Files
codex/codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs
pakrym-oai 83decfa300 [codex] Remove unused legacy shell tools (#22246)
## Why

Recent session history showed no active use of the raw `shell`,
`local_shell`, or `container.exec` execution surfaces. Keeping those
handlers/specs wired into core leaves duplicate shell execution paths
alongside the supported `shell_command` and unified exec tools.

## What changed

- Removed the raw `shell` handler/spec and its `ShellToolCallParams`
protocol helper.
- Removed the legacy `local_shell` and `container.exec` handler/spec
plumbing while preserving persisted-history compatibility for old
response items.
- Normalized model/config `default` and `local` shell selections to
`shell_command`.
- Pruned tests that exercised removed raw-shell/local-shell/apply-patch
variants and kept coverage on `shell_command`, unified exec, and
freeform `apply_patch`.

## Verification

- `git diff --check`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-tools`
- `cargo test -p codex-core tools::handlers::shell`
- `cargo test -p codex-core tools::spec`
- `cargo test -p codex-core tools::router`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
active_call_preserves_triggering_command_context`
- `cargo test -p codex-core guardian_tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all shell_serialization`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all apply_patch_cli`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all shell_command_`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all local_shell`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all otel::`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all hooks::`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `just fix -p codex-tools`
2026-05-13 16:43:25 +00:00

2880 lines
95 KiB
Rust
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use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::io;
use std::num::NonZeroUsize;
use std::path::Path;
use codex_utils_image::PromptImageMode;
use codex_utils_image::load_for_prompt_bytes;
use serde::Deserialize;
use serde::Deserializer;
use serde::Serialize;
use serde::ser::Serializer;
use ts_rs::TS;
use crate::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode;
use crate::permissions::FileSystemPath;
use crate::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
use crate::permissions::FileSystemSandboxKind;
use crate::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
use crate::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath;
use crate::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use crate::user_input::UserInput;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use codex_utils_image::ImageProcessingError;
use schemars::JsonSchema;
use crate::mcp::CallToolResult;
/// Controls the per-command sandbox override requested by a shell-like tool call.
#[derive(
Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, TS,
)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum SandboxPermissions {
/// Run with the turn's configured sandbox policy unchanged.
#[default]
UseDefault,
/// Request to run outside the sandbox.
RequireEscalated,
/// Request to stay in the sandbox while widening permissions for this
/// command only.
WithAdditionalPermissions,
}
impl SandboxPermissions {
/// True if SandboxPermissions requires full unsandboxed execution (i.e. RequireEscalated)
pub fn requires_escalated_permissions(self) -> bool {
matches!(self, SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated)
}
/// True if SandboxPermissions requests any explicit per-command override
/// beyond `UseDefault`.
pub fn requests_sandbox_override(self) -> bool {
!matches!(self, SandboxPermissions::UseDefault)
}
/// True if SandboxPermissions uses the sandboxed per-command permission
/// widening flow.
pub fn uses_additional_permissions(self) -> bool {
matches!(self, SandboxPermissions::WithAdditionalPermissions)
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct FileSystemPermissions {
pub entries: Vec<FileSystemSandboxEntry>,
pub glob_scan_max_depth: Option<NonZeroUsize>,
}
pub type LegacyReadWriteRoots = (Option<Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>>, Option<Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>>);
impl FileSystemPermissions {
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.entries.is_empty()
}
pub fn from_read_write_roots(
read: Option<Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>>,
write: Option<Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>>,
) -> Self {
let mut entries = Vec::new();
if let Some(read) = read {
entries.extend(read.into_iter().map(|path| FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path },
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
}));
}
if let Some(write) = write {
entries.extend(write.into_iter().map(|path| FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path },
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
}));
}
Self {
entries,
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
}
}
pub fn explicit_path_entries(
&self,
) -> impl Iterator<Item = (&AbsolutePathBuf, FileSystemAccessMode)> {
self.entries.iter().filter_map(|entry| match &entry.path {
FileSystemPath::Path { path } => Some((path, entry.access)),
FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { .. } | FileSystemPath::Special { .. } => None,
})
}
pub fn legacy_read_write_roots(&self) -> Option<LegacyReadWriteRoots> {
self.as_legacy_permissions()
.map(|legacy| (legacy.read, legacy.write))
}
fn as_legacy_permissions(&self) -> Option<LegacyFileSystemPermissions> {
if self.glob_scan_max_depth.is_some() {
return None;
}
let mut read = Vec::new();
let mut write = Vec::new();
for entry in &self.entries {
let FileSystemPath::Path { path } = &entry.path else {
return None;
};
match entry.access {
FileSystemAccessMode::Read => read.push(path.clone()),
FileSystemAccessMode::Write => write.push(path.clone()),
FileSystemAccessMode::None => return None,
}
}
Some(LegacyFileSystemPermissions {
read: (!read.is_empty()).then_some(read),
write: (!write.is_empty()).then_some(write),
})
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
struct LegacyFileSystemPermissions {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
read: Option<Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
write: Option<Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
struct CanonicalFileSystemPermissions {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
entries: Vec<FileSystemSandboxEntry>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
glob_scan_max_depth: Option<NonZeroUsize>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
#[serde(untagged)]
enum FileSystemPermissionsDe {
Canonical(CanonicalFileSystemPermissions),
Legacy(LegacyFileSystemPermissions),
}
impl Serialize for FileSystemPermissions {
fn serialize<S>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
where
S: Serializer,
{
if let Some(legacy) = self.as_legacy_permissions() {
legacy.serialize(serializer)
} else {
CanonicalFileSystemPermissions {
entries: self.entries.clone(),
glob_scan_max_depth: self.glob_scan_max_depth,
}
.serialize(serializer)
}
}
}
impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for FileSystemPermissions {
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error>
where
D: Deserializer<'de>,
{
match FileSystemPermissionsDe::deserialize(deserializer)? {
FileSystemPermissionsDe::Canonical(CanonicalFileSystemPermissions {
entries,
glob_scan_max_depth,
}) => Ok(Self {
entries,
glob_scan_max_depth,
}),
FileSystemPermissionsDe::Legacy(LegacyFileSystemPermissions { read, write }) => {
Ok(Self::from_read_write_roots(read, write))
}
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct NetworkPermissions {
pub enabled: Option<bool>,
}
impl NetworkPermissions {
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.enabled.is_none()
}
}
/// Partial permission overlay used for per-command requests and approved
/// session/turn grants.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct AdditionalPermissionProfile {
pub network: Option<NetworkPermissions>,
pub file_system: Option<FileSystemPermissions>,
}
impl AdditionalPermissionProfile {
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.network.is_none() && self.file_system.is_none()
}
}
#[derive(
Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, TS,
)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum SandboxEnforcement {
/// Codex owns sandbox construction for this profile.
#[default]
Managed,
/// No outer filesystem sandbox should be applied.
Disabled,
/// Filesystem isolation is enforced by an external caller.
External,
}
impl SandboxEnforcement {
pub fn from_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy) -> Self {
match sandbox_policy {
SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess => Self::Disabled,
SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { .. } => Self::External,
SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly { .. } | SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. } => Self::Managed,
}
}
}
/// Filesystem permissions for profiles where Codex owns sandbox construction.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[ts(tag = "type")]
pub enum ManagedFileSystemPermissions {
/// Apply a managed filesystem sandbox from the listed entries.
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[ts(rename_all = "snake_case")]
Restricted {
entries: Vec<FileSystemSandboxEntry>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
glob_scan_max_depth: Option<NonZeroUsize>,
},
/// Apply a managed sandbox that allows all filesystem access.
Unrestricted,
}
impl ManagedFileSystemPermissions {
fn from_sandbox_policy(file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy) -> Self {
match file_system_sandbox_policy.kind {
FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted => Self::Restricted {
entries: file_system_sandbox_policy.entries.clone(),
glob_scan_max_depth: file_system_sandbox_policy
.glob_scan_max_depth
.and_then(NonZeroUsize::new),
},
FileSystemSandboxKind::Unrestricted => Self::Unrestricted,
FileSystemSandboxKind::ExternalSandbox => unreachable!(
"external filesystem policies are represented by PermissionProfile::External"
),
}
}
pub fn to_sandbox_policy(&self) -> FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
match self {
Self::Restricted {
entries,
glob_scan_max_depth,
} => FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
kind: FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted,
glob_scan_max_depth: glob_scan_max_depth.map(usize::from),
entries: entries.clone(),
},
Self::Unrestricted => FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted(),
}
}
}
/// Canonical active runtime permissions for a conversation, turn, or command.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[ts(tag = "type")]
pub enum PermissionProfile {
/// Codex owns sandbox construction for this profile.
