## Summary
- preserve legacy Windows elevated sandbox behavior for existing
policies
- add elevated-only support for split filesystem policies that can be
represented as readable-root overrides, writable-root overrides, and
extra deny-write carveouts
- resolve those elevated filesystem overrides during sandbox transform
and thread them through setup and policy refresh
- keep failing closed for explicit unreadable (`none`) carveouts and
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts
- for explicit read-only-under-writable-root carveouts, materialize
missing carveout directories during elevated setup before applying the
deny-write ACL
- document the elevated vs restricted-token support split in the core
README
## Example
Given a split filesystem policy like:
```toml
":root" = "read"
":cwd" = "write"
"./docs" = "read"
"C:/scratch" = "write"
```
the elevated backend now provisions the readable-root overrides,
writable-root overrides, and extra deny-write carveouts during setup and
refresh instead of collapsing back to the legacy workspace-only shape.
If a read-only carveout under a writable root is missing at setup time,
elevated setup creates that carveout as an empty directory before
applying its deny-write ACE; otherwise the sandboxed command could
create it later and bypass the carveout. This is only for explicit
policy carveouts. Best-effort workspace protections like `.codex/` and
`.agents/` still skip missing directories.
A policy like:
```toml
"/workspace" = "write"
"/workspace/docs" = "read"
"/workspace/docs/tmp" = "write"
```
still fails closed, because the elevated backend does not reopen
writable descendants under read-only carveouts yet.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
`argument-comment-lint` was green in CI even though the repo still had
many uncommented literal arguments. The main gap was target coverage:
the repo wrapper did not force Cargo to inspect test-only call sites, so
examples like the `latest_session_lookup_params(true, ...)` tests in
`codex-rs/tui_app_server/src/lib.rs` never entered the blocking CI path.
This change cleans up the existing backlog, makes the default repo lint
path cover all Cargo targets, and starts rolling that stricter CI
enforcement out on the platform where it is currently validated.
## What changed
- mechanically fixed existing `argument-comment-lint` violations across
the `codex-rs` workspace, including tests, examples, and benches
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` and
`tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` so non-`--fix` runs default to
`--all-targets` unless the caller explicitly narrows the target set
- fixed both wrappers so forwarded cargo arguments after `--` are
preserved with a single separator
- documented the new default behavior in
`tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`
- updated `rust-ci` so the macOS lint lane keeps the plain wrapper
invocation and therefore enforces `--all-targets`, while Linux and
Windows temporarily pass `-- --lib --bins`
That temporary CI split keeps the stricter all-targets check where it is
already cleaned up, while leaving room to finish the remaining Linux-
and Windows-specific target-gated cleanup before enabling
`--all-targets` on those runners. The Linux and Windows failures on the
intermediate revision were caused by the wrapper forwarding bug, not by
additional lint findings in those lanes.
## Validation
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh`
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --lib --bins`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --tests`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test` in `tools/argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test -p codex-terminal-detection`
## Follow-up
- Clean up remaining Linux-only target-gated callsites, then switch the
Linux lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
- Clean up remaining Windows-only target-gated callsites, then switch
the Windows lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
## Summary
This PR makes Windows sandbox proxying enforceable by routing proxy-only
runs through the existing `offline` sandbox user and reserving direct
network access for the existing `online` sandbox user.
In brief:
- if a Windows sandbox run should be proxy-enforced, we run it as the
`offline` user
- the `offline` user gets firewall rules that block direct outbound
traffic and only permit the configured localhost proxy path
- if a Windows sandbox run should have true direct network access, we
run it as the `online` user
- no new sandbox identity is introduced
This brings Windows in line with the intended model: proxy use is not
just env-based, it is backed by OS-level egress controls. Windows
already has two sandbox identities:
- `offline`: intended to have no direct network egress
- `online`: intended to have full network access
This PR makes proxy-enforced runs use that model directly.
### Proxy-enforced runs
When proxy enforcement is active:
- the run is assigned to the `offline` identity
- setup extracts the loopback proxy ports from the sandbox env
- Windows setup programs firewall rules for the `offline` user that:
- block all non-loopback outbound traffic
- block loopback UDP
- block loopback TCP except for the configured proxy ports
- optionally allow broader localhost access when `allow_local_binding=1`
So the sandboxed process can only talk to the local proxy. It cannot
open direct outbound sockets or do local UDP-based DNS on its own.The
proxy then performs the real outbound network access outside that
restricted sandbox identity.
### Direct-network runs
When proxy enforcement is not active and full network access is allowed:
- the run is assigned to the `online` identity
- no proxy-only firewall restrictions are applied
- the process gets normal direct network access
### Unelevated vs elevated
The restricted-token / unelevated path cannot enforce per-identity
firewall policy by itself.
