2 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
viyatb-oai	04892b4ceb	refactor: make bubblewrap the default Linux sandbox (#13996) ... ## Summary - make bubblewrap the default Linux sandbox and keep `use_legacy_landlock` as the only override - remove `use_linux_sandbox_bwrap` from feature, config, schema, and docs surfaces - update Linux sandbox selection, CLI/config plumbing, and related tests/docs to match the new default - fold in the follow-up CI fixes for request-permissions responses and Linux read-only sandbox error text	2026-03-11 23:31:18 -07:00
viyatb-oai	b3202cbd58	feat(linux-sandbox): implement proxy-only egress via TCP-UDS-TCP bridge (#11293) ... ## Summary - Implement Linux proxy-only routing in `codex-rs/linux-sandbox` with a two-stage bridge: host namespace `loopback TCP proxy endpoint -> UDS`, then bwrap netns `loopback TCP listener -> host UDS`. - Add hidden `--proxy-route-spec` plumbing for outer-to-inner stage handoff. - Fail closed in proxy mode when no valid loopback proxy endpoints can be routed. - Introduce explicit network seccomp modes: `Restricted` (legacy restricted networking) and `ProxyRouted` (allow INET/INET6 for routed proxy access, deny `AF_UNIX` and `socketpair`). - Enforce that proxy bridge/routing is bwrap-only by validating `--apply-seccomp-then-exec` requires `--use-bwrap-sandbox`. - Keep landlock-only flows unchanged (no proxy bridge behavior outside bwrap). --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-02-21 18:16:34 +00:00