Files
codex/codex-rs/core/src/exec_tests.rs
iceweasel-oai 6b3d82daca Use a private desktop for Windows sandbox instead of Winsta0\Default (#14400)
## Summary
- launch Windows sandboxed children on a private desktop instead of
`Winsta0\Default`
- make private desktop the default while keeping
`windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false` as the escape hatch
- centralize process launch through the shared
`create_process_as_user(...)` path
- scope the private desktop ACL to the launching logon SID

## Why
Today sandboxed Windows commands run on the visible shared desktop. That
leaves an avoidable same-desktop attack surface for window interaction,
spoofing, and related UI/input issues. This change moves sandboxed
commands onto a dedicated per-launch desktop by default so the sandbox
no longer shares `Winsta0\Default` with the user session.

The implementation stays conservative on security with no silent
fallback back to `Winsta0\Default`

If private-desktop setup fails on a machine, users can still opt out
explicitly with `windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false`.

## Validation
- `cargo build -p codex-cli`
- elevated-path `codex exec` desktop-name probe returned
`CodexSandboxDesktop-*`
- elevated-path `codex exec` smoke sweep for shell commands, nested
`pwsh`, jobs, and hidden `notepad` launch
- unelevated-path full private-desktop compatibility sweep via `codex
exec` with `-c windows.sandbox=unelevated`
2026-03-13 10:13:39 -07:00

