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## Why `PermissionProfile` should describe filesystem roots as absolute paths at the type level. Using `PathBuf` in `FileSystemPermissions` made the shared type too permissive and blurred together three different deserialization cases: - skill metadata in `agents/openai.yaml`, where relative paths should resolve against the skill directory - app-server API payloads, where callers should have to send absolute paths - local tool-call payloads for commands like `shell_command` and `exec_command`, where `additional_permissions.file_system` may legitimately be relative to the command `workdir` This change tightens the shared model without regressing the existing local command flow. ## What Changed - changed `protocol::models::FileSystemPermissions` and the app-server `AdditionalFileSystemPermissions` mirror to use `AbsolutePathBuf` - wrapped skill metadata deserialization in `AbsolutePathBufGuard`, so relative permission roots in `agents/openai.yaml` resolve against the containing skill directory - kept app-server/API deserialization strict, so relative `additionalPermissions.fileSystem.*` paths are rejected at the boundary - restored cwd/workdir-relative deserialization for local tool-call payloads by parsing `shell`, `shell_command`, and `exec_command` arguments under an `AbsolutePathBufGuard` rooted at the resolved command working directory - simplified runtime additional-permission normalization so it only canonicalizes and deduplicates absolute roots instead of trying to recover relative ones later - updated the app-server schema fixtures, `app-server/README.md`, and the affected transport/TUI tests to match the final behavior
754 lines
24 KiB
Rust
754 lines
24 KiB
Rust
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
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#![cfg(unix)]
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use anyhow::Result;
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use codex_core::config::Config;
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use codex_core::features::Feature;
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use codex_protocol::models::FileSystemPermissions;
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use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
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use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
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use codex_protocol::protocol::EventMsg;
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use codex_protocol::protocol::ExecApprovalRequestEvent;
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use codex_protocol::protocol::Op;
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use codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewDecision;
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use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
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use codex_protocol::user_input::UserInput;
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use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
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use core_test_support::responses::mount_function_call_agent_response;
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use core_test_support::responses::start_mock_server;
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use core_test_support::skip_if_no_network;
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use core_test_support::test_codex::TestCodex;
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use core_test_support::test_codex::test_codex;
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use core_test_support::wait_for_event;
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use core_test_support::wait_for_event_match;
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use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
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use serde_json::json;
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use std::fs;
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use std::path::Path;
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use std::path::PathBuf;
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fn absolute_path(path: &Path) -> AbsolutePathBuf {
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match AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(path) {
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Ok(path) => path,
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Err(err) => panic!("absolute path: {err}"),
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}
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}
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fn write_skill_metadata(home: &Path, name: &str, contents: &str) -> Result<()> {
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let metadata_dir = home.join("skills").join(name).join("agents");
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fs::create_dir_all(&metadata_dir)?;
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fs::write(metadata_dir.join("openai.yaml"), contents)?;
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Ok(())
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}
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fn shell_command_arguments(command: &str) -> Result<String> {
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Ok(serde_json::to_string(&json!({
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"command": command,
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"timeout_ms": 500,
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}))?)
