Enforce Windows protected metadata targets

This commit is contained in:
Eva Wong
2026-05-04 10:07:34 -07:00
parent 68d2d403b4
commit 88534ef1e4
8 changed files with 145 additions and 11 deletions

View File

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ mod windows_impl {
use crate::logging::log_success;
use crate::policy::SandboxPolicy;
use crate::policy::parse_policy;
use crate::protected_metadata::prepare_protected_metadata_targets;
use crate::runner_client::spawn_runner_transport;
use crate::sandbox_utils::ensure_codex_home_exists;
use crate::sandbox_utils::inject_git_safe_directory;
@@ -80,6 +81,8 @@ mod windows_impl {
let logs_base_dir: Option<&Path> = Some(sandbox_base.as_path());
log_start(&command, logs_base_dir);
let protected_metadata_guard =
prepare_protected_metadata_targets(protected_metadata_targets);
let sandbox_creds = require_logon_sandbox_creds(
&policy,
sandbox_policy_cwd,
@@ -154,7 +157,7 @@ mod windows_impl {
let mut stdout = Vec::new();
let mut stderr = Vec::new();
let (exit_code, timed_out) = loop {
let (mut exit_code, timed_out) = loop {
let msg = read_frame(&mut pipe_read)?
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("runner pipe closed before exit"))?;
match msg.message {
@@ -178,6 +181,12 @@ mod windows_impl {
}
};
let protected_metadata_violations =
protected_metadata_guard.cleanup_created_monitored_paths()?;
if !protected_metadata_violations.is_empty() && exit_code == 0 {
exit_code = 1;
}
if exit_code == 0 {
log_success(&command, logs_base_dir);
} else {

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@@ -170,6 +170,8 @@ pub use process::read_handle_loop;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub use process::spawn_process_with_pipes;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub use protected_metadata::protected_metadata_existing_deny_paths;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub use session::spawn_windows_sandbox_session_elevated;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub use session::spawn_windows_sandbox_session_legacy;
@@ -272,6 +274,7 @@ mod windows_impl {
use super::path_normalization::canonicalize_path;
use super::policy::SandboxPolicy;
use super::process::create_process_as_user;
use super::protected_metadata::prepare_protected_metadata_targets;
use super::sandbox_utils::ensure_codex_home_exists;
use super::spawn_prep::prepare_legacy_spawn_context;
use super::token::convert_string_sid_to_sid;
@@ -366,7 +369,7 @@ mod windows_impl {
mut env_map: HashMap<String, String>,
timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
additional_deny_write_paths: &[PathBuf],
_protected_metadata_targets: &[ProtectedMetadataTarget],
protected_metadata_targets: &[ProtectedMetadataTarget],
use_private_desktop: bool,
) -> Result<CaptureResult> {
let common = prepare_legacy_spawn_context(
@@ -436,6 +439,11 @@ mod windows_impl {
let persist_aces = is_workspace_write;
let AllowDenyPaths { allow, mut deny } =
compute_allow_paths(&policy, sandbox_policy_cwd, &current_dir, &env_map);
let protected_metadata_guard =
prepare_protected_metadata_targets(protected_metadata_targets);
for path in protected_metadata_guard.deny_paths() {
deny.insert(path.clone());
}
for path in additional_deny_write_paths {
if path.exists() {
deny.insert(path.clone());
@@ -586,11 +594,16 @@ mod windows_impl {
let _ = t_err.join();
let stdout = rx_out.recv().unwrap_or_default();
let stderr = rx_err.recv().unwrap_or_default();
let exit_code = if timed_out {
let mut exit_code = if timed_out {
128 + 64
} else {
exit_code_u32 as i32
};
let protected_metadata_violations =
protected_metadata_guard.cleanup_created_monitored_paths()?;
if !protected_metadata_violations.is_empty() && exit_code == 0 {
exit_code = 1;
}
if exit_code == 0 {
log_success(&command, logs_base_dir);

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
#![allow(dead_code)]
use crate::setup::ProtectedMetadataMode;
use crate::setup::ProtectedMetadataTarget;
use anyhow::Context;

