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425fff7ad6
## Why
We need a way to auto-reject specific approval prompt categories without
switching all approvals off.
The goal is to let users independently control:
- sandbox escalation approvals,
- execpolicy `prompt` rule approvals,
- MCP elicitation prompts.
## What changed
- Added a new primary approval mode in `protocol/src/protocol.rs`:
```rust
pub enum AskForApproval {
// ...
Reject(RejectConfig),
// ...
}
pub struct RejectConfig {
pub sandbox_approval: bool,
pub rules: bool,
pub mcp_elicitations: bool,
}
```
- Wired `RejectConfig` semantics through approval paths in `core`:
- `core/src/exec_policy.rs`
- rejects rule-driven prompts when `rules = true`
- rejects sandbox/escalation prompts when `sandbox_approval = true`
- preserves rule priority when both rule and sandbox prompt conditions
are present
- `core/src/tools/sandboxing.rs`
- applies `sandbox_approval` to default exec approval decisions and
sandbox-failure retry gating
- `core/src/safety.rs`
- keeps `Reject { all false }` behavior aligned with `OnRequest` for
patch safety
- rejects out-of-root patch approvals when `sandbox_approval = true`
- `core/src/mcp_connection_manager.rs`
- auto-declines MCP elicitations when `mcp_elicitations = true`
- Ensured approval policy used by MCP elicitation flow stays in sync
with constrained session policy updates.
- Updated app-server v2 conversions and generated schema/TypeScript
artifacts for the new `Reject` shape.
## Verification
Added focused unit coverage for the new behavior in:
- `core/src/exec_policy.rs`
- `core/src/tools/sandboxing.rs`
- `core/src/mcp_connection_manager.rs`
- `core/src/safety.rs`
- `core/src/tools/runtimes/apply_patch.rs`
Key cases covered include rule-vs-sandbox prompt precedence, MCP
auto-decline behavior, and patch/sandbox retry behavior under
`RejectConfig`.
161 lines
3.9 KiB
JSON
161 lines
3.9 KiB
JSON
{
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"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
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"definitions": {
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"AskForApproval": {
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"description": "Determines the conditions under which the user is consulted to approve running the command proposed by Codex.",
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"oneOf": [
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{
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"description": "Under this policy, only \"known safe\" commands—as determined by `is_safe_command()`—that **only read files** are auto‑approved. Everything else will ask the user to approve.",
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"enum": [
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"untrusted"
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],
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"type": "string"
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},
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{
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"description": "DEPRECATED: *All* commands are auto‑approved, but they are expected to run inside a sandbox where network access is disabled and writes are confined to a specific set of paths. If the command fails, it will be escalated to the user to approve execution without a sandbox. Prefer `OnRequest` for interactive runs or `Never` for non-interactive runs.",
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"enum": [
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"on-failure"
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],
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"type": "string"
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},
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{
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"description": "The model decides when to ask the user for approval.",
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"enum": [
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"on-request"
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],
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"type": "string"
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},
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{
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"additionalProperties": false,
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"description": "Fine-grained rejection controls for approval prompts.\n\nWhen a field is `true`, prompts of that category are automatically rejected instead of shown to the user.",
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"properties": {
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"reject": {
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"$ref": "#/definitions/RejectConfig"
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}
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},
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"required": [
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"reject"
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],
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"title": "RejectAskForApproval",
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"type": "object"
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},
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{
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"description": "Never ask the user to approve commands. Failures are immediately returned to the model, and never escalated to the user for approval.",
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"enum": [
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"never"
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],
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"type": "string"
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}
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]
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},
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"RejectConfig": {
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"properties": {
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"mcp_elicitations": {
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"description": "Reject MCP elicitation prompts.",
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"type": "boolean"
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},
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"rules": {
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"description": "Reject prompts triggered by execpolicy `prompt` rules.",
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"type": "boolean"
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},
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"sandbox_approval": {
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"description": "Reject approval prompts related to sandbox escalation.",
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"type": "boolean"
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}
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},
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"required": [
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"mcp_elicitations",
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"rules",
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"sandbox_approval"
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],
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"type": "object"
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},
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"SandboxMode": {
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"enum": [
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"read-only",
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"workspace-write",
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"danger-full-access"
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],
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"type": "string"
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}
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},
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"properties": {
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"approvalPolicy": {
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"anyOf": [
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{
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"$ref": "#/definitions/AskForApproval"
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},
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{
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"type": "null"
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}
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]
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},
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"baseInstructions": {
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"type": [
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"string",
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"null"
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]
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},
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"compactPrompt": {
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"type": [
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"string",
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"null"
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]
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},
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"config": {
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"additionalProperties": true,
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"type": [
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"object",
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"null"
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]
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},
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"cwd": {
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"type": [
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"string",
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"null"
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]
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},
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"developerInstructions": {
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"type": [
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"string",
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"null"
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]
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},
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"includeApplyPatchTool": {
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"type": [
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"boolean",
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"null"
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]
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},
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"model": {
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"type": [
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"string",
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"null"
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]
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},
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"modelProvider": {
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"type": [
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"string",
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"null"
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]
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},
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"profile": {
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"type": [
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"string",
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"null"
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]
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},
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"sandbox": {
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"anyOf": [
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{
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"$ref": "#/definitions/SandboxMode"
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},
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{
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"type": "null"
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}
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]
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}
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},
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"title": "NewConversationParams",
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"type": "object"
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} |