Files
codex/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/request_permissions.rs
Michael Bolin bfff0c729f config: enforce enterprise feature requirements (#13388)
## Why

Enterprises can already constrain approvals, sandboxing, and web search
through `requirements.toml` and MDM, but feature flags were still only
configurable as managed defaults. That meant an enterprise could suggest
feature values, but it could not actually pin them.

This change closes that gap and makes enterprise feature requirements
behave like the other constrained settings. The effective feature set
now stays consistent with enterprise requirements during config load,
when config writes are validated, and when runtime code mutates feature
flags later in the session.

It also tightens the runtime API for managed features. `ManagedFeatures`
now follows the same constraint-oriented shape as `Constrained<T>`
instead of exposing panic-prone mutation helpers, and production code
can no longer construct it through an unconstrained `From<Features>`
path.

The PR also hardens the `compact_resume_fork` integration coverage on
Windows. After the feature-management changes,
`compact_resume_after_second_compaction_preserves_history` was
overflowing the libtest/Tokio thread stacks on Windows, so the test now
uses an explicit larger-stack harness as a pragmatic mitigation. That
may not be the ideal root-cause fix, and it merits a parallel
investigation into whether part of the async future chain should be
boxed to reduce stack pressure instead.

## What Changed

Enterprises can now pin feature values in `requirements.toml` with the
requirements-side `features` table:

```toml
[features]
personality = true
unified_exec = false
```

Only canonical feature keys are allowed in the requirements `features`
table; omitted keys remain unconstrained.

- Added a requirements-side pinned feature map to
`ConfigRequirementsToml`, threaded it through source-preserving
requirements merge and normalization in `codex-config`, and made the
TOML surface use `[features]` (while still accepting legacy
`[feature_requirements]` for compatibility).
- Exposed `featureRequirements` from `configRequirements/read`,
regenerated the JSON/TypeScript schema artifacts, and updated the
app-server README.
- Wrapped the effective feature set in `ManagedFeatures`, backed by
`ConstrainedWithSource<Features>`, and changed its API to mirror
`Constrained<T>`: `can_set(...)`, `set(...) -> ConstraintResult<()>`,
and result-returning `enable` / `disable` / `set_enabled` helpers.
- Removed the legacy-usage and bulk-map passthroughs from
`ManagedFeatures`; callers that need those behaviors now mutate a plain
`Features` value and reapply it through `set(...)`, so the constrained
wrapper remains the enforcement boundary.
- Removed the production loophole for constructing unconstrained
`ManagedFeatures`. Non-test code now creates it through the configured
feature-loading path, and `impl From<Features> for ManagedFeatures` is
restricted to `#[cfg(test)]`.
- Rejected legacy feature aliases in enterprise feature requirements,
and return a load error when a pinned combination cannot survive
dependency normalization.
- Validated config writes against enterprise feature requirements before
persisting changes, including explicit conflicting writes and
profile-specific feature states that normalize into invalid
combinations.
- Updated runtime and TUI feature-toggle paths to use the constrained
setter API and to persist or apply the effective post-constraint value
rather than the requested value.
- Updated the `core_test_support` Bazel target to include the bundled
core model-catalog fixtures in its runtime data, so helper code that
resolves `core/models.json` through runfiles works in remote Bazel test
environments.
- Renamed the core config test coverage to emphasize that effective
feature values are normalized at runtime, while conflicting persisted
config writes are rejected.
- Ran `compact_resume_after_second_compaction_preserves_history` inside
an explicit 8 MiB test thread and Tokio runtime worker stack, following
the existing larger-stack integration-test pattern, to keep the Windows
`compact_resume_fork` test slice from aborting while a parallel
investigation continues into whether some of the underlying async
futures should be boxed.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-config`
- `cargo test -p codex-core feature_requirements_ -- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
load_requirements_toml_produces_expected_constraints -- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
compact_resume_after_second_compaction_preserves_history -- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-core compact_resume_fork -- --nocapture`
- Re-ran the built `codex-core` `tests/all` binary with
`RUST_MIN_STACK=262144` for
`compact_resume_after_second_compaction_preserves_history` to confirm
the explicit-stack harness fixes the deterministic low-stack repro.
- `cargo test -p codex-core`
- This still fails locally in unrelated integration areas that expect
the `codex` / `test_stdio_server` binaries or hit existing `search_tool`
wiremock mismatches.

