linux-sandbox: plumb split sandbox policies through helper

This commit is contained in:
Michael Bolin
2026-03-04 01:44:43 -08:00
parent ed7a864c46
commit 6790e7fa4a
6 changed files with 313 additions and 47 deletions

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
use crate::protocol::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
use crate::protocol::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use crate::spawn::SpawnChildRequest;
@@ -14,9 +15,9 @@ use tokio::process::Child;
/// isolation plus seccomp for network restrictions.
///
/// Unlike macOS Seatbelt where we directly embed the policy text, the Linux
/// helper accepts a list of `--sandbox-permission`/`-s` flags mirroring the
/// public CLI. We convert the internal [`SandboxPolicy`] representation into
/// the equivalent CLI options.
/// helper is a separate executable. We pass the legacy [`SandboxPolicy`] plus
/// split filesystem/network policies as JSON so the helper can migrate
/// incrementally without breaking older call sites.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub async fn spawn_command_under_linux_sandbox<P>(
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: P,
@@ -32,9 +33,13 @@ pub async fn spawn_command_under_linux_sandbox<P>(
where
P: AsRef<Path>,
{
let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args(
let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(sandbox_policy);
let network_sandbox_policy = NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(sandbox_policy);
let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies(
command,
sandbox_policy,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
sandbox_policy_cwd,
use_bwrap_sandbox,
allow_network_for_proxy(false),
@@ -45,7 +50,7 @@ where
args,
arg0,
cwd: command_cwd,
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(sandbox_policy),
network_sandbox_policy,
network,
stdio_policy,
env,
@@ -60,13 +65,55 @@ pub(crate) fn allow_network_for_proxy(enforce_managed_network: bool) -> bool {
enforce_managed_network
}
/// Converts the sandbox policy into the CLI invocation for `codex-linux-sandbox`.
/// Converts the sandbox policies into the CLI invocation for
/// `codex-linux-sandbox`.
///
/// The helper performs the actual sandboxing (bubblewrap + seccomp) after
/// parsing these arguments. See `docs/linux_sandbox.md` for the Linux semantics.
pub(crate) fn create_linux_sandbox_command_args(
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub(crate) fn create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies(
command: Vec<String>,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
use_bwrap_sandbox: bool,
allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
) -> Vec<String> {
#[expect(clippy::expect_used)]
let sandbox_policy_json =
serde_json::to_string(sandbox_policy).expect("Failed to serialize SandboxPolicy to JSON");
#[expect(clippy::expect_used)]
let file_system_policy_json = serde_json::to_string(file_system_sandbox_policy)
.expect("Failed to serialize FileSystemSandboxPolicy to JSON");
#[expect(clippy::expect_used)]
let network_policy_json = serde_json::to_string(&network_sandbox_policy)
.expect("Failed to serialize NetworkSandboxPolicy to JSON");
let mut linux_cmd = create_linux_sandbox_command_args(
command,
sandbox_policy_cwd,
use_bwrap_sandbox,
allow_network_for_proxy,
);
linux_cmd.splice(
2..2,
[
"--sandbox-policy".to_string(),
sandbox_policy_json,
"--file-system-sandbox-policy".to_string(),
file_system_policy_json,
"--network-sandbox-policy".to_string(),
network_policy_json,
],
);
linux_cmd
}
/// Converts the sandbox cwd and execution options into the CLI invocation for
/// `codex-linux-sandbox`.
pub(crate) fn create_linux_sandbox_command_args(
command: Vec<String>,
sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
use_bwrap_sandbox: bool,
allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
@@ -77,16 +124,7 @@ pub(crate) fn create_linux_sandbox_command_args(
.expect("cwd must be valid UTF-8")
.to_string();
#[expect(clippy::expect_used)]
let sandbox_policy_json =
serde_json::to_string(sandbox_policy).expect("Failed to serialize SandboxPolicy to JSON");
let mut linux_cmd: Vec<String> = vec![
"--sandbox-policy-cwd".to_string(),
sandbox_policy_cwd,
"--sandbox-policy".to_string(),
sandbox_policy_json,
];
let mut linux_cmd: Vec<String> = vec!["--sandbox-policy-cwd".to_string(), sandbox_policy_cwd];
if use_bwrap_sandbox {
linux_cmd.push("--use-bwrap-sandbox".to_string());
}
@@ -113,16 +151,14 @@ mod tests {
fn bwrap_flags_are_feature_gated() {
let command = vec!["/bin/true".to_string()];
let cwd = Path::new("/tmp");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let with_bwrap =
create_linux_sandbox_command_args(command.clone(), &policy, cwd, true, false);
let with_bwrap = create_linux_sandbox_command_args(command.clone(), cwd, true, false);
assert_eq!(
with_bwrap.contains(&"--use-bwrap-sandbox".to_string()),
true
);
let without_bwrap = create_linux_sandbox_command_args(command, &policy, cwd, false, false);
let without_bwrap = create_linux_sandbox_command_args(command, cwd, false, false);
assert_eq!(
without_bwrap.contains(&"--use-bwrap-sandbox".to_string()),
false
@@ -133,15 +169,46 @@ mod tests {
fn proxy_flag_is_included_when_requested() {
let command = vec!["/bin/true".to_string()];
let cwd = Path::new("/tmp");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args(command, &policy, cwd, true, true);
let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args(command, cwd, true, true);
assert_eq!(
args.contains(&"--allow-network-for-proxy".to_string()),
true
);
}
#[test]
fn split_policy_flags_are_included() {
let command = vec!["/bin/true".to_string()];
let cwd = Path::new("/tmp");
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy);
let network_sandbox_policy = NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy);
let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies(
command,
&sandbox_policy,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
cwd,
true,
false,
);
assert_eq!(
args.windows(2).any(|window| {
window[0] == "--file-system-sandbox-policy" && !window[1].is_empty()
}),
true
);
assert_eq!(
args.windows(2)
.any(|window| window[0] == "--network-sandbox-policy"
&& window[1] == "\"restricted\""),
true
);
}
#[test]
fn proxy_network_requires_managed_requirements() {
assert_eq!(allow_network_for_proxy(false), false);