So for Windows proxy-enforced runs, we transparently use the logon-user
sandbox path under the hood, even if the caller started from the
unelevated mode. That keeps enforcement real instead of best-effort.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
`PermissionProfile` should only describe the per-command permissions we
still want to grant dynamically. Keeping
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` in that surface forced extra macOS-only
approval, protocol, schema, and TUI branches for a capability we no
longer want to expose.
## What changed
- Removed the macOS-specific permission-profile types from
`codex-protocol`, the app-server v2 API, and the generated
schema/TypeScript artifacts.
- Deleted the core and sandboxing plumbing that threaded
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` through execution requests and seatbelt
construction.
- Simplified macOS seatbelt generation so it always includes the fixed
read-only preferences allowlist instead of carrying a configurable
profile extension.
- Removed the macOS additional-permissions UI/docs/test coverage and
deleted the obsolete macOS permission modules.
- Tightened `request_permissions` intersection handling so explicitly
empty requested read lists are preserved only when that field was
actually granted, avoiding zero-grant responses being stored as active
permissions.
Migrate `cwd` and related session/config state to `AbsolutePathBuf` so
downstream consumers consistently see absolute working directories.
Add test-only `.abs()` helpers for `Path`, `PathBuf`, and `TempDir`, and
update branch-local tests to use them instead of
`AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(...)`.
For the remaining TUI/app-server snapshot coverage that renders absolute
cwd values, keep the snapshots unchanged and skip the Windows-only cases
where the platform-specific absolute path layout differs.
## Summary
- move macOS permission merging/intersection logic and tests from
`codex-core` into `codex-sandboxing`
- move seatbelt policy builders, permissions logic, SBPL assets, and
their tests into `codex-sandboxing`
- keep `codex-core` owning only the seatbelt spawn wrapper and switch
call sites to import the moved APIs directly
## Notes
- no re-exports added
- moved the seatbelt tests with the implementation so internal helpers
could stay private
- local verification is still finishing while this PR is open
## Summary
- add a new `codex-sandboxing` crate for sandboxing extraction work
- move the pure Linux sandbox argv builders and their unit tests out of
`codex-core`
- keep `core::landlock` as the spawn wrapper and update direct callers
to use `codex_sandboxing::landlock`
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
- `cargo test -p codex-core landlock`
- `cargo test -p codex-cli debug_sandbox`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
## Notes
- this is step 1 of the move plan aimed at minimizing per-PR diffs
- no re-exports or no-op proxy methods were added
## Why
The argument-comment lint now has a packaged DotSlash artifact from
[#15198](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/15198), so the normal repo
lint path should use that released payload instead of rebuilding the
lint from source every time.
That keeps `just clippy` and CI aligned with the shipped artifact while
preserving a separate source-build path for people actively hacking on
the lint crate.
The current alpha package also exposed two integration wrinkles that the
repo-side prebuilt wrapper needs to smooth over:
- the bundled Dylint library filename includes the host triple, for
example `@nightly-2025-09-18-aarch64-apple-darwin`, and Dylint derives
`RUSTUP_TOOLCHAIN` from that filename
- on Windows, Dylint's driver path also expects `RUSTUP_HOME` to be
present in the environment
Without those adjustments, the prebuilt CI jobs fail during `cargo
metadata` or driver setup. This change makes the checked-in prebuilt
wrapper normalize the packaged library name to the plain
`nightly-2025-09-18` channel before invoking `cargo-dylint`, and it
teaches both the wrapper and the packaged runner source to infer
`RUSTUP_HOME` from `rustup show home` when the environment does not
already provide it.
After the prebuilt Windows lint job started running successfully, it
also surfaced a handful of existing anonymous literal callsites in
`windows-sandbox-rs`. This PR now annotates those callsites so the new
cross-platform lint job is green on the current tree.
