Files
codex/codex-rs/tui/src/additional_dirs.rs
Michael Bolin 3b74a4d3b1 tui: use permission profiles for sandbox state (#20008)
## Summary
- Move TUI permission state from legacy `SandboxPolicy` values to
canonical `PermissionProfile` values across presets, app events, chat
widget state, app commands, thread routing, and cached thread session
state.
- Keep app-server compatibility boundaries explicit: embedded sessions
send `permissionProfile`, while remote sessions send only a legacy
`sandbox` projection and fall back to read-only when a custom profile
cannot be projected.
- Update status/add-dir UI summaries and snapshots to render the active
permission profile, including workspace profiles selected by the new
built-in defaults.

## Verification
- `rg '\bSandboxPolicy\b' codex-rs/tui -n` returns no matches.
- `cargo test -p codex-tui`
- `cargo check -p codex-tui --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui additional_dirs`
- `just fmt`
- `just fix -p codex-tui`




































---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
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with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/20008).
* #20041
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* #20037
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* #20034
* #20033
* #20032
* #20030
* #20028
* #20027
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* #20015
* #20013
* #20011
* #20010
* __->__ #20008
2026-04-28 20:36:48 +00:00

144 lines
5.0 KiB
Rust

use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use std::path::PathBuf;
/// Returns a warning describing why `--add-dir` entries will be ignored for the
/// resolved permission profile. The caller is responsible for presenting the
/// warning to the user (for example, printing to stderr).
pub fn add_dir_warning_message(
additional_dirs: &[PathBuf],
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
cwd: &std::path::Path,
) -> Option<String> {
if additional_dirs.is_empty() {
return None;
}
if matches!(
permission_profile,
PermissionProfile::Disabled | PermissionProfile::External { .. }
) {
return None;
}
let file_system_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
if file_system_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() {
return None;
}
if file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(cwd, cwd) {
return None;
}
Some(format_warning(additional_dirs))
}
fn format_warning(additional_dirs: &[PathBuf]) -> String {
let joined_paths = additional_dirs
.iter()
.map(|path| path.to_string_lossy())
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(", ");
format!(
"Ignoring --add-dir ({joined_paths}) because the effective permissions do not allow additional writable roots. Switch to workspace-write or danger-full-access to allow them."
)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::add_dir_warning_message;
use codex_protocol::models::ManagedFileSystemPermissions;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath;
use codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
#[test]
fn returns_none_for_workspace_write() {
let profile = PermissionProfile::workspace_write();
let dirs = vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp/example")];
assert_eq!(
add_dir_warning_message(&dirs, &profile, Path::new("/tmp/project")),
None
);
}
#[test]
fn returns_none_for_danger_full_access() {
let profile = PermissionProfile::Disabled;
let dirs = vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp/example")];
assert_eq!(
add_dir_warning_message(&dirs, &profile, Path::new("/tmp/project")),
None
);
}
#[test]
fn returns_none_for_external_sandbox() {
let profile = PermissionProfile::External {
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
};
let dirs = vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp/example")];
assert_eq!(
add_dir_warning_message(&dirs, &profile, Path::new("/tmp/project")),
None
);
}
#[test]
fn warns_for_read_only() {
let profile = PermissionProfile::read_only();
let dirs = vec![PathBuf::from("relative"), PathBuf::from("/abs")];
let message = add_dir_warning_message(&dirs, &profile, Path::new("/tmp/project"))
.expect("expected warning for read-only sandbox");
assert_eq!(
message,
"Ignoring --add-dir (relative, /abs) because the effective permissions do not allow additional writable roots. Switch to workspace-write or danger-full-access to allow them."
);
}
#[test]
fn warns_when_profile_can_write_elsewhere_but_not_cwd() {
let profile = PermissionProfile::Managed {
file_system: ManagedFileSystemPermissions::Restricted {
entries: vec![
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: "/tmp/writable".try_into().expect("absolute path"),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
],
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
},
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
};
let dirs = vec![PathBuf::from("/tmp/extra")];
assert_eq!(
add_dir_warning_message(&dirs, &profile, Path::new("/tmp/project")),
Some("Ignoring --add-dir (/tmp/extra) because the effective permissions do not allow additional writable roots. Switch to workspace-write or danger-full-access to allow them.".to_string())
);
}
#[test]
fn returns_none_when_no_additional_dirs() {
let profile = PermissionProfile::read_only();
let dirs: Vec<PathBuf> = Vec::new();
assert_eq!(
add_dir_warning_message(&dirs, &profile, Path::new("/tmp/project")),
None
);
}
}