426 lines
13 KiB
Rust

use super::*;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
fn make_exec_output(
exit_code: i32,
stdout: &str,
stderr: &str,
aggregated: &str,
) -> ExecToolCallOutput {
ExecToolCallOutput {
exit_code,
stdout: StreamOutput::new(stdout.to_string()),
stderr: StreamOutput::new(stderr.to_string()),
aggregated_output: StreamOutput::new(aggregated.to_string()),
duration: Duration::from_millis(1),
timed_out: false,
}
}
#[test]
fn sandbox_detection_requires_keywords() {
let output = make_exec_output(1, "", "", "");
assert!(!is_likely_sandbox_denied(
SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp,
&output
));
}
#[test]
fn sandbox_detection_identifies_keyword_in_stderr() {
let output = make_exec_output(1, "", "Operation not permitted", "");
assert!(is_likely_sandbox_denied(SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp, &output));
}
#[test]
fn sandbox_detection_respects_quick_reject_exit_codes() {
let output = make_exec_output(127, "", "command not found", "");
assert!(!is_likely_sandbox_denied(
SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp,
&output
));
}
#[test]
fn sandbox_detection_ignores_non_sandbox_mode() {
let output = make_exec_output(1, "", "Operation not permitted", "");
assert!(!is_likely_sandbox_denied(SandboxType::None, &output));
}
#[test]
fn sandbox_detection_ignores_network_policy_text_in_non_sandbox_mode() {
let output = make_exec_output(
0,
"",
"",
r#"CODEX_NETWORK_POLICY_DECISION {"decision":"ask","reason":"not_allowed","source":"decider","protocol":"http","host":"google.com","port":80}"#,
);
assert!(!is_likely_sandbox_denied(SandboxType::None, &output));
}
#[test]
fn sandbox_detection_uses_aggregated_output() {
let output = make_exec_output(
101,
"",
"",
"cargo failed: Read-only file system when writing target",
);
assert!(is_likely_sandbox_denied(
SandboxType::MacosSeatbelt,
&output
));
}
#[test]
fn sandbox_detection_ignores_network_policy_text_with_zero_exit_code() {
let output = make_exec_output(
0,
"",
"",
r#"CODEX_NETWORK_POLICY_DECISION {"decision":"ask","source":"decider","protocol":"http","host":"google.com","port":80}"#,
);
assert!(!is_likely_sandbox_denied(
SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp,
&output
));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn read_capped_limits_retained_bytes() {
let (mut writer, reader) = tokio::io::duplex(1024);
let bytes = vec![b'a'; EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES.saturating_add(128 * 1024)];
tokio::spawn(async move {
writer.write_all(&bytes).await.expect("write");
});
let out = read_capped(reader, None, false).await.expect("read");
assert_eq!(out.text.len(), EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES);
}
#[test]
fn aggregate_output_prefers_stderr_on_contention() {
let stdout = StreamOutput {
text: vec![b'a'; EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES],
truncated_after_lines: None,
};
let stderr = StreamOutput {
text: vec![b'b'; EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES],
truncated_after_lines: None,
};
let aggregated = aggregate_output(&stdout, &stderr);
let stdout_cap = EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES / 3;
let stderr_cap = EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES.saturating_sub(stdout_cap);
assert_eq!(aggregated.text.len(), EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES);
assert_eq!(aggregated.text[..stdout_cap], vec![b'a'; stdout_cap]);
assert_eq!(aggregated.text[stdout_cap..], vec![b'b'; stderr_cap]);
}
#[test]
fn aggregate_output_fills_remaining_capacity_with_stderr() {
let stdout_len = EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES / 10;
let stdout = StreamOutput {
text: vec![b'a'; stdout_len],
truncated_after_lines: None,
};
let stderr = StreamOutput {
text: vec![b'b'; EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES],
truncated_after_lines: None,
};
let aggregated = aggregate_output(&stdout, &stderr);
let stderr_cap = EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES.saturating_sub(stdout_len);
assert_eq!(aggregated.text.len(), EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES);
assert_eq!(aggregated.text[..stdout_len], vec![b'a'; stdout_len]);
assert_eq!(aggregated.text[stdout_len..], vec![b'b'; stderr_cap]);
}
#[test]
fn aggregate_output_rebalances_when_stderr_is_small() {
let stdout = StreamOutput {
text: vec![b'a'; EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES],
truncated_after_lines: None,
};
let stderr = StreamOutput {
text: vec![b'b'; 1],
truncated_after_lines: None,
};
let aggregated = aggregate_output(&stdout, &stderr);
let stdout_len = EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES.saturating_sub(1);
assert_eq!(aggregated.text.len(), EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX_BYTES);
assert_eq!(aggregated.text[..stdout_len], vec![b'a'; stdout_len]);
assert_eq!(aggregated.text[stdout_len..], vec![b'b'; 1]);
}
#[test]
fn aggregate_output_keeps_stdout_then_stderr_when_under_cap() {
let stdout = StreamOutput {
text: vec![b'a'; 4],
truncated_after_lines: None,
};
let stderr = StreamOutput {
text: vec![b'b'; 3],
truncated_after_lines: None,
};
let aggregated = aggregate_output(&stdout, &stderr);
let mut expected = Vec::new();
expected.extend_from_slice(&stdout.text);
expected.extend_from_slice(&stderr.text);
assert_eq!(aggregated.text, expected);
assert_eq!(aggregated.truncated_after_lines, None);
}
#[test]
fn windows_restricted_token_skips_external_sandbox_policies() {
let policy = SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox {
network_access: codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkAccess::Restricted,
};
