mirror of
https://github.com/openai/codex.git
synced 2026-02-01 22:47:52 +00:00
a7e3e37da8
This changes our default Landlock policy to allow `sendmsg(2)` and `recvmsg(2)` syscalls. We believe these were originally denied out of an abundance of caution, but given that `send(2)` nor `recv(2)` are allowed today [which provide comparable capability to the `*msg` equivalents], we do not believe allowing them grants any privileges beyond what we already allow. Rather than using the syscall as the security boundary, preventing access to the potentially hazardous file descriptor in the first place seems like the right layer of defense. In particular, this makes it possible for `shell-tool-mcp` to run on Linux when using a read-only sandbox for the Bash process, as demonstrated by `accept_elicitation_for_prompt_rule()` now succeeding in CI.