## Problem
App-server clients could only initiate ChatGPT login through the browser
callback flow, even though the shared login crate already supports
device-code auth. That left VS Code, Codex App, and other app-server
clients without a first-class way to use the existing device-code
backend when browser redirects are brittle or when the client UX wants
to own the login ceremony.
## Mental model
This change adds a second ChatGPT login start path to app-server:
clients can now call `account/login/start` with `type:
"chatgptDeviceCode"`. App-server immediately returns a `loginId` plus
the device-code UX payload (`verificationUrl` and `userCode`), then
completes the login asynchronously in the background using the existing
`codex_login` polling flow. Successful device-code login still resolves
to ordinary `chatgpt` auth, and completion continues to flow through the
existing `account/login/completed` and `account/updated` notifications.
## Non-goals
This does not introduce a new auth mode, a new account shape, or a
device-code eligibility discovery API. It also does not add automatic
fallback to browser login in core; clients remain responsible for
choosing when to request device code and whether to retry with a
different UX if the backend/admin policy rejects it.
## Tradeoffs
We intentionally keep `login_chatgpt_common` as a local validation
helper instead of turning it into a capability probe. Device-code
eligibility is checked by actually calling `request_device_code`, which
means policy-disabled cases surface as an immediate request error rather
than an async completion event. We also keep the active-login state
machine minimal: browser and device-code logins share the same public
cancel contract, but device-code cancellation is implemented with a
local cancel token rather than a larger cross-crate refactor.
## Architecture
The protocol grows a new `chatgptDeviceCode` request/response variant in
app-server v2. On the server side, the new handler reuses the existing
ChatGPT login precondition checks, calls `request_device_code`, returns
the device-code payload, and then spawns a background task that waits on
either cancellation or `complete_device_code_login`. On success, it
reuses the existing auth reload and cloud-requirements refresh path
before emitting `account/login/completed` success and `account/updated`.
On failure or cancellation, it emits only `account/login/completed`
failure. The existing `account/login/cancel { loginId }` contract
remains unchanged and now works for both browser and device-code
attempts.
## Tests
Added protocol serialization coverage for the new request/response
variant, plus app-server tests for device-code success, failure, cancel,
and start-time rejection behavior. Existing browser ChatGPT login
coverage remains in place to show that the callback-based flow is
unchanged.
## Summary
This PR replaces the legacy network allow/deny list model with explicit
rule maps for domains and unix sockets across managed requirements,
permissions profiles, the network proxy config, and the app server
protocol.
Concretely, it:
- introduces typed domain (`allow` / `deny`) and unix socket permission
(`allow` / `none`) entries instead of separate `allowed_domains`,
`denied_domains`, and `allow_unix_sockets` lists
- updates config loading, managed requirements merging, and exec-policy
overlays to read and upsert rule entries consistently
- exposes the new shape through protocol/schema outputs, debug surfaces,
and app-server config APIs
- rejects the legacy list-based keys and updates docs/tests to reflect
the new config format
## Why
The previous representation split related network policy across multiple
parallel lists, which made merging and overriding rules harder to reason
about. Moving to explicit keyed permission maps gives us a single source
of truth per host/socket entry, makes allow/deny precedence clearer, and
gives protocol consumers access to the full rule state instead of
derived projections only.
## Backward Compatibility
### Backward compatible
- Managed requirements still accept the legacy
`experimental_network.allowed_domains`,
`experimental_network.denied_domains`, and
`experimental_network.allow_unix_sockets` fields. They are normalized
into the new canonical `domains` and `unix_sockets` maps internally.
- App-server v2 still deserializes legacy `allowedDomains`,
`deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` payloads, so older clients can
continue reading managed network requirements.
- App-server v2 responses still populate `allowedDomains`,
`deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` as legacy compatibility views
derived from the canonical maps.
- `managed_allowed_domains_only` keeps the same behavior after
normalization. Legacy managed allowlists still participate in the same
enforcement path as canonical `domains` entries.
### Not backward compatible
- Permissions profiles under `[permissions.<profile>.network]` no longer
accept the legacy list-based keys. Those configs must use the canonical
`[domains]` and `[unix_sockets]` tables instead of `allowed_domains`,
`denied_domains`, or `allow_unix_sockets`.
