use super::*;
use codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;

fn make_exec_output(
    exit_code: i32,
    stdout: &str,
    stderr: &str,
    aggregated: &str,
) -> ExecToolCallOutput {
    ExecToolCallOutput {
        exit_code,
        stdout: StreamOutput::new(stdout.to_string()),
        stderr: StreamOutput::new(stderr.to_string()),
        aggregated_output: StreamOutput::new(aggregated.to_string()),
        duration: Duration::from_millis(1),
        timed_out: false,
    }
}

#[test]
fn sandbox_detection_requires_keywords() {
    let output = make_exec_output(1, "", "", "");
    assert!(!is_likely_sandbox_denied(
        SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp,
        &output
    ));
}

#[test]
fn sandbox_detection_identifies_keyword_in_stderr() {
    let output = make_exec_output(1, "", "Operation not permitted", "");
    assert!(is_likely_sandbox_denied(SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp, &output));
}

#[test]
fn sandbox_detection_respects_quick_reject_exit_codes() {
    let output = make_exec_output(127, "", "command not found", "");
    assert!(!is_likely_sandbox_denied(
        SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp,
        &output
    ));
}

#[test]
fn sandbox_detection_ignores_non_sandbox_mode() {
    let output = make_exec_output(1, "", "Operation not permitted", "");
    assert!(!is_likely_sandbox_denied(SandboxType::None, &output));
}

#[test]
fn sandbox_detection_ignores_network_policy_text_in_non_sandbox_mode() {
    let output = make_exec_output(
        0,
        "",
        "",
        r#"CODEX_NETWORK_POLICY_DECISION {"decision":"ask","reason":"not_allowed","source":"decider","protocol":"http","host":"google.com","port":80}"#,
    );
    assert!(!is_likely_sandbox_denied(SandboxType::None, &output));
}

#[test]
fn sandbox_detection_uses_aggregated_output() {
    let output = make_exec_output(
        101,
        "",
        "",
        "cargo failed: Read-only file system when writing target",
    );
    assert!(is_likely_sandbox_denied(
        SandboxType::MacosSeatbelt,
        &output
    ));
}

#[test]
fn sandbox_detection_ignores_network_policy_text_with_zero_exit_code() {
    let output = make_exec_output(
        0,
        "",
        "",
        r#"CODEX_NETWORK_POLICY_DECISION {"decision":"ask","source":"decider","protocol":"http","host":"google.com","port":80}"#,
    );

    assert!(!is_likely_sandbox_denied(
        SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp,
        &output
    ));
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn read_capped_limits_retained_bytes() {
    let (mut writer, reader) = tokio::io::duplex(1024);
    let bytes = vec![b'a'; EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES.saturating_add(128 * 1024)];
    tokio::spawn(async move {
        writer.write_all(&bytes).await.expect("write");
    });

    let out = read_capped(reader, None, false).await.expect("read");
    assert_eq!(out.text.len(), EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES);
}

#[test]
fn aggregate_output_prefers_stderr_on_contention() {
    let stdout = StreamOutput {
        text: vec![b'a'; EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES],
        truncated_after_lines: None,
    };
    let stderr = StreamOutput {
        text: vec![b'b'; EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES],
        truncated_after_lines: None,
    };

    let aggregated = aggregate_output(&stdout, &stderr);
    let stdout_cap = EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES / 3;
    let stderr_cap = EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES.saturating_sub(stdout_cap);

    assert_eq!(aggregated.text.len(), EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES);
    assert_eq!(aggregated.text[..stdout_cap], vec![b'a'; stdout_cap]);
    assert_eq!(aggregated.text[stdout_cap..], vec![b'b'; stderr_cap]);
}

#[test]
fn aggregate_output_fills_remaining_capacity_with_stderr() {
    let stdout_len = EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES / 10;
    let stdout = StreamOutput {
        text: vec![b'a'; stdout_len],
        truncated_after_lines: None,
    };
    let stderr = StreamOutput {
        text: vec![b'b'; EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES],
        truncated_after_lines: None,
    };

    let aggregated = aggregate_output(&stdout, &stderr);
    let stderr_cap = EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES.saturating_sub(stdout_len);

    assert_eq!(aggregated.text.len(), EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES);
    assert_eq!(aggregated.text[..stdout_len], vec![b'a'; stdout_len]);
    assert_eq!(aggregated.text[stdout_len..], vec![b'b'; stderr_cap]);
}

