codex: stabilize PTY Python REPL test

sandboxing: preserve denied paths when widening permissions (#13451 )
## Why After the split-policy plumbing landed, additional-permissions widening still rebuilt filesystem access through the legacy projection in a few places. That can erase explicit deny entries and make the runtime treat a policy as fully writable even when it still has blocked subpaths, which in turn can skip the platform sandbox when it is still needed. ## What changed - preserved explicit deny entries when merging additional read and write permissions into `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` - switched platform-sandbox selection to rely on `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::has_full_disk_write_access()` instead of ad hoc root-write checks - kept the widened policy path in `core/src/exec.rs` and `core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs` aligned so denied subpaths survive both policy merging and sandbox selection - added regression coverage for root-write policies that still carry carveouts ## Verification - added regression coverage in `core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs` showing that root write plus carveouts still requires the platform sandbox - verified the current PR state with `just clippy` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13451). * #13453 * #13452 * __->__ #13451 * #13449 * #13448 * #13445 * #13440 * #13439 --------- Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
2026-03-08 07:33:21 +00:00 · 2026-03-07 21:30:03 -08:00 · 2026-03-08 04:29:35 +00:00 · 2026-03-07 19:40:10 -08:00 · 2026-03-08 01:46:40 +00:00 · 2026-03-08 01:36:39 +00:00
21 changed files with 1689 additions and 443 deletions
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/landlock.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/landlock.rs
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ use crate::spawn::SpawnChildRequest;
 use crate::spawn::StdioPolicy;
 use crate::spawn::spawn_child_async;
 use codex_network_proxy::NetworkProxy;
+use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 use std::path::Path;
@@ -14,9 +15,9 @@ use tokio::process::Child;
 /// isolation plus seccomp for network restrictions.
 ///
 /// Unlike macOS Seatbelt where we directly embed the policy text, the Linux
-/// helper accepts a list of `--sandbox-permission`/`-s` flags mirroring the
-/// public CLI. We convert the internal [`SandboxPolicy`] representation into
-/// the equivalent CLI options.
+/// helper is a separate executable. We pass the legacy [`SandboxPolicy`] plus
+/// split filesystem/network policies as JSON so the helper can migrate
+/// incrementally without breaking older call sites.
 #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
 pub async fn spawn_command_under_linux_sandbox<P>(
    codex_linux_sandbox_exe: P,
@@ -32,9 +33,13 @@ pub async fn spawn_command_under_linux_sandbox<P>(
 where
    P: AsRef<Path>,
 {
-    let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args(
+    let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(sandbox_policy);
+    let network_sandbox_policy = NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(sandbox_policy);
+    let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies(
        command,
        sandbox_policy,
+        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        network_sandbox_policy,
        sandbox_policy_cwd,
        use_bwrap_sandbox,
        allow_network_for_proxy(false),
@@ -45,7 +50,7 @@ where
        args,
        arg0,
        cwd: command_cwd,
-        network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(sandbox_policy),
+        network_sandbox_policy,
        network,
        stdio_policy,
        env,
@@ -60,32 +65,43 @@ pub(crate) fn allow_network_for_proxy(enforce_managed_network: bool) -> bool {
    enforce_managed_network
 }

-/// Converts the sandbox policy into the CLI invocation for `codex-linux-sandbox`.
+/// Converts the sandbox policies into the CLI invocation for
+/// `codex-linux-sandbox`.
 ///
 /// The helper performs the actual sandboxing (bubblewrap + seccomp) after
-/// parsing these arguments. See `docs/linux_sandbox.md` for the Linux semantics.
-pub(crate) fn create_linux_sandbox_command_args(
+/// parsing these arguments. Policy JSON flags are emitted before helper feature
+/// flags so the argv order matches the helper's CLI shape. See
+/// `docs/linux_sandbox.md` for the Linux semantics.
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+pub(crate) fn create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies(
    command: Vec<String>,
    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
+    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
    use_bwrap_sandbox: bool,
    allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
 ) -> Vec<String> {
-    #[expect(clippy::expect_used)]
+    let sandbox_policy_json = serde_json::to_string(sandbox_policy)
+        .unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("failed to serialize sandbox policy: {err}"));
+    let file_system_policy_json = serde_json::to_string(file_system_sandbox_policy)
+        .unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("failed to serialize filesystem sandbox policy: {err}"));
+    let network_policy_json = serde_json::to_string(&network_sandbox_policy)
+        .unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("failed to serialize network sandbox policy: {err}"));
    let sandbox_policy_cwd = sandbox_policy_cwd
        .to_str()
-        .expect("cwd must be valid UTF-8")
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("cwd must be valid UTF-8"))
        .to_string();

-    #[expect(clippy::expect_used)]
-    let sandbox_policy_json =
-        serde_json::to_string(sandbox_policy).expect("Failed to serialize SandboxPolicy to JSON");
-
    let mut linux_cmd: Vec<String> = vec![
        "--sandbox-policy-cwd".to_string(),
        sandbox_policy_cwd,
        "--sandbox-policy".to_string(),
        sandbox_policy_json,
+        "--file-system-sandbox-policy".to_string(),
+        file_system_policy_json,
+        "--network-sandbox-policy".to_string(),
+        network_policy_json,
    ];
    if use_bwrap_sandbox {
        linux_cmd.push("--use-bwrap-sandbox".to_string());
@@ -93,6 +109,32 @@ pub(crate) fn create_linux_sandbox_command_args(
    if allow_network_for_proxy {
        linux_cmd.push("--allow-network-for-proxy".to_string());
    }
+    linux_cmd.push("--".to_string());
+    linux_cmd.extend(command);
+    linux_cmd
+}
+
+/// Converts the sandbox cwd and execution options into the CLI invocation for
+/// `codex-linux-sandbox`.
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub(crate) fn create_linux_sandbox_command_args(
+    command: Vec<String>,
+    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
+    use_bwrap_sandbox: bool,
+    allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
+) -> Vec<String> {
+    let sandbox_policy_cwd = sandbox_policy_cwd
+        .to_str()
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("cwd must be valid UTF-8"))
+        .to_string();
+
+    let mut linux_cmd: Vec<String> = vec!["--sandbox-policy-cwd".to_string(), sandbox_policy_cwd];
+    if use_bwrap_sandbox {
+        linux_cmd.push("--use-bwrap-sandbox".to_string());
+    }
+    if allow_network_for_proxy {
+        linux_cmd.push("--allow-network-for-proxy".to_string());
+    }

    // Separator so that command arguments starting with `-` are not parsed as
    // options of the helper itself.
@@ -113,16 +155,14 @@ mod tests {
    fn bwrap_flags_are_feature_gated() {
        let command = vec!["/bin/true".to_string()];
        let cwd = Path::new("/tmp");
-        let policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();

-        let with_bwrap =
-            create_linux_sandbox_command_args(command.clone(), &policy, cwd, true, false);
+        let with_bwrap = create_linux_sandbox_command_args(command.clone(), cwd, true, false);
        assert_eq!(
            with_bwrap.contains(&"--use-bwrap-sandbox".to_string()),
            true
        );

-        let without_bwrap = create_linux_sandbox_command_args(command, &policy, cwd, false, false);
+        let without_bwrap = create_linux_sandbox_command_args(command, cwd, false, false);
        assert_eq!(
            without_bwrap.contains(&"--use-bwrap-sandbox".to_string()),
            false
@@ -133,15 +173,46 @@ mod tests {
    fn proxy_flag_is_included_when_requested() {
        let command = vec!["/bin/true".to_string()];
        let cwd = Path::new("/tmp");
-        let policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();

-        let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args(command, &policy, cwd, true, true);
+        let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args(command, cwd, true, true);
        assert_eq!(
            args.contains(&"--allow-network-for-proxy".to_string()),
            true
        );
    }

+    #[test]
+    fn split_policy_flags_are_included() {
+        let command = vec!["/bin/true".to_string()];
+        let cwd = Path::new("/tmp");
+        let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+        let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy);
+        let network_sandbox_policy = NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy);
+
+        let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies(
+            command,
+            &sandbox_policy,
+            &file_system_sandbox_policy,
+            network_sandbox_policy,
+            cwd,
+            true,
+            false,
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            args.windows(2).any(|window| {
+                window[0] == "--file-system-sandbox-policy" && !window[1].is_empty()
+            }),
+            true
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            args.windows(2)
+                .any(|window| window[0] == "--network-sandbox-policy"
+                    && window[1] == "\"restricted\""),
+            true
+        );
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn proxy_network_requires_managed_requirements() {
        assert_eq!(allow_network_for_proxy(false), false);
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/lib.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/lib.rs
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ pub use mcp_connection_manager::SandboxState;
 pub use text_encoding::bytes_to_string_smart;
 mod mcp_tool_call;
 mod memories;
+pub mod mention_syntax;
 mod mentions;
 mod message_history;
 mod model_provider_info;
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/mcp_tool_call.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/mcp_tool_call.rs
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ use crate::analytics_client::InvocationType;
 use crate::analytics_client::build_track_events_context;
 use crate::codex::Session;
 use crate::codex::TurnContext;
+use crate::config::edit::ConfigEdit;
+use crate::config::edit::ConfigEditsBuilder;
 use crate::config::types::AppToolApproval;
 use crate::connectors;
 use crate::features::Feature;
@@ -42,7 +44,9 @@ use codex_rmcp_client::ElicitationAction;
 use codex_rmcp_client::ElicitationResponse;
 use rmcp::model::ToolAnnotations;
 use serde::Serialize;
+use std::path::Path;
 use std::sync::Arc;
+use toml_edit::value;

 /// Handles the specified tool call dispatches the appropriate
 /// `McpToolCallBegin` and `McpToolCallEnd` events to the `Session`.
@@ -127,7 +131,9 @@ pub(crate) async fn handle_mcp_tool_call(
    .await
    {
        let result = match decision {
-            McpToolApprovalDecision::Accept | McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptAndRemember => {
+            McpToolApprovalDecision::Accept
+            | McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptForSession
+            | McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptAndRemember => {
                let tool_call_begin_event = EventMsg::McpToolCallBegin(McpToolCallBeginEvent {
                    call_id: call_id.clone(),
                    invocation: invocation.clone(),
@@ -352,6 +358,7 @@ async fn maybe_track_codex_app_used(
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
 enum McpToolApprovalDecision {
    Accept,
+    AcceptForSession,
    AcceptAndRemember,
    Decline,
    Cancel,
@@ -366,15 +373,22 @@ struct McpToolApprovalMetadata {
    tool_description: Option<String>,
 }