## What Changed
- checked in the current
`tools/argument-comment-lint/argument-comment-lint` DotSlash manifest
- kept `tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` as the source-build wrapper
for lint development
- added `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` as the
normal enforcement path, using the checked-in DotSlash package and
bundled `cargo-dylint`
- updated `just clippy` and `just argument-comment-lint` to use the
prebuilt wrapper
- split `.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml` so source-package checks live in
a dedicated `argument_comment_lint_package` job, while the released lint
runs in an `argument_comment_lint_prebuilt` matrix on Linux, macOS, and
Windows
- kept the pinned `nightly-2025-09-18` toolchain install in the prebuilt
CI matrix, since the prebuilt package still relies on rustup-provided
toolchain components
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` to
normalize host-qualified nightly library filenames, keep the `rustup`
shim directory ahead of direct toolchain `cargo` binaries, and export
`RUSTUP_HOME` when needed for Windows Dylint driver setup
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/src/bin/argument-comment-lint.rs`
so future published DotSlash artifacts apply the same nightly-filename
normalization and `RUSTUP_HOME` inference internally
- fixed the remaining Windows lint violations in
`codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs` by adding the required `/*param*/`
comments at the reported callsites
- documented the checked-in DotSlash file, wrapper split, archive
layout, nightly prerequisite, and Windows `RUSTUP_HOME` requirement in
`tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`
## Why
Once the repo-local lint exists, `codex-rs` needs to follow the
checked-in convention and CI needs to keep it from drifting. This commit
applies the fallback `/*param*/` style consistently across existing
positional literal call sites without changing those APIs.
The longer-term preference is still to avoid APIs that require comments
by choosing clearer parameter types and call shapes. This PR is
intentionally the mechanical follow-through for the places where the
existing signatures stay in place.
After rebasing onto newer `main`, the rollout also had to cover newly
introduced `tui_app_server` call sites. That made it clear the first cut
of the CI job was too expensive for the common path: it was spending
almost as much time installing `cargo-dylint` and re-testing the lint
crate as a representative test job spends running product tests. The CI
update keeps the full workspace enforcement but trims that extra
overhead from ordinary `codex-rs` PRs.
## What changed
- keep a dedicated `argument_comment_lint` job in `rust-ci`
- mechanically annotate remaining opaque positional literals across
`codex-rs` with exact `/*param*/` comments, including the rebased
`tui_app_server` call sites that now fall under the lint
- keep the checked-in style aligned with the lint policy by using
`/*param*/` and leaving string and char literals uncommented
- cache `cargo-dylint`, `dylint-link`, and the relevant Cargo
registry/git metadata in the lint job
- split changed-path detection so the lint crate's own `cargo test` step
runs only when `tools/argument-comment-lint/*` or `rust-ci.yml` changes
- continue to run the repo wrapper over the `codex-rs` workspace, so
product-code enforcement is unchanged
Most of the code changes in this commit are intentionally mechanical
comment rewrites or insertions driven by the lint itself.
## Verification
- `./tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh --workspace`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server -p codex-tui`
- parsed `.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml` locally with PyYAML
---
* -> #14652
* #14651
## Summary
- launch Windows sandboxed children on a private desktop instead of
`Winsta0\Default`
- make private desktop the default while keeping
`windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false` as the escape hatch
- centralize process launch through the shared
`create_process_as_user(...)` path
- scope the private desktop ACL to the launching logon SID
## Why
Today sandboxed Windows commands run on the visible shared desktop. That
leaves an avoidable same-desktop attack surface for window interaction,
spoofing, and related UI/input issues. This change moves sandboxed
commands onto a dedicated per-launch desktop by default so the sandbox
no longer shares `Winsta0\Default` with the user session.
The implementation stays conservative on security with no silent
fallback back to `Winsta0\Default`
If private-desktop setup fails on a machine, users can still opt out
explicitly with `windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false`.
## Validation
- `cargo build -p codex-cli`
- elevated-path `codex exec` desktop-name probe returned
`CodexSandboxDesktop-*`
- elevated-path `codex exec` smoke sweep for shell commands, nested
`pwsh`, jobs, and hidden `notepad` launch
- unelevated-path full private-desktop compatibility sweep via `codex
exec` with `-c windows.sandbox=unelevated`
## Summary
- make bubblewrap the default Linux sandbox and keep
`use_legacy_landlock` as the only override
- remove `use_linux_sandbox_bwrap` from feature, config, schema, and
docs surfaces
- update Linux sandbox selection, CLI/config plumbing, and related
tests/docs to match the new default
- fold in the follow-up CI fixes for request-permissions responses and
Linux read-only sandbox error text
**PR Summary**
This PR adds embedded-only OTEL policy audit logging for
`codex-network-proxy` and threads audit metadata from `codex-core` into
managed proxy startup.
### What changed
- Added structured audit event emission in `network_policy.rs` with
target `codex_otel.network_proxy`.
- Emitted:
- `codex.network_proxy.domain_policy_decision` once per domain-policy
evaluation.
- `codex.network_proxy.block_decision` for non-domain denies.
- Added required policy/network fields, RFC3339 UTC millisecond
`event.timestamp`, and fallback defaults (`http.request.method="none"`,
`client.address="unknown"`).
- Added non-domain deny audit emission in HTTP/SOCKS handlers for
mode-guard and proxy-state denies, including unix-socket deny paths.
