Handle allow-hook updatedPermissions for exec-rule AddRules suggestions and apply the selected updates to session, project, or user rule state.
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Expose top-level permission suggestions in PermissionRequest hook inputs and build them from source approval context so deferred unified-exec network retries carry the same suggestion data as immediate approval paths.
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Remove the approval-attempt enum and let callers provide the final permission-request hook run id suffix directly. This keeps retry hook runs unique without carrying an extra cross-crate type.\n\nCo-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Keep PermissionRequest hook payloads focused on tool identity and the actionable command details. For Bash and exec_command hooks, plumb request justification into tool_input.description when present. For NetworkAccess hooks, pass the originating command and a network-access <domain> description instead of the old approval context envelope.
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Replace stringly approval-attempt plumbing with a shared enum, centralize approval decision handling in the orchestrator, and document plus test the reserved PermissionRequest output fields.
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Select Current Thread startup context by budget from newest turns, cap
each rendered turn at 300 approximate tokens, and add formatter plus
integration snapshot coverage.
## Summary
- leave the default contributor devcontainer on its lightweight
platform-only Docker runtime
- install bubblewrap in setuid mode only in the secure devcontainer
image for running Codex inside Docker
- add Docker run args to the secure profile for bubblewrap's required
capabilities
- use explicit `seccomp=unconfined` and `apparmor=unconfined` in the
secure profile instead of shipping a custom seccomp profile
- document that the relaxed Docker security options are scoped to the
secure profile
## Why
Docker's default seccomp profile blocks bubblewrap with `pivot_root:
Operation not permitted`, even when the container has `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`.
Docker's default AppArmor profile also blocks bubblewrap with `Failed to
make / slave: Permission denied`.
A custom seccomp profile works, but it is hard for customers to audit
and understand. Using Docker's standard `seccomp=unconfined` option is
clearer: the secure profile intentionally relaxes Docker's outer sandbox
just enough for Codex to construct its own bubblewrap/seccomp sandbox
inside the container. The default contributor profile does not get these
expanded runtime settings.
## Validation
- `sed '/\\/\\*/,/\\*\\//d' .devcontainer/devcontainer.json | jq empty`
- `jq empty .devcontainer/devcontainer.secure.json`
- `git diff --check`
- `docker build --platform=linux/arm64 -t
codex-devcontainer-bwrap-test-arm64 ./.devcontainer`
- `docker build --platform=linux/arm64 -f
.devcontainer/Dockerfile.secure -t
codex-devcontainer-secure-bwrap-test-arm64 .`
- interactive `docker run -it` smoke tests:
- verified non-root users `ubuntu` and `vscode`
- verified secure image `/usr/bin/bwrap` is setuid
- verified user/pid namespace, user/network namespace, and preserved-fd
`--ro-bind-data` bwrap commands
- reran secure-image smoke test with simplified `seccomp=unconfined`
setup:
- `bwrap-basic-ok`
- `bwrap-netns-ok`
- `codex-ok`
- ran Codex inside the secure image:
- `codex --version` -> `codex-cli 0.120.0`
- `codex sandbox linux --full-auto -- /bin/sh -lc '...'` -> exited 0 and
printed `codex-inner-ok`
Note: direct `bwrap --proc /proc` is still denied by this Docker
runtime, and Codex's existing proc-mount preflight fallback handles that
by retrying without `--proc`.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- update the guardian timeout guidance to say permission approval review
timed out
- simplify the retry guidance to say retry once or ask the user for
guidance or explicit approval
## Testing
- cargo test -p codex-core
guardian_timeout_message_distinguishes_timeout_from_policy_denial
- cargo test -p codex-core
guardian_review_decision_maps_to_mcp_tool_decision
**Summary**
This PR treats Guardian timeouts as distinct from explicit denials in
the core approval paths.
Timeouts now return timeout-specific guidance instead of Guardian
policy-rejection messaging.
It updates the command, shell, network, and MCP approval flows and adds
focused test coverage.
Addresses #17303
Problem: The standalone codex-tui entrypoint only printed token usage on
exit, so resumable sessions could omit the codex resume footer even when
thread metadata was available.
Solution: Format codex-tui exit output from AppExitInfo so it includes
the same resume hint as the main CLI and reports fatal exits
consistently.
Addresses #17311
Problem: `/stop` stops background terminals, but `/ps` can still show
stale entries because the TUI process cache is cleared only after later
exec end events arrive.
Solution: Clear the TUI's tracked unified exec process list and footer
immediately when `/stop` submits background terminal cleanup.