## Docs

`developers.openai.com/codex` should document the requirements-side
`[features]` table for enterprise and MDM-managed configuration,
including that it only accepts canonical feature keys and that
conflicting config writes are rejected.
2026-03-04 04:40:22 +00:00

756 lines
25 KiB
Rust

#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]
use anyhow::Result;
use codex_core::config::Constrained;
use codex_core::features::Feature;
use codex_core::sandboxing::SandboxPermissions;
use codex_protocol::models::FileSystemPermissions;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
use codex_protocol::protocol::EventMsg;
use codex_protocol::protocol::ExecApprovalRequestEvent;
use codex_protocol::protocol::Op;
use codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewDecision;
use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::user_input::UserInput;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_assistant_message;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_completed;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_function_call;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_response_created;
use core_test_support::responses::mount_sse_once;
use core_test_support::responses::sse;
use core_test_support::responses::start_mock_server;
use core_test_support::skip_if_no_network;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use core_test_support::skip_if_sandbox;
use core_test_support::test_codex::TestCodex;
use core_test_support::test_codex::test_codex;
use core_test_support::wait_for_event;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use regex_lite::Regex;
use serde_json::Value;
use serde_json::json;
use std::fs;
use std::path::Path;
fn absolute_path(path: &Path) -> AbsolutePathBuf {
AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(path).expect("absolute path")
}
struct CommandResult {
exit_code: Option<i64>,
stdout: String,
}
fn parse_result(item: &Value) -> CommandResult {
let output_str = item
.get("output")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.expect("shell output payload");
match serde_json::from_str::<Value>(output_str) {
Ok(parsed) => {
let exit_code = parsed["metadata"]["exit_code"].as_i64();
let stdout = parsed["output"].as_str().unwrap_or_default().to_string();
CommandResult { exit_code, stdout }
}
Err(_) => {
let structured = Regex::new(r"(?s)^Exit code:\s*(-?\d+).*?Output:\n(.*)$").unwrap();
let regex =
Regex::new(r"(?s)^.*?Process exited with code (\d+)\n.*?Output:\n(.*)$").unwrap();
if let Some(captures) = structured.captures(output_str) {
let exit_code = captures.get(1).unwrap().as_str().parse::<i64>().unwrap();
let output = captures.get(2).unwrap().as_str();
CommandResult {
exit_code: Some(exit_code),
stdout: output.to_string(),
}
} else if let Some(captures) = regex.captures(output_str) {
let exit_code = captures.get(1).unwrap().as_str().parse::<i64>().unwrap();
let output = captures.get(2).unwrap().as_str();
CommandResult {
exit_code: Some(exit_code),
stdout: output.to_string(),
}
} else {
CommandResult {
exit_code: None,
stdout: output_str.to_string(),
}
}
}
}
}
fn shell_event_with_request_permissions(
call_id: &str,
command: &str,
additional_permissions: &PermissionProfile,
) -> Result<Value> {
let args = json!({
"command": command,
"timeout_ms": 1_000_u64,
"sandbox_permissions": SandboxPermissions::WithAdditionalPermissions,
"additional_permissions": additional_permissions,
});
let args_str = serde_json::to_string(&args)?;
Ok(ev_function_call(call_id, "shell_command", &args_str))
}
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
fn shell_event_with_raw_request_permissions(
call_id: &str,
command: &str,
workdir: Option<&str>,
additional_permissions: Value,
) -> Result<Value> {
let args = json!({
"command": command,
"workdir": workdir,
"timeout_ms": 1_000_u64,
"sandbox_permissions": SandboxPermissions::WithAdditionalPermissions,
"additional_permissions": additional_permissions,
});
let args_str = serde_json::to_string(&args)?;
Ok(ev_function_call(call_id, "shell_command", &args_str))
}
async fn submit_turn(
test: &TestCodex,
prompt: &str,
approval_policy: AskForApproval,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
) -> Result<()> {
let session_model = test.session_configured.model.clone();
test.codex
.submit(Op::UserTurn {
items: vec![UserInput::Text {
text: prompt.into(),
text_elements: Vec::new(),
}],
final_output_json_schema: None,
cwd: test.cwd.path().to_path_buf(),
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy,
model: session_model,
effort: None,
summary: None,
service_tier: None,
collaboration_mode: None,
personality: None,
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn wait_for_completion(test: &TestCodex) {
wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
matches!(event, EventMsg::TurnComplete(_))
})
.await;
}
async fn expect_exec_approval(
test: &TestCodex,
expected_command: &str,
) -> ExecApprovalRequestEvent {
let event = wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
matches!(
event,
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
)
})
.await;
match event {
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(approval) => {
let last_arg = approval
.command
.last()
.map(String::as_str)
.unwrap_or_default();
assert_eq!(last_arg, expected_command);
approval
}
EventMsg::TurnComplete(_) => panic!("expected approval request before completion"),
other => panic!("unexpected event: {other:?}"),
}
}
fn workspace_write_excluding_tmp() -> SandboxPolicy {
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
read_only_access: Default::default(),
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
}
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
async fn with_additional_permissions_requires_approval_under_on_request() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
skip_if_sandbox!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy_for_config);
config
.features
.enable(Feature::RequestPermissions)
.expect("test config should allow feature update");
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let requested_write = test.workspace_path("requested-but-unused.txt");