#[test]
fn aggregate_output_rebalances_when_stderr_is_small() {
    let stdout = StreamOutput {
        text: vec![b'a'; EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES],
        truncated_after_lines: None,
    };
    let stderr = StreamOutput {
        text: vec![b'b'; 1],
        truncated_after_lines: None,
    };

    let aggregated = aggregate_output(&stdout, &stderr);
    let stdout_len = EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES.saturating_sub(1);

    assert_eq!(aggregated.text.len(), EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES);
    assert_eq!(aggregated.text[..stdout_len], vec![b'a'; stdout_len]);
    assert_eq!(aggregated.text[stdout_len..], vec![b'b'; 1]);
}

#[test]
fn aggregate_output_keeps_stdout_then_stderr_when_under_cap() {
    let stdout = StreamOutput {
        text: vec![b'a'; 4],
        truncated_after_lines: None,
    };
    let stderr = StreamOutput {
        text: vec![b'b'; 3],
        truncated_after_lines: None,
    };

    let aggregated = aggregate_output(&stdout, &stderr);
    let mut expected = Vec::new();
    expected.extend_from_slice(&stdout.text);
    expected.extend_from_slice(&stderr.text);

    assert_eq!(aggregated.text, expected);
    assert_eq!(aggregated.truncated_after_lines, None);
}

#[test]
fn windows_restricted_token_skips_external_sandbox_policies() {
    let policy = SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox {
        network_access: codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkAccess::Restricted,
    };
    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![]);

    assert_eq!(
        windows_restricted_token_sandbox_support(
            SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
            WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
            &policy,
            &file_system_policy,
            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
        ),
        WindowsRestrictedTokenSandboxSupport {
            should_use: false,
            unsupported_reason: Some(
                "windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system=Restricted, network=Restricted, legacy_policy=ExternalSandbox { network_access: Restricted }; refusing to run unsandboxed".to_string()
            ),
        }
    );
}

#[test]
fn windows_restricted_token_runs_for_legacy_restricted_policies() {
    let policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![]);

    assert_eq!(
        windows_restricted_token_sandbox_support(
            SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
            WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
            &policy,
            &file_system_policy,
            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
        ),
        WindowsRestrictedTokenSandboxSupport {
            should_use: true,
            unsupported_reason: None,
        }
    );
}

#[test]
fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_network_only_restrictions() {
    let policy = SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox {
        network_access: codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkAccess::Restricted,
    };
    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted();

    assert_eq!(
        windows_restricted_token_sandbox_support(
            SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
            WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
            &policy,
            &file_system_policy,
            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
        ),
        WindowsRestrictedTokenSandboxSupport {
            should_use: false,
            unsupported_reason: Some(
                "windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system=Unrestricted, network=Restricted, legacy_policy=ExternalSandbox { network_access: Restricted }; refusing to run unsandboxed".to_string()
            ),
        }
    );
}

#[test]
fn windows_restricted_token_allows_legacy_restricted_policies() {
    let policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![]);

    assert_eq!(
        windows_restricted_token_sandbox_support(
            SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
            WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
            &policy,
            &file_system_policy,
            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
        ),
        WindowsRestrictedTokenSandboxSupport {
            should_use: true,
            unsupported_reason: None,
        }
    );
}

#[test]
fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_restricted_read_only_policies() {
    let policy = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly {
        access: codex_protocol::protocol::ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted {
            include_platform_defaults: true,
            readable_roots: vec![],
        },
        network_access: false,
    };
    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&policy);

    assert_eq!(
        windows_restricted_token_sandbox_support(
            SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
            WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
            &policy,
            &file_system_policy,
            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
        ),
        WindowsRestrictedTokenSandboxSupport {
            should_use: false,
            unsupported_reason: Some(
                "windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system=Restricted, network=Restricted, legacy_policy=ReadOnly { access: Restricted { include_platform_defaults: true, readable_roots: [] }, network_access: false }; refusing to run unsandboxed".to_string()
            ),
        },
        "restricted-token should fail closed for restricted read-only policies"
    );
}

#[test]
fn windows_restricted_token_allows_legacy_workspace_write_policies() {
    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
        writable_roots: vec![],
        read_only_access: codex_protocol::protocol::ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess,
        network_access: false,
        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
        exclude_slash_tmp: false,
    };
    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&policy);

    assert_eq!(
        windows_restricted_token_sandbox_support(
            SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
            WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
            &policy,
            &file_system_policy,
            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
        ),
        WindowsRestrictedTokenSandboxSupport {
            should_use: true,
            unsupported_reason: None,
        }
    );
}