+#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
+struct McpToolApprovalPromptOptions {
+    allow_session_remember: bool,
+    allow_persistent_approval: bool,
+}
+
 const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_QUESTION_ID_PREFIX: &str = "mcp_tool_call_approval";
 const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT: &str = "Approve Once";
-const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT_AND_REMEMBER: &str = "Approve this Session";
-const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_DECLINE: &str = "Deny";
+const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT_FOR_SESSION: &str = "Approve this session";
+const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT_AND_REMEMBER: &str = "Always allow";
 const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_CANCEL: &str = "Cancel";
 const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_KIND_KEY: &str = "codex_approval_kind";
 const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_KIND_MCP_TOOL_CALL: &str = "mcp_tool_call";
 const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_KEY: &str = "persist";
 const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_SESSION: &str = "session";
+const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_ALWAYS: &str = "always";
 const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_SOURCE_KEY: &str = "source";
 const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_SOURCE_CONNECTOR: &str = "connector";
 const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_CONNECTOR_ID_KEY: &str = "connector_id";
@@ -384,13 +398,25 @@ const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_TOOL_TITLE_KEY: &str = "tool_title";
 const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_TOOL_DESCRIPTION_KEY: &str = "tool_description";
 const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_TOOL_PARAMS_KEY: &str = "tool_params";

-#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)]
 struct McpToolApprovalKey {
    server: String,
    connector_id: Option<String>,
    tool_name: String,
 }

+fn mcp_tool_approval_prompt_options(
+    session_approval_key: Option<&McpToolApprovalKey>,
+    persistent_approval_key: Option<&McpToolApprovalKey>,
+    tool_call_mcp_elicitation_enabled: bool,
+) -> McpToolApprovalPromptOptions {
+    McpToolApprovalPromptOptions {
+        allow_session_remember: session_approval_key.is_some(),
+        allow_persistent_approval: tool_call_mcp_elicitation_enabled
+            && persistent_approval_key.is_some(),
+    }
+}
+
 async fn maybe_request_mcp_tool_approval(
    sess: &Arc<Session>,
    turn_context: &Arc<TurnContext>,
@@ -412,25 +438,18 @@ async fn maybe_request_mcp_tool_approval(
        }
    }

-    let approval_key = if approval_mode == AppToolApproval::Auto {
-        let connector_id = metadata.and_then(|metadata| metadata.connector_id.clone());
-        if invocation.server == CODEX_APPS_MCP_SERVER_NAME && connector_id.is_none() {
-            None
-        } else {
-            Some(McpToolApprovalKey {
-                server: invocation.server.clone(),
-                connector_id,
-                tool_name: invocation.tool.clone(),
-            })
-        }
-    } else {
-        None
-    };
-    if let Some(key) = approval_key.as_ref()
+    let session_approval_key = session_mcp_tool_approval_key(invocation, metadata, approval_mode);
+    let persistent_approval_key =
+        persistent_mcp_tool_approval_key(invocation, metadata, approval_mode);
+    if let Some(key) = session_approval_key.as_ref()
        && mcp_tool_approval_is_remembered(sess, key).await
    {
        return Some(McpToolApprovalDecision::Accept);
    }
+    let tool_call_mcp_elicitation_enabled = turn_context
+        .config
+        .features
+        .enabled(Feature::ToolCallMcpElicitation);

    if routes_approval_to_guardian(turn_context) {
        let decision = review_approval_request(
@@ -440,9 +459,23 @@ async fn maybe_request_mcp_tool_approval(
            None,
        )
        .await;
-        return Some(mcp_tool_approval_decision_from_guardian(decision));
+        let decision = mcp_tool_approval_decision_from_guardian(decision);
+        apply_mcp_tool_approval_decision(
+            sess,
+            turn_context,
+            decision,
+            session_approval_key,
+            persistent_approval_key,
+        )
+        .await;
+        return Some(decision);
    }

+    let prompt_options = mcp_tool_approval_prompt_options(
+        session_approval_key.as_ref(),
+        persistent_approval_key.as_ref(),
+        tool_call_mcp_elicitation_enabled,
+    );
    let question_id = format!("{MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_QUESTION_ID_PREFIX}_{call_id}");
    let question = build_mcp_tool_approval_question(
        question_id.clone(),
@@ -451,13 +484,9 @@ async fn maybe_request_mcp_tool_approval(
        metadata.and_then(|metadata| metadata.tool_title.as_deref()),
        metadata.and_then(|metadata| metadata.connector_name.as_deref()),
        annotations,
-        approval_key.is_some(),
+        prompt_options,
    );
-    if turn_context
-        .config
-        .features
-        .enabled(Feature::ToolCallMcpElicitation)
-    {
+    if tool_call_mcp_elicitation_enabled {
        let request_id = rmcp::model::RequestId::String(
            format!("{MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_QUESTION_ID_PREFIX}_{call_id}").into(),
        );
@@ -468,7 +497,7 @@ async fn maybe_request_mcp_tool_approval(
            metadata,
            invocation.arguments.as_ref(),
            question.clone(),
-            approval_key.is_some(),
+            prompt_options,
        );
        let decision = parse_mcp_tool_approval_elicitation_response(
            sess.request_mcp_server_elicitation(turn_context.as_ref(), request_id, params)
@@ -476,11 +505,14 @@ async fn maybe_request_mcp_tool_approval(
            &question_id,
        );
        let decision = normalize_approval_decision_for_mode(decision, approval_mode);
-        if matches!(decision, McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptAndRemember)
-            && let Some(key) = approval_key
-        {
-            remember_mcp_tool_approval(sess, key).await;
-        }
+        apply_mcp_tool_approval_decision(
+            sess,
+            turn_context,
+            decision,
+            session_approval_key,
+            persistent_approval_key,
+        )
+        .await;
        return Some(decision);
    }

@@ -494,14 +526,51 @@ async fn maybe_request_mcp_tool_approval(
        parse_mcp_tool_approval_response(response, &question_id),
        approval_mode,
    );
-    if matches!(decision, McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptAndRemember)
-        && let Some(key) = approval_key
-    {
-        remember_mcp_tool_approval(sess, key).await;
-    }
+    apply_mcp_tool_approval_decision(
+        sess,
+        turn_context,
+        decision,
+        session_approval_key,
+        persistent_approval_key,
+    )
+    .await;
    Some(decision)
 }

+fn session_mcp_tool_approval_key(
+    invocation: &McpInvocation,
+    metadata: Option<&McpToolApprovalMetadata>,
+    approval_mode: AppToolApproval,
+) -> Option<McpToolApprovalKey> {
+    if approval_mode != AppToolApproval::Auto {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    let connector_id = metadata.and_then(|metadata| metadata.connector_id.clone());
+    if invocation.server == CODEX_APPS_MCP_SERVER_NAME && connector_id.is_none() {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    Some(McpToolApprovalKey {
+        server: invocation.server.clone(),
+        connector_id,
+        tool_name: invocation.tool.clone(),
+    })
+}
+
+fn persistent_mcp_tool_approval_key(
+    invocation: &McpInvocation,
+    metadata: Option<&McpToolApprovalMetadata>,
+    approval_mode: AppToolApproval,
+) -> Option<McpToolApprovalKey> {
+    if invocation.server != CODEX_APPS_MCP_SERVER_NAME {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    session_mcp_tool_approval_key(invocation, metadata, approval_mode)
+        .filter(|key| key.connector_id.is_some())
+}
+
 fn build_guardian_mcp_tool_review_request(
    invocation: &McpInvocation,
    metadata: Option<&McpToolApprovalMetadata>,
@@ -594,8 +663,8 @@ fn mcp_tool_approval_decision_from_guardian(decision: ReviewDecision) -> McpTool
    match decision {
        ReviewDecision::Approved
        | ReviewDecision::ApprovedExecpolicyAmendment { .. }
-        | ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession
        | ReviewDecision::NetworkPolicyAmendment { .. } => McpToolApprovalDecision::Accept,
+        ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession => McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptForSession,
        ReviewDecision::Denied | ReviewDecision::Abort => McpToolApprovalDecision::Decline,
    }
 }
@@ -691,7 +760,7 @@ fn build_mcp_tool_approval_question(
    tool_title: Option<&str>,
    connector_name: Option<&str>,
    annotations: Option<&ToolAnnotations>,
-    allow_remember_option: bool,
+    prompt_options: McpToolApprovalPromptOptions,
 ) -> RequestUserInputQuestion {
    let destructive =
        annotations.and_then(|annotations| annotations.destructive_hint) == Some(true);
@@ -721,22 +790,22 @@ fn build_mcp_tool_approval_question(
        label: MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT.to_string(),
        description: "Run the tool and continue.".to_string(),
    }];
-    if allow_remember_option {
+    if prompt_options.allow_session_remember {
        options.push(RequestUserInputQuestionOption {
-            label: MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT_AND_REMEMBER.to_string(),
+            label: MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT_FOR_SESSION.to_string(),
            description: "Run the tool and remember this choice for this session.".to_string(),
        });
    }
-    options.extend([
-        RequestUserInputQuestionOption {
-            label: MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_DECLINE.to_string(),
-            description: "Decline this tool call and continue.".to_string(),
-        },
-        RequestUserInputQuestionOption {
-            label: MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_CANCEL.to_string(),
-            description: "Cancel this tool call".to_string(),
-        },
-    ]);
+    if prompt_options.allow_persistent_approval {
+        options.push(RequestUserInputQuestionOption {
+            label: MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT_AND_REMEMBER.to_string(),
+            description: "Run the tool and remember this choice for future tool calls.".to_string(),
+        });
+    }
+    options.push(RequestUserInputQuestionOption {
+        label: MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_CANCEL.to_string(),
+        description: "Cancel this tool call".to_string(),
+    });