View File

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ use crate::exec::SandboxType;
use crate::exec::StdoutStream;
use crate::exec::execute_exec_env;
use crate::landlock::allow_network_for_proxy;
use crate::landlock::create_linux_sandbox_command_args;
use crate::landlock::create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies;
use crate::protocol::FileSystemSandboxKind;
use crate::protocol::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
use crate::protocol::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
@@ -411,9 +411,11 @@ impl SandboxManager {
let exe = codex_linux_sandbox_exe
.ok_or(SandboxTransformError::MissingLinuxSandboxExecutable)?;
let allow_proxy_network = allow_network_for_proxy(enforce_managed_network);
let mut args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args(
let mut args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies(
command.clone(),
&effective_policy,
&effective_file_system_policy,
effective_network_policy,
sandbox_policy_cwd,
use_linux_sandbox_bwrap,
allow_proxy_network,

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ use std::path::Path;
use codex_core::error::CodexErr;
use codex_core::error::Result;
use codex_core::error::SandboxErr;
use codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
@@ -40,13 +41,14 @@ use seccompiler::apply_filter;
/// Filesystem restrictions are intentionally handled by bubblewrap.
pub(crate) fn apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
cwd: &Path,
apply_landlock_fs: bool,
allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
proxy_routed_network: bool,
) -> Result<()> {
let network_seccomp_mode = network_seccomp_mode(
sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
allow_network_for_proxy,
proxy_routed_network,
);
@@ -91,20 +93,20 @@ enum NetworkSeccompMode {
}
fn should_install_network_seccomp(
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
) -> bool {
// Managed-network sessions should remain fail-closed even for policies that
// would normally grant full network access (for example, DangerFullAccess).
!sandbox_policy.has_full_network_access() || allow_network_for_proxy
!network_sandbox_policy.is_enabled() || allow_network_for_proxy
}
fn network_seccomp_mode(
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
proxy_routed_network: bool,
) -> Option<NetworkSeccompMode> {
if !should_install_network_seccomp(sandbox_policy, allow_network_for_proxy) {
if !should_install_network_seccomp(network_sandbox_policy, allow_network_for_proxy) {
None
} else if proxy_routed_network {
Some(NetworkSeccompMode::ProxyRouted)

