Files
codex/codex-rs/exec-server
Michael Bolin 4816b89204 permissions: make profiles represent enforcement (#19231)
## Why

`PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions abstraction,
but the old shape only carried optional filesystem and network fields.
It could describe allowed access, but not who is responsible for
enforcing it. That made `DangerFullAccess` and `ExternalSandbox` lossy
when profiles were exported, cached, or round-tripped through app-server
APIs.

The important model change is that active permissions are now a disjoint
union over the enforcement mode. Conceptually:

```rust
pub enum PermissionProfile {
    Managed {
        file_system: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
        network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
    },
    Disabled,
    External {
        network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
    },
}
```

This distinction matters because `Disabled` means Codex should apply no
outer sandbox at all, while `External` means filesystem isolation is
owned by an outside caller. Those are not equivalent to a broad managed
sandbox. For example, macOS cannot nest Seatbelt inside Seatbelt, so an
inner sandbox may require the outer Codex layer to use no sandbox rather
than a permissive one.

## How Existing Modeling Maps

Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains a boundary projection, but it now maps
into the higher-fidelity profile model:

- `ReadOnly` and `WorkspaceWrite` map to `PermissionProfile::Managed`
with restricted filesystem entries plus the corresponding network
policy.
- `DangerFullAccess` maps to `PermissionProfile::Disabled`, preserving
the “no outer sandbox” intent instead of treating it as a lax managed
sandbox.
- `ExternalSandbox { network_access }` maps to
`PermissionProfile::External { network }`, preserving external
filesystem enforcement while still carrying the active network policy.
- Split runtime policies that legacy `SandboxPolicy` cannot faithfully
express, such as managed unrestricted filesystem plus restricted
network, stay `Managed` instead of being collapsed into
`ExternalSandbox`.
- Per-command/session/turn grants remain partial overlays via
`AdditionalPermissionProfile`; full `PermissionProfile` is reserved for
complete active runtime permissions.

## What Changed

- Change active `PermissionProfile` into a tagged union: `managed`,
`disabled`, and `external`.
- Keep partial permission grants separate with
`AdditionalPermissionProfile` for command/session/turn overlays.
- Represent managed filesystem permissions as either `restricted`
entries or `unrestricted`; `glob_scan_max_depth` is non-zero when
present.
- Preserve old rollout compatibility by accepting the pre-tagged `{
network, file_system }` profile shape during deserialization.
- Preserve fidelity for important edge cases: `DangerFullAccess`
round-trips as `disabled`, `ExternalSandbox` round-trips as `external`,
and managed unrestricted filesystem + restricted network stays managed
instead of being mistaken for external enforcement.
- Preserve configured deny-read entries and bounded glob scan depth when
full profiles are projected back into runtime policies, including
unrestricted replacements that now become `:root = write` plus deny
entries.
- Regenerate the experimental app-server v2 JSON/TypeScript schema and
update the `command/exec` README example for the tagged
`permissionProfile` shape.

## Compatibility

Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains available at config/API boundaries as the
compatibility projection. Existing rollout lines with the old
`PermissionProfile` shape continue to load. The app-server
`permissionProfile` field is experimental, so its v2 wire shape is
intentionally updated to match the higher-fidelity model.

## Verification

- `just write-app-server-schema`
- `cargo check --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol permission_profile`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol
preserving_deny_entries_keeps_unrestricted_policy_enforceable`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol
permission_profile_file_system_permissions`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol serialize_client_response`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
session_configured_reports_permission_profile_for_external_sandbox`
- `just fix`
- `just fix -p codex-protocol`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server`
2026-04-23 23:02:18 -07:00
..

codex-exec-server

codex-exec-server is the library backing codex exec-server, a small JSON-RPC server for spawning and controlling subprocesses through codex-utils-pty.

It provides:

  • a CLI entrypoint: codex exec-server
  • a Rust client: ExecServerClient
  • a small protocol module with shared request/response types

This crate owns the transport, protocol, and filesystem/process handlers. The top-level codex binary owns hidden helper dispatch for sandboxed filesystem operations and codex-linux-sandbox.

Transport

The server speaks the shared codex-app-server-protocol message envelope on the wire.

The CLI entrypoint supports:

  • ws://IP:PORT (default)

Wire framing:

  • websocket: one JSON-RPC message per websocket text frame

Lifecycle

Each connection follows this sequence:

  1. Send initialize.
  2. Wait for the initialize response.
  3. Send initialized.
  4. Call process or filesystem RPCs.

If the server receives any notification other than initialized, it replies with an error using request id -1.

If the websocket connection closes, the server terminates any remaining managed processes for that client connection.

API

initialize

Initial handshake request.

Request params:

{
  "clientName": "my-client"
}

Response:

{}

initialized

Handshake acknowledgement notification sent by the client after a successful initialize response.

Params are currently ignored. Sending any other notification method is treated as an invalid request.

process/start

Starts a new managed process.

