Files
codex/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main_tests.rs
viyatb-oai 774965f1e8 fix: preserve split filesystem semantics in linux sandbox (#14173)
## Stack

   fix: fail closed for unsupported split windows sandboxing #14172
-> fix: preserve split filesystem semantics in linux sandbox #14173
   fix: align core approvals with split sandbox policies #14171
   refactor: centralize filesystem permissions precedence #14174

## Summary
## Summary
- Preserve Linux split filesystem carveouts in bubblewrap by applying
mount masks in the right order, so narrower rules still win under
broader writable roots.
- Preserve unreadable ancestors of writable roots by masking them first
and then rebinding the narrower writable descendants.
- Stop rejecting legacy-plus-split Linux configs that are
sandbox-equivalent after `cwd` resolution by comparing semantics instead
of raw legacy structs.
- Fail closed when callers provide partial split policies, mismatched
legacy-plus-split policies, or force `--use-legacy-landlock` for
split-only shapes that legacy Landlock cannot enforce.
- Add Linux regressions for overlapping writable, read-only, and denied
paths, and document the supported split-policy enforcement path.

## Example
Given a split filesystem policy like:

```toml
[permissions.dev.filesystem]
":root" = "read"
"/code" = "write"
"/code/.git" = "read"
"/code/secrets" = "none"
"/code/secrets/tmp" = "write"
```

this PR makes Linux enforce the intended result under bubblewrap:

- `/code` stays writable
- `/code/.git` stays read-only
- `/code/secrets` stays denied
- `/code/secrets/tmp` can still be reopened as writable if explicitly
allowed

Before this, Linux could lose one of those carveouts depending on mount
order or legacy-policy fallback. This PR keeps the split-policy
semantics intact and rejects configurations that legacy Landlock cannot
represent safely.
2026-03-12 10:56:32 -07:00

