Files
codex/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/request_permissions.rs
Michael Bolin d09a7535ed fix: use AbsolutePathBuf for permission profile file roots (#12970)
## Why
`PermissionProfile` should describe filesystem roots as absolute paths
at the type level. Using `PathBuf` in `FileSystemPermissions` made the
shared type too permissive and blurred together three different
deserialization cases:

- skill metadata in `agents/openai.yaml`, where relative paths should
resolve against the skill directory
- app-server API payloads, where callers should have to send absolute
paths
- local tool-call payloads for commands like `shell_command` and
`exec_command`, where `additional_permissions.file_system` may
legitimately be relative to the command `workdir`

This change tightens the shared model without regressing the existing
local command flow.

## What Changed
- changed `protocol::models::FileSystemPermissions` and the app-server
`AdditionalFileSystemPermissions` mirror to use `AbsolutePathBuf`
- wrapped skill metadata deserialization in `AbsolutePathBufGuard`, so
relative permission roots in `agents/openai.yaml` resolve against the
containing skill directory
- kept app-server/API deserialization strict, so relative
`additionalPermissions.fileSystem.*` paths are rejected at the boundary
- restored cwd/workdir-relative deserialization for local tool-call
payloads by parsing `shell`, `shell_command`, and `exec_command`
arguments under an `AbsolutePathBufGuard` rooted at the resolved command
working directory
- simplified runtime additional-permission normalization so it only
canonicalizes and deduplicates absolute roots instead of trying to
recover relative ones later
- updated the app-server schema fixtures, `app-server/README.md`, and
the affected transport/TUI tests to match the final behavior
2026-02-27 17:42:52 +00:00

