mirror of https://github.com/openai/codex.git synced 2026-04-28 08:34:54 +00:00

Files

viyatb-oai b114781495 fix(permissions): fix symlinked writable roots in sandbox permissions (#15981 )

## Summary
- preserve logical symlink paths during permission normalization and
config cwd handling
- bind real targets for symlinked readable/writable roots in bwrap and
remap carveouts and unreadable roots there
- add regressions for symlinked carveouts and nested symlink escape
masking

## Root cause
Permission normalization canonicalized symlinked writable roots and cwd
to their real targets too early. That drifted policy checks away from
the logical paths the sandboxed process can actually address, while
bwrap still needed the real targets for mounts. The mismatch caused
shell and apply_patch failures on symlinked writable roots.

## Impact
Fixes #15781.

Also fixes #17079:
- #17079 is the protected symlinked carveout side: bwrap now binds the
real symlinked writable-root target and remaps carveouts before masking.

Related to #15157:
- #15157 is the broader permission-check side of this path-identity
problem. This PR addresses the shared logical-vs-canonical normalization
issue, but the reported Darwin prompt behavior should be validated
separately before auto-closing it.

This should also fix #14672, #14694, #14715, and #15725:
- #14672, #14694, and #14715 are the same Linux
symlinked-writable-root/bwrap family as #15781.
- #15725 is the protected symlinked workspace path variant; the PR
preserves the protected logical path in policy space while bwrap applies
read-only or unreadable treatment to the resolved target so
file-vs-directory bind mismatches do not abort sandbox setup.

## Notes
- Added Linux-only regressions for symlinked writable ancestors and
protected symlinked directory targets, including nested symlink escape
masking without rebinding the escape target writable.

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

2026-04-10 17:00:58 -07:00

src

fix(permissions): fix symlinked writable roots in sandbox permissions (#15981 )

2026-04-10 17:00:58 -07:00

tests

Use AbsolutePathBuf for exec cwd plumbing (#17063 )

2026-04-08 10:54:12 -07:00

BUILD.bazel

build(linux-sandbox): always compile vendored bubblewrap on Linux; remove CODEX_BWRAP_ENABLE_FFI (#11498 )

2026-02-11 21:30:41 -08:00

build.rs

Add CODEX_SKIP_VENDORED_BWRAP (#16763 )

2026-04-03 20:24:49 -10:00

Cargo.toml

Refactor config types into a separate crate (#16962 )

2026-04-07 00:32:41 +00:00

config.h

build(linux-sandbox): always compile vendored bubblewrap on Linux; remove CODEX_BWRAP_ENABLE_FFI (#11498 )

2026-02-11 21:30:41 -08:00

README.md

fix: warn when bwrap cannot create user namespaces (#15893 )

2026-04-06 19:19:35 -07:00

README.md

codex-linux-sandbox

This crate is responsible for producing:

a codex-linux-sandbox standalone executable for Linux that is bundled with the Node.js version of the Codex CLI
a lib crate that exposes the business logic of the executable as run_main() so that
- the codex-exec CLI can check if its arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox and, if so, execute as if it were codex-linux-sandbox
- this should also be true of the codex multitool CLI

On Linux, the bubblewrap pipeline prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If bwrap is missing, the helper falls back to the vendored bubblewrap path compiled into this binary. Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bwrap is missing so users know it is falling back to the vendored helper. Codex surfaces the same startup warning path when bubblewrap cannot create user namespaces.

Current Behavior

Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs remain supported.
Bubblewrap is the default filesystem sandbox pipeline.
If bwrap is present on PATH outside the current working directory, the helper uses it.
If bwrap is present but too old to support --argv0, the helper uses a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec.
If bwrap is missing, the helper falls back to the vendored bubblewrap path.
If bwrap is missing, Codex also surfaces a startup warning instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper.
If bubblewrap cannot create user namespaces, Codex surfaces a startup warning instead of waiting for a runtime sandbox failure.
Legacy Landlock + mount protections remain available as an explicit legacy fallback path.
Set features.use_legacy_landlock = true (or CLI -c use_legacy_landlock=true) to force the legacy Landlock fallback.
The legacy Landlock fallback is used only when the split filesystem policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution.
Split-only filesystem policies that do not round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model stay on bubblewrap so nested read-only or denied carveouts are preserved.
When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, the helper applies PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS and a seccomp network filter in-process.
When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, the filesystem is read-only by default via --ro-bind / /.
When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, writable roots are layered with --bind <root> <root>.
When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, protected subpaths under writable roots (for example .git, resolved gitdir:, and .codex) are re-applied as read-only via --ro-bind.
When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, overlapping split-policy entries are applied in path-specificity order so narrower writable children can reopen broader read-only or denied parents while narrower denied subpaths still win. For example, /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write keeps /repo writable, denies /repo/a, and reopens /repo/a/b as writable again.
When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, symlink-in-path and non-existent protected paths inside writable roots are blocked by mounting /dev/null on the symlink or first missing component.
When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, the helper explicitly isolates the user namespace via --unshare-user and the PID namespace via --unshare-pid.
When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active and network is restricted without proxy routing, the helper also isolates the network namespace via --unshare-net.
In managed proxy mode, the helper uses --unshare-net plus an internal TCP->UDS->TCP routing bridge so tool traffic reaches only configured proxy endpoints.
In managed proxy mode, after the bridge is live, seccomp blocks new AF_UNIX/socketpair creation for the user command.
When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, it mounts a fresh /proc via --proc /proc by default, but you can skip this in restrictive container environments with --no-proc.

Notes

The CLI surface still uses legacy names like codex debug landlock.