## Summary
Enforce FileSystemSandboxPolicy protected metadata names in the Linux
bubblewrap adapter so `.git`, `.agents`, and `.codex` remain read only
inside writable workspace roots unless the policy grants an explicit
write carveout.
## Scope
1. Translate protected metadata names from FileSystemSandboxPolicy into
bubblewrap masks for existing metadata paths.
2. Represent missing protected metadata paths as guarded mount targets
so agents cannot create `.git`, `.agents`, or `.codex` under writable
roots.
3. Preserve normal git discovery for existing repos, worktrees, and
parent repos.
4. Keep explicit user write grants working when policy allows a
protected metadata path directly.
## Not in scope
1. No shell preflight UX.
2. No TUI runtime profile propagation.
3. No macOS Seatbelt changes in this PR.
## Reviewer focus
1. This should be reviewed as the Linux enforcement adapter for the
policy primitive from PR 19846.
2. macOS enforcement already landed in PR 19847.
3. The important invariant is that `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` is the
source of truth for `.git`, `.agents`, and `.codex`.
## Validation
1. `git diff` whitespace check passed.
2. `cargo fmt` check passed with the existing stable rustfmt warning
about `imports_granularity`.
3. Full Linux sandbox Cargo test suite passed on the devbox.
4. Devbox forty six case suite passed at head
`012accb703c13bd28df5b40079a9bf183036336a`.
5. Devbox summary: pass 46, fail 0.
6. The devbox suite was run through `just c sandbox linux`.
7. Focused repo test for Viyat parent repo case passed on the devbox.
## Why
`PermissionProfile` is the canonical runtime permission model in the
Rust workspace, but the Linux sandbox helper still accepted a legacy
`SandboxPolicy` plus separate filesystem and network policy flags. That
translation layer made the helper interface harder to reason about and
left `linux-sandbox`-specific callers and tests coupled to the legacy
policy representation.
This change moves the helper onto `PermissionProfile` directly so the
Linux sandbox plumbing matches the rest of the permission stack.
## What changed
- changed `codex-linux-sandbox` to accept `--permission-profile` and
derive the runtime filesystem and network policies internally
- updated the in-process seccomp and legacy Landlock path in
`codex-rs/linux-sandbox` to operate on `PermissionProfile`
- updated Linux sandbox argv construction in `codex-rs/sandboxing`,
`codex-rs/core`, and the CLI debug sandbox path to pass the canonical
profile instead of serializing compatibility policy projections
- simplified the Linux sandbox tests to build the exact permission
profile under test, including the managed-proxy path and
direct-runtime-enforcement carveout coverage
- removed helper-local `SandboxPolicy` usage from `bwrap` tests where
`FileSystemSandboxPolicy` is already the value being exercised
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
- `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox` (on this macOS host, the crate
compiled cleanly and its Linux-only tests were cfg-gated)
- `cargo test -p codex-core --no-run`
- `cargo test -p codex-cli --no-run`
## Why
Config loading had become split across crates: `codex-config` owned the
config types and merge logic, while `codex-core` still owned the loader
that assembled the layer stack. This change consolidates that
responsibility in `codex-config`, so the crate that defines config
behavior also owns how configs are discovered and loaded.
To make that move possible without reintroducing the old dependency
cycle, the shell-environment policy types and helpers that
`codex-exec-server` needs now live in `codex-protocol` instead of
flowing through `codex-config`.
This also makes the migrated loader tests more deterministic on machines
that already have managed or system Codex config installed by letting
tests override the system config and requirements paths instead of
reading the host's `/etc/codex`.