- Added `REASON_UNIX_SOCKET_UNSUPPORTED` and used it for unsupported
unix-socket auditing.
- Added `NetworkProxyAuditMetadata` to runtime/state, re-exported from
`lib.rs` and `state.rs`.
- Added `start_proxy_with_audit_metadata(...)` in core config, with
`start_proxy()` delegating to default metadata.
- Wired metadata construction in `codex.rs` from session/auth context,
including originator sanitization for OTEL-safe tagging.
- Updated `network-proxy/README.md` with embedded-mode audit schema and
behavior notes.
- Refactored HTTP block-audit emission to a small local helper to reduce
duplication.
- Preserved existing unix-socket proxy-disabled host/path behavior for
responses and blocked history while using an audit-only endpoint
override (`server.address="unix-socket"`, `server.port=0`).
### Explicit exclusions
- No standalone proxy OTEL startup work.
- No `main.rs` binary wiring.
- No `standalone_otel.rs`.
- No standalone docs/tests.
### Tests
- Extended `network_policy.rs` tests for event mapping, metadata
propagation, fallbacks, timestamp format, and target prefix.
- Extended HTTP tests to assert unix-socket deny block audit events.
- Extended SOCKS tests to cover deny emission from handler deny
branches.
- Added/updated core tests to verify audit metadata threading into
managed proxy state.
### Validation run
- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-network-proxy` ✅
- `cargo test -p codex-core` ran with one unrelated flaky timeout
(`shell_snapshot::tests::snapshot_shell_does_not_inherit_stdin`), and
the test passed when rerun directly ✅
---------
Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
### Description
#### Summary
Introduces the core plumbing required for structured network approvals
#### What changed
- Added structured network policy decision modeling in core.
- Added approval payload/context types needed for network approval
semantics.
- Wired shell/unified-exec runtime plumbing to consume structured
decisions.
- Updated related core error/event surfaces for structured handling.
- Updated protocol plumbing used by core approval flow.
- Included small CLI debug sandbox compatibility updates needed by this
layer.
#### Why
establishes the minimal backend foundation for network approvals without
yet changing high-level orchestration or TUI behavior.
#### Notes
- Behavior remains constrained by existing requirements/config gating.
- Follow-up PRs in the stack handle orchestration, UX, and app-server
integration.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
## Why
We currently carry multiple permission-related concepts directly on
`Config` for shell/unified-exec behavior (`approval_policy`,
`sandbox_policy`, `network`, `shell_environment_policy`,
`windows_sandbox_mode`).
Consolidating these into one in-memory struct makes permission handling
easier to reason about and sets up the next step: supporting named
permission profiles (`[permissions.PROFILE_NAME]`) without changing
behavior now.
This change is mostly mechanical: it updates existing callsites to go
through `config.permissions`, but it does not yet refactor those
callsites to take a single `Permissions` value in places where multiple
permission fields are still threaded separately.
This PR intentionally **does not** change the on-disk `config.toml`
format yet and keeps compatibility with legacy config keys.
## What Changed
- Introduced `Permissions` in `core/src/config/mod.rs`.
- Added `Config::permissions` and moved effective runtime permission
fields under it:
- `approval_policy`
- `sandbox_policy`
- `network`
- `shell_environment_policy`
- `windows_sandbox_mode`
- Updated config loading/building so these effective values are still
derived from the same existing config inputs and constraints.
- Updated Windows sandbox helpers/resolution to read/write via
`permissions`.
- Threaded the new field through all permission consumers across core
runtime, app-server, CLI/exec, TUI, and sandbox summary code.
- Updated affected tests to reference `config.permissions.*`.
- Renamed the struct/field from
`EffectivePermissions`/`effective_permissions` to
`Permissions`/`permissions` and aligned variable naming accordingly.
## Verification
- `just fix -p codex-core -p codex-tui -p codex-cli -p codex-app-server
-p codex-exec -p codex-utils-sandbox-summary`
- `cargo build -p codex-core -p codex-tui -p codex-cli -p
codex-app-server -p codex-exec -p codex-utils-sandbox-summary`
We are removing feature-gated shared crates from the `codex-rs`
workspace. `codex-common` grouped several unrelated utilities behind
`[features]`, which made dependency boundaries harder to reason about
and worked against the ongoing effort to eliminate feature flags from
workspace crates.
Splitting these utilities into dedicated crates under `utils/` aligns
this area with existing workspace structure and keeps each dependency
explicit at the crate boundary.
## What changed
- Removed `codex-rs/common` (`codex-common`) from workspace members and
workspace dependencies.