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}
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async fn submit_turn_with_policies(
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test: &TestCodex,
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prompt: &str,
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approval_policy: AskForApproval,
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sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
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) -> Result<()> {
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test.codex
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.submit(Op::UserTurn {
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items: vec![UserInput::Text {
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text: prompt.to_string(),
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text_elements: Vec::new(),
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}],
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final_output_json_schema: None,
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cwd: test.cwd_path().to_path_buf(),
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approval_policy,
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sandbox_policy,
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model: test.session_configured.model.clone(),
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effort: None,
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summary: None,
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collaboration_mode: None,
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personality: None,
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})
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.await?;
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Ok(())
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}
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fn write_skill_with_shell_script(home: &Path, name: &str, script_name: &str) -> Result<PathBuf> {
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write_skill_with_shell_script_contents(
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home,
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name,
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script_name,
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r#"#!/bin/sh
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echo 'zsh-fork-stdout'
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echo 'zsh-fork-stderr' >&2
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"#,
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)
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}
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#[cfg(unix)]
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fn write_skill_with_shell_script_contents(
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home: &Path,
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name: &str,
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script_name: &str,
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script_contents: &str,
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) -> Result<PathBuf> {
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use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
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let skill_dir = home.join("skills").join(name);
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let scripts_dir = skill_dir.join("scripts");
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fs::create_dir_all(&scripts_dir)?;
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fs::write(
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skill_dir.join("SKILL.md"),
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format!(
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r#"---
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name: {name}
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description: {name} skill
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---
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"#
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),
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)?;
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let script_path = scripts_dir.join(script_name);
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fs::write(&script_path, script_contents)?;
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let mut permissions = fs::metadata(&script_path)?.permissions();
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permissions.set_mode(0o755);
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fs::set_permissions(&script_path, permissions)?;
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Ok(script_path)
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}
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fn find_test_zsh_path() -> Result<Option<PathBuf>> {
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use core_test_support::fetch_dotslash_file;
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let repo_root = codex_utils_cargo_bin::repo_root()?;
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let dotslash_zsh = repo_root.join("codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/zsh");
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if !dotslash_zsh.is_file() {
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eprintln!(
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"skipping zsh-fork skill test: shared zsh DotSlash file not found at {}",
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dotslash_zsh.display()
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);
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return Ok(None);
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}
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match fetch_dotslash_file(&dotslash_zsh, None) {
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Ok(path) => Ok(Some(path)),
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Err(error) => {
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eprintln!("skipping zsh-fork skill test: failed to fetch zsh via dotslash: {error:#}");
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Ok(None)
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}
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}
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}
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fn supports_exec_wrapper_intercept(zsh_path: &Path) -> bool {
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let status = std::process::Command::new(zsh_path)
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.arg("-fc")
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.arg("/usr/bin/true")
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.env("EXEC_WRAPPER", "/usr/bin/false")
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.status();
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match status {
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Ok(status) => !status.success(),
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Err(_) => false,
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}
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}
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#[derive(Clone)]
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struct ZshForkRuntime {
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zsh_path: PathBuf,
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main_execve_wrapper_exe: PathBuf,
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}
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impl ZshForkRuntime {
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fn apply_to_config(
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&self,
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config: &mut Config,
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approval_policy: AskForApproval,
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sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
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) {
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use codex_config::Constrained;
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config.features.enable(Feature::ShellTool);
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config.features.enable(Feature::ShellZshFork);
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config.zsh_path = Some(self.zsh_path.clone());
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config.main_execve_wrapper_exe = Some(self.main_execve_wrapper_exe.clone());
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config.permissions.allow_login_shell = false;
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config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
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config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy);
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}
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}
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fn restrictive_workspace_write_policy() -> SandboxPolicy {
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SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
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writable_roots: Vec::new(),
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read_only_access: Default::default(),
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network_access: false,
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exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
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exclude_slash_tmp: true,
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}
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}
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fn zsh_fork_runtime(test_name: &str) -> Result<Option<ZshForkRuntime>> {
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let Some(zsh_path) = find_test_zsh_path()? else {
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return Ok(None);
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};
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if !supports_exec_wrapper_intercept(&zsh_path) {
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eprintln!(
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"skipping {test_name}: zsh does not support EXEC_WRAPPER intercepts ({})",
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zsh_path.display()
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);
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return Ok(None);
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}
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let Ok(main_execve_wrapper_exe) = codex_utils_cargo_bin::cargo_bin("codex-execve-wrapper")
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else {
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eprintln!("skipping {test_name}: unable to resolve `codex-execve-wrapper` binary");
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return Ok(None);
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};
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Ok(Some(ZshForkRuntime {
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zsh_path,
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main_execve_wrapper_exe,
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}))
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}
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async fn build_zsh_fork_test<F>(
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server: &wiremock::MockServer,
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runtime: ZshForkRuntime,
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approval_policy: AskForApproval,
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sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
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pre_build_hook: F,
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) -> Result<TestCodex>
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where
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F: FnOnce(&Path) + Send + 'static,
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{
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let mut builder = test_codex()
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.with_pre_build_hook(pre_build_hook)
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.with_config(move |config| {
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runtime.apply_to_config(config, approval_policy, sandbox_policy);
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});
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builder.build(server).await
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}
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fn skill_script_command(test: &TestCodex, script_name: &str) -> Result<(String, String)> {
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let script_path = fs::canonicalize(
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test.codex_home_path()
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.join("skills/mbolin-test-skill/scripts")
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.join(script_name),
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)?;
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let script_path_str = script_path.to_string_lossy().into_owned();
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let command = shlex::try_join([script_path_str.as_str()])?;
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Ok((script_path_str, command))
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}
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async fn wait_for_exec_approval_request(test: &TestCodex) -> Option<ExecApprovalRequestEvent> {
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wait_for_event_match(test.codex.as_ref(), |event| match event {
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EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(request) => Some(Some(request.clone())),
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EventMsg::TurnComplete(_) => Some(None),
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_ => None,
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})
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.await
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}
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async fn wait_for_turn_complete(test: &TestCodex) {
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wait_for_event(test.codex.as_ref(), |event| {
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matches!(event, EventMsg::TurnComplete(_))
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})
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.await;
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}
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fn output_shows_sandbox_denial(output: &str) -> bool {
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output.contains("Permission denied")
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|| output.contains("Operation not permitted")
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|| output.contains("Read-only file system")
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}
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/// Focus on the approval payload: the skill should prompt before execution and
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/// only advertise the permissions declared in its metadata.