- Managed `experimental_network` config cannot mix canonical and legacy
forms in the same block. For example, `domains` cannot be combined with
`allowed_domains` or `denied_domains`, and `unix_sockets` cannot be
combined with `allow_unix_sockets`.
- The canonical format can express explicit `"none"` entries for unix
sockets, but those entries do not round-trip through the legacy
compatibility fields because the legacy fields only represent allow/deny
lists.
## Testing
`/target/debug/codex sandbox macos --log-denials /bin/zsh -c 'curl
https://www.example.com' ` gives 200 with config
```
[permissions.workspace.network.domains]
"www.example.com" = "allow"
```
and fails when set to deny: `curl: (56) CONNECT tunnel failed, response
403`.
Also tested backward compatibility path by verifying that adding the
following to `/etc/codex/requirements.toml` works:
```
[experimental_network]
allowed_domains = ["www.example.com"]
```
## Why
`PermissionProfile` should only describe the per-command permissions we
still want to grant dynamically. Keeping
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` in that surface forced extra macOS-only
approval, protocol, schema, and TUI branches for a capability we no
longer want to expose.
## What changed
- Removed the macOS-specific permission-profile types from
`codex-protocol`, the app-server v2 API, and the generated
schema/TypeScript artifacts.
- Deleted the core and sandboxing plumbing that threaded
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` through execution requests and seatbelt
construction.
- Simplified macOS seatbelt generation so it always includes the fixed
read-only preferences allowlist instead of carrying a configurable
profile extension.
- Removed the macOS additional-permissions UI/docs/test coverage and
deleted the obsolete macOS permission modules.
- Tightened `request_permissions` intersection handling so explicitly
empty requested read lists are preserved only when that field was
actually granted, avoiding zero-grant responses being stored as active
permissions.
## Why
`parse_tool_input_schema` and the supporting `JsonSchema` model were
living in `core/src/tools/spec.rs`, but they already serve callers
outside `codex-core`.
Keeping that shared schema parsing logic inside `codex-core` makes the
crate boundary harder to reason about and works against the guidance in
`AGENTS.md` to avoid growing `codex-core` when reusable code can live
elsewhere.
This change takes the first extraction step by moving the schema parsing
primitive into its own crate while keeping the rest of the tool-spec
assembly in `codex-core`.
## What changed
- added a new `codex-tools` crate under `codex-rs/tools`
- moved the shared tool input schema model and sanitizer/parser into
`tools/src/json_schema.rs`
- kept `tools/src/lib.rs` exports-only, with the module-level unit tests
split into `json_schema_tests.rs`
- updated `codex-core` to use `codex-tools::JsonSchema` and re-export
`parse_tool_input_schema`
- updated `codex-app-server` dynamic tool validation to depend on
`codex-tools` directly instead of reaching through `codex-core`
- wired the new crate into the Cargo workspace and Bazel build graph
## Why
This is effectively a follow-up to
[#15812](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/15812). That change
removed the special skill-script exec path, but `skill_metadata` was
still being threaded through command-approval payloads even though the
approval flow no longer uses it to render prompts or resolve decisions.
Keeping it around added extra protocol, schema, and client surface area
without changing behavior.
Removing it keeps the command-approval contract smaller and avoids
carrying a dead field through app-server, TUI, and MCP boundaries.
## What changed
- removed `ExecApprovalRequestSkillMetadata` and the corresponding
`skillMetadata` field from core approval events and the v2 app-server
protocol
- removed the generated JSON and TypeScript schema output for that field
- updated app-server, MCP server, TUI, and TUI app-server approval
plumbing to stop forwarding the field
- cleaned up tests that previously constructed or asserted
`skillMetadata`
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-test-client`
- `cargo test -p codex-mcp-server`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
## Why
`token_data` is owned by `codex-login`, but `codex-core` was still
re-exporting it. That let callers pull auth token types through
`codex-core`, which keeps otherwise unrelated crates coupled to
`codex-core` and makes `codex-core` more of a build-graph bottleneck.