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[ts(rename_all = "snake_case")]
Managed {
file_system: ManagedFileSystemPermissions,
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
},
/// Do not apply an outer sandbox.
Disabled,
/// Filesystem isolation is enforced by an external caller.
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[ts(rename_all = "snake_case")]
External { network: NetworkSandboxPolicy },
}
/// Metadata for the named or implicit built-in permissions profile that
/// produced the active `PermissionProfile`.
///
/// The runtime must honor `PermissionProfile`; this sidecar exists so clients
/// can display stable profile identity without trying to reverse-engineer a
/// name from the compiled permissions.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Eq, PartialEq, Deserialize, Serialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct ActivePermissionProfile {
/// Profile identifier from `default_permissions` or the implicit built-in
/// default, such as `:workspace` or a user-defined `[permissions.<id>]`
/// profile.
pub id: String,
/// Optional parent profile identifier once permissions profiles support
/// inheritance. This is always `None` until that config feature exists.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
pub extends: Option<String>,
/// Bounded user-requested modifications applied on top of the named
/// profile, if any.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
pub modifications: Vec<ActivePermissionProfileModification>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Eq, PartialEq, Deserialize, Serialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[ts(tag = "type")]
pub enum ActivePermissionProfileModification {
/// Additional concrete directory that should be writable.
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[ts(rename_all = "snake_case")]
AdditionalWritableRoot { path: AbsolutePathBuf },
}
impl ActivePermissionProfile {
pub fn new(id: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
Self {
id: id.into(),
extends: None,
modifications: Vec::new(),
}
}
pub fn with_modifications(
mut self,
modifications: Vec<ActivePermissionProfileModification>,
) -> Self {
self.modifications = modifications;
self
}
}
impl Default for PermissionProfile {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::Managed {
file_system: ManagedFileSystemPermissions::Restricted {
entries: Vec::new(),
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
},
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
}
}
}
impl PermissionProfile {
/// Managed read-only filesystem access with restricted network access.
pub fn read_only() -> Self {
Self::Managed {
file_system: ManagedFileSystemPermissions::Restricted {
entries: vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
}],
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
},
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
}
}
/// Managed workspace-write filesystem access with restricted network
/// access.
///
/// The returned profile contains symbolic `:project_roots` entries that
/// must be resolved against the active permission root before enforcement.
pub fn workspace_write() -> Self {
Self::workspace_write_with(
&[],
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
/*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ false,
/*exclude_slash_tmp*/ false,
)
}
/// Managed workspace-write filesystem access with the legacy
/// `sandbox_workspace_write` knobs applied directly to the profile.
///
/// The returned profile contains symbolic `:project_roots` entries that
/// must be resolved against the active permission root before enforcement.
pub fn workspace_write_with(
writable_roots: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: bool,
exclude_slash_tmp: bool,
) -> Self {
let file_system = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::workspace_write(
writable_roots,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
);
Self::Managed {
file_system: ManagedFileSystemPermissions::from_sandbox_policy(&file_system),
network,
}
}
pub fn from_runtime_permissions(
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
) -> Self {
let enforcement = match file_system_sandbox_policy.kind {
FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted | FileSystemSandboxKind::Unrestricted => {
SandboxEnforcement::Managed
}
FileSystemSandboxKind::ExternalSandbox => SandboxEnforcement::External,
};
Self::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
enforcement,
file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
)
}
pub fn from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
enforcement: SandboxEnforcement,
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
) -> Self {
match file_system_sandbox_policy.kind {
FileSystemSandboxKind::ExternalSandbox => Self::External {
network: network_sandbox_policy,
},
FileSystemSandboxKind::Unrestricted if enforcement == SandboxEnforcement::Disabled => {
Self::Disabled
}
FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted | FileSystemSandboxKind::Unrestricted => {
Self::Managed {
file_system: ManagedFileSystemPermissions::from_sandbox_policy(
file_system_sandbox_policy,
),
network: network_sandbox_policy,
}
}
}
}
pub fn from_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy) -> Self {
Self::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
SandboxEnforcement::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy),
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(sandbox_policy),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(sandbox_policy),
)
}
pub fn from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd(sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy, cwd: &Path) -> Self {
Self::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
SandboxEnforcement::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy),
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd(sandbox_policy, cwd),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(sandbox_policy),
)
}
pub fn enforcement(&self) -> SandboxEnforcement {
match self {
Self::Managed { .. } => SandboxEnforcement::Managed,
Self::Disabled => SandboxEnforcement::Disabled,
Self::External { .. } => SandboxEnforcement::External,
}
}
pub fn file_system_sandbox_policy(&self) -> FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
match self {
Self::Managed { file_system, .. } => file_system.to_sandbox_policy(),
Self::Disabled => FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted(),
Self::External { .. } => FileSystemSandboxPolicy::external_sandbox(),
}
}
pub fn network_sandbox_policy(&self) -> NetworkSandboxPolicy {
match self {
Self::Managed { network, .. } | Self::External { network } => *network,
Self::Disabled => NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
}
}
pub fn to_legacy_sandbox_policy(&self, cwd: &Path) -> io::Result<SandboxPolicy> {
match self {
Self::Managed {
file_system,
network,
} => file_system
.to_sandbox_policy()
.to_legacy_sandbox_policy(*network, cwd),
Self::Disabled => Ok(SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess),
Self::External { network } => Ok(SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox {
network_access: if network.is_enabled() {
crate::protocol::NetworkAccess::Enabled
} else {
crate::protocol::NetworkAccess::Restricted
},
}),
}
}
pub fn to_runtime_permissions(&self) -> (FileSystemSandboxPolicy, NetworkSandboxPolicy) {
(
self.file_system_sandbox_policy(),
self.network_sandbox_policy(),
)
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
enum TaggedPermissionProfile {
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
Managed {
file_system: ManagedFileSystemPermissions,
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
},
Disabled,
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
External {
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
},
}
impl From<TaggedPermissionProfile> for PermissionProfile {
fn from(value: TaggedPermissionProfile) -> Self {
match value {
TaggedPermissionProfile::Managed {
file_system,
network,
} => Self::Managed {
file_system,
network,
},
TaggedPermissionProfile::Disabled => Self::Disabled,
TaggedPermissionProfile::External { network } => Self::External { network },
}
}
}
/// Pre-tagged shape written to rollout files before `PermissionProfile`
/// represented enforcement explicitly.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
struct LegacyPermissionProfile {
network: Option<NetworkPermissions>,
file_system: Option<FileSystemPermissions>,
}
impl From<LegacyPermissionProfile> for PermissionProfile {
fn from(value: LegacyPermissionProfile) -> Self {
let file_system_sandbox_policy = value.file_system.as_ref().map_or_else(
|| FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(Vec::new()),
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from,
);
let network_sandbox_policy = if value
.network
.as_ref()
.and_then(|network| network.enabled)
.unwrap_or(false)
{
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled
} else {
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted
};
Self::from_runtime_permissions(&file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy)
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
#[serde(untagged)]
enum PermissionProfileDe {
Tagged(TaggedPermissionProfile),
Legacy(LegacyPermissionProfile),
}
impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for PermissionProfile {
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error>
where
D: Deserializer<'de>,
{
Ok(match PermissionProfileDe::deserialize(deserializer)? {
PermissionProfileDe::Tagged(tagged) => tagged.into(),
PermissionProfileDe::Legacy(legacy) => legacy.into(),
})
}
}
impl From<NetworkSandboxPolicy> for NetworkPermissions {
fn from(value: NetworkSandboxPolicy) -> Self {
Self {
enabled: Some(value.is_enabled()),
}
}
}
impl From<&FileSystemSandboxPolicy> for FileSystemPermissions {
fn from(value: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy) -> Self {
let entries = match value.kind {
FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted => value.entries.clone(),
FileSystemSandboxKind::Unrestricted | FileSystemSandboxKind::ExternalSandbox => {
vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
}]
}
};
Self {
entries,
glob_scan_max_depth: value.glob_scan_max_depth.and_then(NonZeroUsize::new),
}
}
}
impl From<&FileSystemPermissions> for FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
fn from(value: &FileSystemPermissions) -> Self {
let mut policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(value.entries.clone());
policy.glob_scan_max_depth = value.glob_scan_max_depth.map(usize::from);
policy
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum ResponseInputItem {
Message {
role: String,
content: Vec<ContentItem>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
phase: Option<MessagePhase>,
},
FunctionCallOutput {
call_id: String,
#[ts(as = "FunctionCallOutputBody")]
#[schemars(with = "FunctionCallOutputBody")]
output: FunctionCallOutputPayload,
},
McpToolCallOutput {
call_id: String,
output: CallToolResult,
},
CustomToolCallOutput {
call_id: String,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
name: Option<String>,
#[ts(as = "FunctionCallOutputBody")]
#[schemars(with = "FunctionCallOutputBody")]
output: FunctionCallOutputPayload,
},
ToolSearchOutput {
call_id: String,
status: String,
execution: String,
#[ts(type = "unknown[]")]
tools: Vec<serde_json::Value>,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum ContentItem {
InputText {
text: String,
},
InputImage {
image_url: String,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
detail: Option<ImageDetail>,
},
OutputText {
text: String,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum ImageDetail {
Auto,
Low,
High,
Original,
}
pub const DEFAULT_IMAGE_DETAIL: ImageDetail = ImageDetail::High;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
/// Classifies an assistant message as interim commentary or final answer text.