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#[cfg(unix)]
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#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
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async fn shell_zsh_fork_prompts_for_skill_script_execution() -> Result<()> {
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skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
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let Some(runtime) = zsh_fork_runtime("zsh-fork skill prompt test")? else {
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return Ok(());
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};
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let server = start_mock_server().await;
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let tool_call_id = "zsh-fork-skill-call";
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let test = build_zsh_fork_test(
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&server,
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runtime,
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AskForApproval::OnRequest,
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SandboxPolicy::new_workspace_write_policy(),
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|home| {
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write_skill_with_shell_script(home, "mbolin-test-skill", "hello-mbolin.sh").unwrap();
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write_skill_metadata(
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home,
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"mbolin-test-skill",
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r#"
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permissions:
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file_system:
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read:
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- "./data"
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write:
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- "./output"
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"#,
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)
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.unwrap();
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},
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)
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.await?;
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let (script_path_str, command) = skill_script_command(&test, "hello-mbolin.sh")?;
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let arguments = shell_command_arguments(&command)?;
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let mocks =
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mount_function_call_agent_response(&server, tool_call_id, &arguments, "shell_command")
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.await;
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submit_turn_with_policies(
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&test,
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"use $mbolin-test-skill",
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AskForApproval::OnRequest,
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SandboxPolicy::new_workspace_write_policy(),
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)
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.await?;
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let maybe_approval = wait_for_exec_approval_request(&test).await;
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let approval = match maybe_approval {
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Some(approval) => approval,
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None => {
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let call_output = mocks
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.completion
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.single_request()
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.function_call_output(tool_call_id);
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panic!(
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"expected exec approval request before completion; function_call_output={call_output:?}"
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);
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}
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};
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assert_eq!(approval.call_id, tool_call_id);
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assert_eq!(approval.command, vec![script_path_str.clone()]);
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assert_eq!(
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approval.available_decisions,
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Some(vec![
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ReviewDecision::Approved,
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ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession,
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ReviewDecision::Abort,
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])
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);
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assert_eq!(
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approval.additional_permissions,
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Some(PermissionProfile {
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file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
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read: Some(vec![absolute_path(
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&test.codex_home_path().join("skills/mbolin-test-skill/data"),
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)]),
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write: Some(vec![absolute_path(
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&test
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.codex_home_path()
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.join("skills/mbolin-test-skill/output"),
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)]),
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}),
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..Default::default()
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})
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);
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test.codex
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.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
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id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
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turn_id: None,
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decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
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})
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.await?;
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wait_for_turn_complete(&test).await;
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let call_output = mocks
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.completion
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.single_request()
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.function_call_output(tool_call_id);
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let output = call_output["output"].as_str().unwrap_or_default();
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assert!(
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output.contains("Execution denied: User denied execution"),
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"expected rejection marker in function_call_output: {output:?}"
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);
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Ok(())
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}
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/// Look for `additional_permissions == None`, then verify that both the first
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/// run and the cached session-approval rerun stay inside the turn sandbox.