## What changed
- remove the `codex-core` re-export of `codex_login::token_data`
- update the remaining `codex-core` internals that used
`crate::token_data` to import `codex_login::token_data` directly
- update downstream callers in `codex-rs/chatgpt`,
`codex-rs/tui_app_server`, `codex-rs/app-server/tests/common`, and
`codex-rs/core/tests` to import `codex_login::token_data` directly
- add explicit `codex-login` workspace dependencies and refresh lock
metadata for crates that now depend on it directly
## Validation
- `cargo test -p codex-chatgpt --locked`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `just bazel-lock-update`
- `just bazel-lock-check`
## Notes
- attempted `cargo test -p codex-core --locked` and `cargo test -p
codex-core auth_refresh --locked`, but both ran out of disk while
linking `codex-core` test binaries in the local environment
Fixes#15283.
## Summary
Older system bubblewrap builds reject `--argv0`, which makes our Linux
sandbox fail before the helper can re-exec. This PR keeps using system
`/usr/bin/bwrap` whenever it exists and only falls back to vendored
bwrap when the system binary is missing. That matters on stricter
AppArmor hosts, where the distro bwrap package also provides the policy
setup needed for user namespaces.
For old system bwrap, we avoid `--argv0` instead of switching binaries:
- pass the sandbox helper a full-path `argv0`,
- keep the existing `current_exe() + --argv0` path when the selected
launcher supports it,
- otherwise omit `--argv0` and re-exec through the helper's own
`argv[0]` path, whose basename still dispatches as
`codex-linux-sandbox`.
Also updates the launcher/warning tests and docs so they match the new
behavior: present-but-old system bwrap uses the compatibility path, and
only absent system bwrap falls back to vendored.
### Validation
1. Install Ubuntu 20.04 in a VM
2. Compile codex and run without bubblewrap installed - see a warning
about falling back to the vendored bwrap
3. Install bwrap and verify version is 0.4.0 without `argv0` support
4. run codex and use apply_patch tool without errors
<img width="802" height="631" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 48 36 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/77248a29-aa38-4d7c-9833-496ec6a458b8"
/>
<img width="807" height="634" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 47 32 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5af8b850-a466-489b-95a6-455b76b5050f"
/>
<img width="812" height="635" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 45 45 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/438074f0-8435-4274-a667-332efdd5cb57"
/>
<img width="801" height="623" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 43 56 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0dc8d3f5-e8cf-4218-b4b4-a4f7d9bf02e3"
/>
---------
Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
Add environment manager that is a singleton and is created early in
app-server (before skill manager, before config loading).
Use an environment variable to point to a running exec server.
I've seen several intermittent failures of
`get_auth_status_returns_token_after_proactive_refresh_recovery` today.
I investigated, and I found a couple of issues.
First, `getAuthStatus(refreshToken=true)` could refresh twice in one
request: once via `refresh_token_if_requested()` and again via the
proactive refresh path inside `auth_manager.auth()`. In the
permanent-failure case this produced an extra `/oauth/token` call and
made the app-server auth tests flaky. Use `auth_cached()` after an
explicit refresh request so the handler reuses the post-refresh auth
state instead of immediately re-entering proactive refresh logic. Keep
the existing proactive path for `refreshToken=false`.
Second, serialize auth refresh attempts in `AuthManager` have a
startup/request race. One proactive refresh could already be in flight
while a `getAuthStatus(refreshToken=false)` request entered
`auth().await`, causing a second `/oauth/token` call before the first
failure or refresh result had been recorded. Guarding the refresh flow
with a single async lock makes concurrent callers share one refresh
result, which prevents duplicate refreshes and stabilizes the
proactive-refresh auth tests.
## Summary
- move skill loading and management into codex-core-skills
- leave codex-core with the thin integration layer and shared wiring
## Testing
- CI
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
This change adds websocket authentication at the app-server transport
boundary and enforces it before JSON-RPC `initialize`, so authenticated
deployments reject unauthenticated clients during the websocket
handshake rather than after a connection has already been admitted.
