Files
codex/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/managed_proxy.rs
Michael Bolin 26f355b67b linux-sandbox: use standalone bundled bwrap (#21255)
**Summary**
- Add `codex-bwrap`, a standalone `bwrap` binary built from the existing
vendored bubblewrap sources.
- Remove the linked vendored bwrap path from `codex-linux-sandbox`;
runtime now prefers system `bwrap` and falls back to bundled
`codex-resources/bwrap`.
- Add bundled SHA-256 verification with missing/all-zero digest as the
dev-mode skip value, then exec the verified file through
`/proc/self/fd`.
- Keep `launcher.rs` focused on choosing and dispatching the preferred
launcher. Bundled lookup, digest verification, and bundled exec now live
in `linux-sandbox/src/bundled_bwrap.rs`; Bazel runfiles lookup lives in
`linux-sandbox/src/bazel_bwrap.rs`; shared argv/fd exec helpers live in
`linux-sandbox/src/exec_util.rs`.
- Teach Bazel tests to surface the Bazel-built `//codex-rs/bwrap:bwrap`
through `CARGO_BIN_EXE_bwrap`; `codex-linux-sandbox` only honors that
fallback in debug Bazel runfiles environments so release/user runtime
lookup stays tied to `codex-resources/bwrap`.
- Allow `codex-exec-server` filesystem helpers to preserve just the
Bazel bwrap/runfiles variables they need in debug Bazel builds, since
those helpers intentionally rebuild a small environment before spawning
`codex-linux-sandbox`.
- Verify the Bazel bwrap target in Linux release CI with a build-only
check. Running `bwrap --version` is too strong for GitHub runners
because bubblewrap still attempts namespace setup there.

**Verification**
- Latest update: `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox`
- Latest update: `just fix -p codex-linux-sandbox`
- `cargo check --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu -p codex-linux-sandbox`
could not run locally because this macOS machine does not have
`x86_64-linux-gnu-gcc`; GitHub Linux Bazel CI is expected to cover the
Linux-only modules.
- Earlier in this PR: `cargo test -p codex-bwrap`
- Earlier in this PR: `cargo test -p codex-exec-server`
- Earlier in this PR: `cargo check --release -p codex-exec-server`
- Earlier in this PR: `just fix -p codex-linux-sandbox -p
codex-exec-server`
- Earlier in this PR: `bazel test --nobuild
//codex-rs/linux-sandbox:linux-sandbox-all-test
//codex-rs/core:core-all-test
//codex-rs/exec-server:exec-server-file_system-test
//codex-rs/app-server:app-server-all-test` (analysis completed; Bazel
then refuses to run tests under `--nobuild`)
- Earlier in this PR: `bazel build --nobuild //codex-rs/bwrap:bwrap`
- Prior to this update: `just bazel-lock-update`, `just
bazel-lock-check`, and YAML parse check for
`.github/workflows/bazel.yml`


---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/21255).