737 lines
24 KiB
Rust

#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]
use anyhow::Result;
use codex_core::config::Constrained;
use codex_core::features::Feature;
use codex_core::sandboxing::SandboxPermissions;
use codex_protocol::models::FileSystemPermissions;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
use codex_protocol::protocol::EventMsg;
use codex_protocol::protocol::ExecApprovalRequestEvent;
use codex_protocol::protocol::Op;
use codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewDecision;
use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::user_input::UserInput;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_assistant_message;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_completed;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_function_call;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_response_created;
use core_test_support::responses::mount_sse_once;
use core_test_support::responses::sse;
use core_test_support::responses::start_mock_server;
use core_test_support::skip_if_no_network;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use core_test_support::skip_if_sandbox;
use core_test_support::test_codex::TestCodex;
use core_test_support::test_codex::test_codex;
use core_test_support::wait_for_event;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use regex_lite::Regex;
use serde_json::Value;
use serde_json::json;
use std::fs;
use std::path::Path;
fn absolute_path(path: &Path) -> AbsolutePathBuf {
AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(path).expect("absolute path")
}
struct CommandResult {
exit_code: Option<i64>,
stdout: String,
}
fn parse_result(item: &Value) -> CommandResult {
let output_str = item
.get("output")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.expect("shell output payload");
match serde_json::from_str::<Value>(output_str) {
Ok(parsed) => {
let exit_code = parsed["metadata"]["exit_code"].as_i64();
let stdout = parsed["output"].as_str().unwrap_or_default().to_string();
CommandResult { exit_code, stdout }
}
Err(_) => {
let structured = Regex::new(r"(?s)^Exit code:\s*(-?\d+).*?Output:\n(.*)$").unwrap();
let regex =
Regex::new(r"(?s)^.*?Process exited with code (\d+)\n.*?Output:\n(.*)$").unwrap();
if let Some(captures) = structured.captures(output_str) {
let exit_code = captures.get(1).unwrap().as_str().parse::<i64>().unwrap();
let output = captures.get(2).unwrap().as_str();
CommandResult {
exit_code: Some(exit_code),
stdout: output.to_string(),
}
} else if let Some(captures) = regex.captures(output_str) {
let exit_code = captures.get(1).unwrap().as_str().parse::<i64>().unwrap();
let output = captures.get(2).unwrap().as_str();
CommandResult {
exit_code: Some(exit_code),
stdout: output.to_string(),
}
} else {
CommandResult {
exit_code: None,
stdout: output_str.to_string(),
}
}
}
}
}
fn shell_event_with_request_permissions(
call_id: &str,
command: &str,
additional_permissions: &PermissionProfile,
) -> Result<Value> {
let args = json!({
"command": command,
"timeout_ms": 1_000_u64,
"sandbox_permissions": SandboxPermissions::WithAdditionalPermissions,
"additional_permissions": additional_permissions,
});
let args_str = serde_json::to_string(&args)?;
Ok(ev_function_call(call_id, "shell_command", &args_str))
}
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
fn shell_event_with_raw_request_permissions(
call_id: &str,
command: &str,
workdir: Option<&str>,
additional_permissions: Value,
) -> Result<Value> {
let args = json!({
"command": command,
"workdir": workdir,
"timeout_ms": 1_000_u64,
"sandbox_permissions": SandboxPermissions::WithAdditionalPermissions,
"additional_permissions": additional_permissions,
});
let args_str = serde_json::to_string(&args)?;
Ok(ev_function_call(call_id, "shell_command", &args_str))
}
async fn submit_turn(
test: &TestCodex,
prompt: &str,
approval_policy: AskForApproval,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
) -> Result<()> {
let session_model = test.session_configured.model.clone();
test.codex
.submit(Op::UserTurn {
items: vec![UserInput::Text {
text: prompt.into(),
text_elements: Vec::new(),
}],
final_output_json_schema: None,
cwd: test.cwd.path().to_path_buf(),
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy,
model: session_model,
effort: None,
summary: None,
collaboration_mode: None,
personality: None,
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn wait_for_completion(test: &TestCodex) {
wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
matches!(event, EventMsg::TurnComplete(_))
})
.await;
}
async fn expect_exec_approval(
test: &TestCodex,
expected_command: &str,
) -> ExecApprovalRequestEvent {
let event = wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
matches!(
event,
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
)
})
.await;
match event {
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(approval) => {
let last_arg = approval
.command
.last()
.map(String::as_str)
.unwrap_or_default();
assert_eq!(last_arg, expected_command);
approval
}
EventMsg::TurnComplete(_) => panic!("expected approval request before completion"),
other => panic!("unexpected event: {other:?}"),
}
}
fn workspace_write_excluding_tmp() -> SandboxPolicy {
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
read_only_access: Default::default(),
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
}
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
async fn with_additional_permissions_requires_approval_under_on_request() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
skip_if_sandbox!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy_for_config);
config.features.enable(Feature::RequestPermissions);
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let requested_write = test.workspace_path("requested-but-unused.txt");
let _ = fs::remove_file(&requested_write);
let call_id = "request_permissions_skip_approval";
let command = "touch requested-but-unused.txt";
let requested_permissions = PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
read: Some(vec![]),
write: Some(vec![absolute_path(&requested_write)]),
}),
..Default::default()
};
let event = shell_event_with_request_permissions(call_id, command, &requested_permissions)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(&test, call_id, approval_policy, sandbox_policy.clone()).await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, command).await;
assert_eq!(
approval.additional_permissions,
Some(requested_permissions.clone())
);
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
let result = parse_result(&results.single_request().function_call_output(call_id));
assert!(
result.exit_code.is_none() || result.exit_code == Some(0),
"unexpected exit code/output: {:?} {}",
result.exit_code,
result.stdout
);
assert!(
requested_write.exists(),
"touch command should create requested path"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
async fn relative_additional_permissions_resolve_against_tool_workdir() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
skip_if_sandbox!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy_for_config);
config.features.enable(Feature::RequestPermissions);
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let nested_dir = test.workspace_path("nested");
fs::create_dir_all(&nested_dir)?;
let requested_write = nested_dir.join("relative-write.txt");
let _ = fs::remove_file(&requested_write);
let call_id = "request_permissions_relative_workdir";
let command = "touch relative-write.txt";
let expected_permissions = PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
read: None,
write: Some(vec![absolute_path(&requested_write)]),
}),
..Default::default()
};
let event = shell_event_with_raw_request_permissions(
call_id,
command,
Some("nested"),
json!({
"file_system": {
"write": ["./relative-write.txt"],
},
}),
)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-relative-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-relative-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-relative-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-relative-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(&test, call_id, approval_policy, sandbox_policy.clone()).await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, command).await;
assert_eq!(
approval.additional_permissions,
Some(expected_permissions.clone())
);
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
let result = parse_result(&results.single_request().function_call_output(call_id));
assert!(
result.exit_code.is_none() || result.exit_code == Some(0),
"unexpected exit code/output: {:?} {}",
result.exit_code,
result.stdout
);
assert!(
requested_write.exists(),
"touch command should create requested path"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
async fn read_only_with_additional_permissions_widens_to_unrequested_cwd_write() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