    RequestUserInputQuestion {
        id: question_id,
@@ -755,7 +824,7 @@ fn build_mcp_tool_approval_elicitation_request(
    metadata: Option<&McpToolApprovalMetadata>,
    tool_params: Option<&serde_json::Value>,
    question: RequestUserInputQuestion,
-    allow_session_persist: bool,
+    prompt_options: McpToolApprovalPromptOptions,
 ) -> McpServerElicitationRequestParams {
    let message = if question.header.trim().is_empty() {
        question.question
@@ -774,7 +843,7 @@ fn build_mcp_tool_approval_elicitation_request(
                server,
                metadata,
                tool_params,
-                allow_session_persist,
+                prompt_options,
            ),
            message,
            requested_schema: McpElicitationSchema {
@@ -791,18 +860,39 @@ fn build_mcp_tool_approval_elicitation_meta(
    server: &str,
    metadata: Option<&McpToolApprovalMetadata>,
    tool_params: Option<&serde_json::Value>,
-    allow_session_persist: bool,
+    prompt_options: McpToolApprovalPromptOptions,
 ) -> Option<serde_json::Value> {
    let mut meta = serde_json::Map::new();
    meta.insert(
        MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_KIND_KEY.to_string(),
        serde_json::Value::String(MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_KIND_MCP_TOOL_CALL.to_string()),
    );
-    if allow_session_persist {
-        meta.insert(
-            MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_KEY.to_string(),
-            serde_json::Value::String(MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_SESSION.to_string()),
-        );
+    match (
+        prompt_options.allow_session_remember,
+        prompt_options.allow_persistent_approval,
+    ) {
+        (true, true) => {
+            meta.insert(
+                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_KEY.to_string(),
+                serde_json::json!([
+                    MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_SESSION,
+                    MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_ALWAYS,
+                ]),
+            );
+        }
+        (true, false) => {
+            meta.insert(
+                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_KEY.to_string(),
+                serde_json::Value::String(MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_SESSION.to_string()),
+            );
+        }
+        (false, true) => {
+            meta.insert(
+                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_KEY.to_string(),
+                serde_json::Value::String(MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_ALWAYS.to_string()),
+            );
+        }
+        (false, false) => {}
    }
    if let Some(metadata) = metadata {
        if let Some(tool_title) = metadata.tool_title.as_ref() {
@@ -864,15 +954,20 @@ fn parse_mcp_tool_approval_elicitation_response(
    };
    match response.action {
        ElicitationAction::Accept => {
-            if response
+            match response
                .meta
                .as_ref()
                .and_then(serde_json::Value::as_object)
                .and_then(|meta| meta.get(MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_KEY))
                .and_then(serde_json::Value::as_str)
-                == Some(MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_SESSION)
            {
-                return McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptAndRemember;
+                Some(MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_SESSION) => {
+                    return McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptForSession;
+                }
+                Some(MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_ALWAYS) => {
+                    return McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptAndRemember;
+                }
+                _ => {}
            }

            match parse_mcp_tool_approval_response(
@@ -930,6 +1025,11 @@ fn parse_mcp_tool_approval_response(
        return McpToolApprovalDecision::Cancel;
    };
    if answers
+        .iter()
+        .any(|answer| answer == MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT_FOR_SESSION)
+    {
+        McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptForSession
+    } else if answers
        .iter()
        .any(|answer| answer == MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT_AND_REMEMBER)
    {
@@ -939,13 +1039,8 @@ fn parse_mcp_tool_approval_response(
        .any(|answer| answer == MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT)
    {
        McpToolApprovalDecision::Accept
-    } else if answers
-        .iter()
-        .any(|answer| answer == MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_CANCEL)
-    {
-        McpToolApprovalDecision::Cancel
    } else {
-        McpToolApprovalDecision::Decline
+        McpToolApprovalDecision::Cancel
    }
 }

@@ -954,7 +1049,10 @@ fn normalize_approval_decision_for_mode(
    approval_mode: AppToolApproval,
 ) -> McpToolApprovalDecision {
    if approval_mode == AppToolApproval::Prompt
-        && decision == McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptAndRemember
+        && matches!(
+            decision,
+            McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptForSession | McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptAndRemember
+        )
    {
        McpToolApprovalDecision::Accept
    } else {
@@ -972,6 +1070,81 @@ async fn remember_mcp_tool_approval(sess: &Session, key: McpToolApprovalKey) {
    store.put(key, ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession);
 }

+async fn apply_mcp_tool_approval_decision(
+    sess: &Session,
+    turn_context: &TurnContext,
+    decision: McpToolApprovalDecision,
+    session_approval_key: Option<McpToolApprovalKey>,
+    persistent_approval_key: Option<McpToolApprovalKey>,
+) {
+    match decision {
+        McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptForSession => {
+            if let Some(key) = session_approval_key {
+                remember_mcp_tool_approval(sess, key).await;
+            }
+        }
+        McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptAndRemember => {
+            if let Some(key) = persistent_approval_key {
+                maybe_persist_mcp_tool_approval(sess, turn_context, key).await;
+            } else if let Some(key) = session_approval_key {
+                remember_mcp_tool_approval(sess, key).await;
+            }
+        }
+        McpToolApprovalDecision::Accept
+        | McpToolApprovalDecision::Decline
+        | McpToolApprovalDecision::Cancel => {}
+    }
+}
+
+async fn maybe_persist_mcp_tool_approval(
+    sess: &Session,
+    turn_context: &TurnContext,
+    key: McpToolApprovalKey,
+) {
+    let Some(connector_id) = key.connector_id.clone() else {
+        remember_mcp_tool_approval(sess, key).await;
+        return;
+    };
+    let tool_name = key.tool_name.clone();
+
+    if let Err(err) =
+        persist_codex_app_tool_approval(&turn_context.config.codex_home, &connector_id, &tool_name)
+            .await
+    {
+        error!(
+            error = %err,
+            connector_id,
+            tool_name,
+            "failed to persist codex app tool approval"
+        );
+        remember_mcp_tool_approval(sess, key).await;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    sess.reload_user_config_layer().await;
+    remember_mcp_tool_approval(sess, key).await;
+}
+
+async fn persist_codex_app_tool_approval(
+    codex_home: &Path,
+    connector_id: &str,
+    tool_name: &str,
+) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+    ConfigEditsBuilder::new(codex_home)
+        .with_edits([ConfigEdit::SetPath {
+            segments: vec![
+                "apps".to_string(),
+                connector_id.to_string(),
+                "tools".to_string(),
+                tool_name.to_string(),
+                "approval_mode".to_string(),
+            ],
+            value: value("approve"),
+        }])
+        .apply()
+        .await
+}
+
 fn requires_mcp_tool_approval(annotations: &ToolAnnotations) -> bool {
    if annotations.destructive_hint == Some(true) {
        return true;
@@ -1006,7 +1179,17 @@ async fn notify_mcp_tool_call_skip(
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
    use super::*;
+    use crate::codex::make_session_and_context;
+    use crate::config::ConfigToml;
+    use crate::config::types::AppConfig;
+    use crate::config::types::AppToolConfig;
+    use crate::config::types::AppToolsConfig;
+    use crate::config::types::AppsConfigToml;
+    use codex_config::CONFIG_TOML_FILE;
    use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
+    use serde::Deserialize;
+    use std::collections::HashMap;
+    use tempfile::tempdir;

    fn annotations(
        read_only: Option<bool>,
@@ -1039,6 +1222,16 @@ mod tests {
        }
    }

+    fn prompt_options(
+        allow_session_remember: bool,
+        allow_persistent_approval: bool,
+    ) -> McpToolApprovalPromptOptions {
+        McpToolApprovalPromptOptions {
+            allow_session_remember,
+            allow_persistent_approval,
+        }
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn approval_required_when_read_only_false_and_destructive() {
        let annotations = annotations(Some(false), Some(true), None);
@@ -1058,7 +1251,14 @@ mod tests {
    }

    #[test]
-    fn prompt_mode_does_not_allow_session_remember() {
+    fn prompt_mode_does_not_allow_persistent_remember() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            normalize_approval_decision_for_mode(
+                McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptForSession,
+                AppToolApproval::Prompt,
+            ),
+            McpToolApprovalDecision::Accept
+        );
        assert_eq!(
            normalize_approval_decision_for_mode(
                McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptAndRemember,
@@ -1077,7 +1277,7 @@ mod tests {
            Some("Run Action"),
            None,
            Some(&annotations(Some(false), Some(true), None)),
-            true,
+            prompt_options(false, false),
        );

        assert_eq!(question.header, "Approve app tool call?");
@@ -1086,7 +1286,7 @@ mod tests {
            "The custom_server MCP server wants to run the tool \"Run Action\", which may modify or delete data. Allow this action?"
        );
        assert!(
-            question
+            !question
                .options
                .expect("options")
                .into_iter()
@@ -1104,7 +1304,7 @@ mod tests {
            Some("Run Action"),
            None,
            Some(&annotations(Some(false), Some(true), None)),
-            true,
+            prompt_options(true, true),
        );