## What Changed
- moved the config loader implementation from `codex-core` into
`codex-config::loader` and deleted the old `core::config_loader` module
instead of leaving a compatibility shim
- moved shell-environment policy types and helpers into
`codex-protocol`, then updated `codex-exec-server` and other downstream
crates to import them from their new home
- updated downstream callers to use loader/config APIs from
`codex-config`
- added test-only loader overrides for system config and requirements
paths so loader-focused tests do not depend on host-managed config state
- cleaned up now-unused dependency entries and platform-specific cfgs
that were surfaced by post-push CI
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-config`
- `cargo test -p codex-core config_loader_tests::`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol -p codex-exec-server -p
codex-cloud-requirements -p codex-rmcp-client --lib`
- `cargo test --lib -p codex-app-server-client -p codex-exec`
- `cargo test --no-run --lib -p codex-app-server`
- `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox --lib`
- `cargo shear`
- `just bazel-lock-check`
## Notes
- I did not chase unrelated full-suite failures outside the migrated
loader surface.
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib` still hits unrelated proxy-sensitive
failures on this machine, and Windows CI still shows unrelated
long-running/timeouting test noise outside the loader migration itself.
## Why
This supersedes #19391. During stack repair, GitHub marked #19391 as
merged into a temporary stack branch rather than into `main`, so the
runtime-config change needed a fresh PR.
`PermissionProfile` is now the canonical permissions shape after #19231
because it can distinguish `Managed`, `Disabled`, and `External`
enforcement while also carrying filesystem rules that legacy
`SandboxPolicy` cannot represent cleanly. Core config and session state
still needed to accept profile-backed permissions without forcing every
profile through the strict legacy bridge, which rejected valid runtime
profiles such as direct write roots.
The unrelated CI/test hardening that previously rode along with this PR
has been split into #19683 so this PR stays focused on the permissions
model migration.
## What Changed
- Adds `Permissions.permission_profile` and
`SessionConfiguration.permission_profile` as constrained runtime state,
while keeping `sandbox_policy` as a legacy compatibility projection.
- Introduces profile setters that keep `PermissionProfile`, split
filesystem/network policies, and legacy `SandboxPolicy` projections
synchronized.
- Uses a compatibility projection for requirement checks and legacy
consumers instead of rejecting profiles that cannot round-trip through
`SandboxPolicy` exactly.
- Updates config loading, config overrides, session updates, turn
context plumbing, prompt permission text, sandbox tags, and exec request
construction to carry profile-backed runtime permissions.
- Preserves configured deny-read entries and `glob_scan_max_depth` when
command/session profiles are narrowed.
- Adds `PermissionProfile::read_only()` and
`PermissionProfile::workspace_write()` presets that match legacy
defaults.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-core direct_write_roots`
- `cargo test -p codex-core runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server
requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19606).
* #19395
* #19394
* #19393
* #19392
* __->__ #19606
## Why
`ReadOnlyAccess` was a transitional legacy shape on `SandboxPolicy`:
`FullAccess` meant the historical read-only/workspace-write modes could
read the full filesystem, while `Restricted` tried to carry partial
readable roots. The partial-read model now belongs in
`FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and `PermissionProfile`, so keeping it on
`SandboxPolicy` makes every legacy projection reintroduce lossy
read-root bookkeeping and creates unnecessary noise in the rest of the
permissions migration.
This PR makes the legacy policy model narrower and explicit:
`SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` and `SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite` represent
the old full-read sandbox modes only. Split readable roots, deny-read
globs, and platform-default/minimal read behavior stay in the runtime
permissions model.
## What changed
- Removes `ReadOnlyAccess` from
`codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy`, including the generated
`access` and `readOnlyAccess` API fields.
- Updates legacy policy/profile conversions so restricted filesystem
reads are represented only by `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` /
`PermissionProfile` entries.
- Keeps app-server v2 compatible with legacy `fullAccess` read-access
payloads by accepting and ignoring that no-op shape, while rejecting
legacy `restricted` read-access payloads instead of silently widening
them to full-read legacy policies.
- Carries Windows sandbox platform-default read behavior with an
explicit override flag instead of depending on
`ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted`.
- Refreshes generated app-server schema/types and updates tests/docs for
the simplified legacy policy shape.