skip_if_sandbox!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy_for_config);
config.features.enable(Feature::RequestPermissions);
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let requested_write = test.workspace_path("requested-only-cwd.txt");
let unrequested_write = test.workspace_path("unrequested-cwd-write.txt");
let _ = fs::remove_file(&requested_write);
let _ = fs::remove_file(&unrequested_write);
let call_id = "request_permissions_cwd_widening";
let command = format!(
"printf {:?} > {:?} && cat {:?}",
"cwd-widened", unrequested_write, unrequested_write
);
let requested_permissions = PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
read: Some(vec![]),
write: Some(vec![absolute_path(&requested_write)]),
}),
..Default::default()
};
let event = shell_event_with_request_permissions(call_id, &command, &requested_permissions)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-cwd-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-cwd-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-cwd-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-cwd-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(&test, call_id, approval_policy, sandbox_policy.clone()).await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, &command).await;
assert_eq!(
approval.additional_permissions,
Some(requested_permissions.clone())
);
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
let result = parse_result(&results.single_request().function_call_output(call_id));
assert!(
result.exit_code.is_none() || result.exit_code == Some(0),
"unexpected exit code/output: {:?} {}",
result.exit_code,
result.stdout
);
assert!(result.stdout.contains("cwd-widened"));
assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(&unrequested_write)?, "cwd-widened");
assert!(
!requested_write.exists(),
"only the unrequested cwd path should have been written"
);
let _ = fs::remove_file(unrequested_write);
let _ = fs::remove_file(requested_write);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
async fn read_only_with_additional_permissions_widens_to_unrequested_tmp_write() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
skip_if_sandbox!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy_for_config);
config.features.enable(Feature::RequestPermissions);
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let requested_write = test.workspace_path("requested-only-tmp.txt");
let tmp_dir = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let tmp_write = tmp_dir.path().join("tmp-widening.txt");
let _ = fs::remove_file(&requested_write);
let _ = fs::remove_file(&tmp_write);
let call_id = "request_permissions_tmp_widening";
let command = format!(
"printf {:?} > {:?} && cat {:?}",
"tmp-widened", tmp_write, tmp_write
);
let requested_permissions = PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
read: Some(vec![]),
write: Some(vec![absolute_path(&requested_write)]),
}),
..Default::default()
};
let event = shell_event_with_request_permissions(call_id, &command, &requested_permissions)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-tmp-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-tmp-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-tmp-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-tmp-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(&test, call_id, approval_policy, sandbox_policy.clone()).await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, &command).await;
assert_eq!(
approval.additional_permissions,
Some(requested_permissions.clone())
);
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
let result = parse_result(&results.single_request().function_call_output(call_id));
assert!(
result.exit_code.is_none() || result.exit_code == Some(0),
"unexpected exit code/output: {:?} {}",
result.exit_code,
result.stdout
);
assert!(result.stdout.contains("tmp-widened"));
assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(&tmp_write)?, "tmp-widened");
assert!(
!requested_write.exists(),
"only the unrequested tmp path should have been written"
);
let _ = fs::remove_file(tmp_write);
let _ = fs::remove_file(requested_write);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
async fn workspace_write_with_additional_permissions_can_write_outside_cwd() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
skip_if_sandbox!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let sandbox_policy = workspace_write_excluding_tmp();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy_for_config);
config.features.enable(Feature::RequestPermissions);
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let outside_dir = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let outside_write = outside_dir.path().join("workspace-write-outside.txt");
let placeholder = test.workspace_path("workspace-write-placeholder.txt");
let _ = fs::remove_file(&outside_write);
let _ = fs::remove_file(&placeholder);
let call_id = "request_permissions_workspace_write_outside";
let command = format!(
"printf {:?} > {:?} && cat {:?}",
"outside-cwd-ok", outside_write, outside_write
);
let requested_permissions = PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
read: Some(vec![]),
write: Some(vec![absolute_path(outside_dir.path())]),
}),
..Default::default()
};
let normalized_requested_permissions = PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
read: Some(vec![]),
write: Some(vec![AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(
outside_dir.path().canonicalize()?,
)?]),
}),
..Default::default()
};
let event = shell_event_with_request_permissions(call_id, &command, &requested_permissions)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-ww-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-ww-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-ww-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-ww-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(&test, call_id, approval_policy, sandbox_policy.clone()).await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, &command).await;
assert_eq!(
approval.additional_permissions,
Some(normalized_requested_permissions)
);
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
let result = parse_result(&results.single_request().function_call_output(call_id));
assert!(
result.exit_code.is_none() || result.exit_code == Some(0),
"unexpected exit code/output: {:?} {}",
result.exit_code,
result.stdout
);
assert!(result.stdout.contains("outside-cwd-ok"));
assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(&outside_write)?, "outside-cwd-ok");
assert!(
!placeholder.exists(),
"placeholder path should remain untouched"
);
let _ = fs::remove_file(outside_write);
let _ = fs::remove_file(placeholder);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn with_additional_permissions_denied_approval_blocks_execution() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let sandbox_policy = workspace_write_excluding_tmp();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy_for_config);
config.features.enable(Feature::RequestPermissions);
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let outside_dir = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let outside_write = outside_dir.path().join("workspace-write-denied.txt");
let _ = fs::remove_file(&outside_write);
let call_id = "request_permissions_denied";
let command = format!(
"printf {:?} > {:?} && cat {:?}",
"should-not-write", outside_write, outside_write
);
let requested_permissions = PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
read: Some(vec![]),
write: Some(vec![absolute_path(outside_dir.path())]),
}),
..Default::default()
};
let normalized_requested_permissions = PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
read: Some(vec![]),
write: Some(vec![AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(
outside_dir.path().canonicalize()?,
)?]),
}),
..Default::default()
};
let event = shell_event_with_request_permissions(call_id, &command, &requested_permissions)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-denied-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-denied-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-denied-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-denied-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(&test, call_id, approval_policy, sandbox_policy.clone()).await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, &command).await;
assert_eq!(
approval.additional_permissions,
Some(normalized_requested_permissions)
);
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
let result = parse_result(&results.single_request().function_call_output(call_id));
assert_ne!(
result.exit_code,
Some(0),
"denied command should not succeed"
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains("rejected by user"),
"unexpected denial output: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
!outside_write.exists(),
"denied command should not create file"
);
let _ = fs::remove_file(outside_write);
Ok(())
}