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ use base64::Engine;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64;
use codex_otel::StatsigMetricsSettings;
use codex_windows_sandbox::LOG_FILE_NAME;
use codex_windows_sandbox::ProtectedMetadataMode;
use codex_windows_sandbox::ProtectedMetadataTarget;
use codex_windows_sandbox::SETUP_VERSION;
use codex_windows_sandbox::SetupErrorCode;
@@ -25,6 +26,7 @@ use codex_windows_sandbox::is_command_cwd_root;
use codex_windows_sandbox::load_or_create_cap_sids;
use codex_windows_sandbox::log_note;
use codex_windows_sandbox::path_mask_allows;
use codex_windows_sandbox::protected_metadata_existing_deny_paths;
use codex_windows_sandbox::sandbox_bin_dir;
use codex_windows_sandbox::sandbox_dir;
use codex_windows_sandbox::sandbox_secrets_dir;
@@ -88,7 +90,6 @@ struct Payload {
write_roots: Vec<PathBuf>,
#[serde(default)]
deny_write_paths: Vec<PathBuf>,
#[allow(dead_code)]
#[serde(default)]
protected_metadata_targets: Vec<ProtectedMetadataTarget>,
proxy_ports: Vec<u16>,
@@ -820,6 +821,66 @@ fn run_setup_full(payload: &Payload, log: &mut File, sbx_dir: &Path) -> Result<(
}
}
for target in &payload.protected_metadata_targets {
if !matches!(target.mode, ProtectedMetadataMode::ExistingDeny) {
continue;
}
let deny_paths = protected_metadata_existing_deny_paths(&target.path);
if deny_paths.is_empty() {
log_line(
log,
&format!(
"protected metadata {} missing during setup; skipping",
target.path.display()
),
)?;
continue;
}
for path in deny_paths {
if !seen_deny_paths.insert(path.clone()) {
continue;
}
if std::fs::symlink_metadata(&path).is_err() {
log_line(
log,
&format!(
"protected metadata {} missing during setup; skipping",
path.display()
),
)?;
continue;
}
let canonical_path = canonicalize_path(&path);
let deny_psid = if canonical_path.starts_with(&canonical_command_cwd) {
workspace_psid
} else {
cap_psid
};
match unsafe { add_deny_write_ace(&path, deny_psid) } {
Ok(true) => {
log_line(
log,
&format!("applied deny ACE to protect metadata {}", path.display()),
)?;
}
Ok(false) => {}
Err(err) => {
refresh_errors.push(format!(
"metadata deny ACE failed on {}: {err}",
path.display()
));
log_line(
log,
&format!("metadata deny ACE failed on {}: {err}", path.display()),
)?;
}
}
}
}
lock_sandbox_dir(
&sandbox_bin_dir(&payload.codex_home),
&payload.real_user,

View File

@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ pub(crate) fn allow_null_device_for_workspace_write(is_workspace_write: bool) {
}
}
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub(crate) fn apply_legacy_session_acl_rules(
policy: &SandboxPolicy,
sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
@@ -220,9 +221,11 @@ pub(crate) fn apply_legacy_session_acl_rules(
psid_generic: &LocalSid,
psid_workspace: Option<&LocalSid>,
persist_aces: bool,
additional_deny_paths: &[PathBuf],
) -> Vec<PathBuf> {
let AllowDenyPaths { allow, deny } =
let AllowDenyPaths { allow, mut deny } =
compute_allow_paths(policy, sandbox_policy_cwd, current_dir, env_map);
deny.extend(additional_deny_paths.iter().cloned());
let mut guards: Vec<PathBuf> = Vec::new();
let canonical_cwd = canonicalize_path(current_dir);
unsafe {

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@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ use crate::ipc_framed::EmptyPayload;
use crate::ipc_framed::FramedMessage;
use crate::ipc_framed::Message;
use crate::ipc_framed::SpawnRequest;
use crate::protected_metadata::prepare_protected_metadata_targets;
use crate::runner_client::spawn_runner_transport;
use crate::setup::ProtectedMetadataTarget;
use crate::spawn_prep::prepare_elevated_spawn_context;
@@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_windows_sandbox_session_elevated(
protected_metadata_targets,
)?;
let protected_metadata_guard = prepare_protected_metadata_targets(protected_metadata_targets);
let spawn_request = SpawnRequest {
command: command.clone(),
cwd: cwd.to_path_buf(),
@@ -102,6 +104,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_windows_sandbox_session_elevated(
stdout_tx,
stderr_rx.as_ref().map(|(tx, _rx)| tx.clone()),
exit_tx,
Some(protected_metadata_guard),
);
Ok(finish_driver_spawn(

