Files
codex/codex-rs/tui/src/additional_dirs.rs
Michael Bolin 9025550709 app-server-protocol: remove PermissionProfile from API (#22924)
## Why

The app server API should expose permission profile identity, not the
lower-level runtime permission model. `PermissionProfile` is the
compiled sandbox/network representation that the server uses internally;
exposing it through app-server-protocol forces clients to understand
details that should remain implementation-level.

The API boundary should prefer `ActivePermissionProfile`: a stable
profile id, plus future parent-profile metadata, that clients can pass
back when they want to select the same active permissions. This also
avoids schema generation collisions between the app-server v2 API type
space and the core protocol model.

Incidentally, while PR makes a number of changes to `command/exec`, note
that we are hoping to deprecate this API in favor of `process/spawn`, so
we don't need to be too finicky about these changes.

## What Changed

- Removed `PermissionProfile` from the app-server-protocol API surface,
including generated schema and TypeScript exports.
- Changed `CommandExecParams.permissionProfile` to
`ActivePermissionProfile`.
- Resolve command exec profile ids through `ConfigManager` for the
command cwd, matching turn override selection semantics.
- Updated downstream TUI tests/helpers to use core permission types
directly instead of app-server-protocol `PermissionProfile` shims.
2026-05-15 17:10:15 -07:00

144 lines
5.0 KiB
Rust

use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use std::path::PathBuf;
/// Returns a warning describing why `--add-dir` entries will be ignored for the
/// resolved permission profile. The caller is responsible for presenting the
/// warning to the user (for example, printing to stderr).
pub fn add_dir_warning_message(
additional_dirs: &[PathBuf],
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
cwd: &std::path::Path,
) -> Option<String> {
if additional_dirs.is_empty() {
return None;
}
if matches!(
permission_profile,
PermissionProfile::Disabled | PermissionProfile::External { .. }
) {
return None;
}
let file_system_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
if file_system_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() {
return None;
}
if file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(cwd, cwd) {
return None;
}
Some(format_warning(additional_dirs))
}
fn format_warning(additional_dirs: &[PathBuf]) -> String {
let joined_paths = additional_dirs
.iter()
.map(|path| path.to_string_lossy())
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(", ");
format!(
"Ignoring --add-dir ({joined_paths}) because the effective permissions do not allow additional writable roots. Switch to workspace-write or danger-full-access to allow them."
)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::add_dir_warning_message;
use codex_protocol::models::ManagedFileSystemPermissions;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath;
use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
#[test]
fn returns_none_for_workspace_write() {
let profile = PermissionProfile::workspace_write();
let dirs = vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp/example")];
assert_eq!(
add_dir_warning_message(&dirs, &profile, Path::new("/tmp/project")),
None
);
}
#[test]
fn returns_none_for_danger_full_access() {
let profile = PermissionProfile::Disabled;
let dirs = vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp/example")];
assert_eq!(
add_dir_warning_message(&dirs, &profile, Path::new("/tmp/project")),
None
);
}
#[test]
fn returns_none_for_external_sandbox() {
let profile: PermissionProfile = PermissionProfile::External {
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
};
let dirs = vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp/example")];
assert_eq!(
add_dir_warning_message(&dirs, &profile, Path::new("/tmp/project")),
None
);
}
#[test]
fn warns_for_read_only() {
let profile = PermissionProfile::read_only();
let dirs = vec![PathBuf::from("relative"), PathBuf::from("/abs")];
let message = add_dir_warning_message(&dirs, &profile, Path::new("/tmp/project"))
.expect("expected warning for read-only sandbox");
assert_eq!(
message,
"Ignoring --add-dir (relative, /abs) because the effective permissions do not allow additional writable roots. Switch to workspace-write or danger-full-access to allow them."
);
}
#[test]
fn warns_when_profile_can_write_elsewhere_but_not_cwd() {
let profile: PermissionProfile = PermissionProfile::Managed {
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
file_system: ManagedFileSystemPermissions::Restricted {
entries: vec![
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: "/tmp/writable".try_into().expect("absolute path"),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
],
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
},
};
let dirs = vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp/extra")];
assert_eq!(
add_dir_warning_message(&dirs, &profile, Path::new("/tmp/project")),
Some("Ignoring --add-dir (/tmp/extra) because the effective permissions do not allow additional writable roots. Switch to workspace-write or danger-full-access to allow them.".to_string())
);
}
#[test]
fn returns_none_when_no_additional_dirs() {
let profile = PermissionProfile::read_only();
let dirs: Vec<PathBuf> = Vec::new();
assert_eq!(
add_dir_warning_message(&dirs, &profile, Path::new("/tmp/project")),
None
);
}
}