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![]);
assert_eq!(
should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
),
false
);
}
#[test]
fn windows_restricted_token_runs_for_legacy_restricted_policies() {
let policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![]);
assert_eq!(
should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
),
true
);
}
#[test]
fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_network_only_restrictions() {
let policy = SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox {
network_access: codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkAccess::Restricted,
};
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted();
assert_eq!(
unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
),
Some(
"windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system=Unrestricted, network=Restricted, legacy_policy=ExternalSandbox { network_access: Restricted }; refusing to run unsandboxed".to_string()
)
);
}
#[test]
fn windows_restricted_token_allows_legacy_restricted_policies() {
let policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![]);
assert_eq!(
unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
),
None
);
}
#[test]
fn windows_restricted_token_allows_legacy_workspace_write_policies() {
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
read_only_access: codex_protocol::protocol::ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess,
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
};
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&policy);
assert_eq!(
unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
),
None
);
}
#[test]
fn process_exec_tool_call_uses_platform_sandbox_for_network_only_restrictions() {
let expected = crate::get_platform_sandbox(false).unwrap_or(SandboxType::None);
assert_eq!(
select_process_exec_tool_sandbox_type(
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted(),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
false,
),
expected
);
}
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn sandbox_detection_flags_sigsys_exit_code() {
let exit_code = EXIT_CODE_SIGNAL_BASE + libc::SIGSYS;
let output = make_exec_output(exit_code, "", "", "");
assert!(is_likely_sandbox_denied(SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp, &output));
}
#[cfg(unix)]
#[tokio::test]
async fn kill_child_process_group_kills_grandchildren_on_timeout() -> Result<()> {
// On Linux/macOS, /bin/bash is typically present; on FreeBSD/OpenBSD,
// prefer /bin/sh to avoid NotFound errors.
#[cfg(any(target_os = "freebsd", target_os = "openbsd"))]
let command = vec![
"/bin/sh".to_string(),
"-c".to_string(),
"sleep 60 & echo $!; sleep 60".to_string(),
];
#[cfg(all(unix, not(any(target_os = "freebsd", target_os = "openbsd"))))]
let command = vec![
"/bin/bash".to_string(),
"-c".to_string(),
"sleep 60 & echo $!; sleep 60".to_string(),
];
let env: HashMap<String, String> = std::env::vars().collect();
let params = ExecParams {
command,
cwd: std::env::current_dir()?,
expiration: 500.into(),
env,
network: None,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
windows_sandbox_level: codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
windows_sandbox_private_desktop: false,
justification: None,
arg0: None,
};
let output = exec(
params,
SandboxType::None,
&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy()),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
None,
None,
)
.await?;
assert!(output.timed_out);
let stdout = output.stdout.from_utf8_lossy().text;
let pid_line = stdout.lines().next().unwrap_or("").trim();
let pid: i32 = pid_line.parse().map_err(|error| {
io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
format!("Failed to parse pid from stdout '{pid_line}': {error}"),
)
})?;
let mut killed = false;
for _ in 0..20 {
// Use kill(pid, 0) to check if the process is alive.
if unsafe { libc::kill(pid, 0) } == -1
&& let Some(libc::ESRCH) = std::io::Error::last_os_error().raw_os_error()
{
killed = true;
break;
}
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(100)).await;
}
assert!(killed, "grandchild process with pid {pid} is still alive");
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn process_exec_tool_call_respects_cancellation_token() -> Result<()> {
let command = long_running_command();
let cwd = std::env::current_dir()?;
let env: HashMap<String, String> = std::env::vars().collect();
let cancel_token = CancellationToken::new();
let cancel_tx = cancel_token.clone();
let params = ExecParams {
command,
cwd: cwd.clone(),
expiration: ExecExpiration::Cancellation(cancel_token),
env,
network: None,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
windows_sandbox_level: codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
windows_sandbox_private_desktop: false,
justification: None,
arg0: None,
};
tokio::spawn(async move {
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(1_000)).await;
cancel_tx.cancel();
});
let result = process_exec_tool_call(
params,
&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
cwd.as_path(),
&None,
false,
None,
)
.await;
let output = match result {
Err(CodexErr::Sandbox(SandboxErr::Timeout { output })) => output,
other => panic!("expected timeout error, got {other:?}"),
};
assert!(output.timed_out);
assert_eq!(output.exit_code, EXEC_TIMEOUT_EXIT_CODE);
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(unix)]
fn long_running_command() -> Vec<String> {
vec![
"/bin/sh".to_string(),
"-c".to_string(),
"sleep 30".to_string(),
]
}
#[cfg(windows)]
fn long_running_command() -> Vec<String> {
vec![
"powershell.exe".to_string(),
"-NonInteractive".to_string(),
"-NoLogo".to_string(),
"-Command".to_string(),
"Start-Sleep -Seconds 30".to_string(),
]
}