## Summary
- trust-gate project `.codex` layers consistently, including repos that
have `.codex/hooks.json` or `.codex/execpolicy/*.rules` but no
`.codex/config.toml`
- keep disabled project layers in the config stack so nested trusted
project layers still resolve correctly, while preventing hooks and exec
policies from loading until the project is trusted
- update app-server/TUI onboarding copy to make the trust boundary
explicit and add regressions for loader, hooks, exec-policy, and
onboarding coverage
## Security
Before this change, an untrusted repo could auto-load project hooks or
exec policies from `.codex/` as long as `config.toml` was absent. This
makes trust the single gate for project-local config, hooks, and exec
policies.
## Stack
- Parent of #15936
## Test
- cargo test -p codex-core without_config_toml
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
This fixes a Windows-only failure in the exec policy multi-segment shell
test. The test was meant to verify that a compound shell command only
bypasses sandboxing when every parsed segment has an explicit exec
policy allow rule.
On Windows, the read-only sandbox setup is intentionally treated as
lacking sandbox protection, so the old fixture could take the approval
path before reaching the intended bypass assertion. The test now uses
the workspace-write sandbox policy, keeping the focus on the per-segment
bypass rule while preserving the expected bypass_sandbox false result
when only cat is explicitly allowed.
## Description
Add requirements.toml support for `allowed_approvals_reviewers =
["user", "guardian_subagent"]`, so admins can now restrict the use of
guardian mode.
Note: If a user sets a reviewer that isn’t allowed by requirements.toml,
config loading falls back to the first allowed reviewer and emits a
startup warning.
The table below describes the possible admin controls.
| Admin intent | `requirements.toml` | User `config.toml` | End result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Leave Guardian optional | omit `allowed_approvals_reviewers` or set
`["user", "guardian_subagent"]` | user chooses `approvals_reviewer =
"user"` or `"guardian_subagent"` | Guardian off for `user`, on for
`guardian_subagent` + `approval_policy = "on-request"` |
| Force Guardian off | `allowed_approvals_reviewers = ["user"]` | any
user value | Effective reviewer is `user`; Guardian off |
| Force Guardian on | `allowed_approvals_reviewers =
["guardian_subagent"]` and usually `allowed_approval_policies =
["on-request"]` | any user reviewer value; user should also have
`approval_policy = "on-request"` unless policy is forced | Effective
reviewer is `guardian_subagent`; Guardian on when effective approval
policy is `on-request` |
| Allow both, but default to manual if user does nothing |
`allowed_approvals_reviewers = ["user", "guardian_subagent"]` | omit
`approvals_reviewer` | Effective reviewer is `user`; Guardian off |
| Allow both, and user explicitly opts into Guardian |
`allowed_approvals_reviewers = ["user", "guardian_subagent"]` |
`approvals_reviewer = "guardian_subagent"` and `approval_policy =
"on-request"` | Guardian on |
| Invalid admin config | `allowed_approvals_reviewers = []` | anything |
Config load error |
## Why
`argument-comment-lint` was green in CI even though the repo still had
many uncommented literal arguments. The main gap was target coverage:
the repo wrapper did not force Cargo to inspect test-only call sites, so
examples like the `latest_session_lookup_params(true, ...)` tests in
`codex-rs/tui_app_server/src/lib.rs` never entered the blocking CI path.
This change cleans up the existing backlog, makes the default repo lint
path cover all Cargo targets, and starts rolling that stricter CI
enforcement out on the platform where it is currently validated.
## What changed
- mechanically fixed existing `argument-comment-lint` violations across
the `codex-rs` workspace, including tests, examples, and benches
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` and
`tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` so non-`--fix` runs default to
`--all-targets` unless the caller explicitly narrows the target set
- fixed both wrappers so forwarded cargo arguments after `--` are
preserved with a single separator
- documented the new default behavior in
`tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`
- updated `rust-ci` so the macOS lint lane keeps the plain wrapper
invocation and therefore enforces `--all-targets`, while Linux and
Windows temporarily pass `-- --lib --bins`
That temporary CI split keeps the stricter all-targets check where it is
already cleaned up, while leaving room to finish the remaining Linux-
and Windows-specific target-gated cleanup before enabling
`--all-targets` on those runners. The Linux and Windows failures on the
intermediate revision were caused by the wrapper forwarding bug, not by
additional lint findings in those lanes.
## Validation
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh`
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --lib --bins`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --tests`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test` in `tools/argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test -p codex-terminal-detection`
## Follow-up
- Clean up remaining Linux-only target-gated callsites, then switch the
Linux lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
- Clean up remaining Windows-only target-gated callsites, then switch
the Windows lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
## Why
`PermissionProfile` should only describe the per-command permissions we
still want to grant dynamically. Keeping
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` in that surface forced extra macOS-only
approval, protocol, schema, and TUI branches for a capability we no
longer want to expose.
## What changed
- Removed the macOS-specific permission-profile types from
`codex-protocol`, the app-server v2 API, and the generated
schema/TypeScript artifacts.
- Deleted the core and sandboxing plumbing that threaded
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` through execution requests and seatbelt
construction.
- Simplified macOS seatbelt generation so it always includes the fixed
read-only preferences allowlist instead of carrying a configurable
profile extension.
- Removed the macOS additional-permissions UI/docs/test coverage and
deleted the obsolete macOS permission modules.
- Tightened `request_permissions` intersection handling so explicitly
empty requested read lists are preserved only when that field was
actually granted, avoiding zero-grant responses being stored as active
permissions.
## Summary
If we are in a mode that is already explicitly un-sandboxed, then
`ApprovalPolicy::Never` should not block dangerous commands.
## Testing
- [x] Existing unit test covers old behavior
- [x] Added a unit test for this new case
## Summary
If a subagent requests approval, and the user persists that approval to
the execpolicy, it should (by default) propagate. We'll need to rethink
this a bit in light of coming Permissions changes, though I think this
is closer to the end state that we'd want, which is that execpolicy
changes to one permissions profile should be synced across threads.
## Testing
- [x] Added integration test
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
PR #13783 moved the `codex.rs` unit tests into `codex_tests.rs`. This
applies the same extraction pattern across the rest of `codex-rs/core`
so the production modules stay focused on runtime code instead of large
inline test blocks.
Keeping the tests in sibling files also makes follow-up edits easier to
review because product changes no longer have to share a file with
hundreds or thousands of lines of test scaffolding.
## What changed
- replaced each inline `mod tests { ... }` in `codex-rs/core/src/**`
with a path-based module declaration
- moved each extracted unit test module into a sibling `*_tests.rs`
file, using `mod_tests.rs` for `mod.rs` modules
- preserved the existing `cfg(...)` guards and module-local structure so
the refactor remains structural rather than behavioral
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib` (`1653 passed; 0 failed; 5 ignored`)
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `cargo fmt --check`
- `cargo shear`