* #21257
* #21256
* __->__ #21255
2026-05-05 17:14:29 -07:00

313 lines
9.8 KiB
Rust

#![cfg(target_os = "linux")]
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
use codex_core::exec_env::create_env;
use codex_protocol::config_types::ShellEnvironmentPolicy;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::io::Read;
use std::io::Write;
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use std::net::TcpListener;
use std::process::Output;
use std::process::Stdio;
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::process::Command;
const BWRAP_UNAVAILABLE_ERR: &str = "bubblewrap is unavailable: no system bwrap was found";
const NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 4_000;
const MANAGED_PROXY_PERMISSION_ERR_SNIPPETS: &[&str] = &[
"loopback: Failed RTM_NEWADDR",
"loopback: Failed RTM_NEWLINK",
"setting up uid map: Permission denied",
"No permissions to create a new namespace",
"error isolating Linux network namespace for proxy mode",
];
const PROXY_ENV_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
"HTTP_PROXY",
"HTTPS_PROXY",
"ALL_PROXY",
"FTP_PROXY",
"YARN_HTTP_PROXY",
"YARN_HTTPS_PROXY",
"NPM_CONFIG_HTTP_PROXY",
"NPM_CONFIG_HTTPS_PROXY",
"NPM_CONFIG_PROXY",
"BUNDLE_HTTP_PROXY",
"BUNDLE_HTTPS_PROXY",
"PIP_PROXY",
"DOCKER_HTTP_PROXY",
"DOCKER_HTTPS_PROXY",
];
fn create_env_from_core_vars() -> HashMap<String, String> {
let policy = ShellEnvironmentPolicy::default();
create_env(&policy, /*thread_id*/ None)
}
fn strip_proxy_env(env: &mut HashMap<String, String>) {
for key in PROXY_ENV_KEYS {
env.remove(*key);
let lower = key.to_ascii_lowercase();
env.remove(lower.as_str());
}
}
fn is_bwrap_unavailable_output(output: &Output) -> bool {
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).contains(BWRAP_UNAVAILABLE_ERR)
}
async fn should_skip_bwrap_tests() -> bool {
let mut env = create_env_from_core_vars();
strip_proxy_env(&mut env);
let output = run_linux_sandbox_direct(
&["bash", "-c", "true"],
&PermissionProfile::read_only(),
/*allow_network_for_proxy*/ false,
env,
NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS,
)
.await;
is_bwrap_unavailable_output(&output)
}
fn is_managed_proxy_permission_error(stderr: &str) -> bool {
MANAGED_PROXY_PERMISSION_ERR_SNIPPETS
.iter()
.any(|snippet| stderr.contains(snippet))
}
async fn managed_proxy_skip_reason() -> Option<String> {
if should_skip_bwrap_tests().await {
return Some("bubblewrap is unavailable in this environment".to_string());
}
let mut env = create_env_from_core_vars();
strip_proxy_env(&mut env);
env.insert("HTTP_PROXY".to_string(), "http://127.0.0.1:9".to_string());
let output = run_linux_sandbox_direct(
&["bash", "-c", "true"],
&PermissionProfile::Disabled,
/*allow_network_for_proxy*/ true,
env,
NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS,
)
.await;
if output.status.success() {
return None;
}
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
if is_managed_proxy_permission_error(stderr.as_ref()) {
return Some(format!(
"managed proxy requires kernel namespace privileges unavailable here: {}",
stderr.trim()
));
}
None
}
async fn run_linux_sandbox_direct(
command: &[&str],
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
env: HashMap<String, String>,
timeout_ms: u64,
) -> Output {
let cwd = match std::env::current_dir() {
Ok(cwd) => cwd,
Err(err) => panic!("cwd should exist: {err}"),
};
let permission_profile_json = match serde_json::to_string(permission_profile) {
Ok(permission_profile_json) => permission_profile_json,
Err(err) => panic!("permission profile should serialize: {err}"),
};
let mut args = vec![
"--sandbox-policy-cwd".to_string(),
cwd.to_string_lossy().to_string(),
"--permission-profile".to_string(),
permission_profile_json,
];
if allow_network_for_proxy {
args.push("--allow-network-for-proxy".to_string());
}
args.push("--".to_string());
args.extend(command.iter().map(|entry| (*entry).to_string()));
let mut cmd = Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_codex-linux-sandbox"));
cmd.args(args)
.current_dir(cwd)
.env_clear()
.envs(env)
.stdin(Stdio::null())
.stdout(Stdio::piped())
.stderr(Stdio::piped());
let output = match tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_millis(timeout_ms), cmd.output()).await {
Ok(output) => output,
Err(err) => panic!("sandbox command should not time out: {err}"),
};
match output {
Ok(output) => output,
Err(err) => panic!("sandbox command should execute: {err}"),
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn managed_proxy_mode_fails_closed_without_proxy_env() {
if let Some(skip_reason) = managed_proxy_skip_reason().await {
eprintln!("skipping managed proxy test: {skip_reason}");