Request params:

{
  "processId": "proc-1",
  "argv": ["bash", "-lc", "printf 'hello\\n'"],
  "cwd": "/absolute/working/directory",
  "env": {
    "PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin"
  },
  "tty": true,
  "pipeStdin": false,
  "arg0": null
}

Field definitions:

  • processId: caller-chosen stable id for this process within the connection.
  • argv: command vector. It must be non-empty.
  • cwd: absolute working directory used for the child process.
  • env: environment variables passed to the child process.
  • tty: when true, spawn a PTY-backed interactive process.
  • pipeStdin: when true, keep non-PTY stdin writable via process/write.
  • arg0: optional argv0 override forwarded to codex-utils-pty.

Response:

{
  "processId": "proc-1"
}

Behavior notes:

  • Reusing an existing processId is rejected.
  • PTY-backed processes accept later writes through process/write.
  • Non-PTY processes reject writes unless pipeStdin is true.
  • Output is streamed asynchronously via process/output.
  • Exit is reported asynchronously via process/exited.

process/read

Reads buffered output and terminal state for a managed process.

Request params:

{
  "processId": "proc-1",
  "afterSeq": null,
  "maxBytes": 65536,
  "waitMs": 1000
}

Field definitions:

  • processId: managed process id returned by process/start.
  • afterSeq: optional sequence number cursor; when present, only newer chunks are returned.
  • maxBytes: optional response byte budget.
  • waitMs: optional long-poll timeout in milliseconds.

Response:

{
  "chunks": [],
  "nextSeq": 1,
  "exited": false,
  "exitCode": null,
  "closed": false,
  "failure": null
}

process/write

Writes raw bytes to a running process stdin.

Request params:

{
  "processId": "proc-1",
  "chunk": "aGVsbG8K"
}

chunk is base64-encoded raw bytes. In the example above it is hello\n.

Response:

{
  "status": "accepted"
}

Behavior notes:

  • Writes to an unknown processId are rejected.
  • Writes to a non-PTY process are rejected unless it started with pipeStdin.

process/terminate

Terminates a running managed process.

Request params:

{
  "processId": "proc-1"
}

Response:

{
  "running": true
}

If the process is already unknown or already removed, the server responds with:

{
  "running": false
}

Notifications

process/output

Streaming output chunk from a running process.

Params:

{
  "processId": "proc-1",
  "seq": 1,
  "stream": "stdout",
  "chunk": "aGVsbG8K"
}

Fields:

  • processId: process identifier
  • seq: per-process output sequence number
  • stream: "stdout", "stderr", or "pty"
  • chunk: base64-encoded output bytes

process/exited

Final process exit notification.

Params:

{
  "processId": "proc-1",
  "seq": 2,
  "exitCode": 0
}

process/closed

Notification emitted after process output is closed and the process handle is removed.

Params:

{
  "processId": "proc-1"
}

Filesystem RPCs

Filesystem methods use absolute paths and return JSON-RPC errors for invalid or unavailable paths:

  • fs/readFile
  • fs/writeFile
  • fs/createDirectory
  • fs/getMetadata
  • fs/readDirectory
  • fs/remove
  • fs/copy

Each filesystem request accepts an optional sandbox object. When sandbox contains a ReadOnly or WorkspaceWrite policy, the operation runs in a hidden helper process launched from the top-level codex executable and prepared through the shared sandbox transform path. Helper requests and responses are passed over stdin/stdout.

Errors

The server returns JSON-RPC errors with these codes:

  • -32600: invalid request
  • -32602: invalid params
  • -32603: internal error

Typical error cases:

  • unknown method
  • malformed params
  • empty argv
  • duplicate processId
  • writes to unknown processes
  • writes to non-PTY processes
  • sandbox-denied filesystem operations

Rust surface

The crate exports:

  • ExecServerClient
  • ExecServerError
  • ExecServerClientConnectOptions
  • RemoteExecServerConnectArgs
  • protocol request/response structs for process and filesystem RPCs
  • DEFAULT_LISTEN_URL and ExecServerListenUrlParseError
  • ExecServerRuntimePaths
  • run_main() for embedding the websocket server

Callers must pass ExecServerRuntimePaths to run_main(). The top-level codex exec-server command builds these paths from the codex arg0 dispatch state.

Example session

Initialize:

{"id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"clientName":"example-client"}}
{"id":1,"result":{}}
{"method":"initialized","params":{}}

Start a process:

{"id":2,"method":"process/start","params":{"processId":"proc-1","argv":["bash","-lc","printf 'ready\\n'; while IFS= read -r line; do printf 'echo:%s\\n' \"$line\"; done"],"cwd":"/tmp","env":{"PATH":"/usr/bin:/bin"},"tty":true,"pipeStdin":false,"arg0":null}}
{"id":2,"result":{"processId":"proc-1"}}
{"method":"process/output","params":{"processId":"proc-1","seq":1,"stream":"stdout","chunk":"cmVhZHkK"}}

Write to the process:

{"id":3,"method":"process/write","params":{"processId":"proc-1","chunk":"aGVsbG8K"}}
{"id":3,"result":{"status":"accepted"}}
{"method":"process/output","params":{"processId":"proc-1","seq":2,"stream":"stdout","chunk":"ZWNobzpoZWxsbwo="}}

Terminate it:

{"id":4,"method":"process/terminate","params":{"processId":"proc-1"}}
{"id":4,"result":{"running":true}}
{"method":"process/exited","params":{"processId":"proc-1","seq":3,"exitCode":0}}
{"method":"process/closed","params":{"processId":"proc-1"}}