Files
codex/codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/command_runner_win.rs
iceweasel-oai 6b3d82daca Use a private desktop for Windows sandbox instead of Winsta0\Default (#14400)
## Summary
- launch Windows sandboxed children on a private desktop instead of
`Winsta0\Default`
- make private desktop the default while keeping
`windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false` as the escape hatch
- centralize process launch through the shared
`create_process_as_user(...)` path
- scope the private desktop ACL to the launching logon SID

## Why
Today sandboxed Windows commands run on the visible shared desktop. That
leaves an avoidable same-desktop attack surface for window interaction,
spoofing, and related UI/input issues. This change moves sandboxed
commands onto a dedicated per-launch desktop by default so the sandbox
no longer shares `Winsta0\Default` with the user session.

The implementation stays conservative on security with no silent
fallback back to `Winsta0\Default`

If private-desktop setup fails on a machine, users can still opt out
explicitly with `windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false`.

## Validation
- `cargo build -p codex-cli`
- elevated-path `codex exec` desktop-name probe returned
`CodexSandboxDesktop-*`
- elevated-path `codex exec` smoke sweep for shell commands, nested
`pwsh`, jobs, and hidden `notepad` launch
- unelevated-path full private-desktop compatibility sweep via `codex
exec` with `-c windows.sandbox=unelevated`
2026-03-13 10:13:39 -07:00