///
/// Providers do not emit this consistently, so callers must treat `None` as
/// "phase unknown" and keep compatibility behavior for legacy models.
pub enum MessagePhase {
/// Mid-turn assistant text (for example preamble/progress narration).
///
/// Additional tool calls or assistant output may follow before turn
/// completion.
Commentary,
/// The assistant's terminal answer text for the current turn.
FinalAnswer,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum ResponseItem {
Message {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing)]
#[ts(skip)]
id: Option<String>,
role: String,
content: Vec<ContentItem>,
// Optional output-message phase (for example: "commentary", "final_answer").
// Availability varies by provider/model, so downstream consumers must
// preserve fallback behavior when this is absent.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
phase: Option<MessagePhase>,
},
Reasoning {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing)]
#[ts(skip)]
#[schemars(skip)]
id: String,
summary: Vec<ReasoningItemReasoningSummary>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "should_serialize_reasoning_content")]
#[ts(optional)]
content: Option<Vec<ReasoningItemContent>>,
encrypted_content: Option<String>,
},
LocalShellCall {
/// Legacy id field retained for compatibility with older payloads.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing)]
#[ts(skip)]
id: Option<String>,
/// Set when using the Responses API.
call_id: Option<String>,
status: LocalShellStatus,
action: LocalShellAction,
},
FunctionCall {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing)]
#[ts(skip)]
id: Option<String>,
name: String,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
namespace: Option<String>,
// The Responses API returns the function call arguments as a *string* that contains
// JSON, not as an alreadyparsed object. We keep it as a raw string here and let
// Session::handle_function_call parse it into a Value.
arguments: String,
call_id: String,
},
ToolSearchCall {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing)]
#[ts(skip)]
id: Option<String>,
call_id: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
status: Option<String>,
execution: String,
#[ts(type = "unknown")]
arguments: serde_json::Value,
},
// NOTE: The `output` field for `function_call_output` uses a dedicated payload type with
// custom serialization. On the wire it is either:
// - a plain string (`content`)
// - an array of structured content items (`content_items`)
// We keep this behavior centralized in `FunctionCallOutputPayload`.
FunctionCallOutput {
call_id: String,
#[ts(as = "FunctionCallOutputBody")]
#[schemars(with = "FunctionCallOutputBody")]
output: FunctionCallOutputPayload,
},
CustomToolCall {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing)]
#[ts(skip)]
id: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
status: Option<String>,
call_id: String,
name: String,
input: String,
},
// `custom_tool_call_output.output` uses the same wire encoding as
// `function_call_output.output` so freeform tools can return either plain
// text or structured content items.
CustomToolCallOutput {
call_id: String,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
name: Option<String>,
#[ts(as = "FunctionCallOutputBody")]
#[schemars(with = "FunctionCallOutputBody")]
output: FunctionCallOutputPayload,
},
ToolSearchOutput {
call_id: Option<String>,
status: String,
execution: String,
#[ts(type = "unknown[]")]
tools: Vec<serde_json::Value>,
},
// Emitted by the Responses API when the agent triggers a web search.
// Example payload (from SSE `response.output_item.done`):
// {
// "id":"ws_...",
// "type":"web_search_call",
// "status":"completed",
// "action": {"type":"search","query":"weather: San Francisco, CA"}
// }
WebSearchCall {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing)]
#[ts(skip)]
id: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
status: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
action: Option<WebSearchAction>,
},
// Emitted by the Responses API when the agent triggers image generation.
// Example payload:
// {
// "id":"ig_123",
// "type":"image_generation_call",
// "status":"completed",
// "revised_prompt":"A gray tabby cat hugging an otter...",
// "result":"..."
// }
ImageGenerationCall {
id: String,
status: String,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
revised_prompt: Option<String>,
result: String,
},
#[serde(alias = "compaction_summary")]
Compaction { encrypted_content: String },
ContextCompaction {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
encrypted_content: Option<String>,
},
#[serde(other)]
Other,
}
pub const BASE_INSTRUCTIONS_DEFAULT: &str = include_str!("prompts/base_instructions/default.md");
/// Base instructions for the model in a thread. Corresponds to the `instructions` field in the ResponsesAPI.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(rename = "base_instructions", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub struct BaseInstructions {
pub text: String,
}
impl Default for BaseInstructions {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
text: BASE_INSTRUCTIONS_DEFAULT.to_string(),
}
}
}
const MAX_RENDERED_PREFIXES: usize = 100;
const MAX_ALLOW_PREFIX_TEXT_BYTES: usize = 5000;
const TRUNCATED_MARKER: &str = "...\n[Some commands were truncated]";
pub fn format_allow_prefixes(prefixes: Vec<Vec<String>>) -> Option<String> {
let mut truncated = false;
if prefixes.len() > MAX_RENDERED_PREFIXES {
truncated = true;
}
let mut prefixes = prefixes;
prefixes.sort_by(|a, b| {
a.len()
.cmp(&b.len())
.then_with(|| prefix_combined_str_len(a).cmp(&prefix_combined_str_len(b)))
.then_with(|| a.cmp(b))
});
let full_text = prefixes
.into_iter()
.take(MAX_RENDERED_PREFIXES)
.map(|prefix| format!("- {}", render_command_prefix(&prefix)))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join("\n");
// truncate to last UTF8 char
let mut output = full_text;
let byte_idx = output
.char_indices()
.nth(MAX_ALLOW_PREFIX_TEXT_BYTES)
.map(|(i, _)| i);
if let Some(byte_idx) = byte_idx {
truncated = true;
output = output[..byte_idx].to_string();
}
if truncated {
Some(format!("{output}{TRUNCATED_MARKER}"))
} else {
Some(output)
}
}
fn prefix_combined_str_len(prefix: &[String]) -> usize {
prefix.iter().map(String::len).sum()
}
fn render_command_prefix(prefix: &[String]) -> String {
let tokens = prefix
.iter()
.map(|token| serde_json::to_string(token).unwrap_or_else(|_| format!("{token:?}")))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(", ");
format!("[{tokens}]")
}
fn should_serialize_reasoning_content(content: &Option<Vec<ReasoningItemContent>>) -> bool {
match content {
Some(content) => !content
.iter()
.any(|c| matches!(c, ReasoningItemContent::ReasoningText { .. })),
None => false,
}
}
fn local_image_error_placeholder(
path: &std::path::Path,
error: impl std::fmt::Display,
) -> ContentItem {
ContentItem::InputText {
text: format!(
"Codex could not read the local image at `{}`: {}",
path.display(),
error
),
}
}
pub const VIEW_IMAGE_TOOL_NAME: &str = "view_image";
const IMAGE_OPEN_TAG: &str = "";
const LOCAL_IMAGE_OPEN_TAG_PREFIX: &str = "<image name=";
const LOCAL_IMAGE_OPEN_TAG_SUFFIX: &str = ">";
const LOCAL_IMAGE_CLOSE_TAG: &str = IMAGE_CLOSE_TAG;
pub fn image_open_tag_text() -> String {
IMAGE_OPEN_TAG.to_string()
}
pub fn image_close_tag_text() -> String {
IMAGE_CLOSE_TAG.to_string()
}
pub fn local_image_label_text(label_number: usize) -> String {
format!("[Image #{label_number}]")
}
pub fn local_image_open_tag_text(label_number: usize) -> String {
let label = local_image_label_text(label_number);
format!("{LOCAL_IMAGE_OPEN_TAG_PREFIX}{label}{LOCAL_IMAGE_OPEN_TAG_SUFFIX}")
}
pub fn is_local_image_open_tag_text(text: &str) -> bool {
text.strip_prefix(LOCAL_IMAGE_OPEN_TAG_PREFIX)
.is_some_and(|rest| rest.ends_with(LOCAL_IMAGE_OPEN_TAG_SUFFIX))
}
pub fn is_local_image_close_tag_text(text: &str) -> bool {
is_image_close_tag_text(text)
}
pub fn is_image_open_tag_text(text: &str) -> bool {
text == IMAGE_OPEN_TAG
}
pub fn is_image_close_tag_text(text: &str) -> bool {
text == IMAGE_CLOSE_TAG
}
fn invalid_image_error_placeholder(
path: &std::path::Path,
error: impl std::fmt::Display,
) -> ContentItem {
ContentItem::InputText {
text: format!(
"Image located at `{}` is invalid: {}",