#[test]
fn windows_elevated_sandbox_allows_restricted_read_only_policies() {
    let policy = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly {
        access: codex_protocol::protocol::ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted {
            include_platform_defaults: true,
            readable_roots: vec![],
        },
        network_access: false,
    };
    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&policy);

    assert_eq!(
        windows_restricted_token_sandbox_support(
            SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
            WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated,
            &policy,
            &file_system_policy,
            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
        ),
        WindowsRestrictedTokenSandboxSupport {
            should_use: true,
            unsupported_reason: None,
        },
        "elevated Windows sandbox should keep restricted read-only support enabled"
    );
}

#[test]
fn process_exec_tool_call_uses_platform_sandbox_for_network_only_restrictions() {
    let expected = crate::get_platform_sandbox(false).unwrap_or(SandboxType::None);

    assert_eq!(
        select_process_exec_tool_sandbox_type(
            &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted(),
            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
            WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
            false,
        ),
        expected
    );
}

#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn sandbox_detection_flags_sigsys_exit_code() {
    let exit_code = EXIT_CODE_SIGNAL_BASE + libc::SIGSYS;
    let output = make_exec_output(exit_code, "", "", "");
    assert!(is_likely_sandbox_denied(SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp, &output));
}

#[cfg(unix)]
#[tokio::test]
async fn kill_child_process_group_kills_grandchildren_on_timeout() -> Result<()> {
    // On Linux/macOS, /bin/bash is typically present; on FreeBSD/OpenBSD,
    // prefer /bin/sh to avoid NotFound errors.
    #[cfg(any(target_os = "freebsd", target_os = "openbsd"))]
    let command = vec![
        "/bin/sh".to_string(),
        "-c".to_string(),
        "sleep 60 & echo $!; sleep 60".to_string(),
    ];
    #[cfg(all(unix, not(any(target_os = "freebsd", target_os = "openbsd"))))]
    let command = vec![
        "/bin/bash".to_string(),
        "-c".to_string(),
        "sleep 60 & echo $!; sleep 60".to_string(),
    ];
    let env: HashMap<String, String> = std::env::vars().collect();
    let params = ExecParams {
        command,
        cwd: std::env::current_dir()?,
        expiration: 500.into(),
        env,
        network: None,
        sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
        windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
        windows_sandbox_private_desktop: false,
        justification: None,
        arg0: None,
    };

    let output = exec(
        params,
        SandboxType::None,
        &SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
        &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy()),
        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
        None,
        None,
    )
    .await?;
    assert!(output.timed_out);

    let stdout = output.stdout.from_utf8_lossy().text;
    let pid_line = stdout.lines().next().unwrap_or("").trim();
    let pid: i32 = pid_line.parse().map_err(|error| {
        io::Error::new(
            io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
            format!("Failed to parse pid from stdout '{pid_line}': {error}"),
        )
    })?;

    let mut killed = false;
    for _ in 0..20 {
        // Use kill(pid, 0) to check if the process is alive.
        if unsafe { libc::kill(pid, 0) } == -1
            && let Some(libc::ESRCH) = std::io::Error::last_os_error().raw_os_error()
        {
            killed = true;
            break;
        }
        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(100)).await;
    }

    assert!(killed, "grandchild process with pid {pid} is still alive");
    Ok(())
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn process_exec_tool_call_respects_cancellation_token() -> Result<()> {
    let command = long_running_command();
    let cwd = std::env::current_dir()?;
    let env: HashMap<String, String> = std::env::vars().collect();
    let cancel_token = CancellationToken::new();
    let cancel_tx = cancel_token.clone();
    let params = ExecParams {
        command,
        cwd: cwd.clone(),
        expiration: ExecExpiration::Cancellation(cancel_token),
        env,
        network: None,
        sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
        windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
        windows_sandbox_private_desktop: false,
        justification: None,
        arg0: None,
    };
    tokio::spawn(async move {
        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(1_000)).await;
        cancel_tx.cancel();
    });
    let result = process_exec_tool_call(
        params,
        &SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
        &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess),
        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
        cwd.as_path(),
        &None,
        false,
        None,
    )
    .await;
    let output = match result {
        Err(CodexErr::Sandbox(SandboxErr::Timeout { output })) => output,
        other => panic!("expected timeout error, got {other:?}"),
    };
    assert!(output.timed_out);
    assert_eq!(output.exit_code, EXEC_TIMEOUT_EXIT_CODE);
    Ok(())
}

#[cfg(unix)]
fn long_running_command() -> Vec<String> {
    vec![
        "/bin/sh".to_string(),
        "-c".to_string(),
        "sleep 30".to_string(),
    ]
}

#[cfg(windows)]
fn long_running_command() -> Vec<String> {
    vec![
        "powershell.exe".to_string(),
        "-NonInteractive".to_string(),
        "-NoLogo".to_string(),
        "-Command".to_string(),
        "Start-Sleep -Seconds 30".to_string(),
    ]
}