toml`. That left the Bazel lane vulnerable to drift:
`clippy.toml` can tune lint behavior, but it cannot set
allow/warn/deny/forbid levels.
This PR now closes both sides of the follow-up. It keeps `.bazelrc` in
sync with `[workspace.lints.clippy]`, and it fixes the real clippy
violations that the newly-synced Windows Bazel lane surfaced once that
deny-list started matching Cargo.
## What Changed
- added `.github/scripts/verify_bazel_clippy_lints.py`, a Python check
that parses `codex-rs/Cargo.toml` with `tomllib`, reads the Bazel
`build:clippy` `clippy_flag` entries from `.bazelrc`, and reports
missing, extra, or mismatched lint levels
- ran that verifier from the lightweight `ci.yml` workflow so the sync
check does not depend on a Rust toolchain being installed first
- expanded the `.bazelrc` comment to explain the Cargo `workspace =
true` linkage and why Bazel needs the deny-list duplicated explicitly
- fixed the Windows-only `codex-windows-sandbox` violations that Bazel
clippy reported after the sync, using the same style as #16353: inline
`format!` args, method references instead of trivial closures, removed
redundant clones, and replaced SID conversion `unwrap` and `expect`
calls with proper errors
- cleaned up the remaining cross-platform violations the Bazel lane
exposed in `codex-backend-client` and `core_test_support`
## Testing
Key new test introduced by this PR:
`python3 .github/scripts/verify_bazel_clippy_lints.py`
## Why
Bazel clippy now catches lints that `cargo clippy` can still miss when a
crate under `codex-rs` forgets to opt into workspace lints. The concrete
example here was `codex-rs/app-server/tests/common/Cargo.toml`: Bazel
flagged a clippy violation in `models_cache.rs`, but Cargo did not
because that crate inherited workspace package metadata without
declaring `[lints] workspace = true`.
We already mirror the workspace clippy deny list into Bazel after
[#15955](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/15955), so we also need a
repo-side check that keeps every `codex-rs` manifest opted into the same
workspace settings.
## What changed
- add `.github/scripts/verify_cargo_workspace_manifests.py`, which
parses every `codex-rs/**/Cargo.toml` with `tomllib` and verifies:
- `version.workspace = true`
- `edition.workspace = true`
- `license.workspace = true`
- `[lints] workspace = true`
- top-level crate names follow the `codex-*` / `codex-utils-*`
conventions, with explicit exceptions for `windows-sandbox-rs` and
`utils/path-utils`
- run that script in `.github/workflows/ci.yml`
- update the current outlier manifests so the check is enforceable
immediately
- fix the newly exposed clippy violations in the affected crates
(`app-server/tests/common`, `file-search`, `feedback`,
`shell-escalation`, and `debug-client`)
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/16353).
* #16351
* __->__ #16353
## Why
The initial `argument-comment-lint` rollout left Windows on
default-target coverage because there were still Windows-only callsites
failing under `--all-targets`. This follow-up cleans up those remaining
Windows-specific violations so the Windows CI lane can enforce the same
stricter coverage, leaving Linux as the remaining platform-specific
follow-up.
## What changed
- switched the Windows `rust-ci` argument-comment-lint step back to the
default wrapper invocation so it runs full-target coverage again
- added the required `/*param_name*/` annotations at Windows-gated
literal callsites in:
- `codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/lib.rs`
- `codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/elevated_impl.rs`
- `codex-rs/tui_app_server/src/multi_agents.rs`
- `codex-rs/network-proxy/src/proxy.rs`
## Validation
- Windows `argument comment lint` CI on this PR
## Why
`codex-utils-pty` and `codex-windows-sandbox` were the remaining crates
in `codex-rs` that still overrode the workspace's Rust 2024 edition.
Moving them forward in a separate PR keeps the baseline edition update
isolated from the follow-on Bazel clippy workflow in #15955, while
making linting and formatting behavior consistent with the rest of the
workspace.
This PR also needs Cargo and Bazel to agree on the edition for
`codex-windows-sandbox`. Without the Bazel-side sync, the experimental
Bazel app-server builds fail once they compile `windows-sandbox-rs`.