## Verification
- `cargo check -p codex-app-server-protocol --tests`
- `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol sandbox_policy_`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19449).
* #19395
* #19394
* #19393
* #19392
* #19391
* __->__ #19449
## Summary
- Carry `AbsolutePathBuf` through tool cwd parsing/resolution instead of
resolving workdirs to raw `PathBuf`s.
- Type exec/sandbox request cwd fields as `AbsolutePathBuf` through
`ExecParams`, `ExecRequest`, `SandboxCommand`, and unified exec runtime
requests.
- Keep `PathBuf` conversions at external/event boundaries and update
existing tests/fixtures for the typed cwd.
## Validation
- `cargo check -p codex-core --tests`
- `cargo check -p codex-sandboxing --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib tools::handlers::`
- `just fix -p codex-sandboxing`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `just fmt`
Full `codex-core` test suite was not run locally; per repo guidance I
kept local validation targeted.
Stacked on #16508.
This removes the temporary `codex-core` / `codex-login` re-export shims
from the ownership split and rewrites callsites to import directly from
`codex-model-provider-info`, `codex-models-manager`, `codex-api`,
`codex-protocol`, `codex-feedback`, and `codex-response-debug-context`.
No behavior change intended; this is the mechanical import cleanup layer
split out from the ownership move.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
This finishes the config-type move out of `codex-core` by removing the
temporary compatibility shim in `codex_core::config::types`. Callers now
depend on `codex-config` directly, which keeps these config model types
owned by the config crate instead of re-expanding `codex-core` as a
transitive API surface.
## What Changed
- Removed the `codex-rs/core/src/config/types.rs` re-export shim and the
`core::config::ApprovalsReviewer` re-export.
- Updated `codex-core`, `codex-cli`, `codex-tui`, `codex-app-server`,
`codex-mcp-server`, and `codex-linux-sandbox` call sites to import
`codex_config::types` directly.
- Added explicit `codex-config` dependencies to downstream crates that
previously relied on the `codex-core` re-export.
- Regenerated `codex-rs/core/config.schema.json` after updating the
config docs path reference.
## Summary
- skip nonexistent `workspace-write` writable roots in the Linux
bubblewrap mount builder instead of aborting sandbox startup
- keep existing writable roots mounted normally so mixed Windows/WSL
configs continue to work
- add unit and Linux integration regression coverage for the
missing-root case
## Context
This addresses regression A from #14875. Regression B will be handled in
a separate PR.
The old bubblewrap integration added `ensure_mount_targets_exist` as a
preflight guard because bubblewrap bind targets must exist, and failing
early let Codex return a clearer error than a lower-level mount failure.
That policy turned out to be too strict once bubblewrap became the
default Linux sandbox: shared Windows/WSL or mixed-platform configs can
legitimately contain a well-formed writable root that does not exist on
the current machine. This PR keeps bubblewrap's existing-target
requirement, but changes Codex to skip missing writable roots instead of
treating them as fatal configuration errors.
## Summary
- launch Windows sandboxed children on a private desktop instead of
`Winsta0\Default`
- make private desktop the default while keeping
`windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false` as the escape hatch
- centralize process launch through the shared
`create_process_as_user(...)` path
- scope the private desktop ACL to the launching logon SID
## Why
Today sandboxed Windows commands run on the visible shared desktop. That
leaves an avoidable same-desktop attack surface for window interaction,
spoofing, and related UI/input issues. This change moves sandboxed
commands onto a dedicated per-launch desktop by default so the sandbox
no longer shares `Winsta0\Default` with the user session.
The implementation stays conservative on security with no silent
fallback back to `Winsta0\Default`
If private-desktop setup fails on a machine, users can still opt out
explicitly with `windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false`.