Addresses #17353
Problem: Codex rate-limit fetching failed when the backend returned the
new `prolite` subscription plan type.
Solution: Add `prolite` to the backend/account/auth plan mappings, keep
unknown WHAM plan values decodable, and regenerate app-server plan
schemas.
# External (non-OpenAI) Pull Request Requirements
Before opening this Pull Request, please read the dedicated
"Contributing" markdown file or your PR may be closed:
https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/main/docs/contributing.md
If your PR conforms to our contribution guidelines, replace this text
with a detailed and high quality description of your changes.
Include a link to a bug report or enhancement request.
Problem: The automatic issue labeler still treated agent-related issues
as one broad category, even though more specific agent-area labels now
exist.
Solution: Update the issue labeler prompt to prefer the new agent-area
labels and keep "agent" as the fallback for uncategorized core agent
issues.
Addresses #17276
Problem: Closing the terminal while the TUI input stream is pending
could leave the app outside the normal shutdown path, which is risky
when an approval prompt is active.
Solution: Treat a closed TUI input stream as ShutdownFirst so existing
thread shutdown behavior cancels pending work and approvals before exit.
# TL;DR
- Adds recognized slash commands to the TUI's local in-session recall
history.
- This is the MVP of the whole feature: it keeps slash-command recall
local only: nothing is written to persistent history, app-server
history, or core history storage.
- Treats slash commands like submitted text once they parse as a known
built-in command, regardless of whether command dispatch later succeeds.
# Problem
Slash commands are handled outside the normal message submission path,
so they could clear the composer without becoming part of the local
Up-arrow recall list. That made command-heavy workflows awkward: after
running `/diff`, `/rename Better title`, `/plan investigate this`, or
even a valid command that reports a usage error, users had to retype the
command instead of recalling and editing it like a normal prompt.
The goal of this PR is to make slash commands feel like submitted input
inside the current TUI session while keeping the change deliberately
local. This is not persistent history yet; it only affects the
composer's in-memory recall behavior.
# Mental model
The composer owns draft state and local recall. When slash input parses
as a recognized built-in command, the composer stages the submitted
command text before returning `InputResult::Command` or
`InputResult::CommandWithArgs`. `ChatWidget` then dispatches the command
and records the staged entry once dispatch returns to the input-result
path.
Command-name recognition is the only validation before local recall. A
valid slash command is recallable whether it succeeds, fails with a
usage error, no-ops, is unavailable while a task is running, or is
skipped by command-specific logic. An unrecognized slash command is
different: it is restored as a draft, surfaces the existing
unrecognized-command message, and is not added to recall.
Bare commands recalled from typed text use the trimmed submitted draft.
Commands selected from the popup record the canonical command text, such
as `/diff`, rather than the partial filter text the user typed. Inline
commands with arguments keep the original command invocation available
locally even when their arguments are later prepared through the normal
submission pipeline.
# Non-goals
Persisting slash commands across sessions is intentionally out of scope.
This change does not modify app-server history, core history storage,
protocol events, or message submission semantics.
This does not change command availability, command side effects, popup
filtering, command parsing, or the semantics of unsupported commands. It
only changes whether recognized slash-command invocations are available
through local Up-arrow recall after the user submits them.
# Tradeoffs
The main tradeoff is that recall is based on command recognition, not
command outcome. This intentionally favors a simpler user model: if the
TUI accepted the input as a slash command, the user can recall and edit
that input just like plain text. That means valid-but-unsuccessful
invocations such as usage errors are recallable, which is useful when
the next action is usually to edit and retry.
The previous accept/reject design required command dispatch to report a
boolean outcome, which made the dispatcher API noisier and forced every
branch to decide history behavior. This version keeps the dispatch APIs
as side-effect-only methods and localizes history recording to the
slash-command input path.
Inline command handling still avoids double-recording by preparing
inline arguments without using the normal message-submission history
path. The staged slash-command entry remains the single local recall
record for the command invocation.
# Architecture
`ChatComposer` stages a pending `HistoryEntry` when recognized
slash-command input is promoted into an input result. The pending entry
mirrors the existing local history payload shape so recall can restore
text elements, local images, remote images, mention bindings, and
pending paste state when those are present.
`BottomPane` exposes a narrow method for recording that staged command
entry because it owns the composer. `ChatWidget` records the staged
entry after dispatching a recognized command from the input-result
match. Valid commands rejected before they reach `ChatWidget`, such as
commands unavailable while a task is running, are staged and recorded in
the composer path that detects the rejection.