## What changed
- switch `codex-rs/utils/pty` and `codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs` to
`edition = "2024"`
- update `codex-utils-pty` callsites and tests to use the collapsed `if
let` form that Clippy expects under the new edition
- fix the Rust 2024 fallout in `windows-sandbox-rs`, including the
reserved `gen` identifier, `unsafe extern` requirements, and new Clippy
findings that surfaced under the edition bump
- keep the edition bump separate from a larger unsafe cleanup by
temporarily allowing `unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn` in the Windows entrypoint
modules that now report it under Rust 2024
- update `codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/BUILD.bazel` to `crate_edition =
"2024"` so Bazel compiles the crate with the same edition as Cargo
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/15954).
* #15976
* #15955
* __->__ #15954
## Summary
This PR makes Windows sandbox proxying enforceable by routing proxy-only
runs through the existing `offline` sandbox user and reserving direct
network access for the existing `online` sandbox user.
In brief:
- if a Windows sandbox run should be proxy-enforced, we run it as the
`offline` user
- the `offline` user gets firewall rules that block direct outbound
traffic and only permit the configured localhost proxy path
- if a Windows sandbox run should have true direct network access, we
run it as the `online` user
- no new sandbox identity is introduced
This brings Windows in line with the intended model: proxy use is not
just env-based, it is backed by OS-level egress controls. Windows
already has two sandbox identities:
- `offline`: intended to have no direct network egress
- `online`: intended to have full network access
This PR makes proxy-enforced runs use that model directly.
### Proxy-enforced runs
When proxy enforcement is active:
- the run is assigned to the `offline` identity
- setup extracts the loopback proxy ports from the sandbox env
- Windows setup programs firewall rules for the `offline` user that:
- block all non-loopback outbound traffic
- block loopback UDP
- block loopback TCP except for the configured proxy ports
- optionally allow broader localhost access when `allow_local_binding=1`
So the sandboxed process can only talk to the local proxy. It cannot
open direct outbound sockets or do local UDP-based DNS on its own.The
proxy then performs the real outbound network access outside that
restricted sandbox identity.
### Direct-network runs
When proxy enforcement is not active and full network access is allowed:
- the run is assigned to the `online` identity
- no proxy-only firewall restrictions are applied
- the process gets normal direct network access
### Unelevated vs elevated
The restricted-token / unelevated path cannot enforce per-identity
firewall policy by itself.
So for Windows proxy-enforced runs, we transparently use the logon-user
sandbox path under the hood, even if the caller started from the
unelevated mode. That keeps enforcement real instead of best-effort.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- keep legacy Windows restricted-token sandboxing as the supported
baseline
- support the split-policy subset that restricted-token can enforce
directly today
- support full-disk read, the same writable root set as legacy
`WorkspaceWrite`, and extra read-only carveouts under those writable
roots via additional deny-write ACLs
- continue to fail closed for unsupported split-only shapes, including
explicit unreadable (`none`) carveouts, reopened writable descendants
under read-only carveouts, and writable root sets that do not match the
legacy workspace roots
## Example
Given a filesystem policy like:
```toml
":root" = "read"
":cwd" = "write"
"./docs" = "read"
```
the restricted-token backend can keep the workspace writable while
denying writes under `docs` by layering an extra deny-write carveout on
top of the legacy workspace-write roots.
A policy like:
```toml
"/workspace" = "write"
"/workspace/docs" = "read"
"/workspace/docs/tmp" = "write"
```
still fails closed, because the unelevated backend cannot reopen the
nested writable descendant safely.
## Stack
-> fix: support split carveouts in windows restricted-token sandbox
#14172
fix: support split carveouts in windows elevated sandbox #14568
## Why
The argument-comment lint now has a packaged DotSlash artifact from
[#15198](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/15198), so the normal repo
lint path should use that released payload instead of rebuilding the
lint from source every time.
That keeps `just clippy` and CI aligned with the shipped artifact while
preserving a separate source-build path for people actively hacking on
the lint crate.
The current alpha package also exposed two integration wrinkles that the
repo-side prebuilt wrapper needs to smooth over:
- the bundled Dylint library filename includes the host triple, for
example `@nightly-2025-09-18-aarch64-apple-darwin`, and Dylint derives
`RUSTUP_TOOLCHAIN` from that filename
- on Windows, Dylint's driver path also expects `RUSTUP_HOME` to be
present in the environment
Without those adjustments, the prebuilt CI jobs fail during `cargo
metadata` or driver setup. This change makes the checked-in prebuilt
wrapper normalize the packaged library name to the plain
`nightly-2025-09-18` channel before invoking `cargo-dylint`, and it
teaches both the wrapper and the packaged runner source to infer
`RUSTUP_HOME` from `rustup show home` when the environment does not
already provide it.