return;
}
let mut env = create_env_from_core_vars();
strip_proxy_env(&mut env);
let output = run_linux_sandbox_direct(
&["bash", "-c", "true"],
&PermissionProfile::Disabled,
/*allow_network_for_proxy*/ true,
env,
NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS,
)
.await;
assert_eq!(output.status.success(), false);
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
assert!(
stderr.contains("managed proxy mode requires proxy environment variables"),
"expected fail-closed managed-proxy message, got stderr: {stderr}"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn managed_proxy_mode_routes_through_bridge_and_blocks_direct_egress() {
if let Some(skip_reason) = managed_proxy_skip_reason().await {
eprintln!("skipping managed proxy test: {skip_reason}");
return;
}
let listener = TcpListener::bind((Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, 0)).expect("bind proxy listener");
let proxy_port = listener
.local_addr()
.expect("proxy listener local addr")
.port();
let (request_tx, request_rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel();
std::thread::spawn(move || {
let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().expect("accept proxy connection");
stream
.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(3)))
.expect("set read timeout");
let mut buf = [0_u8; 4096];
let read = stream.read(&mut buf).expect("read proxy request");
let request = String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf[..read]).to_string();
request_tx.send(request).expect("send proxy request");
stream
.write_all(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 2\r\n\r\nOK")
.expect("write proxy response");
});
let mut env = create_env_from_core_vars();
strip_proxy_env(&mut env);
env.insert(
"HTTP_PROXY".to_string(),
format!("http://127.0.0.1:{proxy_port}"),
);
let routed_output = run_linux_sandbox_direct(
&[
"bash",
"-c",
"proxy=\"${HTTP_PROXY#*://}\"; host=\"${proxy%%:*}\"; port=\"${proxy##*:}\"; exec 3<>/dev/tcp/${host}/${port}; printf 'GET http://example.com/ HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: example.com\\r\\n\\r\\n' >&3; IFS= read -r line <&3; printf '%s\\n' \"$line\"",
],
&PermissionProfile::Disabled,
/*allow_network_for_proxy*/ true,
env.clone(),
NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS,
)
.await;
assert_eq!(
routed_output.status.success(),
true,
"expected routed command to execute successfully; status={:?}; stdout={}; stderr={}",
routed_output.status.code(),
String::from_utf8_lossy(&routed_output.stdout),
String::from_utf8_lossy(&routed_output.stderr)
);
let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&routed_output.stdout);
assert!(
stdout.contains("HTTP/1.1 200 OK"),
"expected bridge-routed proxy response, got stdout: {stdout}"
);
let request = request_rx
.recv_timeout(Duration::from_secs(3))
.expect("expected proxy request");
assert!(
request.contains("GET http://example.com/ HTTP/1.1"),
"expected HTTP proxy absolute-form request, got request: {request}"
);
let direct_egress_output = run_linux_sandbox_direct(
&["bash", "-c", "echo hi > /dev/tcp/192.0.2.1/80"],
&PermissionProfile::Disabled,
/*allow_network_for_proxy*/ true,
env,
NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS,
)
.await;
assert_eq!(direct_egress_output.status.success(), false);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn managed_proxy_mode_denies_af_unix_creation_for_user_command() {
if let Some(skip_reason) = managed_proxy_skip_reason().await {
eprintln!("skipping managed proxy test: {skip_reason}");
return;
}
let python_available = Command::new("bash")
.arg("-c")
.arg("command -v python3 >/dev/null")
.status()
.await
.expect("python3 probe should execute")
.success();
if !python_available {
eprintln!("skipping managed proxy AF_UNIX test: python3 is unavailable");
return;
}
let mut env = create_env_from_core_vars();
strip_proxy_env(&mut env);
env.insert("HTTP_PROXY".to_string(), "http://127.0.0.1:9".to_string());
let output = run_linux_sandbox_direct(
&[
"python3",
"-c",
"import socket,sys\ntry:\n socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\nexcept PermissionError:\n sys.exit(0)\nexcept OSError:\n sys.exit(2)\nsys.exit(1)\n",
],
&PermissionProfile::Disabled,
/*allow_network_for_proxy*/ true,
env,
NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS,
)
.await;
assert_eq!(
output.status.code(),
Some(0),
"expected AF_UNIX creation to be denied cleanly for user command; status={:?}; stdout={}; stderr={}",
output.status.code(),
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout),
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)
);
}