- Added six new utility crates under `codex-rs/utils/`:
- `codex-utils-cli`
- `codex-utils-elapsed`
- `codex-utils-sandbox-summary`
- `codex-utils-approval-presets`
- `codex-utils-oss`
- `codex-utils-fuzzy-match`
- Migrated the corresponding modules out of `codex-common` into these
crates (with tests), and added matching `BUILD.bazel` targets.
- Updated direct consumers to use the new crates instead of
`codex-common`:
- `codex-rs/cli`
- `codex-rs/tui`
- `codex-rs/exec`
- `codex-rs/app-server`
- `codex-rs/mcp-server`
- `codex-rs/chatgpt`
- `codex-rs/cloud-tasks`
- Updated workspace lockfile entries to reflect the new dependency graph
and removal of `codex-common`.
As of this PR, `SessionServices` retains a
`Option<StartedNetworkProxy>`, if appropriate.
Now the `network` field on `Config` is `Option<NetworkProxySpec>`
instead of `Option<NetworkProxy>`.
Over in `Session::new()`, we invoke `NetworkProxySpec::start_proxy()` to
create the `StartedNetworkProxy`, which is a new struct that retains the
`NetworkProxy` as well as the `NetworkProxyHandle`. (Note that `Drop` is
implemented for `NetworkProxyHandle` to ensure the proxies are shutdown
when it is dropped.)
The `NetworkProxy` from the `StartedNetworkProxy` is threaded through to
the appropriate places.
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/11207).
* #11285
* __->__ #11207
## Summary
This PR introduces a gated Bubblewrap (bwrap) Linux sandbox path. The
curent Linux sandbox path relies on in-process restrictions (including
Landlock). Bubblewrap gives us a more uniform filesystem isolation
model, especially explicit writable roots with the option to make some
directories read-only and granular network controls.
This is behind a feature flag so we can validate behavior safely before
making it the default.
- Added temporary rollout flag:
- `features.use_linux_sandbox_bwrap`
- Preserved existing default path when the flag is off.
- In Bubblewrap mode:
- Added internal retry without /proc when /proc mount is not permitted
by the host/container.
This adds support for `allowed_sandbox_modes` in `requirements.toml` and
provides legacy support for constraining sandbox modes in
`managed_config.toml`. This is converted to `Constrained<SandboxPolicy>`
in `ConfigRequirements` and applied to `Config` such that constraints
are enforced throughout the harness.
Note that, because `managed_config.toml` is deprecated, we do not add
support for the new `external-sandbox` variant recently introduced in
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/8290. As noted, that variant is not
supported in `config.toml` today, but can be configured programmatically
via app server.
This PR does various types of cleanup before I can proceed with more
ambitious changes to config loading.
First, I noticed duplicated code across these two methods:
774bd9e432/codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs (L314-L324)774bd9e432/codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs (L334-L344)
This has now been consolidated in
`load_config_as_toml_with_cli_overrides()`.
Further, I noticed that `Config::load_with_cli_overrides()` took two
similar arguments:
774bd9e432/codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs (L308-L311)
The difference between `cli_overrides` and `overrides` was not
immediately obvious to me. At first glance, it appears that one should
be able to be expressed in terms of the other, but it turns out that
some fields of `ConfigOverrides` (such as `cwd` and
`codex_linux_sandbox_exe`) are, by design, not configurable via a
`.toml` file or a command-line `--config` flag.
That said, I discovered that many callers of
`Config::load_with_cli_overrides()` were passing
`ConfigOverrides::default()` for `overrides`, so I created two separate
methods:
- `Config::load_with_cli_overrides(cli_overrides: Vec<(String,
TomlValue)>)`
- `Config::load_with_cli_overrides_and_harness_overrides(cli_overrides:
Vec<(String, TomlValue)>, harness_overrides: ConfigOverrides)`
The latter has a long name, as it is _not_ what should be used in the
common case, so the extra typing is designed to draw attention to this
fact. I tried to update the existing callsites to use the shorter name,
where possible.
Further, in the cases where `ConfigOverrides` is used, usually only a
limited subset of fields are actually set, so I updated the declarations
to leverage `..Default::default()` where possible.
The `cap_sid` file contains the IDs of the two custom SIDs that the
Windows sandbox creates/manages to implement read-only and
workspace-write sandbox policies.
It previously lived in `<cwd>/.codex` which means that the sandbox could
write to it, which could degrade the efficacy of the sandbox. This
change moves it to `~/.codex/` (or wherever `CODEX_HOME` points to) so
that it is outside the workspace.
This adds a debugging tool for analyzing why certain commands fail to
execute under the sandbox.