        assert!(
@@ -1114,6 +1314,149 @@ mod tests {
        );
    }

+    #[test]
+    fn trusted_codex_apps_tool_question_offers_always_allow() {
+        let question = build_mcp_tool_approval_question(
+            "q".to_string(),
+            CODEX_APPS_MCP_SERVER_NAME,
+            "run_action",
+            Some("Run Action"),
+            Some("Calendar"),
+            Some(&annotations(Some(false), Some(true), None)),
+            prompt_options(true, true),
+        );
+        let options = question.options.expect("options");
+
+        assert!(options.iter().any(|option| {
+            option.label == MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT_FOR_SESSION
+                && option.description == "Run the tool and remember this choice for this session."
+        }));
+        assert!(options.iter().any(|option| {
+            option.label == MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT_AND_REMEMBER
+                && option.description
+                    == "Run the tool and remember this choice for future tool calls."
+        }));
+        assert_eq!(
+            options
+                .into_iter()
+                .map(|option| option.label)
+                .collect::<Vec<_>>(),
+            vec![
+                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT.to_string(),
+                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT_FOR_SESSION.to_string(),
+                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT_AND_REMEMBER.to_string(),
+                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_CANCEL.to_string(),
+            ]
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn codex_apps_tool_question_without_elicitation_omits_always_allow() {
+        let session_key = McpToolApprovalKey {
+            server: CODEX_APPS_MCP_SERVER_NAME.to_string(),
+            connector_id: Some("calendar".to_string()),
+            tool_name: "run_action".to_string(),
+        };
+        let persistent_key = session_key.clone();
+        let question = build_mcp_tool_approval_question(
+            "q".to_string(),
+            CODEX_APPS_MCP_SERVER_NAME,
+            "run_action",
+            Some("Run Action"),
+            Some("Calendar"),
+            Some(&annotations(Some(false), Some(true), None)),
+            mcp_tool_approval_prompt_options(Some(&session_key), Some(&persistent_key), false),
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            question
+                .options
+                .expect("options")
+                .into_iter()
+                .map(|option| option.label)
+                .collect::<Vec<_>>(),
+            vec![
+                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT.to_string(),
+                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT_FOR_SESSION.to_string(),
+                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_CANCEL.to_string(),
+            ]
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn custom_mcp_tool_question_offers_session_remember_without_always_allow() {
+        let question = build_mcp_tool_approval_question(
+            "q".to_string(),
+            "custom_server",
+            "run_action",
+            Some("Run Action"),
+            None,
+            Some(&annotations(Some(false), Some(true), None)),
+            prompt_options(true, false),
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            question
+                .options
+                .expect("options")
+                .into_iter()
+                .map(|option| option.label)
+                .collect::<Vec<_>>(),
+            vec![
+                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT.to_string(),
+                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT_FOR_SESSION.to_string(),
+                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_CANCEL.to_string(),
+            ]
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn custom_servers_keep_session_remember_without_persistent_approval() {
+        let invocation = McpInvocation {
+            server: "custom_server".to_string(),
+            tool: "run_action".to_string(),
+            arguments: None,
+        };
+        let expected = McpToolApprovalKey {
+            server: "custom_server".to_string(),
+            connector_id: None,
+            tool_name: "run_action".to_string(),
+        };
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            session_mcp_tool_approval_key(&invocation, None, AppToolApproval::Auto),
+            Some(expected)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            persistent_mcp_tool_approval_key(&invocation, None, AppToolApproval::Auto),
+            None
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn codex_apps_connectors_support_persistent_approval() {
+        let invocation = McpInvocation {
+            server: CODEX_APPS_MCP_SERVER_NAME.to_string(),
+            tool: "calendar/list_events".to_string(),
+            arguments: None,
+        };
+        let metadata = approval_metadata(Some("calendar"), Some("Calendar"), None, None, None);
+        let expected = McpToolApprovalKey {
+            server: CODEX_APPS_MCP_SERVER_NAME.to_string(),
+            connector_id: Some("calendar".to_string()),
+            tool_name: "calendar/list_events".to_string(),
+        };
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            session_mcp_tool_approval_key(&invocation, Some(&metadata), AppToolApproval::Auto),
+            Some(expected.clone())
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            persistent_mcp_tool_approval_key(&invocation, Some(&metadata), AppToolApproval::Auto),
+            Some(expected)
+        );
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn sanitize_mcp_tool_result_for_model_rewrites_image_content() {
        let result = Ok(CallToolResult {
@@ -1194,7 +1537,12 @@ mod tests {
    #[test]
    fn approval_elicitation_meta_marks_tool_approvals() {
        assert_eq!(
-            build_mcp_tool_approval_elicitation_meta("custom_server", None, None, false),
+            build_mcp_tool_approval_elicitation_meta(
+                "custom_server",
+                None,
+                None,
+                prompt_options(false, false),
+            ),
            Some(serde_json::json!({
                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_KIND_KEY: MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_KIND_MCP_TOOL_CALL,
            }))
@@ -1202,7 +1550,7 @@ mod tests {
    }

    #[test]
-    fn approval_elicitation_meta_keeps_session_persist_behavior() {
+    fn approval_elicitation_meta_keeps_session_persist_behavior_for_custom_servers() {
        assert_eq!(
            build_mcp_tool_approval_elicitation_meta(
                "custom_server",
@@ -1214,7 +1562,7 @@ mod tests {
                    Some("Runs the selected action."),
                )),
                Some(&serde_json::json!({"id": 1})),
-                true,
+                prompt_options(true, false),
            ),
            Some(serde_json::json!({
                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_KIND_KEY: MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_KIND_MCP_TOOL_CALL,
@@ -1335,7 +1683,7 @@ mod tests {
                Some(&serde_json::json!({
                    "calendar_id": "primary",
                })),
-                false,
+                prompt_options(false, false),
            ),
            Some(serde_json::json!({
                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_KIND_KEY: MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_KIND_MCP_TOOL_CALL,
@@ -1353,7 +1701,7 @@ mod tests {
    }

    #[test]
-    fn approval_elicitation_meta_merges_session_persist_with_connector_source() {
+    fn approval_elicitation_meta_merges_session_and_always_persist_with_connector_source() {
        assert_eq!(
            build_mcp_tool_approval_elicitation_meta(
                CODEX_APPS_MCP_SERVER_NAME,
@@ -1367,11 +1715,14 @@ mod tests {
                Some(&serde_json::json!({
                    "calendar_id": "primary",
                })),
-                true,
+                prompt_options(true, true),
            ),
            Some(serde_json::json!({
                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_KIND_KEY: MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_KIND_MCP_TOOL_CALL,
-                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_KEY: MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_SESSION,
+                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_KEY: [
+                    MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_SESSION,
+                    MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_ALWAYS,
+                ],
                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_SOURCE_KEY: MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_SOURCE_CONNECTOR,
                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_CONNECTOR_ID_KEY: "calendar",
                MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_CONNECTOR_NAME_KEY: "Calendar",
@@ -1401,6 +1752,22 @@ mod tests {
        assert_eq!(response, McpToolApprovalDecision::Decline);
    }

+    #[test]
+    fn accepted_elicitation_response_uses_always_persist_meta() {
+        let response = parse_mcp_tool_approval_elicitation_response(
+            Some(ElicitationResponse {
+                action: ElicitationAction::Accept,
+                content: None,
+                meta: Some(serde_json::json!({
+                    MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_KEY: MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_PERSIST_ALWAYS,
+                })),
+            }),
+            "approval",
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(response, McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptAndRemember);
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn accepted_elicitation_response_uses_session_persist_meta() {
        let response = parse_mcp_tool_approval_elicitation_response(
@@ -1414,7 +1781,7 @@ mod tests {
            "approval",
        );

-        assert_eq!(response, McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptAndRemember);
+        assert_eq!(response, McpToolApprovalDecision::AcceptForSession);
    }

    #[test]
@@ -1430,4 +1797,83 @@ mod tests {

        assert_eq!(response, McpToolApprovalDecision::Accept);
    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn persist_codex_app_tool_approval_writes_tool_override() {
+        let tmp = tempdir().expect("tempdir");
+
+        persist_codex_app_tool_approval(tmp.path(), "calendar", "calendar/list_events")
+            .await
+            .expect("persist approval");
+
+        let contents =
+            std::fs::read_to_string(tmp.path().join(CONFIG_TOML_FILE)).expect("read config");
+        let parsed: ConfigToml = toml::from_str(&contents).expect("parse config");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            parsed.apps,
+            Some(AppsConfigToml {
+                default: None,
+                apps: HashMap::from([(
+                    "calendar".to_string(),
+                    AppConfig {
+                        enabled: true,
+                        destructive_enabled: None,
+                        open_world_enabled: None,
+                        default_tools_approval_mode: None,
+                        default_tools_enabled: None,
+                        tools: Some(AppToolsConfig {
+                            tools: HashMap::from([(
+                                "calendar/list_events".to_string(),
+                                AppToolConfig {
+                                    enabled: None,
+                                    approval_mode: Some(AppToolApproval::Approve),
+                                },
+                            )]),
+                        }),
+                    },
+                )]),
+            })
+        );
+        assert!(contents.contains("[apps.calendar.tools.\"calendar/list_events\"]"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn maybe_persist_mcp_tool_approval_reloads_session_config() {
+        let (session, turn_context) = make_session_and_context().await;
+        let codex_home = session.codex_home().await;
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&codex_home).expect("create codex home");
+        let key = McpToolApprovalKey {
+            server: CODEX_APPS_MCP_SERVER_NAME.to_string(),
+            connector_id: Some("calendar".to_string()),
+            tool_name: "calendar/list_events".to_string(),
+        };
+
+        maybe_persist_mcp_tool_approval(&session, &turn_context, key.clone()).await;
+
+        let config = session.get_config().await;
+        let apps_toml = config
+            .config_layer_stack
+            .effective_config()
+            .as_table()
+            .and_then(|table| table.get("apps"))
+            .cloned()
+            .expect("apps table");
+        let apps = AppsConfigToml::deserialize(apps_toml).expect("deserialize apps config");
+        let tool = apps
+            .apps
+            .get("calendar")
+            .and_then(|app| app.tools.as_ref())
+            .and_then(|tools| tools.tools.get("calendar/list_events"))
+            .expect("calendar/list_events tool config exists");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            tool,
+            &AppToolConfig {
+                enabled: None,
+                approval_mode: Some(AppToolApproval::Approve),
+            }
+        );
+        assert_eq!(mcp_tool_approval_is_remembered(&session, &key).await, true);
+    }
 }
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/mention_syntax.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/mention_syntax.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+// Default plaintext sigil for tools.
+pub const TOOL_MENTION_SIGIL: char = '$';
+// Plugins use `@` in linked plaintext outside TUI.
+pub const PLUGIN_TEXT_MENTION_SIGIL: char = '@';
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/mentions.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/mentions.rs
@@ -5,11 +5,13 @@ use std::path::PathBuf;
 use codex_protocol::user_input::UserInput;

 use crate::connectors;
+use crate::mention_syntax::PLUGIN_TEXT_MENTION_SIGIL;
+use crate::mention_syntax::TOOL_MENTION_SIGIL;
 use crate::plugins::PluginCapabilitySummary;
 use crate::skills::SkillMetadata;
 use crate::skills::injection::ToolMentionKind;
 use crate::skills::injection::app_id_from_path;
-use crate::skills::injection::extract_tool_mentions;
+use crate::skills::injection::extract_tool_mentions_with_sigil;
 use crate::skills::injection::plugin_config_name_from_path;
 use crate::skills::injection::tool_kind_for_path;