path.display(),
error
),
}
}
fn unsupported_image_error_placeholder(path: &std::path::Path, mime: &str) -> ContentItem {
ContentItem::InputText {
text: format!(
"Codex cannot attach image at `{}`: unsupported image `{}`.",
path.display(),
mime
),
}
}
pub fn local_image_content_items_with_label_number(
path: &std::path::Path,
file_bytes: Vec<u8>,
label_number: Option<usize>,
mode: PromptImageMode,
) -> Vec<ContentItem> {
match load_for_prompt_bytes(path, file_bytes, mode) {
Ok(image) => {
let mut items = Vec::with_capacity(3);
if let Some(label_number) = label_number {
items.push(ContentItem::InputText {
text: local_image_open_tag_text(label_number),
});
}
items.push(ContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: image.into_data_url(),
detail: Some(DEFAULT_IMAGE_DETAIL),
});
if label_number.is_some() {
items.push(ContentItem::InputText {
text: LOCAL_IMAGE_CLOSE_TAG.to_string(),
});
}
items
}
Err(err) => match &err {
ImageProcessingError::Read { .. } | ImageProcessingError::Encode { .. } => {
vec![local_image_error_placeholder(path, &err)]
}
ImageProcessingError::Decode { .. } if err.is_invalid_image() => {
vec![invalid_image_error_placeholder(path, &err)]
}
ImageProcessingError::Decode { .. } => {
vec![local_image_error_placeholder(path, &err)]
}
ImageProcessingError::UnsupportedImageFormat { mime } => {
vec![unsupported_image_error_placeholder(path, mime)]
}
},
}
}
impl From<ResponseInputItem> for ResponseItem {
fn from(item: ResponseInputItem) -> Self {
match item {
ResponseInputItem::Message {
role,
content,
phase,
} => Self::Message {
role,
content,
id: None,
phase,
},
ResponseInputItem::FunctionCallOutput { call_id, output } => {
Self::FunctionCallOutput { call_id, output }
}
ResponseInputItem::McpToolCallOutput { call_id, output } => {
let output = output.into_function_call_output_payload();
Self::FunctionCallOutput { call_id, output }
}
ResponseInputItem::CustomToolCallOutput {
call_id,
name,
output,
} => Self::CustomToolCallOutput {
call_id,
name,
output,
},
ResponseInputItem::ToolSearchOutput {
call_id,
status,
execution,
tools,
} => Self::ToolSearchOutput {
call_id: Some(call_id),
status,
execution,
tools,
},
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum LocalShellStatus {
Completed,
InProgress,
Incomplete,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum LocalShellAction {
Exec(LocalShellExecAction),
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct LocalShellExecAction {
pub command: Vec<String>,
pub timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
pub working_directory: Option<String>,
pub env: Option<HashMap<String, String>>,
pub user: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[schemars(rename = "ResponsesApiWebSearchAction")]
pub enum WebSearchAction {
Search {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
query: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
queries: Option<Vec<String>>,
},
OpenPage {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
url: Option<String>,
},
FindInPage {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
url: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
pattern: Option<String>,
},
#[serde(other)]
Other,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum ReasoningItemReasoningSummary {
SummaryText { text: String },
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum ReasoningItemContent {
ReasoningText { text: String },
Text { text: String },
}
impl From<Vec<UserInput>> for ResponseInputItem {
fn from(items: Vec<UserInput>) -> Self {
let mut image_index = 0;
Self::Message {
role: "user".to_string(),
content: items
.into_iter()
.flat_map(|c| match c {
UserInput::Text { text, .. } => vec![ContentItem::InputText { text }],
UserInput::Image { image_url } => {
image_index += 1;
vec![
ContentItem::InputText {
text: image_open_tag_text(),
},
ContentItem::InputImage {
image_url,
detail: Some(DEFAULT_IMAGE_DETAIL),
},
ContentItem::InputText {
text: image_close_tag_text(),
},
]
}
UserInput::LocalImage { path } => {
image_index += 1;
match std::fs::read(&path) {
Ok(file_bytes) => local_image_content_items_with_label_number(
&path,
file_bytes,
Some(image_index),
PromptImageMode::ResizeToFit,
),
Err(err) => vec![local_image_error_placeholder(&path, err)],
}
}
UserInput::Skill { .. } | UserInput::Mention { .. } => Vec::new(), // Tool bodies are injected later in core
})
.collect::<Vec<ContentItem>>(),
phase: None,
}
}
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct SearchToolCallParams {
pub query: String,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
pub limit: Option<usize>,
}
/// If the `name` of a `ResponseItem::FunctionCall` is `shell_command`, the
/// `arguments` field should deserialize to this struct.
#[derive(Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct ShellCommandToolCallParams {
pub command: String,
pub workdir: Option<String>,
/// Whether to run the shell with login shell semantics
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub login: Option<bool>,
/// This is the maximum time in milliseconds that the command is allowed to run.
#[serde(alias = "timeout")]
pub timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
pub sandbox_permissions: Option<SandboxPermissions>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
pub prefix_rule: Option<Vec<String>>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
pub additional_permissions: Option<AdditionalPermissionProfile>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub justification: Option<String>,
}
/// Responses API compatible content items that can be returned by a tool call.
/// This is a subset of ContentItem with the types we support as function call outputs.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum FunctionCallOutputContentItem {
// Do not rename, these are serialized and used directly in the responses API.
InputText {
text: String,
},
// Do not rename, these are serialized and used directly in the responses API.
InputImage {
image_url: String,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
detail: Option<ImageDetail>,
},
}
/// Converts structured function-call output content into plain text for
/// human-readable surfaces.
///
/// This conversion is intentionally lossy:
/// - only `input_text` items are included
/// - image items are ignored
///
/// We use this helper where callers still need a string representation (for
/// example telemetry previews or legacy string-only output paths) while keeping
/// the original multimodal `content_items` as the authoritative payload sent to
/// the model.
pub fn function_call_output_content_items_to_text(
content_items: &[FunctionCallOutputContentItem],
) -> Option<String> {
let text_segments = content_items
.iter()
.filter_map(|item| match item {
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText { text } if !text.trim().is_empty() => {
Some(text.as_str())
}
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText { .. }
| FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage { .. } => None,
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
if text_segments.is_empty() {
None
} else {
Some(text_segments.join("\n"))
}
}
impl From<crate::dynamic_tools::DynamicToolCallOutputContentItem>
for FunctionCallOutputContentItem
{
fn from(item: crate::dynamic_tools::DynamicToolCallOutputContentItem) -> Self {
match item {
crate::dynamic_tools::DynamicToolCallOutputContentItem::InputText { text } => {
Self::InputText { text }
}
crate::dynamic_tools::DynamicToolCallOutputContentItem::InputImage { image_url } => {
Self::InputImage {
image_url,
detail: Some(DEFAULT_IMAGE_DETAIL),
}
}
}
}
}
/// The payload we send back to OpenAI when reporting a tool call result.
///
/// `body` serializes directly as the wire value for `function_call_output.output`.
/// `success` remains internal metadata for downstream handling.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct FunctionCallOutputPayload {
pub body: FunctionCallOutputBody,
pub success: Option<bool>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(untagged)]
pub enum FunctionCallOutputBody {
Text(String),
ContentItems(Vec<FunctionCallOutputContentItem>),
}
impl FunctionCallOutputBody {
/// Best-effort conversion of a function-call output body to plain text for
/// human-readable surfaces.
