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## Why Runtime decisions should not infer permissions from the lossy legacy sandbox projection once `PermissionProfile` is available. In particular, `Disabled` and `External` need to remain distinct, and managed profiles with split filesystem or deny-read rules should not be collapsed before approval, network, safety, or analytics code makes decisions. ## What Changed - Changes managed network proxy setup and network approval logic to use `PermissionProfile` when deciding whether a managed sandbox is active. - Migrates patch safety, Guardian/user-shell approval paths, Landlock helper setup, analytics sandbox classification, and selected turn/session code to profile-backed permissions. - Validates command-level profile overrides against the constrained `PermissionProfile` rather than a strict `SandboxPolicy` round trip. - Preserves configured deny-read restrictions when command profiles are narrowed. - Adds coverage for profile-backed trust, network proxy/approval behavior, patch safety, analytics classification, and command-profile narrowing. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-core direct_write_roots` - `cargo test -p codex-core runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server requested_permissions_trust_project_uses_permission_profile_intent` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19393). * #19395 * #19394 * __->__ #19393
106 lines
3.9 KiB
Rust
106 lines
3.9 KiB
Rust
use crate::function_tool::FunctionCallError;
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use crate::safety::SafetyCheck;
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use crate::safety::assess_patch_safety;
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use crate::session::turn_context::TurnContext;
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use crate::tools::sandboxing::ExecApprovalRequirement;
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use codex_apply_patch::ApplyPatchAction;
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use codex_apply_patch::ApplyPatchFileChange;
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use codex_protocol::protocol::FileChange;
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use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::path::PathBuf;
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pub(crate) enum InternalApplyPatchInvocation {
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/// The `apply_patch` call was handled programmatically, without any sort
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/// of sandbox, because the user explicitly approved it. This is the
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/// result to use with the `shell` function call that contained `apply_patch`.
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Output(Result<String, FunctionCallError>),
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/// The `apply_patch` call was approved, either automatically because it
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/// appears that it should be allowed based on the user's sandbox policy
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/// *or* because the user explicitly approved it. The runtime realizes the
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/// patch through the selected environment filesystem.
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DelegateToRuntime(ApplyPatchRuntimeInvocation),
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}
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#[derive(Debug)]
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pub(crate) struct ApplyPatchRuntimeInvocation {
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pub(crate) action: ApplyPatchAction,
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pub(crate) auto_approved: bool,
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pub(crate) exec_approval_requirement: ExecApprovalRequirement,
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}
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pub(crate) async fn apply_patch(
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turn_context: &TurnContext,
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file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
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action: ApplyPatchAction,
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) -> InternalApplyPatchInvocation {
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match assess_patch_safety(
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&action,
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turn_context.approval_policy.value(),
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&turn_context.permission_profile(),
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file_system_sandbox_policy,
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&turn_context.cwd,
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turn_context.windows_sandbox_level,
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) {
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SafetyCheck::AutoApprove {
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user_explicitly_approved,
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..
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} => InternalApplyPatchInvocation::DelegateToRuntime(ApplyPatchRuntimeInvocation {
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action,
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auto_approved: !user_explicitly_approved,
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exec_approval_requirement: ExecApprovalRequirement::Skip {
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bypass_sandbox: false,
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proposed_execpolicy_amendment: None,
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},
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}),
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SafetyCheck::AskUser => {
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// Delegate the approval prompt (including cached approvals) to the
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// tool runtime, consistent with how shell/unified_exec approvals
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// are orchestrator-driven.
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InternalApplyPatchInvocation::DelegateToRuntime(ApplyPatchRuntimeInvocation {
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action,
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auto_approved: false,
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exec_approval_requirement: ExecApprovalRequirement::NeedsApproval {
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reason: None,
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proposed_execpolicy_amendment: None,
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},
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})
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}
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SafetyCheck::Reject { reason } => InternalApplyPatchInvocation::Output(Err(
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FunctionCallError::RespondToModel(format!("patch rejected: {reason}")),
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)),
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}
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}
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pub(crate) fn convert_apply_patch_to_protocol(
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action: &ApplyPatchAction,
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) -> HashMap<PathBuf, FileChange> {
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let changes = action.changes();
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let mut result = HashMap::with_capacity(changes.len());
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for (path, change) in changes {
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let protocol_change = match change {
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ApplyPatchFileChange::Add { content } => FileChange::Add {
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content: content.clone(),
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},
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ApplyPatchFileChange::Delete { content } => FileChange::Delete {
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content: content.clone(),
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},
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ApplyPatchFileChange::Update {
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unified_diff,
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move_path,
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new_content: _new_content,
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} => FileChange::Update {
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unified_diff: unified_diff.clone(),
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move_path: move_path.clone(),
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},
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};
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result.insert(path.clone(), protocol_change);
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}
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result
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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#[path = "apply_patch_tests.rs"]
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mod tests;
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