@@ -19,10 +21,17 @@ pub(crate) struct CollectedToolMentions {
 }

 pub(crate) fn collect_tool_mentions_from_messages(messages: &[String]) -> CollectedToolMentions {
+    collect_tool_mentions_from_messages_with_sigil(messages, TOOL_MENTION_SIGIL)
+}
+
+fn collect_tool_mentions_from_messages_with_sigil(
+    messages: &[String],
+    sigil: char,
+) -> CollectedToolMentions {
    let mut plain_names = HashSet::new();
    let mut paths = HashSet::new();
    for message in messages {
-        let mentions = extract_tool_mentions(message);
+        let mentions = extract_tool_mentions_with_sigil(message, sigil);
        plain_names.extend(mentions.plain_names().map(str::to_string));
        paths.extend(mentions.paths().map(str::to_string));
    }
@@ -50,7 +59,7 @@ pub(crate) fn collect_explicit_app_ids(input: &[UserInput]) -> HashSet<String> {
        .collect()
 }

-/// Collect explicit structured `plugin://...` mentions.
+/// Collect explicit structured or linked `plugin://...` mentions.
 pub(crate) fn collect_explicit_plugin_mentions(
    input: &[UserInput],
    plugins: &[PluginCapabilitySummary],
@@ -73,7 +82,11 @@ pub(crate) fn collect_explicit_plugin_mentions(
            UserInput::Mention { path, .. } => Some(path.clone()),
            _ => None,
        })
-        .chain(collect_tool_mentions_from_messages(&messages).paths)
+        .chain(
+            // Plugin plaintext links use `@`, not the default `$` tool sigil.
+            collect_tool_mentions_from_messages_with_sigil(&messages, PLUGIN_TEXT_MENTION_SIGIL)
+                .paths,
+        )
        .filter(|path| tool_kind_for_path(path.as_str()) == ToolMentionKind::Plugin)
        .filter_map(|path| plugin_config_name_from_path(path.as_str()).map(str::to_string))
        .collect();
@@ -222,7 +235,7 @@ mod tests {
        ];

        let mentioned = collect_explicit_plugin_mentions(
-            &[text_input("use [$sample](plugin://sample@test)")],
+            &[text_input("use [@sample](plugin://sample@test)")],
            &plugins,
        );

@@ -238,7 +251,7 @@ mod tests {

        let mentioned = collect_explicit_plugin_mentions(
            &[
-                text_input("use [$sample](plugin://sample@test)"),
+                text_input("use [@sample](plugin://sample@test)"),
                UserInput::Mention {
                    name: "sample".to_string(),
                    path: "plugin://sample@test".to_string(),
@@ -263,4 +276,16 @@ mod tests {

        assert_eq!(mentioned, Vec::<PluginCapabilitySummary>::new());
    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn collect_explicit_plugin_mentions_ignores_dollar_linked_plugin_mentions() {
+        let plugins = vec![plugin("sample@test", "sample")];
+
+        let mentioned = collect_explicit_plugin_mentions(
+            &[text_input("use [$sample](plugin://sample@test)")],
+            &plugins,
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(mentioned, Vec::<PluginCapabilitySummary>::new());
+    }
 }
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs
@@ -14,12 +14,12 @@ use crate::exec::SandboxType;
 use crate::exec::StdoutStream;
 use crate::exec::execute_exec_request;
 use crate::landlock::allow_network_for_proxy;
-use crate::landlock::create_linux_sandbox_command_args;
+use crate::landlock::create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies;
 use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
 #[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
 use crate::seatbelt::MACOS_PATH_TO_SEATBELT_EXECUTABLE;
 #[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
-use crate::seatbelt::create_seatbelt_command_args_with_extensions;
+use crate::seatbelt::create_seatbelt_command_args_for_policies_with_extensions;
 #[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
 use crate::spawn::CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR;
 use crate::spawn::CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED_ENV_VAR;
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxKind;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
-use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkAccess;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::ReadOnlyAccess;
@@ -215,7 +214,6 @@ fn additional_permission_roots(
    )
 }

-#[cfg_attr(not(test), allow(dead_code))]
 fn merge_file_system_policy_with_additional_permissions(
    file_system_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
    extra_reads: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
@@ -369,14 +367,7 @@ pub(crate) fn should_require_platform_sandbox(
    }

    match file_system_policy.kind {
-        FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted => !file_system_policy.entries.iter().any(|entry| {
-            entry.access == FileSystemAccessMode::Write
-                && matches!(
-                    &entry.path,
-                    FileSystemPath::Special { value }
-                        if matches!(value, FileSystemSpecialPath::Root)
-                )
-        }),
+        FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted => !file_system_policy.has_full_disk_write_access(),
        FileSystemSandboxKind::Unrestricted | FileSystemSandboxKind::ExternalSandbox => false,
    }
 }
@@ -496,9 +487,10 @@ impl SandboxManager {
            SandboxType::MacosSeatbelt => {
                let mut seatbelt_env = HashMap::new();
                seatbelt_env.insert(CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR.to_string(), "seatbelt".to_string());
-                let mut args = create_seatbelt_command_args_with_extensions(
+                let mut args = create_seatbelt_command_args_for_policies_with_extensions(
                    command.clone(),
-                    &effective_policy,
+                    &effective_file_system_policy,
+                    effective_network_policy,
                    sandbox_policy_cwd,
                    enforce_managed_network,
                    network,
@@ -515,9 +507,11 @@ impl SandboxManager {
                let exe = codex_linux_sandbox_exe
                    .ok_or(SandboxTransformError::MissingLinuxSandboxExecutable)?;
                let allow_proxy_network = allow_network_for_proxy(enforce_managed_network);
-                let mut args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args(
+                let mut args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies(
                    command.clone(),
                    &effective_policy,
+                    &effective_file_system_policy,
+                    effective_network_policy,
                    sandbox_policy_cwd,
                    use_linux_sandbox_bwrap,
                    allow_proxy_network,
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/seatbelt.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/seatbelt.rs
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ use crate::spawn::CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR;
 use crate::spawn::SpawnChildRequest;
 use crate::spawn::StdioPolicy;
 use crate::spawn::spawn_child_async;
+use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;

 const MACOS_SEATBELT_BASE_POLICY: &str = include_str!("seatbelt_base_policy.sbpl");
@@ -260,10 +261,23 @@ fn unix_socket_policy(proxy: &ProxyPolicyInputs) -> String {
    policy
 }

+#[cfg_attr(not(test), allow(dead_code))]
 fn dynamic_network_policy(
    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
    enforce_managed_network: bool,
    proxy: &ProxyPolicyInputs,
+) -> String {
+    dynamic_network_policy_for_network(
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(sandbox_policy),
+        enforce_managed_network,
+        proxy,
+    )
+}
+
+fn dynamic_network_policy_for_network(
+    network_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
+    enforce_managed_network: bool,
+    proxy: &ProxyPolicyInputs,
 ) -> String {
    let should_use_restricted_network_policy =
        !proxy.ports.is_empty() || proxy.has_proxy_config || enforce_managed_network;
@@ -288,7 +302,19 @@ fn dynamic_network_policy(
        return format!("{policy}{MACOS_SEATBELT_NETWORK_POLICY}");
    }

-    if sandbox_policy.has_full_network_access() {
+    if proxy.has_proxy_config {
+        // Proxy configuration is present but we could not infer any valid loopback endpoints.
+        // Fail closed to avoid silently widening network access in proxy-enforced sessions.
+        return String::new();
+    }
+
+    if enforce_managed_network {
+        // Managed network requirements are active but no usable proxy endpoints
+        // are available. Fail closed for network access.
+        return String::new();
+    }
+
+    if network_policy.is_enabled() {
        // No proxy env is configured: retain the existing full-network behavior.
        format!(
            "(allow network-outbound)\n(allow network-inbound)\n{MACOS_SEATBELT_NETWORK_POLICY}"
@@ -305,9 +331,10 @@ pub(crate) fn create_seatbelt_command_args(
    enforce_managed_network: bool,
    network: Option<&NetworkProxy>,
 ) -> Vec<String> {
-    create_seatbelt_command_args_with_extensions(
+    create_seatbelt_command_args_for_policies_with_extensions(
        command,
-        sandbox_policy,
+        &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(sandbox_policy),
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(sandbox_policy),
        sandbox_policy_cwd,
        enforce_managed_network,
        network,
@@ -315,6 +342,64 @@ pub(crate) fn create_seatbelt_command_args(
    )
 }

+fn root_absolute_path() -> AbsolutePathBuf {
+    match AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(Path::new("/")) {
+        Ok(path) => path,
+        Err(err) => panic!("root path must be absolute: {err}"),
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+struct SeatbeltAccessRoot {
+    root: AbsolutePathBuf,
+    excluded_subpaths: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
+}
+
+fn build_seatbelt_access_policy(
+    action: &str,
+    param_prefix: &str,
+    roots: Vec<SeatbeltAccessRoot>,
+) -> (String, Vec<(String, PathBuf)>) {
+    let mut policy_components = Vec::new();
+    let mut params = Vec::new();
+
+    for (index, access_root) in roots.into_iter().enumerate() {
+        let root =
+            normalize_path_for_sandbox(access_root.root.as_path()).unwrap_or(access_root.root);
+        let root_param = format!("{param_prefix}_{index}");
+        params.push((root_param.clone(), root.into_path_buf()));
+
+        if access_root.excluded_subpaths.is_empty() {
+            policy_components.push(format!("(subpath (param \"{root_param}\"))"));
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        let mut require_parts = vec![format!("(subpath (param \"{root_param}\"))")];
+        for (excluded_index, excluded_subpath) in
+            access_root.excluded_subpaths.into_iter().enumerate()
+        {
+            let excluded_subpath =
+                normalize_path_for_sandbox(excluded_subpath.as_path()).unwrap_or(excluded_subpath);
+            let excluded_param = format!("{param_prefix}_{index}_RO_{excluded_index}");
+            params.push((excluded_param.clone(), excluded_subpath.into_path_buf()));
+            require_parts.push(format!(
+                "(require-not (subpath (param \"{excluded_param}\")))"
+            ));
+        }
+        policy_components.push(format!("(require-all {} )", require_parts.join(" ")));
+    }
+
+    if policy_components.is_empty() {
+        (String::new(), Vec::new())
+    } else {
+        (
+            format!("(allow {action}\n{}\n)", policy_components.join(" ")),
+            params,
+        )
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg_attr(not(test), allow(dead_code))]
 pub(crate) fn create_seatbelt_command_args_with_extensions(
    command: Vec<String>,
    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
@@ -323,101 +408,112 @@ pub(crate) fn create_seatbelt_command_args_with_extensions(
    network: Option<&NetworkProxy>,
    extensions: Option<&MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions>,
 ) -> Vec<String> {
-    let (file_write_policy, file_write_dir_params) = {
-        if sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() {
-            // Allegedly, this is more permissive than `(allow file-write*)`.
-            (
-                r#"(allow file-write* (regex #"^/"))"#.to_string(),
-                Vec::new(),
-            )
-        } else {
-            let writable_roots = sandbox_policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd);
+    create_seatbelt_command_args_for_policies_with_extensions(
+        command,
+        &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(sandbox_policy),
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(sandbox_policy),
+        sandbox_policy_cwd,
+        enforce_managed_network,
+        network,
+        extensions,
+    )
+}