///
/// This conversion is intentionally lossy when the body contains content
/// items: image entries are dropped and text entries are joined with
/// newlines.
pub fn to_text(&self) -> Option<String> {
match self {
Self::Text(content) => Some(content.clone()),
Self::ContentItems(items) => function_call_output_content_items_to_text(items),
}
}
}
impl Default for FunctionCallOutputBody {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::Text(String::new())
}
}
impl FunctionCallOutputPayload {
pub fn from_text(content: String) -> Self {
Self {
body: FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(content),
success: None,
}
}
pub fn from_content_items(content_items: Vec<FunctionCallOutputContentItem>) -> Self {
Self {
body: FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(content_items),
success: None,
}
}
pub fn text_content(&self) -> Option<&str> {
match &self.body {
FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(content) => Some(content),
FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(_) => None,
}
}
pub fn text_content_mut(&mut self) -> Option<&mut String> {
match &mut self.body {
FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(content) => Some(content),
FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(_) => None,
}
}
pub fn content_items(&self) -> Option<&[FunctionCallOutputContentItem]> {
match &self.body {
FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(_) => None,
FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(items) => Some(items),
}
}
pub fn content_items_mut(&mut self) -> Option<&mut Vec<FunctionCallOutputContentItem>> {
match &mut self.body {
FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(_) => None,
FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(items) => Some(items),
}
}
}
// `function_call_output.output` is encoded as either:
// - an array of structured content items
// - a plain string
impl Serialize for FunctionCallOutputPayload {
fn serialize<S>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
where
S: Serializer,
{
match &self.body {
FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(content) => serializer.serialize_str(content),
FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(items) => items.serialize(serializer),
}
}
}
impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for FunctionCallOutputPayload {
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error>
where
D: Deserializer<'de>,
{
let body = FunctionCallOutputBody::deserialize(deserializer)?;
Ok(FunctionCallOutputPayload {
body,
success: None,
})
}
}
impl CallToolResult {
pub fn from_result(result: Result<Self, String>) -> Self {
match result {
Ok(result) => result,
Err(error) => Self::from_error_text(error),
}
}
pub fn from_error_text(text: String) -> Self {
Self {
content: vec![serde_json::json!({
"type": "text",
"text": text,
})],
structured_content: None,
is_error: Some(true),
meta: None,
}
}
pub fn success(&self) -> bool {
self.is_error != Some(true)
}
pub fn as_function_call_output_payload(&self) -> FunctionCallOutputPayload {
if let Some(structured_content) = &self.structured_content
&& !structured_content.is_null()
{
match serde_json::to_string(structured_content) {
Ok(serialized_structured_content) => {
return FunctionCallOutputPayload {
body: FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(serialized_structured_content),
success: Some(self.success()),
};
}
Err(err) => {
return FunctionCallOutputPayload {
body: FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(err.to_string()),
success: Some(false),
};
}
}
}
let serialized_content = match serde_json::to_string(&self.content) {
Ok(serialized_content) => serialized_content,
Err(err) => {
return FunctionCallOutputPayload {
body: FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(err.to_string()),
success: Some(false),
};
}
};
let content_items = convert_mcp_content_to_items(&self.content);
let body = match content_items {
Some(content_items) => FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(content_items),
None => FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(serialized_content),
};
FunctionCallOutputPayload {
body,
success: Some(self.success()),
}
}
pub fn into_function_call_output_payload(self) -> FunctionCallOutputPayload {
self.as_function_call_output_payload()
}
}
fn convert_mcp_content_to_items(
contents: &[serde_json::Value],
) -> Option<Vec<FunctionCallOutputContentItem>> {
const CODEX_IMAGE_DETAIL_META_KEY: &str = "codex/imageDetail";
#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
#[serde(tag = "type")]
enum McpContent {
#[serde(rename = "text")]
Text { text: String },
#[serde(rename = "image")]
Image {
data: String,
#[serde(rename = "mimeType", alias = "mime_type")]
mime_type: Option<String>,
#[serde(rename = "_meta", default)]
meta: Option<serde_json::Value>,
},
#[serde(other)]
Unknown,
}
let mut saw_image = false;
let mut items = Vec::with_capacity(contents.len());
for content in contents {
let item = match serde_json::from_value::<McpContent>(content.clone()) {
Ok(McpContent::Text { text }) => FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText { text },
Ok(McpContent::Image {
data,
mime_type,
meta,
}) => {
saw_image = true;
let image_url = if data.starts_with("data:") {
data
} else {
let mime_type = mime_type.unwrap_or_else(|| "application/octet-stream".into());
format!("data:{mime_type};base64,{data}")
};
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url,
detail: meta
.as_ref()
.and_then(serde_json::Value::as_object)
.and_then(|meta| meta.get(CODEX_IMAGE_DETAIL_META_KEY))
.and_then(serde_json::Value::as_str)
.and_then(|detail| match detail {
"auto" => Some(ImageDetail::Auto),
"low" => Some(ImageDetail::Low),
"high" => Some(ImageDetail::High),
"original" => Some(ImageDetail::Original),
_ => None,
})
.or(Some(DEFAULT_IMAGE_DETAIL)),
}
}
Ok(McpContent::Unknown) | Err(_) => FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText {
text: serde_json::to_string(content).unwrap_or_else(|_| "<content>".to_string()),
},
};
items.push(item);
}
if saw_image { Some(items) } else { None }
}
// Implement Display so callers can treat the payload like a plain string when logging or doing
// trivial substring checks in tests (existing tests call `.contains()` on the output). For
// `ContentItems`, Display emits a JSON representation.
impl std::fmt::Display for FunctionCallOutputPayload {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
match &self.body {
FunctionCallOutputBody::Text(content) => f.write_str(content),
FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(items) => {
let content = serde_json::to_string(items).unwrap_or_default();
f.write_str(content.as_str())
}
}
}
}
// (Moved event mapping logic into codex-core to avoid coupling protocol to UI-facing events.)
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use anyhow::Result;
use codex_execpolicy::Policy;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use tempfile::tempdir;
#[test]
fn response_input_message_conversion_preserves_phase() {
let item = ResponseItem::from(ResponseInputItem::Message {
role: "assistant".to_string(),
content: vec![ContentItem::OutputText {
text: "still working".to_string(),
}],
phase: Some(MessagePhase::Commentary),
});
assert_eq!(
item,
ResponseItem::Message {
id: None,
role: "assistant".to_string(),
content: vec![ContentItem::OutputText {
text: "still working".to_string(),
}],
phase: Some(MessagePhase::Commentary),
}
);
}
#[test]
fn sandbox_permissions_helpers_match_documented_semantics() {
let cases = [
(SandboxPermissions::UseDefault, false, false, false),
(SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated, true, true, false),
(
SandboxPermissions::WithAdditionalPermissions,
false,
true,
true,
),
];
for (
sandbox_permissions,
requires_escalated_permissions,
requests_sandbox_override,
uses_additional_permissions,
) in cases
{
assert_eq!(
sandbox_permissions.requires_escalated_permissions(),
requires_escalated_permissions
);
assert_eq!(
sandbox_permissions.requests_sandbox_override(),
requests_sandbox_override
);
assert_eq!(
sandbox_permissions.uses_additional_permissions(),
uses_additional_permissions
);
}
}
#[test]
fn convert_mcp_content_to_items_preserves_data_urls() {
let contents = vec![serde_json::json!({
"type": "image",
"data": "",
"mimeType": "image/png",
})];
let items = convert_mcp_content_to_items(&contents).expect("expected image items");
assert_eq!(
items,
vec![FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".to_string(),
detail: Some(DEFAULT_IMAGE_DETAIL),
}]
);
}
#[test]
fn response_item_parses_image_generation_call() {
let item = serde_json::from_value::<ResponseItem>(serde_json::json!({
"id": "ig_123",
"type": "image_generation_call",
"status": "completed",
"revised_prompt": "A small blue square",
"result": "Zm9v",
}))
.expect("image generation item should deserialize");
assert_eq!(
item,
ResponseItem::ImageGenerationCall {
id: "ig_123".to_string(),
status: "completed".to_string(),
revised_prompt: Some("A small blue square".to_string()),