Example output:
```
$ codex debug seatbelt --log-denials bash -lc "(echo foo > ~/foo.txt)"
bash: /Users/nornagon/foo.txt: Operation not permitted
=== Sandbox denials ===
(bash) file-write-data /dev/tty
(bash) file-write-data /dev/ttys001
(bash) sysctl-read kern.ngroups
(bash) file-write-create /Users/nornagon/foo.txt
```
It operates by:
1. spawning `log stream` to watch system logs, and
2. tracking all descendant PIDs using kqueue + proc_listchildpids.
this is a "best-effort" technique, as `log stream` may drop logs(?), and
kqueue + proc_listchildpids isn't atomic and can end up missing very
short-lived processes. But it works well enough in my testing to be
useful :)
1. scan many more directories since it's much faster than the original
implementation
2. limit overall scan time to 2s
3. skip some directories that are noisy - ApplicationData, Installer,
etc.
This allows `gh api` to work in the workspace-write sandbox w/ network
enabled. Without this we see e.g.
```
$ codex debug seatbelt --full-auto gh api repos/openai/codex/pulls --paginate -X GET -F state=all
Get "https://api.github.com/repos/openai/codex/pulls?per_page=100&state=all": tls: failed to verify certificate: x509: OSStatus -26276
```
- Added the new codex-windows-sandbox crate that builds both a library
entry point (run_windows_sandbox_capture) and a CLI executable to launch
commands inside a Windows restricted-token sandbox, including ACL
management, capability SID provisioning, network lockdown, and output
capture
(windows-sandbox-rs/src/lib.rs:167, windows-sandbox-rs/src/main.rs:54).
- Introduced the experimental WindowsSandbox feature flag and wiring so
Windows builds can opt into the sandbox:
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken, the in-process execution path, and
platform sandbox selection now honor the flag (core/src/features.rs:47,
core/src/config.rs:1224, core/src/safety.rs:19,
core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs:69, core/src/exec.rs:79,
core/src/exec.rs:172).
- Updated workspace metadata to include the new crate and its
Windows-specific dependencies so the core crate can link against it
(codex-rs/
Cargo.toml:91, core/Cargo.toml:86).
- Added a PowerShell bootstrap script that installs the Windows
toolchain, required CLI utilities, and builds the workspace to ease
development
on the platform (scripts/setup-windows.ps1:1).
- Landed a Python smoke-test suite that exercises
read-only/workspace-write policies, ACL behavior, and network denial for
the Windows sandbox
binary (windows-sandbox-rs/sandbox_smoketests.py:1).
## Summary
- Factor `load_config_as_toml` into `core::config_loader` so config
loading is reusable across callers.
- Layer `~/.codex/config.toml`, optional `~/.codex/managed_config.toml`,
and macOS managed preferences (base64) with recursive table merging and
scoped threads per source.
## Config Flow
```
Managed prefs (macOS profile: com.openai.codex/config_toml_base64)
▲
│
~/.codex/managed_config.toml │ (optional file-based override)
▲
│
~/.codex/config.toml (user-defined settings)
```
- The loader searches under the resolved `CODEX_HOME` directory
(defaults to `~/.codex`).
- Managed configs let administrators ship fleet-wide overrides via
device profiles which is useful for enforcing certain settings like
sandbox or approval defaults.
- For nested hash tables: overlays merge recursively. Child tables are
merged key-by-key, while scalar or array values replace the prior layer
entirely. This lets admins add or tweak individual fields without
clobbering unrelated user settings.
The existing `wire_format.rs` should share more types with the
`codex-protocol` crate (like `AskForApproval` instead of maintaining a
parallel `CodexToolCallApprovalPolicy` enum), so this PR moves
`wire_format.rs` into `codex-protocol`, renaming it as
`mcp-protocol.rs`. We also de-dupe types, where appropriate.
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/2423).
* #2424
* __->__ #2423
The high-order bit on this PR is that it makes it so `sandbox.rs` tests
both Mac and Linux, as we introduce a general
`spawn_command_under_sandbox()` function with platform-specific
implementations for testing.
An important, and interesting, discovery in porting the test to Linux is
that (for reasons cited in the code comments), `/dev/shm` has to be
added to `writable_roots` on Linux in order for `multiprocessing.Lock`
to work there. Granting write access to `/dev/shm` comes with some
degree of risk, so we do not make this the default for Codex CLI.
Piggybacking on top of #2317, this moves the
`python_multiprocessing_lock_works` test yet again, moving
`codex-rs/core/tests/sandbox.rs` to `codex-rs/exec/tests/sandbox.rs`
because in `codex-rs/exec/tests` we can use `cargo_bin()` like so:
```
let codex_linux_sandbox_exe = assert_cmd::cargo::cargo_bin("codex-exec");
```
which is necessary so we can use `codex_linux_sandbox_exe` and therefore
`spawn_command_under_linux_sandbox` in an integration test.
