core: adopt host_executable() rules in zsh-fork

This commit is contained in:
Michael Bolin
2026-02-27 13:04:11 -08:00
parent b148d98e0e
commit acf683899c
2 changed files with 179 additions and 22 deletions

View File

@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ use crate::tools::sandboxing::SandboxablePreference;
use crate::tools::sandboxing::ToolCtx;
use crate::tools::sandboxing::ToolError;
use codex_execpolicy::Decision;
use codex_execpolicy::Evaluation;
use codex_execpolicy::MatchOptions;
use codex_execpolicy::Policy;
use codex_execpolicy::RuleMatch;
use codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel;
@@ -493,28 +495,16 @@ impl EscalationPolicy for CoreShellActionProvider {
.await;
}
let command = join_program_and_argv(program, argv);
let (commands, used_complex_parsing) =
if let Some(commands) = parse_shell_lc_plain_commands(&command) {
(commands, false)
} else if let Some(single_command) = parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&command) {
(vec![single_command], true)
} else {
(vec![command.clone()], false)
};
let fallback = |cmd: &[String]| {
crate::exec_policy::render_decision_for_unmatched_command(
self.approval_policy,
&self.sandbox_policy,
cmd,
self.sandbox_permissions,
used_complex_parsing,
)
};
let evaluation = {
let policy = self.policy.read().await;
policy.check_multiple(commands.iter(), &fallback)
evaluate_intercepted_exec_policy(
&policy,
program,
argv,
self.approval_policy,
&self.sandbox_policy,
self.sandbox_permissions,
)
};
// When true, means the Evaluation was due to *.rules, not the
// fallback function.
@@ -552,6 +542,56 @@ impl EscalationPolicy for CoreShellActionProvider {
}
}
fn evaluate_intercepted_exec_policy(
policy: &Policy,
program: &AbsolutePathBuf,
argv: &[String],
approval_policy: AskForApproval,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions,
) -> Evaluation {
let (commands, used_complex_parsing) = commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy(program, argv);
let fallback = |cmd: &[String]| {
crate::exec_policy::render_decision_for_unmatched_command(
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy,
cmd,
sandbox_permissions,
used_complex_parsing,
)
};
policy.check_multiple_with_options(
commands.iter(),
&fallback,
&MatchOptions {
resolve_host_executables: true,
},
)
}
fn commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy(
program: &AbsolutePathBuf,
argv: &[String],
) -> (Vec<Vec<String>>, bool) {
if let [_, flag, script] = argv {
let shell_command = [
program.to_string_lossy().to_string(),
flag.clone(),
script.clone(),
];
if let Some(commands) = parse_shell_lc_plain_commands(&shell_command) {
return (commands, false);
}
if let Some(single_command) = parse_shell_lc_single_command_prefix(&shell_command) {
return (vec![single_command], true);
}
}
(vec![join_program_and_argv(program, argv)], false)
}
struct CoreShellCommandExecutor {
command: Vec<String>,
cwd: PathBuf,

View File

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ use super::CoreShellActionProvider;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use super::CoreShellCommandExecutor;
use super::ParsedShellCommand;
use super::commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy;
use super::evaluate_intercepted_exec_policy;
use super::extract_shell_script;
use super::join_program_and_argv;
use super::map_exec_result;
@@ -12,14 +14,16 @@ use crate::config::Permissions;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use crate::config::types::ShellEnvironmentPolicy;
use crate::exec::SandboxType;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use crate::protocol::AskForApproval;
use crate::protocol::ReadOnlyAccess;
use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use crate::sandboxing::SandboxPermissions;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use crate::seatbelt::MACOS_PATH_TO_SEATBELT_EXECUTABLE;
use codex_execpolicy::Decision;
use codex_execpolicy::Evaluation;
use codex_execpolicy::PolicyParser;
use codex_execpolicy::RuleMatch;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel;
use codex_protocol::models::FileSystemPermissions;
@@ -36,8 +40,25 @@ use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::time::Duration;
fn host_absolute_path(segments: &[&str]) -> String {
let mut path = if cfg!(windows) {
PathBuf::from(r"C:\")
} else {
PathBuf::from("/")
};
for segment in segments {
path.push(segment);
}
path.to_string_lossy().into_owned()
}
fn starlark_string(value: &str) -> String {
value.replace('\\', "\\\\").replace('"', "\\\"")
}
#[test]
fn extract_shell_script_preserves_login_flag() {
assert_eq!(
@@ -126,6 +147,24 @@ fn join_program_and_argv_replaces_original_argv_zero() {
);
}
#[test]
fn commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy_uses_program_path_for_shell_wrapper_parsing() {
let program = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(host_absolute_path(&["bin", "bash"])).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
commands_for_intercepted_exec_policy(
&program,
&["not-bash".into(), "-lc".into(), "git status && pwd".into()],
),
(
vec![
vec!["git".to_string(), "status".to_string()],
vec!["pwd".to_string()],
],
false,
)
);
}
#[test]
fn map_exec_result_preserves_stdout_and_stderr() {
let out = map_exec_result(
@@ -203,6 +242,84 @@ fn shell_request_escalation_execution_is_explicit() {
);
}
#[test]
fn intercepted_exec_policy_uses_host_executable_mappings() {
let git_path = host_absolute_path(&["usr", "bin", "git"]);
let git_path_literal = starlark_string(&git_path);
let policy_src = format!(
r#"
prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "status"], decision = "prompt")
host_executable(name = "git", paths = ["{git_path_literal}"])
"#
);
let mut parser = PolicyParser::new();
parser.parse("test.rules", &policy_src).unwrap();
let policy = parser.build();
let program = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(git_path).unwrap();
let evaluation = evaluate_intercepted_exec_policy(
&policy,
&program,
&["git".to_string(), "status".to_string()],
AskForApproval::OnRequest,
&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
);
assert_eq!(
evaluation,
Evaluation {
decision: Decision::Prompt,
matched_rules: vec![RuleMatch::PrefixRuleMatch {
matched_prefix: vec!["git".to_string(), "status".to_string()],
decision: Decision::Prompt,
resolved_program: Some(program),
justification: None,
}],
}
);
assert!(CoreShellActionProvider::decision_driven_by_policy(
&evaluation.matched_rules,
evaluation.decision
));
}
#[test]
fn intercepted_exec_policy_rejects_disallowed_host_executable_mapping() {
let allowed_git = host_absolute_path(&["usr", "bin", "git"]);
let other_git = host_absolute_path(&["opt", "homebrew", "bin", "git"]);
let allowed_git_literal = starlark_string(&allowed_git);
let policy_src = format!(
r#"
prefix_rule(pattern = ["git", "status"], decision = "prompt")
host_executable(name = "git", paths = ["{allowed_git_literal}"])
"#
);
let mut parser = PolicyParser::new();
parser.parse("test.rules", &policy_src).unwrap();
let policy = parser.build();
let program = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(other_git.clone()).unwrap();
let evaluation = evaluate_intercepted_exec_policy(
&policy,
&program,
&["git".to_string(), "status".to_string()],
AskForApproval::OnRequest,
&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
);
assert!(matches!(
evaluation.matched_rules.as_slice(),
[RuleMatch::HeuristicsRuleMatch { command, .. }]
if command == &vec![other_git, "status".to_string()]
));
assert!(!CoreShellActionProvider::decision_driven_by_policy(
&evaluation.matched_rules,
evaluation.decision
));
}
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
#[tokio::test]
async fn prepare_escalated_exec_turn_default_preserves_macos_seatbelt_extensions() {