Files
codex/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/exec_policy.rs
Michael Bolin cafb07fe6e feat: add justification arg to prefix_rule() in *.rules (#8751)
Adds an optional `justification` parameter to the `prefix_rule()`
execpolicy DSL so policy authors can attach human-readable rationale to
a rule. That justification is propagated through parsing/matching and
can be surfaced to the model (or approval UI) when a command is blocked
or requires approval.

When a command is rejected (or gated behind approval) due to policy, a
generic message makes it hard for the model/user to understand what went
wrong and what to do instead. Allowing policy authors to supply a short
justification improves debuggability and helps guide the model toward
compliant alternatives.

Example:

```python
prefix_rule(
    pattern = ["git", "push"],
    decision = "forbidden",
    justification = "pushing is blocked in this repo",
)
```

If Codex tried to run `git push origin main`, now the failure would
include:

```
`git push origin main` rejected: pushing is blocked in this repo
```

whereas previously, all it was told was:

```
execpolicy forbids this command
```
2026-01-05 21:24:48 +00:00

107 lines
3.1 KiB
Rust

#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]
use anyhow::Result;
use codex_core::protocol::AskForApproval;
use codex_core::protocol::EventMsg;
use codex_core::protocol::Op;
use codex_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::config_types::ReasoningSummary;
use codex_protocol::user_input::UserInput;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_assistant_message;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_completed;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_function_call;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_response_created;
use core_test_support::responses::mount_sse_once;
use core_test_support::responses::sse;
use core_test_support::responses::start_mock_server;
use core_test_support::test_codex::test_codex;
use core_test_support::wait_for_event;
use serde_json::json;
use std::fs;
#[tokio::test]
async fn execpolicy_blocks_shell_invocation() -> Result<()> {
// TODO execpolicy doesn't parse powershell commands yet
if cfg!(windows) {
return Ok(());
}
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(|config| {
let policy_path = config.codex_home.join("rules").join("policy.rules");
fs::create_dir_all(
policy_path
.parent()
.expect("policy directory must have a parent"),
)
.expect("create policy directory");
fs::write(
&policy_path,
r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["echo"], decision="forbidden")"#,
)
.expect("write policy file");
});
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let call_id = "shell-forbidden";
let args = json!({
"command": "echo blocked",
"timeout_ms": 1_000,
});
mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-1"),
ev_function_call(call_id, "shell_command", &serde_json::to_string(&args)?),
ev_completed("resp-1"),
]),
)
.await;
mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-2"),
]),
)
.await;
let session_model = test.session_configured.model.clone();
test.codex
.submit(Op::UserTurn {
items: vec![UserInput::Text {
text: "run shell command".into(),
}],
final_output_json_schema: None,
cwd: test.cwd_path().to_path_buf(),
approval_policy: AskForApproval::Never,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
model: session_model,
effort: None,
summary: ReasoningSummary::Auto,
})
.await?;
let EventMsg::ExecCommandEnd(end) = wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
matches!(event, EventMsg::ExecCommandEnd(_))
})
.await
else {
unreachable!()
};
wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
matches!(event, EventMsg::TaskComplete(_))
})
.await;
assert!(
end.aggregated_output
.contains("policy forbids commands starting with `echo`"),
"unexpected output: {}",
end.aggregated_output
);
Ok(())
}