result: "Zm9v".to_string(),
}
);
}
#[test]
fn response_item_parses_image_generation_call_without_revised_prompt() {
let item = serde_json::from_value::<ResponseItem>(serde_json::json!({
"id": "ig_123",
"type": "image_generation_call",
"status": "completed",
"result": "Zm9v",
}))
.expect("image generation item should deserialize");
assert_eq!(
item,
ResponseItem::ImageGenerationCall {
id: "ig_123".to_string(),
status: "completed".to_string(),
revised_prompt: None,
result: "Zm9v".to_string(),
}
);
}
#[test]
fn additional_permission_profile_is_empty_when_all_fields_are_none() {
assert_eq!(AdditionalPermissionProfile::default().is_empty(), true);
}
#[test]
fn additional_permission_profile_is_not_empty_when_field_is_present_but_nested_empty() {
let permission_profile = AdditionalPermissionProfile {
network: Some(NetworkPermissions { enabled: None }),
file_system: None,
};
assert_eq!(permission_profile.is_empty(), false);
}
#[test]
fn permission_profile_round_trip_preserves_glob_scan_max_depth() {
let mut file_system_sandbox_policy =
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::GlobPattern {
pattern: "**/*.env".to_string(),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
}]);
file_system_sandbox_policy.glob_scan_max_depth = Some(2);
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
);
assert_eq!(
permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy(),
file_system_sandbox_policy
);
}
#[test]
fn permission_profile_deserializes_legacy_rollout_shape() -> Result<()> {
let legacy = serde_json::json!({
"network": {
"enabled": true,
},
"file_system": {
"entries": [{
"path": {
"type": "special",
"value": {
"kind": "root",
},
},
"access": "write",
}],
"glob_scan_max_depth": 2,
},
});
let permission_profile: PermissionProfile = serde_json::from_value(legacy)?;
assert_eq!(
permission_profile,
PermissionProfile::Managed {
file_system: ManagedFileSystemPermissions::Restricted {
entries: vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
}],
glob_scan_max_depth: NonZeroUsize::new(2),
},
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
}
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn permission_profile_presets_match_legacy_defaults() {
assert_eq!(
PermissionProfile::read_only(),
PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy())
);
assert_eq!(
PermissionProfile::workspace_write(),
PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(
&SandboxPolicy::new_workspace_write_policy()
)
);
}
#[test]
fn permission_profile_round_trip_preserves_disabled_sandbox() -> Result<()> {
let cwd = tempdir()?;
let permission_profile =
PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess);
assert_eq!(permission_profile, PermissionProfile::Disabled);
assert_eq!(
permission_profile.to_legacy_sandbox_policy(cwd.path())?,
SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess
);
assert_eq!(
permission_profile.to_runtime_permissions(),
(
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted(),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled
)
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn disabled_permission_profile_ignores_runtime_network_policy() {
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
SandboxEnforcement::Disabled,
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted(),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
);
assert_eq!(permission_profile, PermissionProfile::Disabled);
}
#[test]
fn permission_profile_from_runtime_permissions_preserves_external_sandbox() {
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::external_sandbox(),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
);
assert_eq!(
permission_profile,
PermissionProfile::External {
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
}
);
assert_eq!(
PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
SandboxEnforcement::Managed,
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::external_sandbox(),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
),
permission_profile,
);
}
#[test]
fn permission_profile_from_runtime_permissions_preserves_unrestricted_managed_network() {
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
SandboxEnforcement::External,
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted(),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
);
assert_eq!(
permission_profile,
PermissionProfile::Managed {
file_system: ManagedFileSystemPermissions::Unrestricted,
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
},
"the legacy ExternalSandbox projection must not hide a split unrestricted filesystem policy"
);
assert_eq!(
permission_profile.to_runtime_permissions(),
(
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted(),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
)
);
}
#[test]
fn permission_profile_round_trip_preserves_external_sandbox() -> Result<()> {
let cwd = tempdir()?;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox {
network_access: crate::protocol::NetworkAccess::Restricted,
};
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&sandbox_policy);
assert_eq!(
permission_profile,
PermissionProfile::External {
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
}
);
assert_eq!(
permission_profile.to_legacy_sandbox_policy(cwd.path())?,
sandbox_policy
);
assert_eq!(
permission_profile.to_runtime_permissions(),
(
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::external_sandbox(),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted
)
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn file_system_permissions_with_glob_scan_depth_uses_canonical_json() -> Result<()> {
let path = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(PathBuf::from(if cfg!(windows) {
r"C:\tmp\allowed"
} else {
"/tmp/allowed"
}))
.expect("absolute path");
let file_system_permissions = FileSystemPermissions {
entries: vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path },
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
}],
glob_scan_max_depth: NonZeroUsize::new(2),
};
let serialized = serde_json::to_value(&file_system_permissions)?;
assert_eq!(serialized.get("read"), None);
assert_eq!(serialized.get("write"), None);
assert_eq!(
serialized.get("glob_scan_max_depth"),
Some(&serde_json::json!(2))
);
assert!(serialized.get("entries").is_some());
assert_eq!(
serde_json::from_value::<FileSystemPermissions>(serialized)?,
file_system_permissions
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn file_system_permissions_rejects_zero_glob_scan_depth() {
serde_json::from_value::<FileSystemPermissions>(serde_json::json!({
"entries": [],
"glob_scan_max_depth": 0,
}))
.expect_err("zero glob scan depth should fail deserialization");
}
#[test]
fn convert_mcp_content_to_items_builds_data_urls_when_missing_prefix() {
let contents = vec![serde_json::json!({
"type": "image",
"data": "Zm9v",
"mimeType": "image/png",
})];
let items = convert_mcp_content_to_items(&contents).expect("expected image items");
assert_eq!(
items,
vec![FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".to_string(),
detail: Some(DEFAULT_IMAGE_DETAIL),
}]
);
}
#[test]
fn convert_mcp_content_to_items_returns_none_without_images() {
let contents = vec![serde_json::json!({
"type": "text",
"text": "hello",
})];
assert_eq!(convert_mcp_content_to_items(&contents), None);
}
#[test]
fn function_call_output_content_items_to_text_joins_text_segments() {
let content_items = vec![
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText {
text: "line 1".to_string(),
},
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".to_string(),
detail: Some(DEFAULT_IMAGE_DETAIL),
},
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText {
text: "line 2".to_string(),
},
];
let text = function_call_output_content_items_to_text(&content_items);
assert_eq!(text, Some("line 1\nline 2".to_string()));
}
#[test]
fn function_call_output_content_items_to_text_ignores_blank_text_and_images() {
let content_items = vec![
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText {
text: " ".to_string(),
},
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".to_string(),
detail: Some(DEFAULT_IMAGE_DETAIL),
},
];
let text = function_call_output_content_items_to_text(&content_items);
assert_eq!(text, None);
}
#[test]
fn function_call_output_body_to_text_returns_plain_text_content() {
let body = FunctionCallOutputBody::Text("ok".to_string());
let text = body.to_text();
assert_eq!(text, Some("ok".to_string()));
}
#[test]
fn function_call_output_body_to_text_uses_content_item_fallback() {
let body = FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(vec![
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText {
text: "line 1".to_string(),
},
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".to_string(),
detail: Some(DEFAULT_IMAGE_DETAIL),
},
]);
let text = body.to_text();
assert_eq!(text, Some("line 1".to_string()));
}
#[test]
fn function_call_deserializes_optional_namespace() {
let item: ResponseItem = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
"type": "function_call",