View File

@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ use crate::proxy_routing::activate_proxy_routes_in_netns;
use crate::proxy_routing::prepare_host_proxy_route_spec;
use crate::vendored_bwrap::exec_vendored_bwrap;
use crate::vendored_bwrap::run_vendored_bwrap_main;
use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
#[derive(Debug, Parser)]
/// CLI surface for the Linux sandbox helper.
@@ -26,8 +29,18 @@ pub struct LandlockCommand {
#[arg(long = "sandbox-policy-cwd")]
pub sandbox_policy_cwd: PathBuf,
#[arg(long = "sandbox-policy")]
pub sandbox_policy: codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy,
/// Legacy compatibility policy.
///
/// Newer callers pass split filesystem/network policies as well so the
/// helper can migrate incrementally without breaking older invocations.
#[arg(long = "sandbox-policy", hide = true)]
pub sandbox_policy: Option<SandboxPolicy>,
#[arg(long = "file-system-sandbox-policy", hide = true)]
pub file_system_sandbox_policy: Option<FileSystemSandboxPolicy>,
#[arg(long = "network-sandbox-policy", hide = true)]
pub network_sandbox_policy: Option<NetworkSandboxPolicy>,
/// Opt-in: use the bubblewrap-based Linux sandbox pipeline.
///
@@ -77,6 +90,8 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
let LandlockCommand {
sandbox_policy_cwd,
sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
use_bwrap_sandbox,
apply_seccomp_then_exec,
allow_network_for_proxy,
@@ -89,6 +104,16 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
panic!("No command specified to execute.");
}
ensure_inner_stage_mode_is_valid(apply_seccomp_then_exec, use_bwrap_sandbox);
let EffectiveSandboxPolicies {
sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
} = resolve_sandbox_policies(
sandbox_policy_cwd.as_path(),
sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
);
// Inner stage: apply seccomp/no_new_privs after bubblewrap has already
// established the filesystem view.
@@ -104,6 +129,7 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
let proxy_routing_active = allow_network_for_proxy;
if let Err(e) = apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(
&sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
&sandbox_policy_cwd,
false,
allow_network_for_proxy,
@@ -114,9 +140,10 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
exec_or_panic(command);
}
if sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() && !allow_network_for_proxy {
if file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() && !allow_network_for_proxy {
if let Err(e) = apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(
&sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
&sandbox_policy_cwd,
false,
allow_network_for_proxy,
@@ -142,6 +169,8 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
let inner = build_inner_seccomp_command(
&sandbox_policy_cwd,
&sandbox_policy,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
use_bwrap_sandbox,
allow_network_for_proxy,
proxy_route_spec,
@@ -150,6 +179,7 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
run_bwrap_with_proc_fallback(
&sandbox_policy_cwd,
&sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
inner,
!no_proc,
allow_network_for_proxy,
@@ -159,6 +189,7 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
// Legacy path: Landlock enforcement only, when bwrap sandboxing is not enabled.
if let Err(e) = apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(
&sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
&sandbox_policy_cwd,
true,
allow_network_for_proxy,
@@ -169,6 +200,53 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
exec_or_panic(command);
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
struct EffectiveSandboxPolicies {
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
file_system_sandbox_policy: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
}
fn resolve_sandbox_policies(
sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
sandbox_policy: Option<SandboxPolicy>,
file_system_sandbox_policy: Option<FileSystemSandboxPolicy>,
network_sandbox_policy: Option<NetworkSandboxPolicy>,
) -> EffectiveSandboxPolicies {
match (
sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
) {
(Some(sandbox_policy), Some(file_system_sandbox_policy), Some(network_sandbox_policy)) => {