This also moves `spawn_command_under_linux_sandbox()` out of `exec.rs`
and into `landlock.rs`, which makes things more consistent with
`seatbelt.rs` in `codex-core`.
For reference, https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/1808 is the PR that
made the change to Seatbelt to get this test to pass on Mac.
At 550 lines, `exec.rs` was a bit large. In particular, I found it hard
to locate the Seatbelt-related code quickly without a file with
`seatbelt` in the name, so this refactors things so:
- `spawn_command_under_seatbelt()` and dependent code moves to a new
`seatbelt.rs` file
- `spawn_child_async()` and dependent code moves to a new `spawn.rs`
file
On a high-level, we try to design `config.toml` so that you don't have
to "comment out a lot of stuff" when testing different options.
Previously, defining a sandbox policy was somewhat at odds with this
principle because you would define the policy as attributes of
`[sandbox]` like so:
```toml
[sandbox]
mode = "workspace-write"
writable_roots = [ "/tmp" ]
```
but if you wanted to temporarily change to a read-only sandbox, you
might feel compelled to modify your file to be:
```toml
[sandbox]
mode = "read-only"
# mode = "workspace-write"
# writable_roots = [ "/tmp" ]
```
Technically, commenting out `writable_roots` would not be strictly
necessary, as `mode = "read-only"` would ignore `writable_roots`, but
it's still a reasonable thing to do to keep things tidy.
Currently, the various values for `mode` do not support that many
attributes, so this is not that hard to maintain, but one could imagine
this becoming more complex in the future.
In this PR, we change Codex CLI so that it no longer recognizes
`[sandbox]`. Instead, it introduces a top-level option, `sandbox_mode`,
and `[sandbox_workspace_write]` is used to further configure the sandbox
when when `sandbox_mode = "workspace-write"` is used:
```toml
sandbox_mode = "workspace-write"
[sandbox_workspace_write]
writable_roots = [ "/tmp" ]
```
This feels a bit more future-proof in that it is less tedious to
configure different sandboxes:
```toml
sandbox_mode = "workspace-write"
[sandbox_read_only]
# read-only options here...
[sandbox_workspace_write]
writable_roots = [ "/tmp" ]
[sandbox_danger_full_access]
# danger-full-access options here...
```
In this scheme, you never need to comment out the configuration for an
individual sandbox type: you only need to redefine `sandbox_mode`.
Relatedly, previous to this change, a user had to do `-c
sandbox.mode=read-only` to change the mode on the command line. With
this change, things are arguably a bit cleaner because the equivalent
option is `-c sandbox_mode=read-only` (and now `-c
sandbox_workspace_write=...` can be set separately).
Though more importantly, we introduce the `-s/--sandbox` option to the
CLI, which maps directly to `sandbox_mode` in `config.toml`, making
config override behavior easier to reason about. Moreover, as you can
see in the updates to the various Markdown files, it is much easier to
explain how to configure sandboxing when things like `--sandbox
read-only` can be used as an example.
Relatedly, this cleanup also made it straightforward to add support for
a `sandbox` option for Codex when used as an MCP server (see the changes
to `mcp-server/src/codex_tool_config.rs`).
Fixes https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/1248.
This is a major redesign of how sandbox configuration works and aims to
fix https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/1248. Specifically, it
replaces `sandbox_permissions` in `config.toml` (and the
`-s`/`--sandbox-permission` CLI flags) with a "table" with effectively
three variants:
```toml
# Safest option: full disk is read-only, but writes and network access are disallowed.
[sandbox]
mode = "read-only"
# The cwd of the Codex task is writable, as well as $TMPDIR on macOS.
# writable_roots can be used to specify additional writable folders.
[sandbox]
mode = "workspace-write"
writable_roots = [] # Optional, defaults to the empty list.
network_access = false # Optional, defaults to false.
# Disable sandboxing: use at your own risk!!!
[sandbox]
mode = "danger-full-access"
```
This should make sandboxing easier to reason about. While we have
dropped support for `-s`, the way it works now is:
- no flags => `read-only`
- `--full-auto` => `workspace-write`
- currently, there is no way to specify `danger-full-access` via a CLI
flag, but we will revisit that as part of
https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/1254
Outstanding issue:
- As noted in the `TODO` on `SandboxPolicy::is_unrestricted()`, we are
still conflating sandbox preferences with approval preferences in that
case, which needs to be cleaned up.
This PR introduces support for `-c`/`--config` so users can override
individual config values on the command line using `--config
name=value`. Example:
```
codex --config model=o4-mini
```
Making it possible to set arbitrary config values on the command line
results in a more flexible configuration scheme and makes it easier to
provide single-line examples that can be copy-pasted from documentation.