326 lines
11 KiB
Rust

#![cfg(target_os = "windows")]
use anyhow::Context;
use anyhow::Result;
use codex_windows_sandbox::allow_null_device;
use codex_windows_sandbox::convert_string_sid_to_sid;
use codex_windows_sandbox::create_process_as_user;
use codex_windows_sandbox::create_readonly_token_with_caps_from;
use codex_windows_sandbox::create_workspace_write_token_with_caps_from;
use codex_windows_sandbox::get_current_token_for_restriction;
use codex_windows_sandbox::hide_current_user_profile_dir;
use codex_windows_sandbox::log_note;
use codex_windows_sandbox::parse_policy;
use codex_windows_sandbox::to_wide;
use codex_windows_sandbox::SandboxPolicy;
use serde::Deserialize;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::ffi::c_void;
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::CloseHandle;
use windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::GetLastError;
use windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::LocalFree;
use windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::HANDLE;
use windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::HLOCAL;
use windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::CreateFileW;
use windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::FILE_GENERIC_READ;
use windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::FILE_GENERIC_WRITE;
use windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::OPEN_EXISTING;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Diagnostics::Debug::SetErrorMode;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::JobObjects::AssignProcessToJobObject;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::JobObjects::CreateJobObjectW;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::JobObjects::JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::JobObjects::SetInformationJobObject;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::JobObjects::JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::JobObjects::JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Threading::TerminateProcess;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Threading::WaitForSingleObject;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Threading::INFINITE;
#[path = "cwd_junction.rs"]
mod cwd_junction;
#[allow(dead_code)]
mod read_acl_mutex;
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
struct RunnerRequest {
policy_json_or_preset: String,
// Writable location for logs (sandbox user's .codex).
codex_home: PathBuf,
// Real user's CODEX_HOME for shared data (caps, config).
real_codex_home: PathBuf,
cap_sids: Vec<String>,
command: Vec<String>,
cwd: PathBuf,
env_map: HashMap<String, String>,
timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
use_private_desktop: bool,
stdin_pipe: String,
stdout_pipe: String,
stderr_pipe: String,
}
const WAIT_TIMEOUT: u32 = 0x0000_0102;
unsafe fn create_job_kill_on_close() -> Result<HANDLE> {
let h = CreateJobObjectW(std::ptr::null_mut(), std::ptr::null());
if h == 0 {
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("CreateJobObjectW failed"));
}
let mut limits: JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION = std::mem::zeroed();
limits.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags = JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE;
let ok = SetInformationJobObject(
h,
JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation,
&mut limits as *mut _ as *mut _,
std::mem::size_of::<JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION>() as u32,
);
if ok == 0 {
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("SetInformationJobObject failed"));
}
Ok(h)
}
fn read_request_file(req_path: &Path) -> Result<String> {
let content = std::fs::read_to_string(req_path)
.with_context(|| format!("read request file {}", req_path.display()));
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(req_path);
content
}
pub fn main() -> Result<()> {
let mut input = String::new();
let mut args = std::env::args().skip(1);
if let Some(first) = args.next() {
if let Some(rest) = first.strip_prefix("--request-file=") {
let req_path = PathBuf::from(rest);
input = read_request_file(&req_path)?;
}
}
if input.is_empty() {
anyhow::bail!("runner: no request-file provided");
}
let req: RunnerRequest = serde_json::from_str(&input).context("parse runner request json")?;
let log_dir = Some(req.codex_home.as_path());
hide_current_user_profile_dir(req.codex_home.as_path());
// Suppress Windows error UI from sandboxed child crashes so callers only observe exit codes.
let _ = unsafe { SetErrorMode(0x0001 | 0x0002) }; // SEM_FAILCRITICALERRORS | SEM_NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
log_note(
&format!(
"runner start cwd={} cmd={:?} real_codex_home={}",
req.cwd.display(),
req.command,
req.real_codex_home.display()
),
Some(&req.codex_home),
);
let policy = parse_policy(&req.policy_json_or_preset).context("parse policy_json_or_preset")?;
if !policy.has_full_disk_read_access() {
anyhow::bail!(
"Restricted read-only access is not yet supported by the Windows sandbox backend"
);
}
let mut cap_psids: Vec<*mut c_void> = Vec::new();
for sid in &req.cap_sids {
let Some(psid) = (unsafe { convert_string_sid_to_sid(sid) }) else {
anyhow::bail!("ConvertStringSidToSidW failed for capability SID");
};
cap_psids.push(psid);
}
if cap_psids.is_empty() {
anyhow::bail!("runner: empty capability SID list");
}
// Create restricted token from current process token.
let base = unsafe { get_current_token_for_restriction()? };
let token_res: Result<HANDLE> = unsafe {
match &policy {
SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly { .. } => {
create_readonly_token_with_caps_from(base, &cap_psids)
}
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. } => {
create_workspace_write_token_with_caps_from(base, &cap_psids)
}
SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess | SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { .. } => {
unreachable!()
}
}
};
let h_token = token_res?;
unsafe {
CloseHandle(base);
}
unsafe {
for psid in &cap_psids {
allow_null_device(*psid);
}
for psid in cap_psids {
if !psid.is_null() {
LocalFree(psid as HLOCAL);
}
}
}
// Open named pipes for stdio.
let open_pipe = |name: &str, access: u32| -> Result<HANDLE> {
let path = to_wide(name);
let handle = unsafe {
CreateFileW(
path.as_ptr(),
access,
0,
std::ptr::null_mut(),
OPEN_EXISTING,
0,
0,
)
};
if handle == windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE {
let err = unsafe { GetLastError() };
log_note(
&format!("CreateFileW failed for pipe {name}: {err}"),
Some(&req.codex_home),
);
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("CreateFileW failed for pipe {name}: {err}"));
}
Ok(handle)
};
let h_stdin = open_pipe(&req.stdin_pipe, FILE_GENERIC_READ)?;
let h_stdout = open_pipe(&req.stdout_pipe, FILE_GENERIC_WRITE)?;
let h_stderr = open_pipe(&req.stderr_pipe, FILE_GENERIC_WRITE)?;
let stdio = Some((h_stdin, h_stdout, h_stderr));
// While the read-ACL helper is running, PowerShell can fail to start in the requested CWD due
// to unreadable ancestors. Use a junction CWD for that window; once the helper finishes, go
// back to using the real requested CWD (no probing, no extra state).
let use_junction = match read_acl_mutex::read_acl_mutex_exists() {
Ok(exists) => exists,
Err(err) => {
// Fail-safe: if we can't determine the state, assume the helper might be running and
// use the junction path to avoid CWD failures on unreadable ancestors.
log_note(
&format!("junction: read_acl_mutex_exists failed: {err}; assuming read ACL helper is running"),
log_dir,
);
true
}
};
if use_junction {
log_note(
"junction: read ACL helper running; using junction CWD",
log_dir,
);
}
let effective_cwd = if use_junction {
cwd_junction::create_cwd_junction(&req.cwd, log_dir).unwrap_or_else(|| req.cwd.clone())
} else {
req.cwd.clone()
};
log_note(
&format!(
"runner: effective cwd={} (requested {})",
effective_cwd.display(),
req.cwd.display()
),
log_dir,
);
// Build command and env, spawn with CreateProcessAsUserW.
let spawn_result = unsafe {
create_process_as_user(
h_token,
&req.command,
&effective_cwd,
&req.env_map,
Some(&req.codex_home),
stdio,
req.use_private_desktop,
)
};
let created = match spawn_result {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => {
log_note(&format!("runner: spawn failed: {e:?}"), log_dir);
unsafe {
CloseHandle(h_stdin);
CloseHandle(h_stdout);
CloseHandle(h_stderr);
CloseHandle(h_token);
}
return Err(e);
}
};
let proc_info = created.process_info;
let _desktop = created;
// Optional job kill on close.
let h_job = unsafe { create_job_kill_on_close().ok() };
if let Some(job) = h_job {
unsafe {
let _ = AssignProcessToJobObject(job, proc_info.hProcess);
}
}
// Wait for process.
let wait_res = unsafe {
WaitForSingleObject(
proc_info.hProcess,
req.timeout_ms.map(|ms| ms as u32).unwrap_or(INFINITE),
)
};
let timed_out = wait_res == WAIT_TIMEOUT;
let exit_code: i32;
unsafe {
if timed_out {
let _ = TerminateProcess(proc_info.hProcess, 1);
exit_code = 128 + 64;
} else {
let mut raw_exit: u32 = 1;
windows_sys::Win32::System::Threading::GetExitCodeProcess(
proc_info.hProcess,
&mut raw_exit,
);
exit_code = raw_exit as i32;
}
if proc_info.hThread != 0 {
CloseHandle(proc_info.hThread);
}
if proc_info.hProcess != 0 {
CloseHandle(proc_info.hProcess);
}
CloseHandle(h_stdin);
CloseHandle(h_stdout);
CloseHandle(h_stderr);
CloseHandle(h_token);
if let Some(job) = h_job {
CloseHandle(job);
}
}
if exit_code != 0 {
eprintln!("runner child exited with code {}", exit_code);
}
std::process::exit(exit_code);
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::read_request_file;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use std::fs;
#[test]
fn removes_request_file_after_read() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
let req_path = dir.path().join("request.json");
fs::write(&req_path, "{\"ok\":true}").expect("write request");
let content = read_request_file(&req_path).expect("read request");
assert_eq!(content, "{\"ok\":true}");
assert!(!req_path.exists(), "request file should be removed");
}
}