## Validation
- `cargo build -p codex-cli`
- elevated-path `codex exec` desktop-name probe returned
`CodexSandboxDesktop-*`
- elevated-path `codex exec` smoke sweep for shell commands, nested
`pwsh`, jobs, and hidden `notepad` launch
- unelevated-path full private-desktop compatibility sweep via `codex
exec` with `-c windows.sandbox=unelevated`
## Summary
- preserve Linux bubblewrap semantics for `write -> none -> write`
filesystem policies by recreating masked mount targets before rebinding
narrower writable descendants
- add a Linux runtime regression for `/repo = write`, `/repo/a = none`,
`/repo/a/b = write` so the nested writable child is exercised under
bubblewrap
- document the supported legacy Landlock fallback and the split-policy
bubblewrap behavior for overlapping carveouts
## Example
Given a split filesystem policy like:
```toml
"/repo" = "write"
"/repo/a" = "none"
"/repo/a/b" = "write"
```
this PR keeps `/repo` writable, masks `/repo/a`, and still reopens
`/repo/a/b` as writable again under bubblewrap.
## Testing
- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox --tests -- -D warnings`
## Summary
- make bubblewrap the default Linux sandbox and keep
`use_legacy_landlock` as the only override
- remove `use_linux_sandbox_bwrap` from feature, config, schema, and
docs surfaces
- update Linux sandbox selection, CLI/config plumbing, and related
tests/docs to match the new default
- fold in the follow-up CI fixes for request-permissions responses and
Linux read-only sandbox error text
## Why
After `#13449`, the Linux helper could receive split filesystem and
network policies, but the bubblewrap mount builder still reconstructed
filesystem access from the legacy `SandboxPolicy`.
That loses explicit unreadable carveouts under writable roots, and it
also mishandles `Root` read access paired with explicit deny carveouts.
In those cases bubblewrap could still expose paths that the split
filesystem policy intentionally blocked.
## What changed
- switched bubblewrap mount generation to consume
`FileSystemSandboxPolicy` directly at the implementation boundary;
legacy `SandboxPolicy` configs still flow through the existing
`FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy)` bridge before reaching
bwrap
- kept the Linux helper and preflight path on the split filesystem
policy all the way into bwrap
- re-applied explicit unreadable carveouts after readable and writable
mounts so blocked subpaths still win under bubblewrap
- masked denied directories with `--tmpfs` plus `--remount-ro` and
denied files with `--ro-bind-data`, preserving the backing fd until exec
- added comments in the unreadable-root masking block to explain why the
mount order and directory/file split are intentional
- updated Linux helper call sites and tests for the split-policy bwrap
path
## Verification
- added protocol coverage for root carveouts staying scoped
- added core coverage that root-write plus deny carveouts still requires
a platform sandbox
- added bwrap unit coverage for reapplying blocked carveouts after
writable binds
- added Linux integration coverage for explicit split-policy carveouts
under bubblewrap
- validated the final branch state with `cargo test -p
codex-linux-sandbox`, `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox --all-targets
-- -D warnings`, and the PR CI reruns
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13453).
* __->__ #13453
* #13452
* #13451
* #13449
* #13448
* #13445
* #13440
* #13439
---------
Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
## Why
`#13434` introduces split `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and
`NetworkSandboxPolicy`, but the runtime still made most execution-time
sandbox decisions from the legacy `SandboxPolicy` projection.
That projection loses information about combinations like unrestricted
filesystem access with restricted network access. In practice, that
means the runtime can choose the wrong platform sandbox behavior or set
the wrong network-restriction environment for a command even when config
has already separated those concerns.
This PR carries the split policies through the runtime so sandbox
selection, process spawning, and exec handling can consult the policy
that actually matters.