During rollout, websocket auth is opt-in for non-loopback listeners so
we do not break existing remote clients. If `--ws-auth ...` is
configured, the server enforces auth during websocket upgrade. If auth
is not configured, non-loopback listeners still start, but app-server
logs a warning and the startup banner calls out that auth should be
configured before real remote use.
The server supports two auth modes: a file-backed capability token, and
a standard HMAC-signed JWT/JWS bearer token verified with the
`jsonwebtoken` crate, with optional issuer, audience, and clock-skew
validation. Capability tokens are normalized, hashed, and compared in
constant time. Short shared secrets for signed bearer tokens are
rejected at startup. Requests carrying an `Origin` header are rejected
with `403` by transport middleware, and authenticated clients present
credentials as `Authorization: Bearer <token>` during websocket upgrade.
## Validation
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server transport::auth`
- `cargo test -p codex-cli app_server_`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-app-server --all-targets -- -D warnings`
- `just bazel-lock-check`
Note: in the broad `cargo test -p codex-app-server
connection_handling_websocket` run, the touched websocket auth cases
passed, but unrelated Unix shutdown tests failed with a timeout in this
environment.
---------
Co-authored-by: Eric Traut <etraut@openai.com>
## Summary
- move the analytics events client into codex-analytics
- update codex-core and app-server callsites to use the new crate
## Testing
- CI
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Migrate `cwd` and related session/config state to `AbsolutePathBuf` so
downstream consumers consistently see absolute working directories.
Add test-only `.abs()` helpers for `Path`, `PathBuf`, and `TempDir`, and
update branch-local tests to use them instead of
`AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(...)`.
For the remaining TUI/app-server snapshot coverage that renders absolute
cwd values, keep the snapshots unchanged and skip the Windows-only cases
where the platform-specific absolute path layout differs.
## Summary
- keep legacy Windows restricted-token sandboxing as the supported
baseline
- support the split-policy subset that restricted-token can enforce
directly today
- support full-disk read, the same writable root set as legacy
`WorkspaceWrite`, and extra read-only carveouts under those writable
roots via additional deny-write ACLs
- continue to fail closed for unsupported split-only shapes, including
explicit unreadable (`none`) carveouts, reopened writable descendants
under read-only carveouts, and writable root sets that do not match the
legacy workspace roots
## Example
Given a filesystem policy like:
```toml
":root" = "read"
":cwd" = "write"
"./docs" = "read"
```
the restricted-token backend can keep the workspace writable while
denying writes under `docs` by layering an extra deny-write carveout on
top of the legacy workspace-write roots.
A policy like:
```toml
"/workspace" = "write"
"/workspace/docs" = "read"
"/workspace/docs/tmp" = "write"
```
still fails closed, because the unelevated backend cannot reopen the
nested writable descendant safely.
## Stack
-> fix: support split carveouts in windows restricted-token sandbox
#14172
fix: support split carveouts in windows elevated sandbox #14568
### Summary
Add the v2 app-server filesystem watch RPCs and notifications, wire them
through the message processor, and implement connection-scoped watches
with notify-backed change delivery. This also updates the schema
fixtures, app-server documentation, and the v2 integration coverage for
watch and unwatch behavior.
This allows clients to efficiently watch for filesystem updates, e.g. to
react on branch changes.
### Testing
- exercise watch lifecycles for directory changes, atomic file
replacement, missing-file targets, and unwatch cleanup
## Summary
- drop `sandbox_permissions` from the sandboxing `ExecOptions` and
`ExecRequest` adapter types
- remove the now-unused plumbing from shell, unified exec, JS REPL, and
apply-patch runtime call sites
- default reconstructed `ExecParams` to `SandboxPermissions::UseDefault`
where the lower-level API still requires the field
## Testing
- `just fmt`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test -p codex-core` (still running locally; first failures
observed in `suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli`,
`suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli_supports_openai_base_url_config_override`,
and
`suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli_supports_openai_base_url_env_fallback`)
Switch plugin-install background MCP OAuth to a silent login path so the
raw authorization URL is no longer printed in normal success cases.
OAuth behavior is otherwise unchanged, with fallback URL output via
stderr still shown only if browser launch fails.
Before:
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4bf387af-afa8-4b83-bcd6-4ca6b55da8db
## Summary
Fixes slow `Ctrl+C` exit from the ChatGPT browser-login screen in
`tui_app_server`.