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#[cfg(unix)]
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#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
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async fn shell_zsh_fork_skill_without_permissions_inherits_turn_sandbox() -> Result<()> {
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skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
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let Some(runtime) = zsh_fork_runtime("zsh-fork inherited skill sandbox test")? else {
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return Ok(());
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};
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let outside_dir = tempfile::tempdir_in(std::env::current_dir()?)?;
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let outside_path = outside_dir
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.path()
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.join("zsh-fork-skill-inherited-sandbox.txt");
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let outside_path_quoted = shlex::try_join([outside_path.to_string_lossy().as_ref()])?;
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let script_contents = format!(
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"#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s' forbidden > {outside_path_quoted}\ncat {outside_path_quoted}\n"
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);
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let outside_path_for_hook = outside_path.clone();
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let script_contents_for_hook = script_contents.clone();
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let workspace_write_policy = restrictive_workspace_write_policy();
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let server = start_mock_server().await;
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let test = build_zsh_fork_test(
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&server,
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runtime,
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AskForApproval::OnRequest,
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workspace_write_policy.clone(),
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move |home| {
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let _ = fs::remove_file(&outside_path_for_hook);
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write_skill_with_shell_script_contents(
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home,
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"mbolin-test-skill",
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"sandboxed.sh",
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&script_contents_for_hook,
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)
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.unwrap();
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},
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)
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.await?;
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let (script_path_str, command) = skill_script_command(&test, "sandboxed.sh")?;
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let first_call_id = "zsh-fork-skill-permissions-1";
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let first_arguments = shell_command_arguments(&command)?;
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let first_mocks = mount_function_call_agent_response(
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&server,
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first_call_id,
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&first_arguments,
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"shell_command",
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)
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.await;
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submit_turn_with_policies(
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&test,
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"use $mbolin-test-skill",
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AskForApproval::OnRequest,
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workspace_write_policy.clone(),
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)
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.await?;
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|
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let maybe_approval = wait_for_exec_approval_request(&test).await;
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let approval = match maybe_approval {
|
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Some(approval) => approval,
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None => panic!("expected exec approval request before completion"),
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};
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assert_eq!(approval.call_id, first_call_id);
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assert_eq!(approval.command, vec![script_path_str.clone()]);
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assert_eq!(approval.additional_permissions, None);
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|
|
test.codex
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.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
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id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
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turn_id: None,
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decision: ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession,
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})
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.await?;
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|
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wait_for_turn_complete(&test).await;
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|
|
let first_output = first_mocks
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|
.completion
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.single_request()
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|
.function_call_output(first_call_id)["output"]
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.as_str()
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.unwrap_or_default()
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.to_string();
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|
assert!(
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|
output_shows_sandbox_denial(&first_output) || !first_output.contains("forbidden"),
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|
"expected inherited turn sandbox denial on first run, got output: {first_output:?}"
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);
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|
assert!(
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!outside_path.exists(),
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|
"first run should not write outside the turn sandbox"
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);
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|
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let second_call_id = "zsh-fork-skill-permissions-2";
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|
let second_arguments = shell_command_arguments(&command)?;
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|
let second_mocks = mount_function_call_agent_response(
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&server,
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second_call_id,
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&second_arguments,
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"shell_command",
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|
)
|
|
.await;
|
|
|
|
submit_turn_with_policies(
|
|
&test,
|
|
"use $mbolin-test-skill",
|
|
AskForApproval::OnRequest,
|
|
workspace_write_policy,
|
|
)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
|
|
let cached_approval = wait_for_exec_approval_request(&test).await;
|
|
assert!(
|
|
cached_approval.is_none(),
|
|
"expected second run to reuse the cached session approval"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let second_output = second_mocks
|
|
.completion
|
|
.single_request()
|
|
.function_call_output(second_call_id)["output"]
|
|
.as_str()
|
|
.unwrap_or_default()
|
|
.to_string();
|
|
assert!(
|
|
output_shows_sandbox_denial(&second_output) || !second_output.contains("forbidden"),
|
|
"expected cached skill approval to retain inherited turn sandboxing, got output: {second_output:?}"
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
!outside_path.exists(),
|
|
"cached session approval should not widen a permissionless skill to full access"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// The validation to focus on is: writes to the skill-approved folder succeed,
|
|
/// and writes to an unrelated folder fail, both before and after cached approval.