## What changed
- threaded `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and `NetworkSandboxPolicy` through
`TurnContext`, `ExecRequest`, sandbox attempts, shell escalation state,
unified exec, and app-server exec overrides
- updated sandbox selection in `core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs` and
`core/src/exec.rs` to key off `FileSystemSandboxPolicy.kind` plus
`NetworkSandboxPolicy`, rather than inferring behavior only from the
legacy `SandboxPolicy`
- updated process spawning in `core/src/spawn.rs` and the platform
wrappers to use `NetworkSandboxPolicy` when deciding whether to set
`CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED`
- kept additional-permissions handling and legacy `ExternalSandbox`
compatibility projections aligned with the split policies, including
explicit user-shell execution and Windows restricted-token routing
- updated callers across `core`, `app-server`, and `linux-sandbox` to
pass the split policies explicitly
## Verification
- added regression coverage in `core/tests/suite/user_shell_cmd.rs` to
verify `RunUserShellCommand` does not inherit
`CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED` from the active turn
- added coverage in `core/src/exec.rs` for Windows restricted-token
sandbox selection when the legacy projection is `ExternalSandbox`
- updated Linux sandbox coverage in
`linux-sandbox/tests/suite/landlock.rs` to exercise the split-policy
exec path
- verified the current PR state with `just clippy`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13439).
* #13453
* #13452
* #13451
* #13449
* #13448
* #13445
* #13440
* __->__ #13439
---------
Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
This reverts commit daf0f03ac8.
# External (non-OpenAI) Pull Request Requirements
Before opening this Pull Request, please read the dedicated
"Contributing" markdown file or your PR may be closed:
https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/main/docs/contributing.md
If your PR conforms to our contribution guidelines, replace this text
with a detailed and high quality description of your changes.
Include a link to a bug report or enhancement request.
Summary
- detect skill-invoking shell commands based on the original command
string, request approvals when needed, and cache positive decisions per
session
- keep implicit skill invocation emitted after approval and keep skill
approval decline messaging centralized to the shell handler
- expand and adjust skill approval tests to cover shell-based skill
scripts while matching the new detection expectations
Testing
- Not run (not requested)
## Why
`codex-rs/core/src/lib.rs` re-exported a broad set of types and modules
from `codex-protocol` and `codex-shell-command`. That made it easy for
workspace crates to import those APIs through `codex-core`, which in
turn hides dependency edges and makes it harder to reduce compile-time
coupling over time.
This change removes those public re-exports so call sites must import
from the source crates directly. Even when a crate still depends on
`codex-core` today, this makes dependency boundaries explicit and
unblocks future work to drop `codex-core` dependencies where possible.
## What Changed
- Removed public re-exports from `codex-rs/core/src/lib.rs` for:
- `codex_protocol::protocol` and related protocol/model types (including
`InitialHistory`)
- `codex_protocol::config_types` (`protocol_config_types`)
- `codex_shell_command::{bash, is_dangerous_command, is_safe_command,
parse_command, powershell}`
- Migrated workspace Rust call sites to import directly from:
- `codex_protocol::protocol`
- `codex_protocol::config_types`
- `codex_protocol::models`
- `codex_shell_command`
- Added explicit `Cargo.toml` dependencies (`codex-protocol` /
`codex-shell-command`) in crates that now import those crates directly.
- Kept `codex-core` internal modules compiling by using `pub(crate)`
aliases in `core/src/lib.rs` (internal-only, not part of the public
API).
- Updated the two utility crates that can already drop a `codex-core`
dependency edge entirely:
- `codex-utils-approval-presets`
- `codex-utils-cli`
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-utils-approval-presets`
- `cargo test -p codex-utils-cli`
- `cargo check --workspace --all-targets`
- `just clippy`
## Summary
Simplify network approvals by removing per-attempt proxy correlation and
moving to session-level approval dedupe keyed by (host, protocol, port).
Instead of encoding attempt IDs into proxy credentials/URLs, we now
treat approvals as a destination policy decision.
- Concurrent calls to the same destination share one approval prompt.
- Different destinations (or same host on different ports) get separate
prompts.
- Allow once approves the current queued request group only.
- Allow for session caches that (host, protocol, port) and auto-allows
future matching requests.
- Never policy continues to deny without prompting.