"name": "mcp__codex_apps__gmail_get_recent_emails",
"namespace": "mcp__codex_apps__gmail",
"arguments": "{\"top_k\":5}",
"call_id": "call-1",
}))
.expect("function_call should deserialize");
assert_eq!(
item,
ResponseItem::FunctionCall {
id: None,
name: "mcp__codex_apps__gmail_get_recent_emails".to_string(),
namespace: Some("mcp__codex_apps__gmail".to_string()),
arguments: "{\"top_k\":5}".to_string(),
call_id: "call-1".to_string(),
}
);
}
#[test]
fn render_command_prefix_list_sorts_by_len_then_total_len_then_alphabetical() {
let prefixes = vec![
vec!["b".to_string(), "zz".to_string()],
vec!["aa".to_string()],
vec!["b".to_string()],
vec!["a".to_string(), "b".to_string(), "c".to_string()],
vec!["a".to_string()],
vec!["b".to_string(), "a".to_string()],
];
let output = format_allow_prefixes(prefixes).expect("rendered list");
assert_eq!(
output,
r#"- ["a"]
- ["b"]
- ["aa"]
- ["b", "a"]
- ["b", "zz"]
- ["a", "b", "c"]"#
.to_string(),
);
}
#[test]
fn render_command_prefix_list_limits_output_to_max_prefixes() {
let prefixes = (0..(MAX_RENDERED_PREFIXES + 5))
.map(|i| vec![format!("{i:03}")])
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let output = format_allow_prefixes(prefixes).expect("rendered list");
assert_eq!(output.ends_with(TRUNCATED_MARKER), true);
eprintln!("output: {output}");
assert_eq!(output.lines().count(), MAX_RENDERED_PREFIXES + 1);
}
#[test]
fn format_allow_prefixes_limits_output() {
let mut exec_policy = Policy::empty();
for i in 0..200 {
exec_policy
.add_prefix_rule(
&[format!("tool-{i:03}"), "x".repeat(500)],
codex_execpolicy::Decision::Allow,
)
.expect("add rule");
}
let output =
format_allow_prefixes(exec_policy.get_allowed_prefixes()).expect("formatted prefixes");
assert!(
output.len() <= MAX_ALLOW_PREFIX_TEXT_BYTES + TRUNCATED_MARKER.len(),
"output length exceeds expected limit: {output}",
);
}
#[test]
fn serializes_success_as_plain_string() -> Result<()> {
let item = ResponseInputItem::FunctionCallOutput {
call_id: "call1".into(),
output: FunctionCallOutputPayload::from_text("ok".into()),
};
let json = serde_json::to_string(&item)?;
let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&json)?;
// Success case -> output should be a plain string
assert_eq!(v.get("output").unwrap().as_str().unwrap(), "ok");
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn serializes_failure_as_string() -> Result<()> {
let item = ResponseInputItem::FunctionCallOutput {
call_id: "call1".into(),
output: FunctionCallOutputPayload {
body: FunctionCallOutputBody::Text("bad".into()),
success: Some(false),
},
};
let json = serde_json::to_string(&item)?;
let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&json)?;
assert_eq!(v.get("output").unwrap().as_str().unwrap(), "bad");
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn serializes_image_outputs_as_array() -> Result<()> {
let call_tool_result = CallToolResult {
content: vec![
serde_json::json!({"type":"text","text":"caption"}),
serde_json::json!({"type":"image","data":"BASE64","mimeType":"image/png"}),
],
structured_content: None,
is_error: Some(false),
meta: None,
};
let payload = call_tool_result.into_function_call_output_payload();
assert_eq!(payload.success, Some(true));
let Some(items) = payload.content_items() else {
panic!("expected content items");
};
let items = items.to_vec();
assert_eq!(
items,
vec![
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText {
text: "caption".into(),
},
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".into(),
detail: Some(DEFAULT_IMAGE_DETAIL),
},
]
);
let item = ResponseInputItem::FunctionCallOutput {
call_id: "call1".into(),
output: payload,
};
let json = serde_json::to_string(&item)?;
let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&json)?;
let output = v.get("output").expect("output field");
assert!(output.is_array(), "expected array output");
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn serializes_custom_tool_image_outputs_as_array() -> Result<()> {
let item = ResponseInputItem::CustomToolCallOutput {
call_id: "call1".into(),
name: None,
output: FunctionCallOutputPayload::from_content_items(vec![
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".into(),
detail: Some(DEFAULT_IMAGE_DETAIL),
},
]),
};
let json = serde_json::to_string(&item)?;
let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&json)?;
let output = v.get("output").expect("output field");
assert!(output.is_array(), "expected array output");
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn preserves_existing_image_data_urls() -> Result<()> {
let call_tool_result = CallToolResult {
content: vec![serde_json::json!({
"type": "image",
"data": "",
"mimeType": "image/png"
})],
structured_content: None,
is_error: Some(false),
meta: None,
};
let payload = call_tool_result.into_function_call_output_payload();
let Some(items) = payload.content_items() else {
panic!("expected content items");
};
let items = items.to_vec();
assert_eq!(
items,
vec![FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".into(),
detail: Some(DEFAULT_IMAGE_DETAIL),
}]
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn preserves_original_detail_metadata_on_mcp_images() -> Result<()> {
let call_tool_result = CallToolResult {
content: vec![serde_json::json!({
"type": "image",
"data": "BASE64",
"mimeType": "image/png",
"_meta": {
"codex/imageDetail": "original",
},
})],
structured_content: None,
is_error: Some(false),
meta: None,
};
let payload = call_tool_result.into_function_call_output_payload();
let Some(items) = payload.content_items() else {
panic!("expected content items");
};
let items = items.to_vec();
assert_eq!(
items,
vec![FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".into(),
detail: Some(ImageDetail::Original),
}]
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn preserves_standard_detail_metadata_on_mcp_images() -> Result<()> {
let call_tool_result = CallToolResult {
content: vec![serde_json::json!({
"type": "image",
"data": "BASE64",
"mimeType": "image/png",
"_meta": {
"codex/imageDetail": "high",
},
})],
structured_content: None,
is_error: Some(false),
meta: None,
};
let payload = call_tool_result.into_function_call_output_payload();
let Some(items) = payload.content_items() else {
panic!("expected content items");
};
let items = items.to_vec();
assert_eq!(
items,
vec![FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".into(),
detail: Some(ImageDetail::High),
}]
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn deserializes_array_payload_into_items() -> Result<()> {
let json = r#"[
{"type": "input_text", "text": "note"},
{"type": "input_image", "image_url": ""}
]"#;
let payload: FunctionCallOutputPayload = serde_json::from_str(json)?;
assert_eq!(payload.success, None);
let expected_items = vec![
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputText {
text: "note".into(),
},
FunctionCallOutputContentItem::InputImage {
image_url: "".into(),
detail: None,
},
];
assert_eq!(
payload.body,
FunctionCallOutputBody::ContentItems(expected_items.clone())
);
assert_eq!(
serde_json::to_string(&payload)?,
serde_json::to_string(&expected_items)?
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn deserializes_compaction_alias() -> Result<()> {
let json = r#"{"type":"compaction_summary","encrypted_content":"abc"}"#;
let item: ResponseItem = serde_json::from_str(json)?;
assert_eq!(
item,
ResponseItem::Compaction {
encrypted_content: "abc".into(),
}
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn deserializes_context_compaction() -> Result<()> {
let json = r#"{"type":"context_compaction","encrypted_content":"abc"}"#;
let item: ResponseItem = serde_json::from_str(json)?;
assert_eq!(
item,
ResponseItem::ContextCompaction {
encrypted_content: Some("abc".into()),
}
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn serializes_context_compaction_trigger_without_payload() -> Result<()> {
let item = ResponseItem::ContextCompaction {
encrypted_content: None,
};
assert_eq!(
serde_json::to_value(item)?,
serde_json::json!({
"type": "context_compaction",
})
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn deserializes_legacy_ghost_snapshot_as_other() -> Result<()> {
let json = r#"{
"type":"ghost_snapshot",
"ghost_commit":{
"id":"ghost-1",
"parent":null,
"preexisting_untracked_files":[],
"preexisting_untracked_dirs":[]
}
}"#;
let item: ResponseItem = serde_json::from_str(json)?;
assert_eq!(item, ResponseItem::Other);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn roundtrips_web_search_call_actions() -> Result<()> {
let cases = vec![
(
r#"{
"type": "web_search_call",
"status": "completed",
"action": {
"type": "search",
"query": "weather seattle",
"queries": ["weather seattle", "seattle weather now"]
}
}"#,
None,
Some(WebSearchAction::Search {
query: Some("weather seattle".into()),
queries: Some(vec!["weather seattle".into(), "seattle weather now".into()]),
}),
Some("completed".into()),
true,
),
(
r#"{
"type": "web_search_call",
"status": "open",
"action": {
"type": "open_page",
"url": "https://example.com"