-            let mut writable_folder_policies: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
-            let mut file_write_params = Vec::new();
-
-            for (index, wr) in writable_roots.iter().enumerate() {
-                // Canonicalize to avoid mismatches like /var vs /private/var on macOS.
-                let canonical_root = wr
-                    .root
-                    .as_path()
-                    .canonicalize()
-                    .unwrap_or_else(|_| wr.root.to_path_buf());
-                let root_param = format!("WRITABLE_ROOT_{index}");
-                file_write_params.push((root_param.clone(), canonical_root));
-
-                if wr.read_only_subpaths.is_empty() {
-                    writable_folder_policies.push(format!("(subpath (param \"{root_param}\"))"));
-                } else {
-                    // Add parameters for each read-only subpath and generate
-                    // the `(require-not ...)` clauses.
-                    let mut require_parts: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
-                    require_parts.push(format!("(subpath (param \"{root_param}\"))"));
-                    for (subpath_index, ro) in wr.read_only_subpaths.iter().enumerate() {
-                        let canonical_ro = ro
-                            .as_path()
-                            .canonicalize()
-                            .unwrap_or_else(|_| ro.to_path_buf());
-                        let ro_param = format!("WRITABLE_ROOT_{index}_RO_{subpath_index}");
-                        require_parts
-                            .push(format!("(require-not (subpath (param \"{ro_param}\")))"));
-                        file_write_params.push((ro_param, canonical_ro));
-                    }
-                    let policy_component = format!("(require-all {} )", require_parts.join(" "));
-                    writable_folder_policies.push(policy_component);
-                }
-            }
-
-            if writable_folder_policies.is_empty() {
-                ("".to_string(), Vec::new())
+pub(crate) fn create_seatbelt_command_args_for_policies_with_extensions(
+    command: Vec<String>,
+    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
+    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
+    enforce_managed_network: bool,
+    network: Option<&NetworkProxy>,
+    extensions: Option<&MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions>,
+) -> Vec<String> {
+    let unreadable_roots =
+        file_system_sandbox_policy.get_unreadable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd);
+    let (file_write_policy, file_write_dir_params) =
+        if file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() {
+            if unreadable_roots.is_empty() {
+                // Allegedly, this is more permissive than `(allow file-write*)`.
+                (
+                    r#"(allow file-write* (regex #"^/"))"#.to_string(),
+                    Vec::new(),
+                )
            } else {
-                let file_write_policy = format!(
-                    "(allow file-write*\n{}\n)",
-                    writable_folder_policies.join(" ")
-                );
-                (file_write_policy, file_write_params)
+                build_seatbelt_access_policy(
+                    "file-write*",
+                    "WRITABLE_ROOT",
+                    vec![SeatbeltAccessRoot {
+                        root: root_absolute_path(),
+                        excluded_subpaths: unreadable_roots.clone(),
+                    }],
+                )
            }
-        }
-    };
-
-    let (file_read_policy, file_read_dir_params) = if sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access() {
-        (
-            "; allow read-only file operations\n(allow file-read*)".to_string(),
-            Vec::new(),
-        )
-    } else {
-        let mut readable_roots_policies: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
-        let mut file_read_params = Vec::new();
-        for (index, root) in sandbox_policy
-            .get_readable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd)
-            .into_iter()
-            .enumerate()
-        {
-            // Canonicalize to avoid mismatches like /var vs /private/var on macOS.
-            let canonical_root = root
-                .as_path()
-                .canonicalize()
-                .unwrap_or_else(|_| root.to_path_buf());
-            let root_param = format!("READABLE_ROOT_{index}");
-            file_read_params.push((root_param.clone(), canonical_root));
-            readable_roots_policies.push(format!("(subpath (param \"{root_param}\"))"));
-        }
-
-        if readable_roots_policies.is_empty() {
-            ("".to_string(), Vec::new())
        } else {
-            (
-                format!(
-                    "; allow read-only file operations\n(allow file-read*\n{}\n)",
-                    readable_roots_policies.join(" ")
-                ),
-                file_read_params,
+            build_seatbelt_access_policy(
+                "file-write*",
+                "WRITABLE_ROOT",
+                file_system_sandbox_policy
+                    .get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd)
+                    .into_iter()
+                    .map(|root| SeatbeltAccessRoot {
+                        root: root.root,
+                        excluded_subpaths: root.read_only_subpaths,
+                    })
+                    .collect(),
            )
-        }
-    };
+        };
+
+    let (file_read_policy, file_read_dir_params) =
+        if file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access() {
+            if unreadable_roots.is_empty() {
+                (
+                    "; allow read-only file operations\n(allow file-read*)".to_string(),
+                    Vec::new(),
+                )
+            } else {
+                let (policy, params) = build_seatbelt_access_policy(
+                    "file-read*",
+                    "READABLE_ROOT",
+                    vec![SeatbeltAccessRoot {
+                        root: root_absolute_path(),
+                        excluded_subpaths: unreadable_roots,
+                    }],
+                );
+                (
+                    format!("; allow read-only file operations\n{policy}"),
+                    params,
+                )
+            }
+        } else {
+            let (policy, params) = build_seatbelt_access_policy(
+                "file-read*",
+                "READABLE_ROOT",
+                file_system_sandbox_policy
+                    .get_readable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd)
+                    .into_iter()
+                    .map(|root| SeatbeltAccessRoot {
+                        excluded_subpaths: unreadable_roots
+                            .iter()
+                            .filter(|path| path.as_path().starts_with(root.as_path()))
+                            .cloned()
+                            .collect(),
+                        root,
+                    })
+                    .collect(),
+            );
+            if policy.is_empty() {
+                (String::new(), params)
+            } else {
+                (
+                    format!("; allow read-only file operations\n{policy}"),
+                    params,
+                )
+            }
+        };

    let proxy = proxy_policy_inputs(network);
-    let network_policy = dynamic_network_policy(sandbox_policy, enforce_managed_network, &proxy);
+    let network_policy =
+        dynamic_network_policy_for_network(network_sandbox_policy, enforce_managed_network, &proxy);
    let seatbelt_extensions = extensions.map_or_else(
        || {
            // Backward-compatibility default when no extension profile is provided.
@@ -426,7 +522,7 @@ pub(crate) fn create_seatbelt_command_args_with_extensions(
        build_seatbelt_extensions,
    );

-    let include_platform_defaults = sandbox_policy.include_platform_defaults();
+    let include_platform_defaults = file_system_sandbox_policy.include_platform_defaults();
    let mut policy_sections = vec![
        MACOS_SEATBELT_BASE_POLICY.to_string(),
        file_read_policy,
@@ -493,6 +589,7 @@ mod tests {
    use super::ProxyPolicyInputs;
    use super::UnixDomainSocketPolicy;
    use super::create_seatbelt_command_args;
+    use super::create_seatbelt_command_args_for_policies_with_extensions;
    use super::create_seatbelt_command_args_with_extensions;
    use super::dynamic_network_policy;
    use super::macos_dir_params;
@@ -504,6 +601,11 @@ mod tests {
    use crate::seatbelt_permissions::MacOsAutomationPermission;
    use crate::seatbelt_permissions::MacOsPreferencesPermission;
    use crate::seatbelt_permissions::MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions;
+    use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode;
+    use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath;
+    use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
+    use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
+    use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
    use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
    use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
    use std::fs;
@@ -526,6 +628,15 @@ mod tests {
        AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(Path::new(path)).expect("absolute path")
    }

+    fn seatbelt_policy_arg(args: &[String]) -> &str {
+        let policy_index = args
+            .iter()
+            .position(|arg| arg == "-p")
+            .expect("seatbelt args should include -p");
+        args.get(policy_index + 1)
+            .expect("seatbelt args should include policy text")
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn base_policy_allows_node_cpu_sysctls() {
        assert!(
@@ -573,6 +684,95 @@ mod tests {
        );
    }