Slash-command dispatch itself now lives in
`chatwidget/slash_dispatch.rs` so the behavior is reviewable without
adding more weight to `chatwidget.rs`. The extraction is
behavior-preserving: the dispatch match arms stay intact, while the
input flow in `chatwidget.rs` remains the single place that connects
submitted slash-command input to dispatch.
# Observability
There is no new logging because this is a local UI recall behavior and
the result is directly visible through Up-arrow recall. The practical
debug path is to trace Enter through
`ChatComposer::try_dispatch_bare_slash_command`,
`ChatComposer::try_dispatch_slash_command_with_args`, or popup Enter/Tab
handling, then confirm the recognized command is staged before dispatch
and recorded exactly once afterward.
If a valid command unexpectedly does not appear in recall, check whether
the input path staged slash history before clearing the composer and
whether it used the `ChatWidget` slash-dispatch wrapper. If an
unrecognized command unexpectedly appears in recall, check the parser
branch that should restore the draft instead of staging history.
# Tests
Composer-level tests cover staging and recording for a bare typed slash
command, a popup-selected command, and an inline command with arguments.
Chat-widget tests cover valid commands being recallable after normal
dispatch, inline dispatch, usage errors, task-running unavailability,
no-op stub dispatch, and command-specific skip behavior such as `/init`
when an instructions file already exists. They also cover the negative
case: unrecognized slash commands are not added to local recall.
## Summary
- Add an optional `tags` dictionary to feedback upload params.
- Capture the active app-server turn id in the TUI and submit it as
`tags.turn_id` with `/feedback` uploads.
- Merge client-provided feedback tags into Sentry feedback tags while
preserving reserved system fields like `thread_id`, `classification`,
`cli_version`, `session_source`, and `reason`.
## Behavior / impact
Existing feedback upload callers remain compatible because `tags` is
optional and nullable. The wire shape is still a normal JSON object /
TypeScript dictionary, so adding future feedback metadata will not
require a new top-level protocol field each time. This change only adds
feedback metadata for Codex CLI/TUI uploads; it does not affect existing
pipelines, DAGs, exports, or downstream consumers unless they choose to
read the new `turn_id` feedback tag.
## Tests
- `cargo fmt -- --config imports_granularity=Item` passed; stable
rustfmt warned that `imports_granularity` is nightly-only.
- `cargo run -p codex-app-server-protocol --bin write_schema_fixtures`
- `cargo test -p codex-feedback
upload_tags_include_client_tags_and_preserve_reserved_fields`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol
schema_fixtures_match_generated`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui build_feedback_upload_params`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui
live_app_server_turn_started_sets_feedback_turn_id`
- `cargo check -p codex-app-server --tests`
- `git diff --check`
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Description
Keeps the existing Codex contributor devcontainer in place and adds a
separate secure profile for customer use.
## What changed
- leaves `.devcontainer/devcontainer.json` and the contributor
`Dockerfile` aligned with `main`
- adds `.devcontainer/devcontainer.secure.json` and
`.devcontainer/Dockerfile.secure`
- adds secure-profile bootstrap scripts:
- `post_install.py`
- `post-start.sh`
- `init-firewall.sh`
- updates `.devcontainer/README.md` to explain when to use each path
## Secure profile behavior
The new secure profile is opt-in and is meant for running Codex in a
stricter project container:
- preinstalls the Codex CLI plus common build tools
- uses persistent volumes for Codex state, Cargo, Rustup, and GitHub
auth
- applies an allowlist-driven outbound firewall at startup
- blocks IPv6 by default so the allowlist cannot be bypassed via AAAA
routes
- keeps the stricter networking isolated from the default contributor
workflow
## Resulting behavior
- `devcontainer.json` remains the low-friction Codex contributor setup
- `devcontainer.secure.json` is the customer-facing secure option
- the repo supports both workflows without forcing the secure profile on
Codex contributors
Addresses #17302
Problem: `thread/list` compared cwd filters with raw path equality, so
`resume --last` could miss Windows sessions when the saved cwd used a
verbatim path form and the current cwd did not.
Solution: Normalize cwd comparisons through the existing path comparison
utilities before falling back to direct equality, and add Windows
regression coverage for verbatim paths. I made this a general utility
function and replaced all of the duplicated instance of it across the
code base.
## Summary
- Update the marketplace add local-source integration test to pass an
explicit relative local path.
- Keep the change test-only; no CLI source parsing behavior changes.