430 lines
15 KiB
Rust

#[cfg(test)]
use super::*;
#[cfg(test)]
use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
#[cfg(test)]
use codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
#[cfg(test)]
use codex_protocol::protocol::ReadOnlyAccess;
#[cfg(test)]
use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
#[cfg(test)]
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
#[cfg(test)]
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
#[test]
fn detects_proc_mount_invalid_argument_failure() {
let stderr = "bwrap: Can't mount proc on /newroot/proc: Invalid argument";
assert!(is_proc_mount_failure(stderr));
}
#[test]
fn detects_proc_mount_operation_not_permitted_failure() {
let stderr = "bwrap: Can't mount proc on /newroot/proc: Operation not permitted";
assert!(is_proc_mount_failure(stderr));
}
#[test]
fn detects_proc_mount_permission_denied_failure() {
let stderr = "bwrap: Can't mount proc on /newroot/proc: Permission denied";
assert!(is_proc_mount_failure(stderr));
}
#[test]
fn ignores_non_proc_mount_errors() {
let stderr = "bwrap: Can't bind mount /dev/null: Operation not permitted";
assert!(!is_proc_mount_failure(stderr));
}
#[test]
fn inserts_bwrap_argv0_before_command_separator() {
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let argv = build_bwrap_argv(
vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
Path::new("/"),
BwrapOptions {
mount_proc: true,
network_mode: BwrapNetworkMode::FullAccess,
},
)
.args;
assert_eq!(
argv,
vec![
"bwrap".to_string(),
"--new-session".to_string(),
"--die-with-parent".to_string(),
"--ro-bind".to_string(),
"/".to_string(),
"/".to_string(),
"--dev".to_string(),
"/dev".to_string(),
"--unshare-user".to_string(),
"--unshare-pid".to_string(),
"--proc".to_string(),
"/proc".to_string(),
"--argv0".to_string(),
"codex-linux-sandbox".to_string(),
"--".to_string(),
"/bin/true".to_string(),
]
);
}
#[test]
fn inserts_unshare_net_when_network_isolation_requested() {
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let argv = build_bwrap_argv(
vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
Path::new("/"),
BwrapOptions {
mount_proc: true,
network_mode: BwrapNetworkMode::Isolated,
},
)
.args;
assert!(argv.contains(&"--unshare-net".to_string()));
}
#[test]
fn inserts_unshare_net_when_proxy_only_network_mode_requested() {
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let argv = build_bwrap_argv(
vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
Path::new("/"),
BwrapOptions {
mount_proc: true,
network_mode: BwrapNetworkMode::ProxyOnly,
},
)
.args;
assert!(argv.contains(&"--unshare-net".to_string()));
}
#[test]
fn proxy_only_mode_takes_precedence_over_full_network_policy() {
let mode = bwrap_network_mode(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled, true);
assert_eq!(mode, BwrapNetworkMode::ProxyOnly);
}
#[test]
fn split_only_filesystem_policy_requires_direct_runtime_enforcement() {
let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
let docs = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(&docs).expect("absolute docs");
let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
value: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
},
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Path { path: docs },
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
]);
assert!(
policy.needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted, temp_dir.path(),)
);
}
#[test]
fn root_write_read_only_carveout_requires_direct_runtime_enforcement() {
let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
let docs = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(&docs).expect("absolute docs");
let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
value: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Path { path: docs },
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
]);
assert!(
policy.needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted, temp_dir.path(),)
);
}
#[test]
fn managed_proxy_preflight_argv_is_wrapped_for_full_access_policy() {
let mode = bwrap_network_mode(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled, true);
let argv = build_preflight_bwrap_argv(
Path::new("/"),
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess),
mode,
)
.args;
assert!(argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--"));
}
#[test]
fn managed_proxy_inner_command_includes_route_spec() {
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let args = build_inner_seccomp_command(InnerSeccompCommandArgs {
sandbox_policy_cwd: Path::new("/tmp"),
sandbox_policy: &sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
allow_network_for_proxy: true,
proxy_route_spec: Some("{\"routes\":[]}".to_string()),
command: vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
});
assert!(args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--proxy-route-spec"));
assert!(args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "{\"routes\":[]}"));
}
#[test]
fn inner_command_includes_split_policy_flags() {
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let args = build_inner_seccomp_command(InnerSeccompCommandArgs {
sandbox_policy_cwd: Path::new("/tmp"),
sandbox_policy: &sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
allow_network_for_proxy: false,
proxy_route_spec: None,
command: vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
});
assert!(args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--file-system-sandbox-policy"));
assert!(args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--network-sandbox-policy"));
}
#[test]
fn non_managed_inner_command_omits_route_spec() {
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let args = build_inner_seccomp_command(InnerSeccompCommandArgs {
sandbox_policy_cwd: Path::new("/tmp"),
sandbox_policy: &sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
allow_network_for_proxy: false,
proxy_route_spec: None,
command: vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
});
assert!(!args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--proxy-route-spec"));
}
#[test]
fn managed_proxy_inner_command_requires_route_spec() {
let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(|| {
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
build_inner_seccomp_command(InnerSeccompCommandArgs {
sandbox_policy_cwd: Path::new("/tmp"),
sandbox_policy: &sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
allow_network_for_proxy: true,
proxy_route_spec: None,
command: vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
})
});
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn resolve_sandbox_policies_derives_split_policies_from_legacy_policy() {
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let resolved =
resolve_sandbox_policies(Path::new("/tmp"), Some(sandbox_policy.clone()), None, None)
.expect("legacy policy should resolve");
assert_eq!(resolved.sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy);
assert_eq!(
resolved.file_system_sandbox_policy,
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy)
);
assert_eq!(
resolved.network_sandbox_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy)
);
}
#[test]
fn resolve_sandbox_policies_derives_legacy_policy_from_split_policies() {
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy);
let network_sandbox_policy = NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy);
let resolved = resolve_sandbox_policies(
Path::new("/tmp"),
None,
Some(file_system_sandbox_policy.clone()),
Some(network_sandbox_policy),
)
.expect("split policies should resolve");
assert_eq!(resolved.sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy);
assert_eq!(
resolved.file_system_sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy
);
assert_eq!(resolved.network_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy);
}
#[test]
fn resolve_sandbox_policies_rejects_partial_split_policies() {
let err = resolve_sandbox_policies(
Path::new("/tmp"),
Some(SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy()),
Some(FileSystemSandboxPolicy::default()),
None,
)
.expect_err("partial split policies should fail");
assert_eq!(err, ResolveSandboxPoliciesError::PartialSplitPolicies);
}
#[test]
fn resolve_sandbox_policies_rejects_mismatched_legacy_and_split_inputs() {
let err = resolve_sandbox_policies(
Path::new("/tmp"),
Some(SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy()),
Some(FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted()),
Some(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled),
)
.expect_err("mismatched legacy and split policies should fail");
assert!(
matches!(
err,
ResolveSandboxPoliciesError::MismatchedLegacyPolicy { .. }
),
"{err}"
);
}
#[test]
fn resolve_sandbox_policies_accepts_split_policies_requiring_direct_runtime_enforcement() {
let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
let docs = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(&docs).expect("absolute docs");
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
value: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Path { path: docs },
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
]);
let resolved = resolve_sandbox_policies(
temp_dir.path(),
Some(sandbox_policy.clone()),
Some(file_system_sandbox_policy.clone()),
Some(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted),
)
.expect("split-only policy should preserve provided legacy fallback");
assert_eq!(resolved.sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy);
assert_eq!(
resolved.file_system_sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy
);
assert_eq!(
resolved.network_sandbox_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted
);
}
#[test]
fn resolve_sandbox_policies_accepts_semantically_equivalent_workspace_write_inputs() {
let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let workspace = temp_dir.path().join("workspace");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&workspace).expect("create workspace");
let workspace = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(&workspace).expect("absolute workspace");
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![workspace],
read_only_access: ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess,
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
};
let file_system_sandbox_policy =
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&SandboxPolicy::new_workspace_write_policy());
let resolved = resolve_sandbox_policies(
temp_dir.path().join("workspace").as_path(),
Some(sandbox_policy.clone()),
Some(file_system_sandbox_policy.clone()),
Some(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted),
)
.expect("semantically equivalent legacy workspace-write policy should resolve");
assert_eq!(resolved.sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy);
assert_eq!(
resolved.file_system_sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy
);
assert_eq!(
resolved.network_sandbox_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted
);
}
#[test]
fn apply_seccomp_then_exec_with_legacy_landlock_panics() {
let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(|| ensure_inner_stage_mode_is_valid(true, true));
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn legacy_landlock_rejects_split_only_filesystem_policies() {
let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
let docs = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(&docs).expect("absolute docs");
let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
value: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Path { path: docs },
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
]);
let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(|| {
ensure_legacy_landlock_mode_supports_policy(
true,
&policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
temp_dir.path(),
);
});
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn valid_inner_stage_modes_do_not_panic() {
ensure_inner_stage_mode_is_valid(false, false);
ensure_inner_stage_mode_is_valid(false, true);
ensure_inner_stage_mode_is_valid(true, false);
}