## Root cause
Onboarding-level `Ctrl+C` quit bypassed the auth widget's cancel path.
That let the active ChatGPT login keep running, and in-process
app-server shutdown then waited on the stale login attempt before
finishing.
## Changes
- Extract a shared `cancel_active_attempt()` path in the auth widget
- Use that path from onboarding-level `Ctrl+C` before exiting the TUI
- Add focused tests for canceling browser-login and device-code attempts
- Add app-server shutdown cleanup that explicitly drops any active login
before draining background work
- create `codex-git-utils` and move the shared git helpers into it with
file moves preserved for diff readability
- move the `GitInfo` helpers out of `core` so stacked rollout work can
depend on the shared crate without carrying its own git info module
---------
Co-authored-by: Ahmed Ibrahim <219906144+aibrahim-oai@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
`shell-tool-mcp` and the Bash fork are no longer needed, but the patched
zsh fork is still relevant for shell escalation and for the
DotSlash-backed zsh-fork integration tests.
Deleting the old `shell-tool-mcp` workflow also deleted the only
pipeline that rebuilt those patched zsh binaries. This keeps the package
removal, while preserving a small release path that can be reused
whenever `codex-rs/shell-escalation/patches/zsh-exec-wrapper.patch`
changes.
## What changed
- removed the `shell-tool-mcp` workspace package, its npm
packaging/release jobs, the Bash test fixture, and the remaining
Bash-specific compatibility wiring
- deleted the old `.github/workflows/shell-tool-mcp.yml` and
`.github/workflows/shell-tool-mcp-ci.yml` workflows now that their
responsibilities have been replaced or removed
- kept the zsh patch under
`codex-rs/shell-escalation/patches/zsh-exec-wrapper.patch` and updated
the `codex-rs/shell-escalation` docs/code to describe the zsh-based flow
directly
- added `.github/workflows/rust-release-zsh.yml` to build only the three
zsh binaries that `codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/zsh` needs today:
- `aarch64-apple-darwin` on `macos-15`
- `x86_64-unknown-linux-musl` on `ubuntu-24.04`
- `aarch64-unknown-linux-musl` on `ubuntu-24.04`
- extracted the shared zsh build/smoke-test/stage logic into
`.github/scripts/build-zsh-release-artifact.sh`, made that helper
directly executable, and now invoke it directly from the workflow so the
Linux and macOS jobs only keep the OS-specific setup in YAML
- wired those standalone `codex-zsh-*.tar.gz` assets into
`rust-release.yml` and added `.github/dotslash-zsh-config.json` so
releases also publish a `codex-zsh` DotSlash file
- updated the checked-in `codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/zsh` fixture
comments to explain that new releases come from the standalone zsh
assets, while the checked-in fixture remains pinned to the latest
historical release until a newer zsh artifact is published
- tightened a couple of follow-on cleanups in
`codex-rs/shell-escalation`: the `ExecParams::command` comment now
describes the shell `-c`/`-lc` string more clearly, and the README now
points at the same `git.code.sf.net` zsh source URL that the workflow
uses
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-shell-escalation`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `bash -n .github/scripts/build-zsh-release-artifact.sh`
- attempted `cargo test -p codex-core`; unrelated existing failures
remain, but the touched `tools::runtimes::shell::unix_escalation::*`
coverage passed during that run
built from #14256. PR description from @etraut-openai:
This PR addresses a hole in [PR
11802](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/11802). The previous PR
assumed that app server clients would respond to token refresh failures
by presenting the user with an error ("you must log in again") and then
not making further attempts to call network endpoints using the expired
token. While they do present the user with this error, they don't
prevent further attempts to call network endpoints and can repeatedly
call `getAuthStatus(refreshToken=true)` resulting in many failed calls
to the token refresh endpoint.
There are three solutions I considered here:
1. Change the getAuthStatus app server call to return a null auth if the
caller specified "refreshToken" on input and the refresh attempt fails.
This will cause clients to immediately log out the user and return them
to the log in screen. This is a really bad user experience. It's also a
breaking change in the app server contract that could break third-party
clients.
