Files
codex/codex-rs/core/src/safety.rs
jif-oai f7e8ff8e50 Make turn diff tracking operation backed (#21180)
## Summary
- replace filesystem-based turn diff tracking with an operation-backed
accumulator
- preserve enough verified apply_patch state to render move-overwrite
cases correctly
- keep the turn/diff/updated contract intact while removing remote-only
turn-diff test skips

This takes the assumption that no 3P services rely on the output format
of `apply_patch`

## Why
For the CCA file system isolation push

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-05-07 11:33:47 +02:00

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use std::path::Component;
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use crate::util::resolve_path;
use codex_apply_patch::ApplyPatchAction;
use codex_apply_patch::ApplyPatchFileChange;
use codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
use codex_sandboxing::SandboxType;
use codex_sandboxing::get_platform_sandbox;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
const PATCH_REJECTED_OUTSIDE_PROJECT_REASON: &str =
"writing outside of the project; rejected by user approval settings";
const PATCH_REJECTED_READ_ONLY_REASON: &str =
"writing is blocked by read-only sandbox; rejected by user approval settings";
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
pub enum SafetyCheck {
AutoApprove {
sandbox_type: SandboxType,
user_explicitly_approved: bool,
},
AskUser,
Reject {
reason: String,
},
}
pub fn assess_patch_safety(
action: &ApplyPatchAction,
policy: AskForApproval,
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
) -> SafetyCheck {
if action.is_empty() {
return SafetyCheck::Reject {
reason: "empty patch".to_string(),
};
}
match policy {
AskForApproval::OnFailure
| AskForApproval::Never
| AskForApproval::OnRequest
| AskForApproval::Granular(_) => {
// Continue to see if this can be auto-approved.
}
// TODO(ragona): I'm not sure this is actually correct? I believe in this case
// we want to continue to the writable paths check before asking the user.
AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted => {
return SafetyCheck::AskUser;
}
}
let rejects_sandbox_approval = matches!(policy, AskForApproval::Never)
|| matches!(
policy,
AskForApproval::Granular(granular_config) if !granular_config.sandbox_approval
);
// Even though the patch appears to be constrained to writable paths, it is
// possible that paths in the patch are hard links to files outside the
// writable roots, so we should still run `apply_patch` in a sandbox in that case.
if is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths(action, file_system_sandbox_policy, cwd)
|| matches!(policy, AskForApproval::OnFailure)
{
if matches!(
permission_profile,
PermissionProfile::Disabled | PermissionProfile::External { .. }
) {
// Disabled and External profiles intentionally do not apply an
// outer Codex filesystem sandbox.
SafetyCheck::AutoApprove {
sandbox_type: SandboxType::None,
user_explicitly_approved: false,
}
} else {
// Only autoapprove when we can actually enforce a sandbox. Otherwise
// fall back to asking the user because the patch may touch arbitrary
// paths outside the project.
match get_platform_sandbox(windows_sandbox_level != WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled) {
Some(sandbox_type) => SafetyCheck::AutoApprove {
sandbox_type,
user_explicitly_approved: false,
},
None => {
if rejects_sandbox_approval {
SafetyCheck::Reject {
reason: patch_rejection_reason(
permission_profile,
file_system_sandbox_policy,
cwd,
)
.to_string(),
}
} else {
SafetyCheck::AskUser
}
}
}
}
} else if rejects_sandbox_approval {
SafetyCheck::Reject {
reason: patch_rejection_reason(permission_profile, file_system_sandbox_policy, cwd)
.to_string(),
}
} else {
SafetyCheck::AskUser
}
}
fn patch_rejection_reason(
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
) -> &'static str {
match permission_profile {
PermissionProfile::Managed { .. }
if !file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access()
&& file_system_sandbox_policy
.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.as_path())
.is_empty() =>
{
PATCH_REJECTED_READ_ONLY_REASON
}
PermissionProfile::Managed { .. }
| PermissionProfile::Disabled
| PermissionProfile::External { .. } => PATCH_REJECTED_OUTSIDE_PROJECT_REASON,
}
}
fn is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths(
action: &ApplyPatchAction,
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
) -> bool {
// Normalize a path by removing `.` and resolving `..` without touching the
// filesystem (works even if the file does not exist).
fn normalize(path: &Path) -> Option<PathBuf> {
let mut out = PathBuf::new();
for comp in path.components() {
match comp {
Component::ParentDir => {
out.pop();
}
Component::CurDir => { /* skip */ }
other => out.push(other.as_os_str()),
}
}
Some(out)
}
// Determine whether `path` is inside **any** writable root. Both `path`
// and roots are converted to absolute, normalized forms before the
// prefix check.
let is_path_writable = |p: &Path| {
let abs = resolve_path(cwd, &p.to_path_buf());
let abs = match normalize(&abs) {
Some(v) => v,
None => return false,
};
file_system_sandbox_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&abs, cwd)
};
for (path, change) in action.changes() {
match change {
ApplyPatchFileChange::Add { .. } | ApplyPatchFileChange::Delete { .. } => {
if !is_path_writable(path) {
return false;
}
}
ApplyPatchFileChange::Update { move_path, .. } => {
if !is_path_writable(path) {
return false;
}
if let Some(dest) = move_path
&& !is_path_writable(dest)
{
return false;
}
}
}
}
true
}
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "safety_tests.rs"]
mod tests;