Example:
- 3 calls:
- a.com (line 443)
- b.com (line 443)
- a.com (line 443)
=> 2 prompts total (a, b), second a waits on the first decision.
- a.com:80 is treated separately from a.com line 443
## Testing
- `just fmt` (in `codex-rs`)
- `cargo test -p codex-core tools::network_approval::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-core` (unit tests pass; existing
integration-suite failures remain in this environment)
## Summary
- Updates the Linux bubblewrap sandbox args to mount a minimal `/dev`
using `--dev /dev` instead of only binding `/dev/null`. tools needing
entropy (git, crypto libs, etc.) can fail.
- Changed mount order so `--dev /dev` is added before writable-root
`--bind` mounts, preserving writable `/dev/*` submounts like `/dev/shm`
## Why
Fixes sandboxed command failures when reading `/dev/urandom` (and
similar standard device-node access).
Fixes https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/12056
### Description
#### Summary
Introduces the core plumbing required for structured network approvals
#### What changed
- Added structured network policy decision modeling in core.
- Added approval payload/context types needed for network approval
semantics.
- Wired shell/unified-exec runtime plumbing to consume structured
decisions.
- Updated related core error/event surfaces for structured handling.
- Updated protocol plumbing used by core approval flow.
- Included small CLI debug sandbox compatibility updates needed by this
layer.
#### Why
establishes the minimal backend foundation for network approvals without
yet changing high-level orchestration or TUI behavior.
#### Notes
- Behavior remains constrained by existing requirements/config gating.
- Follow-up PRs in the stack handle orchestration, UX, and app-server
integration.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
`SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` previously implied broad read access and could
not express a narrower read surface.
This change introduces an explicit read-access model so we can support
user-configurable read restrictions in follow-up work, while preserving
current behavior today.
It also ensures unsupported backends fail closed for restricted-read
policies instead of silently granting broader access than intended.
## What
- Added `ReadOnlyAccess` in protocol with:
- `Restricted { include_platform_defaults, readable_roots }`
- `FullAccess`
- Updated `SandboxPolicy` to carry read-access configuration:
- `ReadOnly { access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
- `WorkspaceWrite { ..., read_only_access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
- Preserved existing behavior by defaulting current construction paths
to `ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess`.
- Threaded the new fields through sandbox policy consumers and call
sites across `core`, `tui`, `linux-sandbox`, `windows-sandbox`, and
related tests.
- Updated Seatbelt policy generation to honor restricted read roots by
emitting scoped read rules when full read access is not granted.
- Added fail-closed behavior on Linux and Windows backends when
restricted read access is requested but not yet implemented there
(`UnsupportedOperation`).
- Regenerated app-server protocol schema and TypeScript artifacts,
including `ReadOnlyAccess`.
## Compatibility / rollout
- Runtime behavior remains unchanged by default (`FullAccess`).
- API/schema changes are in place so future config wiring can enable
restricted read access without another policy-shape migration.
This PR adds the following field to `Config`:
```rust
pub network: Option<NetworkProxy>,
```
Though for the moment, it will always be initialized as `None` (this
will be addressed in a subsequent PR).
This PR does the work to thread `network` through to `execute_exec_env()`, `process_exec_tool_call()`, and `UnifiedExecRuntime.run()` to ensure it is available whenever we span a process.
## Summary
This PR introduces a gated Bubblewrap (bwrap) Linux sandbox path. The
curent Linux sandbox path relies on in-process restrictions (including
Landlock). Bubblewrap gives us a more uniform filesystem isolation
model, especially explicit writable roots with the option to make some
directories read-only and granular network controls.
This is behind a feature flag so we can validate behavior safely before
making it the default.
- Added temporary rollout flag:
- `features.use_linux_sandbox_bwrap`
- Preserved existing default path when the flag is off.
- In Bubblewrap mode:
- Added internal retry without /proc when /proc mount is not permitted
by the host/container.