let _ = fs::remove_file(&requested_write);
let call_id = "request_permissions_skip_approval";
let command = "touch requested-but-unused.txt";
let requested_permissions = PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
read: Some(vec![]),
write: Some(vec![absolute_path(&requested_write)]),
}),
..Default::default()
};
let event = shell_event_with_request_permissions(call_id, command, &requested_permissions)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(&test, call_id, approval_policy, sandbox_policy.clone()).await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, command).await;
assert_eq!(
approval.additional_permissions,
Some(requested_permissions.clone())
);
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
let result = parse_result(&results.single_request().function_call_output(call_id));
assert!(
result.exit_code.is_none() || result.exit_code == Some(0),
"unexpected exit code/output: {:?} {}",
result.exit_code,
result.stdout
);
assert!(
requested_write.exists(),
"touch command should create requested path"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
async fn relative_additional_permissions_resolve_against_tool_workdir() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
skip_if_sandbox!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy_for_config);
config
.features
.enable(Feature::RequestPermissions)
.expect("test config should allow feature update");
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let nested_dir = test.workspace_path("nested");
fs::create_dir_all(&nested_dir)?;
let requested_write = nested_dir.join("relative-write.txt");
let _ = fs::remove_file(&requested_write);
let call_id = "request_permissions_relative_workdir";
let command = "touch relative-write.txt";
let expected_permissions = PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
read: None,
write: Some(vec![absolute_path(&requested_write)]),
}),
..Default::default()
};
let event = shell_event_with_raw_request_permissions(
call_id,
command,
Some("nested"),
json!({
"file_system": {
"write": ["./relative-write.txt"],
},
}),
)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-relative-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-relative-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-relative-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-relative-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(&test, call_id, approval_policy, sandbox_policy.clone()).await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, command).await;
assert_eq!(
approval.additional_permissions,
Some(expected_permissions.clone())
);
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
let result = parse_result(&results.single_request().function_call_output(call_id));
assert!(
result.exit_code.is_none() || result.exit_code == Some(0),
"unexpected exit code/output: {:?} {}",
result.exit_code,
result.stdout
);
assert!(
requested_write.exists(),
"touch command should create requested path"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
async fn read_only_with_additional_permissions_widens_to_unrequested_cwd_write() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
skip_if_sandbox!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy_for_config);
config
.features
.enable(Feature::RequestPermissions)
.expect("test config should allow feature update");
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let requested_write = test.workspace_path("requested-only-cwd.txt");
let unrequested_write = test.workspace_path("unrequested-cwd-write.txt");
let _ = fs::remove_file(&requested_write);
let _ = fs::remove_file(&unrequested_write);
let call_id = "request_permissions_cwd_widening";
let command = format!(
"printf {:?} > {:?} && cat {:?}",
"cwd-widened", unrequested_write, unrequested_write
);
let requested_permissions = PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
read: Some(vec![]),
write: Some(vec![absolute_path(&requested_write)]),
}),
..Default::default()
};
let event = shell_event_with_request_permissions(call_id, &command, &requested_permissions)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-cwd-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-cwd-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-cwd-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-cwd-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(&test, call_id, approval_policy, sandbox_policy.clone()).await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, &command).await;
assert_eq!(
approval.additional_permissions,
Some(requested_permissions.clone())
);
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
let result = parse_result(&results.single_request().function_call_output(call_id));
assert!(
result.exit_code.is_none() || result.exit_code == Some(0),
"unexpected exit code/output: {:?} {}",
result.exit_code,
result.stdout
);
assert!(result.stdout.contains("cwd-widened"));
assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(&unrequested_write)?, "cwd-widened");
assert!(
!requested_write.exists(),
"only the unrequested cwd path should have been written"
);
let _ = fs::remove_file(unrequested_write);
let _ = fs::remove_file(requested_write);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
async fn read_only_with_additional_permissions_widens_to_unrequested_tmp_write() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
skip_if_sandbox!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy_for_config);
config
.features
.enable(Feature::RequestPermissions)
.expect("test config should allow feature update");
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let requested_write = test.workspace_path("requested-only-tmp.txt");
let tmp_dir = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let tmp_write = tmp_dir.path().join("tmp-widening.txt");
let _ = fs::remove_file(&requested_write);
let _ = fs::remove_file(&tmp_write);
let call_id = "request_permissions_tmp_widening";
let command = format!(
"printf {:?} > {:?} && cat {:?}",
"tmp-widened", tmp_write, tmp_write
);
let requested_permissions = PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
read: Some(vec![]),
write: Some(vec![absolute_path(&requested_write)]),