After the prebuilt Windows lint job started running successfully, it
also surfaced a handful of existing anonymous literal callsites in
`windows-sandbox-rs`. This PR now annotates those callsites so the new
cross-platform lint job is green on the current tree.
## What Changed
- checked in the current
`tools/argument-comment-lint/argument-comment-lint` DotSlash manifest
- kept `tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` as the source-build wrapper
for lint development
- added `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` as the
normal enforcement path, using the checked-in DotSlash package and
bundled `cargo-dylint`
- updated `just clippy` and `just argument-comment-lint` to use the
prebuilt wrapper
- split `.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml` so source-package checks live in
a dedicated `argument_comment_lint_package` job, while the released lint
runs in an `argument_comment_lint_prebuilt` matrix on Linux, macOS, and
Windows
- kept the pinned `nightly-2025-09-18` toolchain install in the prebuilt
CI matrix, since the prebuilt package still relies on rustup-provided
toolchain components
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` to
normalize host-qualified nightly library filenames, keep the `rustup`
shim directory ahead of direct toolchain `cargo` binaries, and export
`RUSTUP_HOME` when needed for Windows Dylint driver setup
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/src/bin/argument-comment-lint.rs`
so future published DotSlash artifacts apply the same nightly-filename
normalization and `RUSTUP_HOME` inference internally
- fixed the remaining Windows lint violations in
`codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs` by adding the required `/*param*/`
comments at the reported callsites
- documented the checked-in DotSlash file, wrapper split, archive
layout, nightly prerequisite, and Windows `RUSTUP_HOME` requirement in
`tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`
## Summary
- support legacy `ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted` on Windows in the elevated
setup/runner backend
- keep the unelevated restricted-token backend on the legacy full-read
model only, and fail closed for restricted read-only policies there
- keep the legacy full-read Windows path unchanged while deriving
narrower read roots only for elevated restricted-read policies
- honor `include_platform_defaults` by adding backend-managed Windows
system roots only when requested, while always keeping helper roots and
the command `cwd` readable
- preserve `workspace-write` semantics by keeping writable roots
readable when restricted read access is in use in the elevated backend
- document the current Windows boundary: legacy `SandboxPolicy` is
supported on both backends, while richer split-only carveouts still fail
closed instead of running with weaker enforcement
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox --tests --target
x86_64-pc-windows-msvc`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-windows-sandbox --tests --target
x86_64-pc-windows-msvc -- -D warnings`
- `cargo test -p codex-core windows_restricted_token_`
## Notes
- local `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox` on macOS only exercises
the non-Windows stubs; the Windows-targeted compile and clippy runs
provide the local signal, and GitHub Windows CI exercises the runtime
path
## Summary
This is PR 2 of the Windows sandbox runner split.
PR 1 introduced the framed IPC runner foundation and related Windows
sandbox infrastructure without changing the active elevated one-shot
execution path. This PR switches that elevated one-shot path over to the
new runner IPC transport and removes the old request-file bootstrap that
PR 1 intentionally left in place.
After this change, ordinary elevated Windows sandbox commands still
behave as one-shot executions, but they now run as the simple case of
the same helper/IPC transport that later unified_exec work will build
on.
## Why this is needed for unified_exec
Windows elevated sandboxed execution crosses a user boundary: the CLI
launches a helper as the sandbox user and has to manage command
execution from outside that security context. For one-shot commands, the
old request-file/bootstrap flow was sufficient. For unified_exec, it is
not.
Unified_exec needs a long-lived bidirectional channel so the parent can:
- send a spawn request
- receive structured spawn success/failure
- stream stdout and stderr incrementally
- eventually support stdin writes, termination, and other session
lifecycle events
This PR does not add long-lived sessions yet. It converts the existing
elevated one-shot path to use the same framed IPC transport so that PR 3
can add unified_exec session semantics on top of a transport that is
already exercised by normal elevated command execution.