|
|
#[cfg(unix)]
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
|
|
async fn shell_zsh_fork_skill_session_approval_enforces_skill_permissions() -> Result<()> {
|
|
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
|
|
|
|
let Some(runtime) = zsh_fork_runtime("zsh-fork explicit skill sandbox test")? else {
|
|
return Ok(());
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let outside_dir = tempfile::tempdir_in(std::env::current_dir()?)?;
|
|
let allowed_dir = outside_dir.path().join("allowed-output");
|
|
let blocked_dir = outside_dir.path().join("blocked-output");
|
|
fs::create_dir_all(&allowed_dir)?;
|
|
fs::create_dir_all(&blocked_dir)?;
|
|
|
|
let allowed_path = allowed_dir.join("allowed.txt");
|
|
let blocked_path = blocked_dir.join("blocked.txt");
|
|
let allowed_path_quoted = shlex::try_join([allowed_path.to_string_lossy().as_ref()])?;
|
|
let blocked_path_quoted = shlex::try_join([blocked_path.to_string_lossy().as_ref()])?;
|
|
let script_contents = format!(
|
|
"#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s' allowed > {allowed_path_quoted}\ncat {allowed_path_quoted}\nprintf '%s' forbidden > {blocked_path_quoted}\nif [ -f {blocked_path_quoted} ]; then echo blocked-created; fi\n"
|
|
);
|
|
let allowed_dir_for_hook = allowed_dir.clone();
|
|
let allowed_path_for_hook = allowed_path.clone();
|
|
let blocked_path_for_hook = blocked_path.clone();
|
|
let script_contents_for_hook = script_contents.clone();
|
|
|
|
let permissions_yaml = format!(
|
|
"permissions:\n file_system:\n write:\n - \"{}\"\n",
|
|
allowed_dir.display()
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let workspace_write_policy = restrictive_workspace_write_policy();
|
|
let server = start_mock_server().await;
|
|
let test = build_zsh_fork_test(
|
|
&server,
|
|
runtime,
|
|
AskForApproval::OnRequest,
|
|
workspace_write_policy.clone(),
|
|
move |home| {
|
|
let _ = fs::remove_file(&allowed_path_for_hook);
|
|
let _ = fs::remove_file(&blocked_path_for_hook);
|
|
fs::create_dir_all(&allowed_dir_for_hook).unwrap();
|
|
fs::create_dir_all(blocked_path_for_hook.parent().unwrap()).unwrap();
|
|
write_skill_with_shell_script_contents(
|
|
home,
|
|
"mbolin-test-skill",
|
|
"sandboxed.sh",
|
|
&script_contents_for_hook,
|
|
)
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
write_skill_metadata(home, "mbolin-test-skill", &permissions_yaml).unwrap();
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
|
|
let (script_path_str, command) = skill_script_command(&test, "sandboxed.sh")?;
|
|
|
|
let first_call_id = "zsh-fork-skill-permissions-1";
|
|
let first_arguments = shell_command_arguments(&command)?;
|
|
let first_mocks = mount_function_call_agent_response(
|
|
&server,
|
|
first_call_id,
|
|
&first_arguments,
|
|
"shell_command",
|
|
)
|
|
.await;
|
|
|
|
submit_turn_with_policies(
|
|
&test,
|
|
"use $mbolin-test-skill",
|
|
AskForApproval::OnRequest,
|
|
workspace_write_policy.clone(),
|
|
)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
|
|
let maybe_approval = wait_for_exec_approval_request(&test).await;
|
|
let approval = match maybe_approval {
|
|
Some(approval) => approval,
|
|
None => panic!("expected exec approval request before completion"),
|
|
};
|
|
assert_eq!(approval.call_id, first_call_id);
|
|
assert_eq!(approval.command, vec![script_path_str.clone()]);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
approval.additional_permissions,
|
|
Some(PermissionProfile {
|
|
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
|
|
read: None,
|
|
write: Some(vec![absolute_path(&allowed_dir)]),
|
|
}),
|
|
..Default::default()
|
|
})
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
test.codex
|
|
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
|
|
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
|
|
turn_id: None,
|
|
decision: ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession,
|
|
})
|
|
.await?;
|
|
|
|
wait_for_turn_complete(&test).await;
|
|
|
|
let first_output = first_mocks
|
|
.completion
|
|
.single_request()
|
|
.function_call_output(first_call_id)["output"]
|
|
.as_str()
|
|
.unwrap_or_default()
|
|
.to_string();
|
|
assert!(