**Description**
This removes the pre‑Landlock read‑only bind‑mount step from the Linux
sandbox so filesystem restrictions rely solely on Landlock again.
`mounts.rs` is kept in place but left unused. The linux‑sandbox README
is updated to match the new behavior and manual test expectations.
fixes https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/9236
### Motivation
- Prevent sandbox setup from failing when unprivileged user namespaces
are denied so Landlock-only protections can still be applied.
- Ensure `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` is set before installing seccomp and
Landlock restrictions to avoid kernel `EPERM`/`LandlockRestrict`
ordering issues.
### Description
- Add `is_permission_denied` helper that detects `EPERM` /
`PermissionDenied` from `CodexErr` to drive fallback logic.
- In `apply_read_only_mounts` skip read-only bind-mount setup and return
`Ok(())` when `unshare_user_and_mount_namespaces()` fails with
permission-denied so Landlock rules can still be installed.
- Add `set_no_new_privs()` and call it from
`apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread` before installing seccomp
filters and Landlock rules when disk or network access is restricted.
### Motivation
- Landlock alone cannot prevent writes to sensitive in-repo files like
`.git/` when the repo root is writable, so explicit mount restrictions
are required for those paths.
- The sandbox must set up any mounts before calling Landlock so Landlock
can still be applied afterwards and the two mechanisms compose
correctly.
### Description
- Add a new `linux-sandbox` helper `apply_read_only_mounts` in
`linux-sandbox/src/mounts.rs` that: unshares namespaces, maps uids/gids
when required, makes mounts private, bind-mounts targets, and remounts
them read-only.
- Wire the mount step into the sandbox flow by calling
`apply_read_only_mounts(...)` before network/seccomp and before applying
Landlock rules in `linux-sandbox/src/landlock.rs`.
Changes the `writable_roots` field of the `WorkspaceWrite` variant of
the `SandboxPolicy` enum from `Vec<PathBuf>` to `Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>`.
This is helpful because now callers can be sure the value is an absolute
path rather than a relative one. (Though when using an absolute path in
a Seatbelt config policy, we still have to _canonicalize_ it first.)
Because `writable_roots` can be read from a config file, it is important
that we are able to resolve relative paths properly using the parent
folder of the config file as the base path.
helpful in the future if we want more granularity for requesting
escalated permissions:
e.g when running in readonly sandbox, model can request to escalate to a
sandbox that allows writes
`process_exec_tool_call()` was taking `SandboxType` as a param, but in
practice, the only place it was constructed was in
`codex_message_processor.rs` where it was derived from the other
`sandbox_policy` param, so this PR inlines the logic that decides the
`SandboxType` into `process_exec_tool_call()`.
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
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with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/7122).
* #7112
* __->__ #7122
This updates `ExecParams` so that instead of taking `timeout_ms:
Option<u64>`, it now takes a more general cancellation mechanism,
`ExecExpiration`, which is an enum that includes a
`Cancellation(tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken)` variant.
If the cancellation token is fired, then `process_exec_tool_call()`
returns in the same way as if a timeout was exceeded.
This is necessary so that in #6973, we can manage the timeout logic
external to the `process_exec_tool_call()` because we want to "suspend"
the timeout when an elicitation from a human user is pending.
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/6972).
* #7005
* #6973
* __->__ #6972
this dramatically improves time to run `cargo test -p codex-core` (~25x
speedup).
before:
```
cargo test -p codex-core 35.96s user 68.63s system 19% cpu 8:49.80 total
```
after:
```
cargo test -p codex-core 5.51s user 8.16s system 63% cpu 21.407 total
```
both tests measured "hot", i.e. on a 2nd run with no filesystem changes,
to exclude compile times.
approach inspired by [Delete Cargo Integration
Tests](https://matklad.github.io/2021/02/27/delete-cargo-integration-tests.html),
we move all test cases in tests/ into a single suite in order to have a
single binary, as there is significant overhead for each test binary
executed, and because test execution is only parallelized with a single
binary.