}
}"#,
None,
Some(WebSearchAction::OpenPage {
url: Some("https://example.com".into()),
}),
Some("open".into()),
true,
),
(
r#"{
"type": "web_search_call",
"status": "in_progress",
"action": {
"type": "find_in_page",
"url": "https://example.com/docs",
"pattern": "installation"
}
}"#,
None,
Some(WebSearchAction::FindInPage {
url: Some("https://example.com/docs".into()),
pattern: Some("installation".into()),
}),
Some("in_progress".into()),
true,
),
(
r#"{
"type": "web_search_call",
"status": "in_progress",
"id": "ws_partial"
}"#,
Some("ws_partial".into()),
None,
Some("in_progress".into()),
false,
),
];
for (json_literal, expected_id, expected_action, expected_status, expect_roundtrip) in cases
{
let parsed: ResponseItem = serde_json::from_str(json_literal)?;
let expected = ResponseItem::WebSearchCall {
id: expected_id.clone(),
status: expected_status.clone(),
action: expected_action.clone(),
};
assert_eq!(parsed, expected);
let serialized = serde_json::to_value(&parsed)?;
let mut expected_serialized: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(json_literal)?;
if !expect_roundtrip && let Some(obj) = expected_serialized.as_object_mut() {
obj.remove("id");
}
assert_eq!(serialized, expected_serialized);
}
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn wraps_image_user_input_with_tags() -> Result<()> {
let image_url = "".to_string();
let item = ResponseInputItem::from(vec![UserInput::Image {
image_url: image_url.clone(),
}]);
match item {
ResponseInputItem::Message { content, .. } => {
let expected = vec![
ContentItem::InputText {
text: image_open_tag_text(),
},
ContentItem::InputImage {
image_url,
detail: Some(DEFAULT_IMAGE_DETAIL),
},
ContentItem::InputText {
text: image_close_tag_text(),
},
];
assert_eq!(content, expected);
}
other => panic!("expected message response but got {other:?}"),
}
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn tool_search_call_roundtrips() -> Result<()> {
let parsed: ResponseItem = serde_json::from_str(
r#"{
"type": "tool_search_call",
"call_id": "search-1",
"execution": "client",
"arguments": {
"query": "calendar create",
"limit": 1
}
}"#,
)?;
assert_eq!(
parsed,
ResponseItem::ToolSearchCall {
id: None,
call_id: Some("search-1".to_string()),
status: None,
execution: "client".to_string(),
arguments: serde_json::json!({
"query": "calendar create",
"limit": 1,
}),
}
);
assert_eq!(
serde_json::to_value(&parsed)?,
serde_json::json!({
"type": "tool_search_call",
"call_id": "search-1",
"execution": "client",
"arguments": {
"query": "calendar create",
"limit": 1,
}
})
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn tool_search_output_roundtrips() -> Result<()> {
let input = ResponseInputItem::ToolSearchOutput {
call_id: "search-1".to_string(),
status: "completed".to_string(),
execution: "client".to_string(),
tools: vec![serde_json::json!({
"type": "function",
"name": "mcp__codex_apps__calendar_create_event",
"description": "Create a calendar event.",
"defer_loading": true,
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"title": {"type": "string"}
},
"required": ["title"],
"additionalProperties": false,
}
})],
};
assert_eq!(
ResponseItem::from(input.clone()),
ResponseItem::ToolSearchOutput {
call_id: Some("search-1".to_string()),
status: "completed".to_string(),
execution: "client".to_string(),
tools: vec![serde_json::json!({
"type": "function",
"name": "mcp__codex_apps__calendar_create_event",
"description": "Create a calendar event.",
"defer_loading": true,
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"title": {"type": "string"}
},
"required": ["title"],
"additionalProperties": false,
}
})],
}
);
assert_eq!(
serde_json::to_value(input)?,
serde_json::json!({
"type": "tool_search_output",
"call_id": "search-1",
"status": "completed",
"execution": "client",
"tools": [{
"type": "function",
"name": "mcp__codex_apps__calendar_create_event",
"description": "Create a calendar event.",
"defer_loading": true,
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"title": {"type": "string"}
},
"required": ["title"],
"additionalProperties": false,
}
}]
})
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn tool_search_server_items_allow_null_call_id() -> Result<()> {
let parsed_call: ResponseItem = serde_json::from_str(
r#"{
"type": "tool_search_call",
"execution": "server",
"call_id": null,
"status": "completed",
"arguments": {
"paths": ["crm"]
}
}"#,
)?;
assert_eq!(
parsed_call,
ResponseItem::ToolSearchCall {
id: None,
call_id: None,
status: Some("completed".to_string()),
execution: "server".to_string(),
arguments: serde_json::json!({
"paths": ["crm"],
}),
}
);
let parsed_output: ResponseItem = serde_json::from_str(
r#"{
"type": "tool_search_output",
"execution": "server",
"call_id": null,
"status": "completed",
"tools": []
}"#,
)?;
assert_eq!(
parsed_output,
ResponseItem::ToolSearchOutput {
call_id: None,
status: "completed".to_string(),
execution: "server".to_string(),
tools: vec![],
}
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn mixed_remote_and_local_images_share_label_sequence() -> Result<()> {
let image_url = "".to_string();
let dir = tempdir()?;
let local_path = dir.path().join("local.png");
// A tiny valid PNG (1x1) so this test doesn't depend on cross-crate file paths, which
// break under Bazel sandboxing.
const TINY_PNG_BYTES: &[u8] = &[
137, 80, 78, 71, 13, 10, 26, 10, 0, 0, 0, 13, 73, 72, 68, 82, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1,
8, 6, 0, 0, 0, 31, 21, 196, 137, 0, 0, 0, 11, 73, 68, 65, 84, 120, 156, 99, 96, 0, 2,
0, 0, 5, 0, 1, 122, 94, 171, 63, 0, 0, 0, 0, 73, 69, 78, 68, 174, 66, 96, 130,
];
std::fs::write(&local_path, TINY_PNG_BYTES)?;
let item = ResponseInputItem::from(vec![
UserInput::Image {
image_url: image_url.clone(),
},
UserInput::LocalImage { path: local_path },
]);
match item {
ResponseInputItem::Message { content, .. } => {
assert_eq!(
content.first(),
Some(&ContentItem::InputText {
text: image_open_tag_text(),
})
);
assert_eq!(
content.get(1),
Some(&ContentItem::InputImage {
image_url,
detail: Some(DEFAULT_IMAGE_DETAIL),
})
);
assert_eq!(
content.get(2),
Some(&ContentItem::InputText {
text: image_close_tag_text(),
})
);
assert_eq!(
content.get(3),
Some(&ContentItem::InputText {
text: local_image_open_tag_text(/*label_number*/ 2),
})
);
assert!(matches!(
content.get(4),
Some(ContentItem::InputImage { .. })
));
assert_eq!(
content.get(5),
Some(&ContentItem::InputText {
text: image_close_tag_text(),
})
);
}
other => panic!("expected message response but got {other:?}"),
}
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn local_image_read_error_adds_placeholder() -> Result<()> {
let dir = tempdir()?;
let missing_path = dir.path().join("missing-image.png");
let item = ResponseInputItem::from(vec![UserInput::LocalImage {
path: missing_path.clone(),
}]);
match item {
ResponseInputItem::Message { content, .. } => {
assert_eq!(content.len(), 1);
match &content[0] {
ContentItem::InputText { text } => {
let display_path = missing_path.display().to_string();
assert!(
text.contains(&display_path),
"placeholder should mention missing path: {text}"
);
assert!(
text.contains("could not read"),
"placeholder should mention read issue: {text}"
);
}
other => panic!("expected placeholder text but found {other:?}"),
}
}
other => panic!("expected message response but got {other:?}"),
}
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn local_image_non_image_adds_placeholder() -> Result<()> {
let dir = tempdir()?;
let json_path = dir.path().join("example.json");
std::fs::write(&json_path, br#"{"hello":"world"}"#)?;
let item = ResponseInputItem::from(vec![UserInput::LocalImage {
path: json_path.clone(),
}]);
match item {
ResponseInputItem::Message { content, .. } => {
assert_eq!(content.len(), 1);
match &content[0] {
ContentItem::InputText { text } => {
assert!(
text.contains("unsupported image `application/json`"),
"placeholder should mention unsupported image MIME: {text}"
);
assert!(
text.contains(&json_path.display().to_string()),
"placeholder should mention path: {text}"
);
}
other => panic!("expected placeholder text but found {other:?}"),
}
}
other => panic!("expected message response but got {other:?}"),
}
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn local_image_unsupported_image_format_adds_placeholder() -> Result<()> {
let dir = tempdir()?;
let svg_path = dir.path().join("example.svg");
std::fs::write(
&svg_path,
br#"<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="1" height="1"></svg>"#,
)?;
let item = ResponseInputItem::from(vec![UserInput::LocalImage {
path: svg_path.clone(),
}]);
match item {
ResponseInputItem::Message { content, .. } => {
assert_eq!(content.len(), 1);
let expected = format!(
"Codex cannot attach image at `{}`: unsupported image `image/svg+xml`.",
svg_path.display()
);
match &content[0] {
ContentItem::InputText { text } => assert_eq!(text, &expected),
other => panic!("expected placeholder text but found {other:?}"),
}
}
other => panic!("expected message response but got {other:?}"),
}
Ok(())
}
}