Effectively, it means there are four levels of configuration for some
values:
- Default value (e.g., `model` currently defaults to `o4-mini`)
- Value in `config.toml` (e.g., user could override the default to be
`model = "o3"` in their `config.toml`)
- Specifying `-c` or `--config` to override `model` (e.g., user can
include `-c model=o3` in their list of args to Codex)
- If available, a config-specific flag can be used, which takes
precedence over `-c` (e.g., user can specify `--model o3` in their list
of args to Codex)
Now that it is possible to specify anything that could be configured in
`config.toml` on the command line using `-c`, we do not need to have a
custom flag for every possible config option (which can clutter the
output of `--help`). To that end, as part of this PR, we drop support
for the `--disable-response-storage` flag, as users can now specify `-c
disable_response_storage=true` to get the equivalent functionality.
Under the hood, this works by loading the `config.toml` into a
`toml::Value`. Then for each `key=value`, we create a small synthetic
TOML file with `value` so that we can run the TOML parser to get the
equivalent `toml::Value`. We then parse `key` to determine the point in
the original `toml::Value` to do the insert/replace. Once all of the
overrides from `-c` args have been applied, the `toml::Value` is
deserialized into a `ConfigToml` and then the `ConfigOverrides` are
applied, as before.
Historically, we spawned the Seatbelt and Landlock sandboxes in
substantially different ways:
For **Seatbelt**, we would run `/usr/bin/sandbox-exec` with our policy
specified as an arg followed by the original command:
d1de7bb383/codex-rs/core/src/exec.rs (L147-L219)
For **Landlock/Seccomp**, we would do
`tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread()`, _invoke
Landlock/Seccomp APIs to modify the permissions of that new thread_, and
then spawn the command:
d1de7bb383/codex-rs/core/src/exec_linux.rs (L28-L49)
While it is neat that Landlock/Seccomp supports applying a policy to
only one thread without having to apply it to the entire process, it
requires us to maintain two different codepaths and is a bit harder to
reason about. The tipping point was
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/1061, in which we had to start
building up the `env` in an unexpected way for the existing
Landlock/Seccomp approach to continue to work.
This PR overhauls things so that we do similar things for Mac and Linux.
It turned out that we were already building our own "helper binary"
comparable to Mac's `sandbox-exec` as part of the `cli` crate:
d1de7bb383/codex-rs/cli/Cargo.toml (L10-L12)
We originally created this to build a small binary to include with the
Node.js version of the Codex CLI to provide support for Linux
sandboxing.
Though the sticky bit is that, at this point, we still want to deploy
the Rust version of Codex as a single, standalone binary rather than a
CLI and a supporting sandboxing binary. To satisfy this goal, we use
"the arg0 trick," in which we:
* use `std::env::current_exe()` to get the path to the CLI that is
currently running
* use the CLI as the `program` for the `Command`
* set `"codex-linux-sandbox"` as arg0 for the `Command`
A CLI that supports sandboxing should check arg0 at the start of the
program. If it is `"codex-linux-sandbox"`, it must invoke
`codex_linux_sandbox::run_main()`, which runs the CLI as if it were
`codex-linux-sandbox`. When acting as `codex-linux-sandbox`, we make the
appropriate Landlock/Seccomp API calls and then use `execvp(3)` to spawn
the original command, so do _replace_ the process rather than spawn a
subprocess. Incidentally, we do this before starting the Tokio runtime,
so the process should only have one thread when `execvp(3)` is called.
Because the `core` crate that needs to spawn the Linux sandboxing is not
a CLI in its own right, this means that every CLI that includes `core`
and relies on this behavior has to (1) implement it and (2) provide the
path to the sandboxing executable. While the path is almost always
`std::env::current_exe()`, we needed to make this configurable for
integration tests, so `Config` now has a `codex_linux_sandbox_exe:
Option<PathBuf>` property to facilitate threading this through,
introduced in https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/1089.
This common pattern is now captured in
`codex_linux_sandbox::run_with_sandbox()` and all of the `main.rs`
functions that should use it have been updated as part of this PR.
The `codex-linux-sandbox` crate added to the Cargo workspace as part of
this PR now has the bulk of the Landlock/Seccomp logic, which makes
`core` a bit simpler. Indeed, `core/src/exec_linux.rs` and
`core/src/landlock.rs` were removed/ported as part of this PR. I also
moved the unit tests for this code into an integration test,
`linux-sandbox/tests/landlock.rs`, in which I use
`env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_codex-linux-sandbox")` as the value for
`codex_linux_sandbox_exe` since `std::env::current_exe()` is not
appropriate in that case.