## Scope
This PR:
- updates `windows-sandbox-rs/src/elevated_impl.rs` to launch the runner
with named pipes, send a framed `SpawnRequest`, wait for `SpawnReady`,
and collect framed `Output`/`Exit` messages
- removes the old `--request-file=...` execution path from
`windows-sandbox-rs/src/elevated/command_runner_win.rs`
- keeps the public behavior one-shot: no session reuse or interactive
unified_exec behavior is introduced here
This PR does not:
- add Windows unified_exec session support
- add background terminal reuse
- add PTY session lifecycle management
## Why Windows needs this and Linux/macOS do not
On Linux and macOS, the existing sandbox/process model composes much
more directly with long-lived process control. The parent can generally
spawn and own the child process (or PTY) directly inside the sandbox
model we already use.
Windows elevated sandboxing is different. The parent is not directly
managing the sandboxed process in the same way; it launches across a
different user/security context. That means long-lived control requires
an explicit helper process plus IPC for spawn, output, exit, and later
stdin/session control.
So the extra machinery here is not because unified_exec is conceptually
different on Windows. It is because the elevated Windows sandbox
boundary requires a helper-mediated transport to support it cleanly.
## Validation
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
# Summary
This PR introduces the Windows sandbox runner IPC foundation that later
unified_exec work will build on.
The key point is that this is intentionally infrastructure-only. The new
IPC transport, runner plumbing, and ConPTY helpers are added here, but
the active elevated Windows sandbox path still uses the existing
request-file bootstrap. In other words, this change prepares the
transport and module layout we need for unified_exec without switching
production behavior over yet.
Part of this PR is also a source-layout cleanup: some Windows sandbox
files are moved into more explicit `elevated/`, `conpty/`, and shared
locations so it is clearer which code is for the elevated sandbox flow,
which code is legacy/direct-spawn behavior, and which helpers are shared
between them. That reorganization is intentional in this first PR so
later behavioral changes do not also have to carry a large amount of
file-move churn.
# Why This Is Needed For unified_exec
Windows elevated sandboxed unified_exec needs a long-lived,
bidirectional control channel between the CLI and a helper process
running under the sandbox user. That channel has to support:
- starting a process and reporting structured spawn success/failure
- streaming stdout/stderr back incrementally
- forwarding stdin over time
- terminating or polling a long-lived process
- supporting both pipe-backed and PTY-backed sessions
The existing elevated one-shot path is built around a request-file
bootstrap and does not provide those primitives cleanly. Before we can
turn on Windows sandbox unified_exec, we need the underlying runner
protocol and transport layer that can carry those lifecycle events and
streams.
# Why Windows Needs More Machinery Than Linux Or macOS
Linux and macOS can generally build unified_exec on top of the existing
sandbox/process model: the parent can spawn the child directly, retain
normal ownership of stdio or PTY handles, and manage the lifetime of the
sandboxed process without introducing a second control process.
Windows elevated sandboxing is different. To run inside the sandbox
boundary, we cross into a different user/security context and then need
to manage a long-lived process from outside that boundary. That means we
need an explicit helper process plus an IPC transport to carry spawn,
stdin, output, and exit events back and forth. The extra code here is
mostly that missing Windows sandbox infrastructure, not a conceptual
difference in unified_exec itself.
# What This PR Adds
- the framed IPC message types and transport helpers for parent <->
runner communication
- the renamed Windows command runner with both the existing request-file
bootstrap and the dormant IPC bootstrap
- named-pipe helpers for the elevated runner path
- ConPTY helpers and process-thread attribute plumbing needed for
PTY-backed sessions
- shared sandbox/process helpers that later PRs will reuse when
switching live execution paths over
- early file/module moves so later PRs can focus on behavior rather than
layout churn
# What This PR Does Not Yet Do
- it does not switch the active elevated one-shot path over to IPC yet
- it does not enable Windows sandbox unified_exec yet
- it does not remove the existing request-file bootstrap yet
So while this code compiles and the new path has basic validation, it is
not yet the exercised production path. That is intentional for this
first PR: the goal here is to land the transport and runner foundation
cleanly before later PRs start routing real command execution through
it.
