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## Why [#12964](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12964) added `host_executable()` support to `codex-execpolicy`, and [#13046](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/13046) adopted it in the zsh-fork interception path. The remaining gap was the preflight execpolicy check in `core/src/exec_policy.rs`. That path derives approval requirements before execution for `shell`, `shell_command`, and `unified_exec`, but it was still using the default exact-token matcher. As a result, a command that already included an absolute executable path, such as `/usr/bin/git status`, could still miss a basename rule like `prefix_rule(pattern = ["git"], ...)` during preflight even when the policy also defined a matching `host_executable(name = "git", ...)` entry. This PR brings the same opt-in `host_executable()` resolution to the preflight approval path when an absolute program path is already present in the parsed command. ## What Changed - updated `ExecPolicyManager::create_exec_approval_requirement_for_command()` in `core/src/exec_policy.rs` to use `check_multiple_with_options(...)` with `MatchOptions { resolve_host_executables: true }` - kept the existing shell parsing flow for approval derivation, but now allow basename rules to match absolute executable paths during preflight when `host_executable()` permits it - updated requested-prefix amendment evaluation to use the same host-executable-aware matching mode, so suggested `prefix_rule()` amendments are checked consistently for absolute-path commands - added preflight coverage for: - absolute-path commands that should match basename rules through `host_executable()` - absolute-path commands whose paths are not in the allowed `host_executable()` mapping - requested prefix-rule amendments for absolute-path commands ## Verification - `just fix -p codex-core` - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib exec_policy::tests::`
162 lines
4.4 KiB
Rust
162 lines
4.4 KiB
Rust
use crate::bash::parse_shell_lc_plain_commands;
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use std::path::Path;
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#[cfg(windows)]
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#[path = "windows_dangerous_commands.rs"]
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mod windows_dangerous_commands;
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pub fn command_might_be_dangerous(command: &[String]) -> bool {
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#[cfg(windows)]
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{
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if windows_dangerous_commands::is_dangerous_command_windows(command) {
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return true;
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}
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}
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if is_dangerous_to_call_with_exec(command) {
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return true;
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}
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// Support `bash -lc "<script>"` where the any part of the script might contain a dangerous command.
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if let Some(all_commands) = parse_shell_lc_plain_commands(command)
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&& all_commands
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.iter()
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.any(|cmd| is_dangerous_to_call_with_exec(cmd))
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{
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return true;
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}
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false
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}
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fn is_git_global_option_with_value(arg: &str) -> bool {
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matches!(
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arg,
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"-C" | "-c"
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| "--config-env"
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| "--exec-path"
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| "--git-dir"
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| "--namespace"
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| "--super-prefix"
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| "--work-tree"
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)
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}
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fn is_git_global_option_with_inline_value(arg: &str) -> bool {
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matches!(
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arg,
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s if s.starts_with("--config-env=")
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|| s.starts_with("--exec-path=")
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|| s.starts_with("--git-dir=")
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|| s.starts_with("--namespace=")
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|| s.starts_with("--super-prefix=")
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|| s.starts_with("--work-tree=")
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) || ((arg.starts_with("-C") || arg.starts_with("-c")) && arg.len() > 2)
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}
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pub(crate) fn executable_name_lookup_key(raw: &str) -> Option<String> {
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#[cfg(windows)]
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{
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Path::new(raw)
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.file_name()
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.and_then(|name| name.to_str())
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.map(|name| {
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let name = name.to_ascii_lowercase();
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for suffix in [".exe", ".cmd", ".bat", ".com"] {
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if let Some(stripped) = name.strip_suffix(suffix) {
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return stripped.to_string();
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}
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}
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name
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})
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}
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#[cfg(not(windows))]
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{
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Path::new(raw)
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.file_name()
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.and_then(|name| name.to_str())
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.map(std::borrow::ToOwned::to_owned)
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}
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}
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/// Find the first matching git subcommand, skipping known global options that
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/// may appear before it (e.g., `-C`, `-c`, `--git-dir`).
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///
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/// Shared with `is_safe_command` to avoid git-global-option bypasses.
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pub(crate) fn find_git_subcommand<'a>(
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command: &'a [String],
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subcommands: &[&str],
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) -> Option<(usize, &'a str)> {
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let cmd0 = command.first().map(String::as_str)?;
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if executable_name_lookup_key(cmd0).as_deref() != Some("git") {
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return None;
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}
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let mut skip_next = false;
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for (idx, arg) in command.iter().enumerate().skip(1) {
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if skip_next {
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skip_next = false;
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continue;
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}
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let arg = arg.as_str();
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if is_git_global_option_with_inline_value(arg) {
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continue;
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}
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if is_git_global_option_with_value(arg) {
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skip_next = true;
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continue;
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}
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if arg == "--" || arg.starts_with('-') {
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continue;
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}
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if subcommands.contains(&arg) {
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return Some((idx, arg));
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}
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// In git, the first non-option token is the subcommand. If it isn't
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// one of the subcommands we're looking for, we must stop scanning to
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// avoid misclassifying later positional args (e.g., branch names).
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return None;
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}
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None
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}
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fn is_dangerous_to_call_with_exec(command: &[String]) -> bool {
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let cmd0 = command.first().map(String::as_str);
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match cmd0 {
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Some("rm") => matches!(command.get(1).map(String::as_str), Some("-f" | "-rf")),
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// for sudo <cmd> simply do the check for <cmd>
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Some("sudo") => is_dangerous_to_call_with_exec(&command[1..]),
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// ── anything else ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
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_ => false,
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}
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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fn vec_str(items: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
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items.iter().map(std::string::ToString::to_string).collect()
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}
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#[test]
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fn rm_rf_is_dangerous() {
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assert!(command_might_be_dangerous(&vec_str(&["rm", "-rf", "/"])));
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}
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#[test]
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fn rm_f_is_dangerous() {
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assert!(command_might_be_dangerous(&vec_str(&["rm", "-f", "/"])));
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}
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}
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