+    #[test]
+    fn explicit_unreadable_paths_are_excluded_from_full_disk_read_and_write_access() {
+        let unreadable = absolute_path("/tmp/codex-unreadable");
+        let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
+            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+                path: FileSystemPath::Special {
+                    value: crate::protocol::FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
+                },
+                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
+            },
+            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: unreadable },
+                access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
+            },
+        ]);
+
+        let args = create_seatbelt_command_args_for_policies_with_extensions(
+            vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
+            &file_system_policy,
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+            Path::new("/"),
+            false,
+            None,
+            None,
+        );
+
+        let policy = seatbelt_policy_arg(&args);
+        assert!(
+            policy.contains("(require-not (subpath (param \"READABLE_ROOT_0_RO_0\")))"),
+            "expected read carveout in policy:\n{policy}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            policy.contains("(require-not (subpath (param \"WRITABLE_ROOT_0_RO_0\")))"),
+            "expected write carveout in policy:\n{policy}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            args.iter()
+                .any(|arg| arg == "-DREADABLE_ROOT_0_RO_0=/tmp/codex-unreadable"),
+            "expected read carveout parameter in args: {args:#?}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            args.iter()
+                .any(|arg| arg == "-DWRITABLE_ROOT_0_RO_0=/tmp/codex-unreadable"),
+            "expected write carveout parameter in args: {args:#?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn explicit_unreadable_paths_are_excluded_from_readable_roots() {
+        let root = absolute_path("/tmp/codex-readable");
+        let unreadable = absolute_path("/tmp/codex-readable/private");
+        let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
+            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: root },
+                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
+            },
+            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: unreadable },
+                access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
+            },
+        ]);
+
+        let args = create_seatbelt_command_args_for_policies_with_extensions(
+            vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
+            &file_system_policy,
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+            Path::new("/"),
+            false,
+            None,
+            None,
+        );
+
+        let policy = seatbelt_policy_arg(&args);
+        assert!(
+            policy.contains("(require-not (subpath (param \"READABLE_ROOT_0_RO_0\")))"),
+            "expected read carveout in policy:\n{policy}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            args.iter()
+                .any(|arg| arg == "-DREADABLE_ROOT_0=/tmp/codex-readable"),
+            "expected readable root parameter in args: {args:#?}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            args.iter()
+                .any(|arg| arg == "-DREADABLE_ROOT_0_RO_0=/tmp/codex-readable/private"),
+            "expected read carveout parameter in args: {args:#?}"
+        );
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn seatbelt_args_include_macos_permission_extensions() {
        let cwd = std::env::temp_dir();
@@ -991,7 +1191,7 @@ sys.exit(0 if allowed else 13)
 ; allow read-only file operations
 (allow file-read*)
 (allow file-write*
-(require-all (subpath (param "WRITABLE_ROOT_0")) (require-not (subpath (param "WRITABLE_ROOT_0_RO_0"))) (require-not (subpath (param "WRITABLE_ROOT_0_RO_1"))) ) (subpath (param "WRITABLE_ROOT_1")) (subpath (param "WRITABLE_ROOT_2"))
+(subpath (param "WRITABLE_ROOT_0")) (require-all (subpath (param "WRITABLE_ROOT_1")) (require-not (subpath (param "WRITABLE_ROOT_1_RO_0"))) (require-not (subpath (param "WRITABLE_ROOT_1_RO_1"))) ) (subpath (param "WRITABLE_ROOT_2"))
 )

 ; macOS permission profile extensions
@@ -1004,43 +1204,51 @@ sys.exit(0 if allowed else 13)
 "#,
        );

-        let mut expected_args = vec![
-            "-p".to_string(),
-            expected_policy,
+        assert_eq!(seatbelt_policy_arg(&args), expected_policy);
+
+        let expected_definitions = [
            format!(
                "-DWRITABLE_ROOT_0={}",
-                vulnerable_root_canonical.to_string_lossy()
-            ),
-            format!(
-                "-DWRITABLE_ROOT_0_RO_0={}",
-                dot_git_canonical.to_string_lossy()
-            ),
-            format!(
-                "-DWRITABLE_ROOT_0_RO_1={}",
-                dot_codex_canonical.to_string_lossy()
-            ),
-            format!(
-                "-DWRITABLE_ROOT_1={}",
-                empty_root_canonical.to_string_lossy()
-            ),
-            format!(
-                "-DWRITABLE_ROOT_2={}",
                cwd.canonicalize()
                    .expect("canonicalize cwd")
                    .to_string_lossy()
            ),
+            format!(
+                "-DWRITABLE_ROOT_1={}",
+                vulnerable_root_canonical.to_string_lossy()
+            ),
+            format!(
+                "-DWRITABLE_ROOT_1_RO_0={}",
+                dot_git_canonical.to_string_lossy()
+            ),
+            format!(
+                "-DWRITABLE_ROOT_1_RO_1={}",
+                dot_codex_canonical.to_string_lossy()
+            ),
+            format!(
+                "-DWRITABLE_ROOT_2={}",
+                empty_root_canonical.to_string_lossy()
+            ),
        ];
+        for expected_definition in expected_definitions {
+            assert!(
+                args.contains(&expected_definition),
+                "expected definition arg `{expected_definition}` in {args:#?}"
+            );
+        }
+        for (key, value) in macos_dir_params() {
+            let expected_definition = format!("-D{key}={}", value.to_string_lossy());
+            assert!(
+                args.contains(&expected_definition),
+                "expected definition arg `{expected_definition}` in {args:#?}"
+            );
+        }

-        expected_args.extend(
-            macos_dir_params()
-                .into_iter()
-                .map(|(key, value)| format!("-D{key}={value}", value = value.to_string_lossy())),
-        );
-
-        expected_args.push("--".to_string());
-        expected_args.extend(shell_command);
-
-        assert_eq!(expected_args, args);
+        let command_index = args
+            .iter()
+            .position(|arg| arg == "--")
+            .expect("seatbelt args should include command separator");
+        assert_eq!(args[command_index + 1..], shell_command);

        // Verify that .codex/config.toml cannot be modified under the generated
        // Seatbelt policy.
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/skills/injection.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/skills/injection.rs
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ use crate::analytics_client::InvocationType;
 use crate::analytics_client::SkillInvocation;
 use crate::analytics_client::TrackEventsContext;
 use crate::instructions::SkillInstructions;
+use crate::mention_syntax::TOOL_MENTION_SIGIL;
 use crate::mentions::build_skill_name_counts;
 use crate::skills::SkillMetadata;
 use codex_otel::SessionTelemetry;
@@ -232,10 +233,10 @@ pub(crate) fn normalize_skill_path(path: &str) -> &str {
 /// resource path is present, it is captured for exact path matching while also tracking
 /// the name for fallback matching.
 pub(crate) fn extract_tool_mentions(text: &str) -> ToolMentions<'_> {
-    extract_tool_mentions_with_sigil(text, '$')
+    extract_tool_mentions_with_sigil(text, TOOL_MENTION_SIGIL)
 }

-fn extract_tool_mentions_with_sigil(text: &str, sigil: char) -> ToolMentions<'_> {
+pub(crate) fn extract_tool_mentions_with_sigil(text: &str, sigil: char) -> ToolMentions<'_> {
    let text_bytes = text.as_bytes();
    let mut mentioned_names: HashSet<&str> = HashSet::new();
    let mut mentioned_paths: HashSet<&str> = HashSet::new();
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/js_repl/mod.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/js_repl/mod.rs
@@ -1750,6 +1750,16 @@ mod tests {
    use std::path::Path;
    use tempfile::tempdir;

+    fn set_danger_full_access(turn: &mut crate::codex::TurnContext) {
+        turn.sandbox_policy
+            .set(SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess)
+            .expect("test setup should allow updating sandbox policy");
+        turn.file_system_sandbox_policy =
+            crate::protocol::FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(turn.sandbox_policy.get());
+        turn.network_sandbox_policy =
+            crate::protocol::NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(turn.sandbox_policy.get());
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn node_version_parses_v_prefix_and_suffix() {
        let version = NodeVersion::parse("v25.1.0-nightly.2024").unwrap();
@@ -2467,9 +2477,7 @@ mod tests {
        turn.approval_policy
            .set(AskForApproval::Never)
            .expect("test setup should allow updating approval policy");
-        turn.sandbox_policy
-            .set(SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess)
-            .expect("test setup should allow updating sandbox policy");
+        set_danger_full_access(&mut turn);

        let session = Arc::new(session);
        let turn = Arc::new(turn);
@@ -2521,9 +2529,7 @@ console.log("cell-complete");
        turn.approval_policy
            .set(AskForApproval::Never)
            .expect("test setup should allow updating approval policy");
-        turn.sandbox_policy
-            .set(SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess)
-            .expect("test setup should allow updating sandbox policy");
+        set_danger_full_access(&mut turn);

        let session = Arc::new(session);
        let turn = Arc::new(turn);
@@ -2579,9 +2585,7 @@ console.log(out.type);
        turn.approval_policy
            .set(AskForApproval::Never)
            .expect("test setup should allow updating approval policy");
-        turn.sandbox_policy
-            .set(SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess)
-            .expect("test setup should allow updating sandbox policy");
+        set_danger_full_access(&mut turn);

        let session = Arc::new(session);
        let turn = Arc::new(turn);
--- a/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/request_permissions.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/request_permissions.rs
@@ -208,14 +208,17 @@ async fn with_additional_permissions_requires_approval_under_on_request() -> Res
    });
    let test = builder.build(&server).await?;

-    let requested_write = test.workspace_path("requested-but-unused.txt");
+    let requested_dir = test.workspace_path("requested-dir");
+    fs::create_dir_all(&requested_dir)?;
+    let requested_dir_canonical = requested_dir.canonicalize()?;
+    let requested_write = requested_dir.join("requested-but-unused.txt");
    let _ = fs::remove_file(&requested_write);
    let call_id = "request_permissions_skip_approval";
-    let command = "touch requested-but-unused.txt";
+    let command = "touch requested-dir/requested-but-unused.txt";
    let requested_permissions = PermissionProfile {
        file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
            read: Some(vec![]),
-            write: Some(vec![absolute_path(&requested_write)]),
+            write: Some(vec![absolute_path(&requested_dir_canonical)]),
        }),
        ..Default::default()
    };
@@ -292,6 +295,7 @@ async fn relative_additional_permissions_resolve_against_tool_workdir() -> Resul

    let nested_dir = test.workspace_path("nested");
    fs::create_dir_all(&nested_dir)?;
+    let nested_dir_canonical = nested_dir.canonicalize()?;
    let requested_write = nested_dir.join("relative-write.txt");
    let _ = fs::remove_file(&requested_write);

@@ -300,7 +304,7 @@ async fn relative_additional_permissions_resolve_against_tool_workdir() -> Resul
    let expected_permissions = PermissionProfile {
        file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
            read: None,
-            write: Some(vec![absolute_path(&requested_write)]),
+            write: Some(vec![absolute_path(&nested_dir_canonical)]),
        }),
        ..Default::default()
    };
@@ -310,7 +314,7 @@ async fn relative_additional_permissions_resolve_against_tool_workdir() -> Resul
        Some("nested"),
        json!({
            "file_system": {
-                "write": ["./relative-write.txt"],
+                "write": ["."],
            },
        }),
    )?;
@@ -366,7 +370,8 @@ async fn relative_additional_permissions_resolve_against_tool_workdir() -> Resul