EffectiveSandboxPolicies {
sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
}
}
(Some(sandbox_policy), None, None) => EffectiveSandboxPolicies {
file_system_sandbox_policy: FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
sandbox_policy,
},
(None, Some(file_system_sandbox_policy), Some(network_sandbox_policy)) => {
let sandbox_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy
.to_legacy_sandbox_policy(network_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd)
.unwrap_or_else(|err| {
panic!("failed to derive legacy sandbox policy from split policies: {err}")
});
EffectiveSandboxPolicies {
sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
}
}
(None, None, None) => panic!("missing sandbox policy configuration"),
_ => panic!("file-system and network sandbox policies must be provided together"),
}
}
fn ensure_inner_stage_mode_is_valid(apply_seccomp_then_exec: bool, use_bwrap_sandbox: bool) {
if apply_seccomp_then_exec && !use_bwrap_sandbox {
panic!("--apply-seccomp-then-exec requires --use-bwrap-sandbox");
@@ -177,12 +255,13 @@ fn ensure_inner_stage_mode_is_valid(apply_seccomp_then_exec: bool, use_bwrap_san
fn run_bwrap_with_proc_fallback(
sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
sandbox_policy: &codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
inner: Vec<String>,
mount_proc: bool,
allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
) -> ! {
let network_mode = bwrap_network_mode(sandbox_policy, allow_network_for_proxy);
let network_mode = bwrap_network_mode(network_sandbox_policy, allow_network_for_proxy);
let mut mount_proc = mount_proc;
if mount_proc && !preflight_proc_mount_support(sandbox_policy_cwd, sandbox_policy, network_mode)
@@ -200,12 +279,12 @@ fn run_bwrap_with_proc_fallback(
}
fn bwrap_network_mode(
sandbox_policy: &codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy,
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
) -> BwrapNetworkMode {
if allow_network_for_proxy {
BwrapNetworkMode::ProxyOnly
} else if sandbox_policy.has_full_network_access() {
} else if network_sandbox_policy.is_enabled() {
BwrapNetworkMode::FullAccess
} else {
BwrapNetworkMode::Isolated
@@ -214,7 +293,7 @@ fn bwrap_network_mode(
fn build_bwrap_argv(
inner: Vec<String>,
sandbox_policy: &codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
options: BwrapOptions,
) -> Vec<String> {
@@ -237,7 +316,7 @@ fn build_bwrap_argv(
fn preflight_proc_mount_support(
sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
sandbox_policy: &codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
network_mode: BwrapNetworkMode,
) -> bool {
let preflight_argv =
@@ -248,7 +327,7 @@ fn preflight_proc_mount_support(
fn build_preflight_bwrap_argv(
sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
sandbox_policy: &codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
network_mode: BwrapNetworkMode,
) -> Vec<String> {
let preflight_command = vec![resolve_true_command()];
@@ -361,7 +440,9 @@ fn is_proc_mount_failure(stderr: &str) -> bool {
/// Build the inner command that applies seccomp after bubblewrap.
fn build_inner_seccomp_command(
sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
sandbox_policy: &codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
use_bwrap_sandbox: bool,
allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
proxy_route_spec: Option<String>,
@@ -375,6 +456,14 @@ fn build_inner_seccomp_command(
Ok(json) => json,
Err(err) => panic!("failed to serialize sandbox policy: {err}"),
};
let file_system_policy_json = match serde_json::to_string(file_system_sandbox_policy) {
Ok(json) => json,
Err(err) => panic!("failed to serialize filesystem sandbox policy: {err}"),
};
let network_policy_json = match serde_json::to_string(&network_sandbox_policy) {
Ok(json) => json,
Err(err) => panic!("failed to serialize network sandbox policy: {err}"),
};
let mut inner = vec![
current_exe.to_string_lossy().to_string(),
@@ -382,6 +471,10 @@ fn build_inner_seccomp_command(
sandbox_policy_cwd.to_string_lossy().to_string(),
"--sandbox-policy".to_string(),
policy_json,
"--file-system-sandbox-policy".to_string(),
file_system_policy_json,
"--network-sandbox-policy".to_string(),
network_policy_json,
];
if use_bwrap_sandbox {
inner.push("--use-bwrap-sandbox".to_string());