# Follow-Ups
Planned follow-up PRs will:
1. switch elevated one-shot Windows sandbox execution to the new runner
IPC path
2. layer Windows sandbox unified_exec sessions on top of the same
transport
3. remove the legacy request-file path once the IPC-based path is live
# Validation
- `cargo build -p codex-windows-sandbox`
## Summary
- launch Windows sandboxed children on a private desktop instead of
`Winsta0\Default`
- make private desktop the default while keeping
`windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false` as the escape hatch
- centralize process launch through the shared
`create_process_as_user(...)` path
- scope the private desktop ACL to the launching logon SID
## Why
Today sandboxed Windows commands run on the visible shared desktop. That
leaves an avoidable same-desktop attack surface for window interaction,
spoofing, and related UI/input issues. This change moves sandboxed
commands onto a dedicated per-launch desktop by default so the sandbox
no longer shares `Winsta0\Default` with the user session.
The implementation stays conservative on security with no silent
fallback back to `Winsta0\Default`
If private-desktop setup fails on a machine, users can still opt out
explicitly with `windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false`.
## Validation
- `cargo build -p codex-cli`
- elevated-path `codex exec` desktop-name probe returned
`CodexSandboxDesktop-*`
- elevated-path `codex exec` smoke sweep for shell commands, nested
`pwsh`, jobs, and hidden `notepad` launch
- unelevated-path full private-desktop compatibility sweep via `codex
exec` with `-c windows.sandbox=unelevated`
We do this for codex-command-runner.exe as well for the same reason.
Windows sandbox users cannot execute binaries in the WindowsApp/
installed directory for the Codex App. This causes apply-patch to fail
because it tries to execute codex.exe as the sandbox user.
• Keep Windows sandbox runner launches working from packaged installs by
running the helper from a user-owned runtime location.
On some Windows installs, the packaged helper location is difficult to
use reliably for sandboxed runner launches even though the binaries are
present. This change works around that by copying codex-
command-runner.exe into CODEX_HOME/.sandbox-bin/, reusing that copy
across launches, and falling back to the existing packaged-path lookup
if anything goes wrong.
The runtime copy lives in a dedicated directory with tighter ACLs than
.sandbox: sandbox users can read and execute the runner there, but they
cannot modify it. This keeps the workaround focused on the
command runner, leaves the setup helper on its trusted packaged path,
and adds logging so it is clear which runner path was selected at
launch.
The Mac and Linux implementations of the sandbox recently added write
protections for `.codex` and `.agents` subdirectories in all writable
roots. When adding documentation for this, I noticed that this change
was never made for the Windows sandbox.
Summary
- make compute_allow_paths treat .codex/.agents as protected alongside
.git, and cover their behavior in new tests
- wire protect_workspace_agents_dir through the sandbox lib and setup
path to apply deny ACEs when `.agents` exists
- factor shared ACL logic for workspace subdirectories
There is an edge case where a directory is not readable by the sandbox.
In practice, we've seen very little of it, but it can happen so this
slash command unlocks users when it does.
Future idea is to make this a tool that the agent knows about so it can
be more integrated.
`SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` previously implied broad read access and could
not express a narrower read surface.
This change introduces an explicit read-access model so we can support
user-configurable read restrictions in follow-up work, while preserving
current behavior today.
It also ensures unsupported backends fail closed for restricted-read
policies instead of silently granting broader access than intended.
## What
- Added `ReadOnlyAccess` in protocol with:
- `Restricted { include_platform_defaults, readable_roots }`
- `FullAccess`
- Updated `SandboxPolicy` to carry read-access configuration:
- `ReadOnly { access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
- `WorkspaceWrite { ..., read_only_access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
- Preserved existing behavior by defaulting current construction paths
to `ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess`.
- Threaded the new fields through sandbox policy consumers and call
sites across `core`, `tui`, `linux-sandbox`, `windows-sandbox`, and
related tests.
- Updated Seatbelt policy generation to honor restricted read roots by
emitting scoped read rules when full read access is not granted.
- Added fail-closed behavior on Linux and Windows backends when
restricted read access is requested but not yet implemented there
(`UnsupportedOperation`).
- Regenerated app-server protocol schema and TypeScript artifacts,
including `ReadOnlyAccess`.
## Compatibility / rollout
- Runtime behavior remains unchanged by default (`FullAccess`).
- API/schema changes are in place so future config wiring can enable
restricted read access without another policy-shape migration.
These leaked into the repo:
- #4905 `codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/Cargo.lock`
- #5391 `codex-rs/app-server-test-client/Cargo.lock`
Note that these affect cache keys such as:
9722567a80/.github/workflows/rust-release.yml (L154)
so it seems best to remove them.
