## Why
Follow-up to #16345, the Bazel clippy rollout in #15955, and the cleanup
pass in #16353.
`cargo clippy` was enforcing the workspace deny-list from
`codex-rs/Cargo.toml` because the member crates opt into `[lints]
workspace = true`, but Bazel clippy was only using `rules_rust` plus
`clippy.toml`. That left the Bazel lane vulnerable to drift:
`clippy.toml` can tune lint behavior, but it cannot set
allow/warn/deny/forbid levels.
This PR now closes both sides of the follow-up. It keeps `.bazelrc` in
sync with `[workspace.lints.clippy]`, and it fixes the real clippy
violations that the newly-synced Windows Bazel lane surfaced once that
deny-list started matching Cargo.
## What Changed
- added `.github/scripts/verify_bazel_clippy_lints.py`, a Python check
that parses `codex-rs/Cargo.toml` with `tomllib`, reads the Bazel
`build:clippy` `clippy_flag` entries from `.bazelrc`, and reports
missing, extra, or mismatched lint levels
- ran that verifier from the lightweight `ci.yml` workflow so the sync
check does not depend on a Rust toolchain being installed first
- expanded the `.bazelrc` comment to explain the Cargo `workspace =
true` linkage and why Bazel needs the deny-list duplicated explicitly
- fixed the Windows-only `codex-windows-sandbox` violations that Bazel
clippy reported after the sync, using the same style as #16353: inline
`format!` args, method references instead of trivial closures, removed
redundant clones, and replaced SID conversion `unwrap` and `expect`
calls with proper errors
- cleaned up the remaining cross-platform violations the Bazel lane
exposed in `codex-backend-client` and `core_test_support`
## Testing
Key new test introduced by this PR:
`python3 .github/scripts/verify_bazel_clippy_lints.py`
## Why
The argument-comment lint now has a packaged DotSlash artifact from
[#15198](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/15198), so the normal repo
lint path should use that released payload instead of rebuilding the
lint from source every time.
That keeps `just clippy` and CI aligned with the shipped artifact while
preserving a separate source-build path for people actively hacking on
the lint crate.
The current alpha package also exposed two integration wrinkles that the
repo-side prebuilt wrapper needs to smooth over:
- the bundled Dylint library filename includes the host triple, for
example `@nightly-2025-09-18-aarch64-apple-darwin`, and Dylint derives
`RUSTUP_TOOLCHAIN` from that filename
- on Windows, Dylint's driver path also expects `RUSTUP_HOME` to be
present in the environment
Without those adjustments, the prebuilt CI jobs fail during `cargo
metadata` or driver setup. This change makes the checked-in prebuilt
wrapper normalize the packaged library name to the plain
`nightly-2025-09-18` channel before invoking `cargo-dylint`, and it
teaches both the wrapper and the packaged runner source to infer
`RUSTUP_HOME` from `rustup show home` when the environment does not
already provide it.
After the prebuilt Windows lint job started running successfully, it
also surfaced a handful of existing anonymous literal callsites in
`windows-sandbox-rs`. This PR now annotates those callsites so the new
cross-platform lint job is green on the current tree.
