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## Summary Some permission profiles can encode filesystem reads that should remain unavailable to the agent. Before this change, the model-visible context and automatic approval review prompt summarized the effective permissions as a legacy sandbox mode, which can omit permission-profile filesystem entries from escalation decisions. For example, a profile can grant workspace access while denying a private subtree across every workspace root: ```toml default_permissions = "restricted-workspace" [permissions.restricted-workspace.workspace_roots] "/Users/alice/project" = true "/Users/alice/other-project" = true [permissions.restricted-workspace.filesystem] ":minimal" = "read" [permissions.restricted-workspace.filesystem.":workspace_roots"] "." = "write" "private" = "deny" "private/**" = "deny" ``` The context window now describes the workspace roots and effective filesystem side of the `PermissionProfile` directly, with deny entries marked as non-escalatable: ```xml <environment_context> <cwd>/Users/alice/project</cwd> <shell>zsh</shell> <filesystem><workspace_roots><root>/Users/alice/project</root><root>/Users/alice/other-project</root></workspace_roots><permission_profile type="managed"><file_system type="restricted"><entry access="read"><special>:minimal</special></entry><entry access="write"><path>/Users/alice/project</path></entry><entry access="write"><path>/Users/alice/other-project</path></entry><entry access="deny" escalatable="false"><path>/Users/alice/project/private</path></entry><entry access="deny" escalatable="false"><path>/Users/alice/other-project/private</path></entry><entry access="deny" escalatable="false"><glob>/Users/alice/project/private/**</glob></entry><entry access="deny" escalatable="false"><glob>/Users/alice/other-project/private/**</glob></entry></file_system></permission_profile></filesystem> </environment_context> ``` Managed requirements can impose the same kind of deny-read restriction: ```toml [permissions.filesystem] deny_read = [ "/Users/alice/project/private", "/Users/alice/project/private/**", ] ``` The automatic approval review prompt also receives the parent turn's denied-read context, so review decisions can account for the active permission profile. ## What Changed - Render the effective filesystem profile in `<environment_context>`, including profile type, filesystem entries, workspace roots, and non-escalatable deny entries. - Persist effective `workspace_roots` in `TurnContextItem` so resumed/replayed context does not have to bind `:workspace_roots` through legacy `cwd` fallback. - Add explicit permission instructions that denied reads are policy restrictions, not escalation targets. - Pass the parent turn's denied-read context into automatic approval reviews. - Add targeted coverage for prompt rendering, workspace-root materialization, replay context, and review prompt context. - Keep the prompt-context test expectations platform-aware so the same filesystem rendering assertions pass on Unix and Windows paths. ## Testing - `just test -p codex-core context::environment_context::tests::serialize_environment_context_with_full_filesystem_profile` - `just test -p codex-core context::environment_context::tests::turn_context_item_filesystem_uses_workspace_roots_instead_of_cwd` - `just test -p codex-core context::permissions_instructions::permissions_instructions_tests::builds_permissions_from_profile_with_denied_reads` - `just fix -p codex-core` I also attempted `just test -p codex-core`; the changed prompt-context tests passed, but the full local run did not complete cleanly in this sandboxed macOS environment due unrelated user-shell `CODEX_SANDBOX*` expectations and integration-test timeouts.