1. Move Windows Sandbox NUX to right after trust directory screen
2. Don't offer read-only as an option in Sandbox NUX.
Elevated/Legacy/Quit
3. Don't allow new untrusted directories. It's trust or quit
4. move experimental sandbox features to `[windows]
sandbox="elevated|unelevatd"`
5. Copy tweaks = elevated -> default, non-elevated -> non-admin
calculated a hashed user ID from either auth user id or API key
Also correctly populates OS.
These will make our metrics more useful and powerful for analysis.
Today, there is a single capability SID that allows the sandbox to write
to
* workspace (cwd)
* tmp directories if enabled
* additional writable roots
This change splits those up, so that each workspace has its own
capability SID, while tmp and additional roots, which are
installation-wide, are still governed by the "generic" capability SID
This isolates workspaces from each other in terms of sandbox write
access.
Also allows us to protect <cwd>/.codex when codex runs in a specific
<cwd>
Currently `apply_patch` will fail on Windows if the file contents happen
to have a multi-byte character at the point where the `preview` function
truncates.
I've used the existing `take_bytes_at_char_boundary` helper and added a
regression test (that fails without the fix).
This is related to #4013 but doesn't fix it.
## Summary
- Remove elevated runner request files after read (best-effort cleanup
on errors)
- Add a unit test to cover request file lifecycle
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox` (Windows)
Fixes#9315
This fixes a bug where the elevated sandbox setup encrypts sandbox user
passwords as an admin user, but normal command execution attempts to
decrypt them as a different user.
Machine scope allows all users to encyrpt/decrypt
this PR also moves the encrypted file to a different location
.codex/.sandbox-secrets which the sandbox users cannot read.
## Summary
- Use `std::env::split_paths` to parse PATH entries in audit candidate
collection
- Add a unit test covering multiple PATH entries (including spaces)
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox` (Windows)
Fixes#9317
## Summary
- Deny `.git` entries under writable roots even when `.git` is a file
(worktrees/submodules)
- Add a unit test for `.git` file handling
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox` (Windows)
Fixes#9313
The elevated setup does not work on non-English windows installs where
Users/Administrators/etc are in different languages. This PR uses the
well-known SIDs instead, which do not vary based on locale
## Summary
Bumps the windows setup version, to re-trigger windows sandbox setup for
users in the experimental sandbox. We've seen some drift in the ACL
controls, amongst a few other changes. Hopefully this should fix#9062.
## Testing
- [x] Tested locally
This PR configures Codex CLI so it can be built with
[Bazel](https://bazel.build) in addition to Cargo. The `.bazelrc`
includes configuration so that remote builds can be done using
[BuildBuddy](https://www.buildbuddy.io).
If you are familiar with Bazel, things should work as you expect, e.g.,
run `bazel test //... --keep-going` to run all the tests in the repo,
but we have also added some new aliases in the `justfile` for
convenience:
- `just bazel-test` to run tests locally
- `just bazel-remote-test` to run tests remotely (currently, the remote
build is for x86_64 Linux regardless of your host platform). Note we are
currently seeing the following test failures in the remote build, so we
still need to figure out what is happening here:
```
failures:
suite::compact::manual_compact_twice_preserves_latest_user_messages
suite::compact_resume_fork::compact_resume_after_second_compaction_preserves_history
suite::compact_resume_fork::compact_resume_and_fork_preserve_model_history_view
```
- `just build-for-release` to build release binaries for all
platforms/architectures remotely
To setup remote execution:
- [Create a buildbuddy account](https://app.buildbuddy.io/) (OpenAI
employees should also request org access at
https://openai.buildbuddy.io/join/ with their `@openai.com` email
address.)
- [Copy your API key](https://app.buildbuddy.io/docs/setup/) to
`~/.bazelrc` (add the line `build
--remote_header=x-buildbuddy-api-key=YOUR_KEY`)
- Use `--config=remote` in your `bazel` invocations (or add `common
--config=remote` to your `~/.bazelrc`, or use the `just` commands)
## CI
In terms of CI, this PR introduces `.github/workflows/bazel.yml`, which
uses Bazel to run the tests _locally_ on Mac and Linux GitHub runners
(we are working on supporting Windows, but that is not ready yet). Note
that the failures we are seeing in `just bazel-remote-test` do not occur
on these GitHub CI jobs, so everything in `.github/workflows/bazel.yml`
is green right now.