|
|
first_output.contains("allowed"),
|
|
"expected skill sandbox to permit writes to the approved folder, got output: {first_output:?}"
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(&allowed_path)?, "allowed");
|
|
assert!(
|
|
!blocked_path.exists(),
|
|
"first run should not write outside the explicit skill sandbox"
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
!first_output.contains("blocked-created"),
|
|
"blocked path should not have been created: {first_output:?}"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let second_call_id = "zsh-fork-skill-permissions-2";
|
|
let second_arguments = shell_command_arguments(&command)?;
|
|
let second_mocks = mount_function_call_agent_response(
|
|
&server,
|
|
second_call_id,
|
|
&second_arguments,
|
|
"shell_command",
|
|
)
|
|
.await;
|
|
|
|
let _ = fs::remove_file(&allowed_path);
|
|
let _ = fs::remove_file(&blocked_path);
|
|
|
|
submit_turn_with_policies(
|
|
&test,
|
|
"use $mbolin-test-skill",
|
|
AskForApproval::OnRequest,
|
|
workspace_write_policy,
|
|
)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
|
|
let cached_approval = wait_for_exec_approval_request(&test).await;
|
|
assert!(
|
|
cached_approval.is_none(),
|
|
"expected second run to reuse the cached session approval"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let second_output = second_mocks
|
|
.completion
|
|
.single_request()
|
|
.function_call_output(second_call_id)["output"]
|
|
.as_str()
|
|
.unwrap_or_default()
|
|
.to_string();
|
|
assert!(
|
|
second_output.contains("allowed"),
|
|
"expected cached skill approval to retain the explicit skill sandbox, got output: {second_output:?}"
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(&allowed_path)?, "allowed");
|
|
assert!(
|
|
!blocked_path.exists(),
|
|
"cached session approval should not widen skill execution beyond the explicit skill sandbox"
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
!second_output.contains("blocked-created"),
|
|
"blocked path should not have been created after cached approval: {second_output:?}"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// This stays narrow on purpose: the important check is that `WorkspaceWrite`
|
|
/// continues to deny writes outside the workspace even under `zsh-fork`.
|
|
#[cfg(unix)]
|
|
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
|
|
async fn shell_zsh_fork_still_enforces_workspace_write_sandbox() -> Result<()> {
|
|
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
|
|
|
|
let Some(runtime) = zsh_fork_runtime("zsh-fork workspace sandbox test")? else {
|
|
return Ok(());
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let server = start_mock_server().await;
|
|
let tool_call_id = "zsh-fork-workspace-write-deny";
|
|
let outside_path = "/tmp/codex-zsh-fork-workspace-write-deny.txt";
|
|
let workspace_write_policy = restrictive_workspace_write_policy();
|
|
let _ = fs::remove_file(outside_path);
|
|
let test = build_zsh_fork_test(
|
|
&server,
|
|
runtime,
|
|
AskForApproval::Never,
|
|
workspace_write_policy.clone(),
|
|
move |_| {
|
|
let _ = fs::remove_file(outside_path);
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
|
|
let command = format!("touch {outside_path}");
|
|
let arguments = shell_command_arguments(&command)?;
|
|
let mocks =
|
|
mount_function_call_agent_response(&server, tool_call_id, &arguments, "shell_command")
|
|
.await;
|
|
|
|
submit_turn_with_policies(
|
|
&test,
|
|
"write outside workspace with zsh fork",
|
|
AskForApproval::Never,
|
|
workspace_write_policy,
|
|
)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
|
|
wait_for_turn_complete(&test).await;
|
|
|
|
let call_output = mocks
|
|
.completion
|
|
.single_request()
|
|
.function_call_output(tool_call_id);
|
|
let output = call_output["output"].as_str().unwrap_or_default();
|
|
assert!(
|
|
output_shows_sandbox_denial(output),
|
|
"expected sandbox denial, got output: {output:?}"
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
!Path::new(outside_path).exists(),
|
|
"command should not write outside workspace under WorkspaceWrite policy"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|