2. Augment the getAuthStatus app server call to return an additional
field that indicates the state of "token could not be refreshed". This
is a non-breaking change to the app server API, but it requires
non-trivial changes for all clients to properly handle this new field
properly.
3. Change the getAuthStatus implementation to handle the case where a
token refresh fails by marking the AuthManager's in-memory access and
refresh tokens as "poisoned" so it they are no longer used. This is the
simplest fix that requires no client changes.
I chose option 3.
Here's Codex's explanation of this change:
When an app-server client asks `getAuthStatus(refreshToken=true)`, we
may try to refresh a stale ChatGPT access token. If that refresh fails
permanently (for example `refresh_token_reused`, expired, or revoked),
the old behavior was bad in two ways:
1. We kept the in-memory auth snapshot alive as if it were still usable.
2. Later auth checks could retry refresh again and again, creating a
storm of doomed `/oauth/token` requests and repeatedly surfacing the
same failure.
This is especially painful for app-server clients because they poll auth
status and can keep driving the refresh path without any real chance of
recovery.
This change makes permanent refresh failures terminal for the current
managed auth snapshot without changing the app-server API contract.
What changed:
- `AuthManager` now poisons the current managed auth snapshot in memory
after a permanent refresh failure, keyed to the unchanged `AuthDotJson`.
- Once poisoned, later refresh attempts for that same snapshot fail fast
locally without calling the auth service again.
- The poison is cleared automatically when auth materially changes, such
as a new login, logout, or reload of different auth state from storage.
- `getAuthStatus(includeToken=true)` now omits `authToken` after a
permanent refresh failure instead of handing out the stale cached bearer
token.
This keeps the current auth method visible to clients, avoids forcing an
immediate logout flow, and stops repeated refresh attempts for
credentials that cannot recover.
---------
Co-authored-by: Eric Traut <etraut@openai.com>
* Add
`OutgoingMessageSender::send_server_notification_to_connection_and_wait`
which returns only once message is written to websocket (or failed to do
so)
* Use this mechanism to apply back pressure to stdout/stderr streams of
processes spawned by `command/exec`, to limit them to at most one
message in-memory at a time
* Use back pressure signal to also batch smaller chunks into ≈64KiB ones
This should make commands execution more robust over
high-latency/low-throughput networks
This PR completes the conversion of non-interactive `codex exec` to use
app server rather than directly using core events and methods.
### Summary
- move `codex-exec` off exec-owned `AuthManager` and `ThreadManager`
state
- route exec bootstrap, resume, and auth refresh through existing
app-server paths
- replace legacy `codex/event/*` decoding in exec with typed app-server
notification handling
- update human and JSONL exec output adapters to translate existing
app-server notifications only
- clean up "app server client" layer by eliminating support for legacy
notifications; this is no longer needed
- remove exposure of `authManager` and `threadManager` from "app server
client" layer
### Testing
- `exec` has pretty extensive unit and integration tests already, and
these all pass
- In addition, I asked Codex to put together a comprehensive manual set
of tests to cover all of the `codex exec` functionality (including
command-line options), and it successfully generated and ran these tests
## Summary
- move the pure sandbox policy transform helpers from `codex-core` into
`codex-sandboxing`
- move the corresponding unit tests with the extracted implementation
- update `core` and `app-server` callers to import the moved APIs
directly, without re-exports or proxy methods
## Testing
- cargo test -p codex-sandboxing
- cargo test -p codex-core sandboxing
- cargo test -p codex-app-server --lib
- just fix -p codex-sandboxing
- just fix -p codex-core
- just fix -p codex-app-server
- just fmt
- just argument-comment-lint
## Summary
- update the self-serve business usage-based limit message to direct
users to their admin for additional credits
- add a focused unit test for the self_serve_business_usage_based plan
branch
Added also:
If you are at a rate limit but you still have credits, codex cli would
tell you to switch the model. We shouldnt do this if you have credits so
fixed this.