The `bazel.yml` uses extra config in `.github/workflows/ci.bazelrc` so
that macOS CI jobs build _remotely_ on Linux hosts (using the
`docker://docker.io/mbolin491/codex-bazel` Docker image declared in the
root `BUILD.bazel`) using cross-compilation to build the macOS
artifacts. Then these artifacts are downloaded locally to GitHub's macOS
runner so the tests can be executed natively. This is the relevant
config that enables this:
```
common:macos --config=remote
common:macos --strategy=remote
common:macos --strategy=TestRunner=darwin-sandbox,local
```
Because of the remote caching benefits we get from BuildBuddy, these new
CI jobs can be extremely fast! For example, consider these two jobs that
ran all the tests on Linux x86_64:
- Bazel 1m37s
https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/20861063212/job/59940545209?pr=8875
- Cargo 9m20s
https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/20861063192/job/59940559592?pr=8875
For now, we will continue to run both the Bazel and Cargo jobs for PRs,
but once we add support for Windows and running Clippy, we should be
able to cutover to using Bazel exclusively for PRs, which should still
speed things up considerably. We will probably continue to run the Cargo
jobs post-merge for commits that land on `main` as a sanity check.
Release builds will also continue to be done by Cargo for now.
Earlier attempt at this PR: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/8832
Earlier attempt to add support for Buck2, now abandoned:
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/8504
---------
Co-authored-by: David Zbarsky <dzbarsky@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
Elevated Sandbox NUX:
* prompt for elevated sandbox setup when agent mode is selected (via
/approvals or at startup)
* prompt for degraded sandbox if elevated setup is declined or fails
* introduce /elevate-sandbox command to upgrade from degraded
experience.
The elevated sandbox creates two new Windows users - CodexSandboxOffline
and CodexSandboxOnline. This is necessary, so this PR does all that it
can to "hide" those users. It uses the registry plus directory flags (on
their home directories) to get them to show up as little as possible.
Never treat .codex or .codex/.sandbox as a workspace root.
Handle write permissions to .codex/.sandbox in a single method so that
the sandbox setup/runner can write logs and other setup files to that
directory.
This is more future-proof if we ever decide to add additional Sandbox
Users for new functionality
This also moves some more user-related code into a new file for code
cleanliness
I attempted to build codex on LoongArch Linux and encountered
compilation errors.
After investigation, the errors were traced to certain `windows-sys`
features
which rely on platform-specific cfgs that only support x86 and aarch64.
With this change applied, the project now builds and runs successfully
on my
platform:
- OS: AOSC OS (loongarch64)
- Kernel: Linux 6.17
- CPU: Loongson-3A6000
Please let me know if this approach is reasonable, or if there is a
better way
to support additional platforms.
The elevated setup synchronously applies read/write ACLs to any
workspace roots.
However, until we apply *read* permission to the full path, powershell
cannot use some roots as a cwd as it needs access to all parts of the
path in order to apply it as the working directory for a command.
The solution is, while the async read-ACL part of setup is running, use
a "junction" that lives in C:\Users\CodexSandbox{Offline|Online} that
points to the cwd.
Once the read ACLs are applied, we stop using the junction.
-----
this PR also removes some dead code and overly-verbose logging, and has
some light refactoring to the ACL-related functions
## Description
Introduced `ExternalSandbox` policy to cover use case when sandbox
defined by outside environment, effectively it translates to
`SandboxMode#DangerFullAccess` for file system (since sandbox configured
on container level) and configurable `network_access` (either Restricted
or Enabled by outside environment).
as example you can configure `ExternalSandbox` policy as part of
`sendUserTurn` v1 app_server API:
```
{
"conversationId": <id>,
"cwd": <cwd>,
"approvalPolicy": "never",
"sandboxPolicy": {
"type": ""external-sandbox",
"network_access": "enabled"/"restricted"
},
"model": <model>,
"effort": <effort>,
....
}
```
when granting read access to the sandbox user, grant the
codex/command-runner exe directory first so commands can run before the
entire read ACL process is finished.
- Batch read ACL creation for online/offline sandbox user
- creates a new ACL helper process that is long-lived and runs in the
background
- uses a mutex so that only one helper process is running at a time.
