Files
codex/codex-rs/network-proxy/src/lib.rs
Celia Chen dd30c8eedd chore: refactor network permissions to use explicit domain and unix socket rule maps (#15120)
## Summary

This PR replaces the legacy network allow/deny list model with explicit
rule maps for domains and unix sockets across managed requirements,
permissions profiles, the network proxy config, and the app server
protocol.

Concretely, it:

- introduces typed domain (`allow` / `deny`) and unix socket permission
(`allow` / `none`) entries instead of separate `allowed_domains`,
`denied_domains`, and `allow_unix_sockets` lists
- updates config loading, managed requirements merging, and exec-policy
overlays to read and upsert rule entries consistently
- exposes the new shape through protocol/schema outputs, debug surfaces,
and app-server config APIs
- rejects the legacy list-based keys and updates docs/tests to reflect
the new config format

## Why

The previous representation split related network policy across multiple
parallel lists, which made merging and overriding rules harder to reason
about. Moving to explicit keyed permission maps gives us a single source
of truth per host/socket entry, makes allow/deny precedence clearer, and
gives protocol consumers access to the full rule state instead of
derived projections only.

## Backward Compatibility

### Backward compatible

- Managed requirements still accept the legacy
`experimental_network.allowed_domains`,
`experimental_network.denied_domains`, and
`experimental_network.allow_unix_sockets` fields. They are normalized
into the new canonical `domains` and `unix_sockets` maps internally.
- App-server v2 still deserializes legacy `allowedDomains`,
`deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` payloads, so older clients can
continue reading managed network requirements.
- App-server v2 responses still populate `allowedDomains`,
`deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` as legacy compatibility views
derived from the canonical maps.
- `managed_allowed_domains_only` keeps the same behavior after
normalization. Legacy managed allowlists still participate in the same
enforcement path as canonical `domains` entries.

### Not backward compatible

- Permissions profiles under `[permissions.<profile>.network]` no longer
accept the legacy list-based keys. Those configs must use the canonical
`[domains]` and `[unix_sockets]` tables instead of `allowed_domains`,
`denied_domains`, or `allow_unix_sockets`.
- Managed `experimental_network` config cannot mix canonical and legacy
forms in the same block. For example, `domains` cannot be combined with
`allowed_domains` or `denied_domains`, and `unix_sockets` cannot be
combined with `allow_unix_sockets`.
- The canonical format can express explicit `"none"` entries for unix
sockets, but those entries do not round-trip through the legacy
compatibility fields because the legacy fields only represent allow/deny
lists.
## Testing
`/target/debug/codex sandbox macos --log-denials /bin/zsh -c 'curl
https://www.example.com' ` gives 200 with config
```
[permissions.workspace.network.domains]
"www.example.com" = "allow"
```
and fails when set to deny: `curl: (56) CONNECT tunnel failed, response
403`.

Also tested backward compatibility path by verifying that adding the
following to `/etc/codex/requirements.toml` works:
```
[experimental_network]
allowed_domains = ["www.example.com"]
```
2026-03-27 06:17:59 +00:00

57 lines
1.8 KiB
Rust

#![deny(clippy::print_stdout, clippy::print_stderr)]
mod certs;
mod config;
mod http_proxy;
mod mitm;
mod network_policy;
mod policy;
mod proxy;
mod reasons;
mod responses;
mod runtime;
mod socks5;
mod state;
mod upstream;
pub use config::NetworkDomainPermission;
pub use config::NetworkDomainPermissionEntry;
pub use config::NetworkDomainPermissions;
pub use config::NetworkMode;
pub use config::NetworkProxyConfig;
pub use config::NetworkUnixSocketPermission;
pub use config::NetworkUnixSocketPermissions;
pub use config::host_and_port_from_network_addr;
pub use network_policy::NetworkDecision;
pub use network_policy::NetworkDecisionSource;
pub use network_policy::NetworkPolicyDecider;
pub use network_policy::NetworkPolicyDecision;
pub use network_policy::NetworkPolicyRequest;
pub use network_policy::NetworkPolicyRequestArgs;
pub use network_policy::NetworkProtocol;
pub use policy::normalize_host;
pub use proxy::ALL_PROXY_ENV_KEYS;
pub use proxy::ALLOW_LOCAL_BINDING_ENV_KEY;
pub use proxy::Args;
pub use proxy::DEFAULT_NO_PROXY_VALUE;
pub use proxy::NO_PROXY_ENV_KEYS;
pub use proxy::NetworkProxy;
pub use proxy::NetworkProxyBuilder;
pub use proxy::NetworkProxyHandle;
pub use proxy::PROXY_URL_ENV_KEYS;
pub use proxy::has_proxy_url_env_vars;
pub use proxy::proxy_url_env_value;
pub use runtime::BlockedRequest;
pub use runtime::BlockedRequestArgs;
pub use runtime::BlockedRequestObserver;
pub use runtime::ConfigReloader;
pub use runtime::ConfigState;
pub use runtime::NetworkProxyState;
pub use state::NetworkProxyAuditMetadata;
pub use state::NetworkProxyConstraintError;
pub use state::NetworkProxyConstraints;
pub use state::PartialNetworkConfig;
pub use state::PartialNetworkProxyConfig;
pub use state::build_config_state;
pub use state::validate_policy_against_constraints;