## Test
- launched the source-built CLI and verified the updated message is
shown for the self-serve business usage-based plan

## Summary
- add `ForkSnapshotMode` to `ThreadManager::fork_thread` so callers can
request either a committed snapshot or an interrupted snapshot
- share the model-visible `<turn_aborted>` history marker between the
live interrupt path and interrupted forks
- update the small set of direct fork callsites to pass
`ForkSnapshotMode::Committed`
Note: this enables /btw to work similarly as Esc to interrupt (hopefully
somewhat in distribution)
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- queue input after the user submits `/compact` until that manual
compact turn ends
- mirror the same behavior in the app-server TUI
- add regressions for input queued before compact starts and while it is
running
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
Fixes [#15283](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/15283), where
sandboxed tool calls fail on older distro `bubblewrap` builds because
`/usr/bin/bwrap` does not understand `--argv0`. The upstream [bubblewrap
v0.9.0 release
notes](https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap/releases/tag/v0.9.0)
explicitly call out `Add --argv0`. Flipping `use_legacy_landlock`
globally works around that compatibility bug, but it also weakens the
default Linux sandbox and breaks proxy-routed and split-policy cases
called out in review.
The follow-up Linux CI failure was in the new launcher test rather than
the launcher logic: the fake `bwrap` helper stayed open for writing, so
Linux would not exec it. This update also closes the user-visibility gap
from review by surfacing the same startup warning when `/usr/bin/bwrap`
is present but too old for `--argv0`, not only when it is missing.
## What Changed
- keep `use_legacy_landlock` default-disabled
- teach `codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/launcher.rs` to fall back to the
vendored bubblewrap build when `/usr/bin/bwrap` does not advertise
`--argv0` support
- add launcher tests for supported, unsupported, and missing system
`bwrap`
- write the fake `bwrap` test helper to a closed temp path so the
supported-path launcher test works on Linux too
- extend the startup warning path so Codex warns when `/usr/bin/bwrap`
is missing or too old to support `--argv0`
- mirror the warning/fallback wording across
`codex-rs/linux-sandbox/README.md` and `codex-rs/core/README.md`,
including that the fallback is the vendored bubblewrap compiled into the
binary
- cite the upstream `bubblewrap` release that introduced `--argv0`
## Verification
- `bazel test --config=remote --platforms=//:rbe
//codex-rs/linux-sandbox:linux-sandbox-unit-tests
--test_filter=launcher::tests::prefers_system_bwrap_when_help_lists_argv0
--test_output=errors`
- `cargo test -p codex-core system_bwrap_warning`
- `cargo check -p codex-exec -p codex-tui -p codex-tui-app-server -p
codex-app-server`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- emit a typed `thread/realtime/transcriptUpdated` notification from
live realtime transcript deltas
- expose that notification as flat `threadId`, `role`, and `text` fields
instead of a nested transcript array
- continue forwarding raw `handoff_request` items on
`thread/realtime/itemAdded`, including the accumulated
`active_transcript`
- update app-server docs, tests, and generated protocol schema artifacts
to match the delta-based payloads
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
This PR add an URI-based system to reference agents within a tree. This
comes from a sync between research and engineering.
The main agent (the one manually spawned by a user) is always called
`/root`. Any sub-agent spawned by it will be `/root/agent_1` for example
where `agent_1` is chosen by the model.
Any agent can contact any agents using the path.
Paths can be used either in absolute or relative to the calling agents
Resume is not supported for now on this new path
## Summary
- make app-server treat `clientInfo.name == "codex-tui"` as a legacy
compatibility case
- fall back to `DEFAULT_ORIGINATOR` instead of sending `codex-tui` as
the originator header
- add a TODO noting this is a temporary workaround that should be
removed later
## Testing
- Not run (not requested)
- Split the feature system into a new `codex-features` crate.
- Cut `codex-core` and workspace consumers over to the new config and
warning APIs.
Co-authored-by: Ahmed Ibrahim <219906144+aibrahim-oai@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
- Move the auth implementation and token data into codex-login.
- Keep codex-core re-exporting that surface from codex-login for
existing callers.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
For each feature we have:
1. Trait exposed on environment
2. **Local Implementation** of the trait
3. Remote implementation that uses the client to proxy via network
4. Handler implementation that handles PRC requests and calls into
**Local Implementation**