## Tests
- cargo fmt -p codex-cli
- cargo test -p codex-cli --test marketplace_add
## Impact
- Production behavior is unchanged.
- No impact to feedback upload logic, DAGs, exports, or downstream
pipelines.
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- keep hostname targets proxied by default by removing hostname suffixes
from the managed `NO_PROXY` value while preserving private/link-local
CIDRs
- make the macOS `allow_local_binding` sandbox rules match the local
socket shape used by DNS tools by allowing wildcard local binds
- allow raw DNS egress to remote port 53 only when `allow_local_binding`
is enabled, without opening blanket outbound network access
## Root cause
Raw DNS tools do not honor `HTTP_PROXY` or `ALL_PROXY`, so the
proxy-only Seatbelt policy blocked their resolver traffic before it
could reach host DNS. In the affected managed config,
`allow_local_binding = true`, but the existing rule only allowed
`localhost:*` binds; `dig`/BIND can bind sockets in a way that needs
wildcard local binding. Separately, hostname suffixes in `NO_PROXY`
could force internal hostnames to resolve locally instead of through the
proxy path.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Problem: The TUI still depended on `codex-core` directly in a number of
places, and we had no enforcement from keeping this problem from getting
worse.
Solution: Route TUI core access through
`codex-app-server-client::legacy_core`, add CI enforcement for that
boundary, and re-export this legacy bridge inside the TUI as
`crate::legacy_core` so the remaining call sites stay readable. There is
no functional change in this PR — just changes to import targets.
Over time, we can whittle away at the remaining symbols in this legacy
namespace with the eventual goal of removing them all. In the meantime,
this linter rule will prevent us from inadvertently importing new
symbols from core.
## Summary
- Add `TimedOut` to Guardian/review carrier types:
- `ReviewDecision::TimedOut`
- `GuardianAssessmentStatus::TimedOut`
- app-server v2 `GuardianApprovalReviewStatus::TimedOut`
- Regenerate app-server JSON/TypeScript schemas for the new wire shape.
- Wire the new status through core/app-server/TUI mappings with
conservative fail-closed handling.
- Keep `TimedOut` non-user-selectable in the approval UI.
**Does not change runtime behavior yet; emitting `TimeOut` and
parent-model timeout messaging will come in followup PRs**
Problem: The Windows exec-server test command could let separator
whitespace become part of `echo` output, making the exact
retained-output assertion flaky.
Solution: Tighten the Windows `cmd.exe` command by placing command
separators directly after the echoed tokens so stdout remains
deterministic while preserving the exact assertion.
Added a new top-level `codex marketplace add` command for installing
plugin marketplaces into Codex’s local marketplace cache.
This change adds source parsing for local directories, GitHub shorthand,
and git URLs, supports optional `--ref` and git-only `--sparse` checkout
paths, stages the source in a temp directory, validates the marketplace
manifest, and installs it under
`$CODEX_HOME/marketplaces/<marketplace-name>`
Included tests cover local install behavior in the CLI and marketplace
discovery from installed roots in core. Scoped formatting and fix passes
were run, and targeted CLI/core tests passed.
## Summary
- preserve logical symlink paths during permission normalization and
config cwd handling
- bind real targets for symlinked readable/writable roots in bwrap and
remap carveouts and unreadable roots there
- add regressions for symlinked carveouts and nested symlink escape
masking
## Root cause
Permission normalization canonicalized symlinked writable roots and cwd
to their real targets too early. That drifted policy checks away from
the logical paths the sandboxed process can actually address, while
bwrap still needed the real targets for mounts. The mismatch caused
shell and apply_patch failures on symlinked writable roots.
## Impact
Fixes#15781.
Also fixes#17079:
- #17079 is the protected symlinked carveout side: bwrap now binds the
real symlinked writable-root target and remaps carveouts before masking.
Related to #15157:
- #15157 is the broader permission-check side of this path-identity
problem. This PR addresses the shared logical-vs-canonical normalization
issue, but the reported Darwin prompt behavior should be validated
separately before auto-closing it.
This should also fix#14672, #14694, #14715, and #15725:
- #14672, #14694, and #14715 are the same Linux
symlinked-writable-root/bwrap family as #15781.
- #15725 is the protected symlinked workspace path variant; the PR
preserves the protected logical path in policy space while bwrap applies
read-only or unreadable treatment to the resolved target so
file-vs-directory bind mismatches do not abort sandbox setup.
## Notes
- Added Linux-only regressions for symlinked writable ancestors and
protected symlinked directory targets, including nested symlink escape
masking without rebinding the escape target writable.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
