mirror of https://github.com/openai/codex.git synced 2026-04-29 00:55:38 +00:00

Files

rreichel3-oai 86764af684 Protect first-time project .codex creation across Linux and macOS sandboxes (#15067 )

## Problem

Codex already treated an existing top-level project `./.codex` directory
as protected, but there was a gap on first creation.

If `./.codex` did not exist yet, a turn could create files under it,
such as `./.codex/config.toml`, without going through the same approval
path as later modifications. That meant the initial write could bypass
the intended protection for project-local Codex state.

## What this changes

This PR closes that first-creation gap in the Unix enforcement layers:

- `codex-protocol`
- treat the top-level project `./.codex` path as a protected carveout
even when it does not exist yet
- avoid injecting the default carveout when the user already has an
explicit rule for that exact path
- macOS Seatbelt
- deny writes to both the exact protected path and anything beneath it,
so creating `./.codex` itself is blocked in addition to writes inside it
- Linux bubblewrap
- preserve the same protected-path behavior for first-time creation
under `./.codex`
- tests
- add protocol regressions for missing `./.codex` and explicit-rule
collisions
- add Unix sandbox coverage for blocking first-time `./.codex` creation
  - tighten Seatbelt policy assertions around excluded subpaths

## Scope

This change is intentionally scoped to protecting the top-level project
`.codex` subtree from agent writes.

It does not make `.codex` unreadable, and it does not change the product
behavior around loading project skills from `.codex` when project config
is untrusted.

## Why this shape

The fix is pointed rather than broad:
- it preserves the current model of “project `.codex` is protected from
writes”
- it closes the security-relevant first-write hole
- it avoids folding a larger permissions-model redesign into this PR

## Validation

- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing seatbelt`
- `cargo test -p codex-exec --test all
sandbox_blocks_first_time_dot_codex_creation -- --nocapture`

---------

Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>

2026-03-26 16:06:53 -04:00

src

Protect first-time project .codex creation across Linux and macOS sandboxes (#15067 )

2026-03-26 16:06:53 -04:00

tests

core: add a full-buffer exec capture policy (#15254 )

2026-03-20 02:38:12 +00:00

BUILD.bazel

build(linux-sandbox): always compile vendored bubblewrap on Linux; remove CODEX_BWRAP_ENABLE_FFI (#11498 )

2026-02-11 21:30:41 -08:00

build.rs

build(linux-sandbox): always compile vendored bubblewrap on Linux; remove CODEX_BWRAP_ENABLE_FFI (#11498 )

2026-02-11 21:30:41 -08:00

Cargo.toml

fix: fix old system bubblewrap compatibility without falling back to vendored bwrap (#15693 )

2026-03-25 23:51:39 -07:00

config.h

build(linux-sandbox): always compile vendored bubblewrap on Linux; remove CODEX_BWRAP_ENABLE_FFI (#11498 )

2026-02-11 21:30:41 -08:00

README.md

fix: resolve bwrap from trusted PATH entry (#15791 )

2026-03-26 12:13:51 -07:00

README.md

codex-linux-sandbox

This crate is responsible for producing:

a codex-linux-sandbox standalone executable for Linux that is bundled with the Node.js version of the Codex CLI
a lib crate that exposes the business logic of the executable as run_main() so that
- the codex-exec CLI can check if its arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox and, if so, execute as if it were codex-linux-sandbox
- this should also be true of the codex multitool CLI

On Linux, the bubblewrap pipeline prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If bwrap is missing, the helper falls back to the vendored bubblewrap path compiled into this binary. Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bwrap is missing so users know it is falling back to the vendored helper.

Current Behavior

Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs remain supported.
Bubblewrap is the default filesystem sandbox pipeline.
If bwrap is present on PATH outside the current working directory, the helper uses it.
If bwrap is present but too old to support --argv0, the helper uses a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec.
If bwrap is missing, the helper falls back to the vendored bubblewrap path.
If bwrap is missing, Codex also surfaces a startup warning instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper.
Legacy Landlock + mount protections remain available as an explicit legacy fallback path.
Set features.use_legacy_landlock = true (or CLI -c use_legacy_landlock=true) to force the legacy Landlock fallback.
The legacy Landlock fallback is used only when the split filesystem policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution.
Split-only filesystem policies that do not round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model stay on bubblewrap so nested read-only or denied carveouts are preserved.
When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, the helper applies PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS and a seccomp network filter in-process.
When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, the filesystem is read-only by default via --ro-bind / /.
When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, writable roots are layered with --bind <root> <root>.
When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, protected subpaths under writable roots (for example .git, resolved gitdir:, and .codex) are re-applied as read-only via --ro-bind.
When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, overlapping split-policy entries are applied in path-specificity order so narrower writable children can reopen broader read-only or denied parents while narrower denied subpaths still win. For example, /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write keeps /repo writable, denies /repo/a, and reopens /repo/a/b as writable again.
When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, symlink-in-path and non-existent protected paths inside writable roots are blocked by mounting /dev/null on the symlink or first missing component.
When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, the helper explicitly isolates the user namespace via --unshare-user and the PID namespace via --unshare-pid.
When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active and network is restricted without proxy routing, the helper also isolates the network namespace via --unshare-net.
In managed proxy mode, the helper uses --unshare-net plus an internal TCP->UDS->TCP routing bridge so tool traffic reaches only configured proxy endpoints.
In managed proxy mode, after the bridge is live, seccomp blocks new AF_UNIX/socketpair creation for the user command.
When the default bubblewrap pipeline is active, it mounts a fresh /proc via --proc /proc by default, but you can skip this in restrictive container environments with --no-proc.

Notes

The CLI surface still uses legacy names like codex debug landlock.