}),
..Default::default()
};
let event = shell_event_with_request_permissions(call_id, &command, &requested_permissions)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-tmp-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-tmp-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-tmp-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-tmp-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(&test, call_id, approval_policy, sandbox_policy.clone()).await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, &command).await;
assert_eq!(
approval.additional_permissions,
Some(requested_permissions.clone())
);
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
let result = parse_result(&results.single_request().function_call_output(call_id));
assert!(
result.exit_code.is_none() || result.exit_code == Some(0),
"unexpected exit code/output: {:?} {}",
result.exit_code,
result.stdout
);
assert!(result.stdout.contains("tmp-widened"));
assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(&tmp_write)?, "tmp-widened");
assert!(
!requested_write.exists(),
"only the unrequested tmp path should have been written"
);
let _ = fs::remove_file(tmp_write);
let _ = fs::remove_file(requested_write);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
async fn workspace_write_with_additional_permissions_can_write_outside_cwd() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
skip_if_sandbox!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let sandbox_policy = workspace_write_excluding_tmp();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy_for_config);
config
.features
.enable(Feature::RequestPermissions)
.expect("test config should allow feature update");
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let outside_dir = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let outside_write = outside_dir.path().join("workspace-write-outside.txt");
let placeholder = test.workspace_path("workspace-write-placeholder.txt");
let _ = fs::remove_file(&outside_write);
let _ = fs::remove_file(&placeholder);
let call_id = "request_permissions_workspace_write_outside";
let command = format!(
"printf {:?} > {:?} && cat {:?}",
"outside-cwd-ok", outside_write, outside_write
);
let requested_permissions = PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
read: Some(vec![]),
write: Some(vec![absolute_path(outside_dir.path())]),
}),
..Default::default()
};
let normalized_requested_permissions = PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
read: Some(vec![]),
write: Some(vec![AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(
outside_dir.path().canonicalize()?,
)?]),
}),
..Default::default()
};
let event = shell_event_with_request_permissions(call_id, &command, &requested_permissions)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-ww-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-ww-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-ww-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-ww-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(&test, call_id, approval_policy, sandbox_policy.clone()).await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, &command).await;
assert_eq!(
approval.additional_permissions,
Some(normalized_requested_permissions)
);
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
let result = parse_result(&results.single_request().function_call_output(call_id));
assert!(
result.exit_code.is_none() || result.exit_code == Some(0),
"unexpected exit code/output: {:?} {}",
result.exit_code,
result.stdout
);
assert!(result.stdout.contains("outside-cwd-ok"));
assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(&outside_write)?, "outside-cwd-ok");
assert!(
!placeholder.exists(),
"placeholder path should remain untouched"
);
let _ = fs::remove_file(outside_write);
let _ = fs::remove_file(placeholder);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn with_additional_permissions_denied_approval_blocks_execution() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let sandbox_policy = workspace_write_excluding_tmp();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy_for_config);
config
.features
.enable(Feature::RequestPermissions)
.expect("test config should allow feature update");
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let outside_dir = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let outside_write = outside_dir.path().join("workspace-write-denied.txt");
let _ = fs::remove_file(&outside_write);
let call_id = "request_permissions_denied";
let command = format!(
"printf {:?} > {:?} && cat {:?}",
"should-not-write", outside_write, outside_write
);
let requested_permissions = PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
read: Some(vec![]),
write: Some(vec![absolute_path(outside_dir.path())]),
}),
..Default::default()
};
let normalized_requested_permissions = PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
read: Some(vec![]),
write: Some(vec![AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(
outside_dir.path().canonicalize()?,
)?]),
}),
..Default::default()
};
let event = shell_event_with_request_permissions(call_id, &command, &requested_permissions)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-denied-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-denied-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-denied-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-denied-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(&test, call_id, approval_policy, sandbox_policy.clone()).await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, &command).await;
assert_eq!(
approval.additional_permissions,
Some(normalized_requested_permissions)
);
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
let result = parse_result(&results.single_request().function_call_output(call_id));
assert_ne!(
result.exit_code,
Some(0),
"denied command should not succeed"
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains("rejected by user"),
"unexpected denial output: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
!outside_write.exists(),
"denied command should not create file"
);
let _ = fs::remove_file(outside_write);
Ok(())
}