This PR:
* Added the clippy.toml to configure allowable expect / unwrap usage in
tests
* Removed as many expect/allow lines as possible from tests
* moved a bunch of allows to expects where possible
Note: in integration tests, non `#[test]` helper functions are not
covered by this so we had to leave a few lingering `expect(expect_used`
checks around
This PR does two things because after I got deep into the first one I
started pulling on the thread to the second:
- Makes `ConversationManager` the place where all in-memory
conversations are created and stored. Previously, `MessageProcessor` in
the `codex-mcp-server` crate was doing this via its `session_map`, but
this is something that should be done in `codex-core`.
- It unwinds the `ctrl_c: tokio::sync::Notify` that was threaded
throughout our code. I think this made sense at one time, but now that
we handle Ctrl-C within the TUI and have a proper `Op::Interrupt` event,
I don't think this was quite right, so I removed it. For `codex exec`
and `codex proto`, we now use `tokio::signal::ctrl_c()` directly, but we
no longer make `Notify` a field of `Codex` or `CodexConversation`.
Changes of note:
- Adds the files `conversation_manager.rs` and `codex_conversation.rs`
to `codex-core`.
- `Codex` and `CodexSpawnOk` are no longer exported from `codex-core`:
other crates must use `CodexConversation` instead (which is created via
`ConversationManager`).
- `core/src/codex_wrapper.rs` has been deleted in favor of
`ConversationManager`.
- `ConversationManager::new_conversation()` returns `NewConversation`,
which is in line with the `new_conversation` tool we want to add to the
MCP server. Note `NewConversation` includes `SessionConfiguredEvent`, so
we eliminate checks in cases like `codex-rs/core/tests/client.rs` to
verify `SessionConfiguredEvent` is the first event because that is now
internal to `ConversationManager`.
- Quite a bit of code was deleted from
`codex-rs/mcp-server/src/message_processor.rs` since it no longer has to
manage multiple conversations itself: it goes through
`ConversationManager` instead.
- `core/tests/live_agent.rs` has been deleted because I had to update a
bunch of tests and all the tests in here were ignored, and I don't think
anyone ever ran them, so this was just technical debt, at this point.
- Removed `notify_on_sigint()` from `util.rs` (and in a follow-up, I
hope to refactor the blandly-named `util.rs` into more descriptive
files).
- In general, I started replacing local variables named `codex` as
`conversation`, where appropriate, though admittedly I didn't do it
through all the integration tests because that would have added a lot of
noise to this PR.
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
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with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/2240).
* #2264
* #2263
* __->__ #2240
Replaces the `include_default_writable_roots` option on
`sandbox_workspace_write` (that defaulted to `true`, which was slightly
weird/annoying) with `exclude_tmpdir_env_var`, which defaults to
`false`.
Though perhaps more importantly `/tmp` is now enabled by default as part
of `sandbox_mode = "workspace-write"`, though `exclude_slash_tmp =
false` can be used to disable this.
## Summary
A split-up PR of #1763 , stacked on top of a tools refactor #1858 to
make the change clearer. From the previous summary:
> Let's try something new: tell the model about the sandbox, and let it
decide when it will need to break the sandbox. Some local testing
suggests that it works pretty well with zero iteration on the prompt!
## Testing
- [x] Added unit tests
- [x] Tested locally and it appears to work smoothly!
Without this change, it is challenging to create integration tests to
verify that the folders not included in `writable_roots` in
`SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite` are read-only because, by default,
`get_writable_roots_with_cwd()` includes `TMPDIR`, which is where most
integrationt
tests do their work.
This introduces a `use_exact_writable_roots` option to disable the
default
includes returned by `get_writable_roots_with_cwd()`.
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
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with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/1785).
* #1765
* __->__ #1785
## Summary
- stream command stdout as `ExecCommandStdout` events
- forward streamed stdout to clients and ignore in human output
processor
- adjust call sites for new streaming API