## What Changed
- checked in the current
`tools/argument-comment-lint/argument-comment-lint` DotSlash manifest
- kept `tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` as the source-build wrapper
for lint development
- added `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` as the
normal enforcement path, using the checked-in DotSlash package and
bundled `cargo-dylint`
- updated `just clippy` and `just argument-comment-lint` to use the
prebuilt wrapper
- split `.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml` so source-package checks live in
a dedicated `argument_comment_lint_package` job, while the released lint
runs in an `argument_comment_lint_prebuilt` matrix on Linux, macOS, and
Windows
- kept the pinned `nightly-2025-09-18` toolchain install in the prebuilt
CI matrix, since the prebuilt package still relies on rustup-provided
toolchain components
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` to
normalize host-qualified nightly library filenames, keep the `rustup`
shim directory ahead of direct toolchain `cargo` binaries, and export
`RUSTUP_HOME` when needed for Windows Dylint driver setup
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/src/bin/argument-comment-lint.rs`
so future published DotSlash artifacts apply the same nightly-filename
normalization and `RUSTUP_HOME` inference internally
- fixed the remaining Windows lint violations in
`codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs` by adding the required `/*param*/`
comments at the reported callsites
- documented the checked-in DotSlash file, wrapper split, archive
layout, nightly prerequisite, and Windows `RUSTUP_HOME` requirement in
`tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`
Today, there is a single capability SID that allows the sandbox to write
to
* workspace (cwd)
* tmp directories if enabled
* additional writable roots
This change splits those up, so that each workspace has its own
capability SID, while tmp and additional roots, which are
installation-wide, are still governed by the "generic" capability SID
This isolates workspaces from each other in terms of sandbox write
access.
Also allows us to protect <cwd>/.codex when codex runs in a specific
<cwd>
The elevated setup synchronously applies read/write ACLs to any
workspace roots.
However, until we apply *read* permission to the full path, powershell
cannot use some roots as a cwd as it needs access to all parts of the
path in order to apply it as the working directory for a command.
The solution is, while the async read-ACL part of setup is running, use
a "junction" that lives in C:\Users\CodexSandbox{Offline|Online} that
points to the cwd.
Once the read ACLs are applied, we stop using the junction.
-----
this PR also removes some dead code and overly-verbose logging, and has
some light refactoring to the ACL-related functions
- Batch read ACL creation for online/offline sandbox user
- creates a new ACL helper process that is long-lived and runs in the
background
- uses a mutex so that only one helper process is running at a time.
- updating helpers, refactoring some functions that will be used in the
elevated sandbox
- better logging
- better and faster handling of ACL checks/writes
- No functional change—legacy restricted-token sandbox
remains the only path.
Our Restricted Token contains 3 SIDs (Logon, Everyone, {WorkspaceWrite
Capability || ReadOnly Capability})
because it must include Everyone, that left us vulnerable to directories
that allow writes to Everyone. Even though those directories do not have
ACEs that enable our capability SIDs to write to them, they could still
be written to even in ReadOnly mode, or even in WorkspaceWrite mode if
they are outside of a writable root.
A solution to this is to explicitly add *Deny* ACEs to these
directories, always for the ReadOnly Capability SID, and for the
WorkspaceWrite SID if the directory is outside of a workspace root.
Under a restricted token, Windows always checks Deny ACEs before Allow
ACEs so even though our restricted token would allow a write to these
directories due to the Everyone SID, it fails first because of the Deny
ACE on the capability SID
- Added the new codex-windows-sandbox crate that builds both a library
entry point (run_windows_sandbox_capture) and a CLI executable to launch
commands inside a Windows restricted-token sandbox, including ACL
management, capability SID provisioning, network lockdown, and output
capture
(windows-sandbox-rs/src/lib.rs:167, windows-sandbox-rs/src/main.rs:54).
- Introduced the experimental WindowsSandbox feature flag and wiring so
Windows builds can opt into the sandbox:
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken, the in-process execution path, and
platform sandbox selection now honor the flag (core/src/features.rs:47,
core/src/config.rs:1224, core/src/safety.rs:19,
core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs:69, core/src/exec.rs:79,
core/src/exec.rs:172).
- Updated workspace metadata to include the new crate and its
Windows-specific dependencies so the core crate can link against it
(codex-rs/
Cargo.toml:91, core/Cargo.toml:86).
- Added a PowerShell bootstrap script that installs the Windows
toolchain, required CLI utilities, and builds the workspace to ease
development
on the platform (scripts/setup-windows.ps1:1).
- Landed a Python smoke-test suite that exercises
read-only/workspace-write policies, ACL behavior, and network denial for
the Windows sandbox
binary (windows-sandbox-rs/sandbox_smoketests.py:1).