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ use crate::process::StderrMode;
use crate::process::StdinMode;
use crate::process::read_handle_loop;
use crate::process::spawn_process_with_pipes;
use crate::protected_metadata::ProtectedMetadataGuard;
use crate::protected_metadata::prepare_protected_metadata_targets;
use crate::setup::ProtectedMetadataTarget;
use crate::spawn_prep::LocalSid;
use crate::spawn_prep::allow_null_device_for_workspace_write;
@@ -206,10 +208,11 @@ fn finalize_exit(
output_join: std::thread::JoinHandle<()>,
guards: Vec<PathBuf>,
cap_sid: Option<String>,
protected_metadata_guard: ProtectedMetadataGuard,
logs_base_dir: Option<&Path>,
command: Vec<String>,
) {
let exit_code = {
let mut exit_code = {
let mut raw_exit = 1u32;
if let Ok(guard) = process_handle.lock()
&& let Some(handle) = guard.as_ref()
@@ -223,6 +226,21 @@ fn finalize_exit(
};
let _ = output_join.join();
let protected_metadata_failure =
match protected_metadata_guard.cleanup_created_monitored_paths() {
Ok(paths) => {
if !paths.is_empty() && exit_code == 0 {
exit_code = 1;
}
None
}
Err(err) => {
if exit_code == 0 {
exit_code = 1;
}
Some(format!("protected metadata cleanup failed: {err:#}"))
}
};
let _ = exit_tx.send(exit_code);
unsafe {
@@ -236,7 +254,9 @@ fn finalize_exit(
}
}
if exit_code == 0 {
if let Some(message) = protected_metadata_failure {
log_failure(&command, &message, logs_base_dir);
} else if exit_code == 0 {
log_success(&command, logs_base_dir);
} else {
log_failure(&command, &format!("exit code {exit_code}"), logs_base_dir);
@@ -290,7 +310,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_windows_sandbox_session_legacy(
timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
tty: bool,
stdin_open: bool,
_protected_metadata_targets: &[ProtectedMetadataTarget],
protected_metadata_targets: &[ProtectedMetadataTarget],
use_private_desktop: bool,
) -> Result<SpawnedProcess> {
let common = prepare_legacy_spawn_context(
@@ -309,6 +329,9 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_windows_sandbox_session_legacy(
allow_null_device_for_workspace_write(common.is_workspace_write);
let persist_aces = common.is_workspace_write;
let protected_metadata_guard = prepare_protected_metadata_targets(protected_metadata_targets);
let additional_deny_write_paths: Vec<PathBuf> =
protected_metadata_guard.deny_paths().cloned().collect();
let guards = apply_legacy_session_acl_rules(
&common.policy,
sandbox_policy_cwd,
@@ -317,6 +340,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_windows_sandbox_session_legacy(
&security.psid_generic,
security.psid_workspace.as_ref(),
persist_aces,
&additional_deny_write_paths,
);
let (writer_tx, writer_rx) = mpsc::channel::<Vec<u8>>(128);
@@ -408,6 +432,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_windows_sandbox_session_legacy(
output_join,
guards_for_wait,
cap_sid_for_wait,
protected_metadata_guard,
common.logs_base_dir.as_deref(),
command_for_wait,
);

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ use crate::ipc_framed::ResizePayload;
use crate::ipc_framed::StdinPayload;
use crate::ipc_framed::decode_bytes;
use crate::ipc_framed::encode_bytes;
use crate::protected_metadata::ProtectedMetadataGuard;
use anyhow::Result;
use codex_utils_pty::ProcessDriver;
use codex_utils_pty::SpawnedProcess;
@@ -97,6 +98,7 @@ pub(crate) fn start_runner_stdout_reader(
stdout_tx: broadcast::Sender<Vec<u8>>,
stderr_tx: Option<broadcast::Sender<Vec<u8>>>,
exit_tx: oneshot::Sender<i32>,
protected_metadata_guard: Option<ProtectedMetadataGuard>,
) {
std::thread::spawn(move || {
loop {
@@ -140,7 +142,27 @@ pub(crate) fn start_runner_stdout_reader(
}
}
Message::Exit { payload } => {
let _ = exit_tx.send(payload.exit_code);
let mut exit_code = payload.exit_code;
if let Some(protected_metadata_guard) = protected_metadata_guard {
match protected_metadata_guard.cleanup_created_monitored_paths() {
Ok(paths) => {
if !paths.is_empty() && exit_code == 0 {
exit_code = 1;
}
}
Err(err) => {
send_runner_error(
&format!("protected metadata cleanup failed: {err:#}"),
&stdout_tx,
stderr_tx.as_ref(),
);
if exit_code == 0 {
exit_code = 1;
}
}
}
}
let _ = exit_tx.send(exit_code);
break;
}
Message::Error { payload } => {