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,13 @@
#[cfg(test)]
use super::*;
#[cfg(test)]
use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
#[cfg(test)]
use codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
#[cfg(test)]
use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
#[cfg(test)]
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
#[test]
fn detects_proc_mount_invalid_argument_failure() {
@@ -90,22 +96,25 @@ fn inserts_unshare_net_when_proxy_only_network_mode_requested() {
#[test]
fn proxy_only_mode_takes_precedence_over_full_network_policy() {
let mode = bwrap_network_mode(&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess, true);
let mode = bwrap_network_mode(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled, true);
assert_eq!(mode, BwrapNetworkMode::ProxyOnly);
}
#[test]
fn managed_proxy_preflight_argv_is_wrapped_for_full_access_policy() {
let mode = bwrap_network_mode(&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess, true);
let mode = bwrap_network_mode(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled, true);
let argv = build_preflight_bwrap_argv(Path::new("/"), &SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess, mode);
assert!(argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--"));
}
#[test]
fn managed_proxy_inner_command_includes_route_spec() {
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let args = build_inner_seccomp_command(
Path::new("/tmp"),
&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
&sandbox_policy,
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
true,
true,
Some("{\"routes\":[]}".to_string()),
@@ -117,10 +126,31 @@ fn managed_proxy_inner_command_includes_route_spec() {
}
#[test]
fn non_managed_inner_command_omits_route_spec() {
fn inner_command_includes_split_policy_flags() {
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let args = build_inner_seccomp_command(
Path::new("/tmp"),
&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
&sandbox_policy,
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
true,
false,
None,
vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
);
assert!(args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--file-system-sandbox-policy"));
assert!(args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--network-sandbox-policy"));
}
#[test]
fn non_managed_inner_command_omits_route_spec() {
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let args = build_inner_seccomp_command(
Path::new("/tmp"),
&sandbox_policy,
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
true,
false,
None,
@@ -133,9 +163,12 @@ fn non_managed_inner_command_omits_route_spec() {
#[test]
fn managed_proxy_inner_command_requires_route_spec() {
let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(|| {
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
build_inner_seccomp_command(
Path::new("/tmp"),
&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
&sandbox_policy,
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
true,
true,
None,
@@ -145,6 +178,59 @@ fn managed_proxy_inner_command_requires_route_spec() {
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn resolve_sandbox_policies_derives_split_policies_from_legacy_policy() {
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let resolved =
resolve_sandbox_policies(Path::new("/tmp"), Some(sandbox_policy.clone()), None, None);
assert_eq!(resolved.sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy.clone());
assert_eq!(
resolved.file_system_sandbox_policy,
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy)
);
assert_eq!(
resolved.network_sandbox_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy)
);
}
#[test]
fn resolve_sandbox_policies_derives_legacy_policy_from_split_policies() {
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy);
let network_sandbox_policy = NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy);
let resolved = resolve_sandbox_policies(
Path::new("/tmp"),
None,
Some(file_system_sandbox_policy.clone()),
Some(network_sandbox_policy),
);
assert_eq!(resolved.sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy);
assert_eq!(
resolved.file_system_sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy
);
assert_eq!(resolved.network_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy);
}
#[test]
fn resolve_sandbox_policies_rejects_partial_split_policies() {
let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(|| {
resolve_sandbox_policies(
Path::new("/tmp"),
Some(SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy()),
Some(FileSystemSandboxPolicy::default()),
None,
)
});
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn apply_seccomp_then_exec_without_bwrap_panics() {
let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(|| ensure_inner_stage_mode_is_valid(true, false));

View File

@@ -1096,6 +1096,22 @@ impl FromStr for SandboxPolicy {
}
}
impl FromStr for FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
type Err = serde_json::Error;
fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
serde_json::from_str(s)
}
}
impl FromStr for NetworkSandboxPolicy {
type Err = serde_json::Error;
fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
serde_json::from_str(s)
}
}
impl SandboxPolicy {
/// Returns a policy with read-only disk access and no network.
pub fn new_read_only_policy() -> Self {