 #[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
 #[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
-async fn read_only_with_additional_permissions_widens_to_unrequested_cwd_write() -> Result<()> {
+async fn read_only_with_additional_permissions_does_not_widen_to_unrequested_cwd_write()
+-> Result<()> {
    skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
    skip_if_sandbox!(Ok(()));

@@ -440,16 +445,18 @@ async fn read_only_with_additional_permissions_widens_to_unrequested_cwd_write()

    let result = parse_result(&results.single_request().function_call_output(call_id));
    assert!(
-        result.exit_code.is_none() || result.exit_code == Some(0),
-        "unexpected exit code/output: {:?} {}",
+        result.exit_code != Some(0),
+        "unrequested cwd write should stay denied: {:?} {}",
        result.exit_code,
        result.stdout
    );
-    assert!(result.stdout.contains("cwd-widened"));
-    assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(&unrequested_write)?, "cwd-widened");
    assert!(
        !requested_write.exists(),
-        "only the unrequested cwd path should have been written"
+        "requested path should remain untouched when the command targets an unrequested file"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        !unrequested_write.exists(),
+        "unrequested cwd write should remain blocked"
    );

    let _ = fs::remove_file(unrequested_write);
@@ -459,7 +466,8 @@ async fn read_only_with_additional_permissions_widens_to_unrequested_cwd_write()

 #[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
 #[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
-async fn read_only_with_additional_permissions_widens_to_unrequested_tmp_write() -> Result<()> {
+async fn read_only_with_additional_permissions_does_not_widen_to_unrequested_tmp_write()
+-> Result<()> {
    skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
    skip_if_sandbox!(Ok(()));

@@ -534,16 +542,18 @@ async fn read_only_with_additional_permissions_widens_to_unrequested_tmp_write()

    let result = parse_result(&results.single_request().function_call_output(call_id));
    assert!(
-        result.exit_code.is_none() || result.exit_code == Some(0),
-        "unexpected exit code/output: {:?} {}",
+        result.exit_code != Some(0),
+        "unrequested tmp write should stay denied: {:?} {}",
        result.exit_code,
        result.stdout
    );
-    assert!(result.stdout.contains("tmp-widened"));
-    assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(&tmp_write)?, "tmp-widened");
    assert!(
        !requested_write.exists(),
-        "only the unrequested tmp path should have been written"
+        "requested path should remain untouched when the command targets an unrequested file"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        !tmp_write.exists(),
+        "unrequested tmp write should remain blocked"
    );

    let _ = fs::remove_file(tmp_write);
--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/landlock.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/landlock.rs
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ use std::path::Path;
 use codex_core::error::CodexErr;
 use codex_core::error::Result;
 use codex_core::error::SandboxErr;
+use codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
 use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;

@@ -40,13 +41,14 @@ use seccompiler::apply_filter;
 /// Filesystem restrictions are intentionally handled by bubblewrap.
 pub(crate) fn apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(
    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
+    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
    cwd: &Path,
    apply_landlock_fs: bool,
    allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
    proxy_routed_network: bool,
 ) -> Result<()> {
    let network_seccomp_mode = network_seccomp_mode(
-        sandbox_policy,
+        network_sandbox_policy,
        allow_network_for_proxy,
        proxy_routed_network,
    );
@@ -91,20 +93,20 @@ enum NetworkSeccompMode {
 }

 fn should_install_network_seccomp(
-    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
+    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
    allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
 ) -> bool {
    // Managed-network sessions should remain fail-closed even for policies that
    // would normally grant full network access (for example, DangerFullAccess).
-    !sandbox_policy.has_full_network_access() || allow_network_for_proxy
+    !network_sandbox_policy.is_enabled() || allow_network_for_proxy
 }

 fn network_seccomp_mode(
-    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
+    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
    allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
    proxy_routed_network: bool,
 ) -> Option<NetworkSeccompMode> {
-    if !should_install_network_seccomp(sandbox_policy, allow_network_for_proxy) {
+    if !should_install_network_seccomp(network_sandbox_policy, allow_network_for_proxy) {
        None
    } else if proxy_routed_network {
        Some(NetworkSeccompMode::ProxyRouted)
@@ -266,13 +268,13 @@ mod tests {
    use super::NetworkSeccompMode;
    use super::network_seccomp_mode;
    use super::should_install_network_seccomp;
-    use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
+    use codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
    use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;

    #[test]
    fn managed_network_enforces_seccomp_even_for_full_network_policy() {
        assert_eq!(
-            should_install_network_seccomp(&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess, true),
+            should_install_network_seccomp(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled, true),
            true
        );
    }
@@ -280,7 +282,7 @@ mod tests {
    #[test]
    fn full_network_policy_without_managed_network_skips_seccomp() {
        assert_eq!(
-            should_install_network_seccomp(&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess, false),
+            should_install_network_seccomp(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled, false),
            false
        );
    }
@@ -288,11 +290,11 @@ mod tests {
    #[test]
    fn restricted_network_policy_always_installs_seccomp() {
        assert!(should_install_network_seccomp(
-            &SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
            false
        ));
        assert!(should_install_network_seccomp(
-            &SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
            true
        ));
    }
@@ -300,7 +302,7 @@ mod tests {
    #[test]
    fn managed_proxy_routes_use_proxy_routed_seccomp_mode() {
        assert_eq!(
-            network_seccomp_mode(&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess, true, true),
+            network_seccomp_mode(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled, true, true),
            Some(NetworkSeccompMode::ProxyRouted)
        );
    }
@@ -308,7 +310,7 @@ mod tests {
    #[test]
    fn restricted_network_without_proxy_routing_uses_restricted_mode() {
        assert_eq!(
-            network_seccomp_mode(&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(), false, false),
+            network_seccomp_mode(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted, false, false),
            Some(NetworkSeccompMode::Restricted)
        );
    }
@@ -316,7 +318,7 @@ mod tests {
    #[test]
    fn full_network_without_managed_proxy_skips_network_seccomp_mode() {
        assert_eq!(
-            network_seccomp_mode(&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess, false, false),
+            network_seccomp_mode(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled, false, false),
            None
        );
    }
--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main.rs
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ use crate::proxy_routing::activate_proxy_routes_in_netns;
 use crate::proxy_routing::prepare_host_proxy_route_spec;
 use crate::vendored_bwrap::exec_vendored_bwrap;
 use crate::vendored_bwrap::run_vendored_bwrap_main;
+use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
+use codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
+use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;

 #[derive(Debug, Parser)]
 /// CLI surface for the Linux sandbox helper.
@@ -26,8 +29,18 @@ pub struct LandlockCommand {
    #[arg(long = "sandbox-policy-cwd")]
    pub sandbox_policy_cwd: PathBuf,

-    #[arg(long = "sandbox-policy")]
-    pub sandbox_policy: codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy,
+    /// Legacy compatibility policy.
+    ///
+    /// Newer callers pass split filesystem/network policies as well so the
+    /// helper can migrate incrementally without breaking older invocations.
+    #[arg(long = "sandbox-policy", hide = true)]
+    pub sandbox_policy: Option<SandboxPolicy>,
+
+    #[arg(long = "file-system-sandbox-policy", hide = true)]
+    pub file_system_sandbox_policy: Option<FileSystemSandboxPolicy>,
+
+    #[arg(long = "network-sandbox-policy", hide = true)]
+    pub network_sandbox_policy: Option<NetworkSandboxPolicy>,

    /// Opt-in: use the bubblewrap-based Linux sandbox pipeline.
    ///
@@ -77,6 +90,8 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
    let LandlockCommand {
        sandbox_policy_cwd,
        sandbox_policy,
+        file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        network_sandbox_policy,
        use_bwrap_sandbox,
        apply_seccomp_then_exec,
        allow_network_for_proxy,
@@ -89,6 +104,16 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
        panic!("No command specified to execute.");
    }
    ensure_inner_stage_mode_is_valid(apply_seccomp_then_exec, use_bwrap_sandbox);
+    let EffectiveSandboxPolicies {
+        sandbox_policy,
+        file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        network_sandbox_policy,
+    } = resolve_sandbox_policies(
+        sandbox_policy_cwd.as_path(),
+        sandbox_policy,
+        file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        network_sandbox_policy,
+    );

    // Inner stage: apply seccomp/no_new_privs after bubblewrap has already
    // established the filesystem view.
@@ -104,6 +129,7 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
        let proxy_routing_active = allow_network_for_proxy;
        if let Err(e) = apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(
            &sandbox_policy,
+            network_sandbox_policy,
            &sandbox_policy_cwd,
            false,
            allow_network_for_proxy,
@@ -114,9 +140,10 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
        exec_or_panic(command);
    }

-    if sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() && !allow_network_for_proxy {
+    if file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() && !allow_network_for_proxy {
        if let Err(e) = apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(
            &sandbox_policy,
+            network_sandbox_policy,
            &sandbox_policy_cwd,
            false,
            allow_network_for_proxy,
@@ -139,17 +166,20 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
            } else {
                None
            };
-        let inner = build_inner_seccomp_command(
-            &sandbox_policy_cwd,
-            &sandbox_policy,
+        let inner = build_inner_seccomp_command(InnerSeccompCommandArgs {
+            sandbox_policy_cwd: &sandbox_policy_cwd,
+            sandbox_policy: &sandbox_policy,
+            file_system_sandbox_policy: &file_system_sandbox_policy,
+            network_sandbox_policy,
            use_bwrap_sandbox,
            allow_network_for_proxy,
            proxy_route_spec,
            command,
-        );
+        });
        run_bwrap_with_proc_fallback(
            &sandbox_policy_cwd,
            &sandbox_policy,
+            network_sandbox_policy,
            inner,
            !no_proc,
            allow_network_for_proxy,
@@ -159,6 +189,7 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
    // Legacy path: Landlock enforcement only, when bwrap sandboxing is not enabled.
    if let Err(e) = apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(
        &sandbox_policy,
+        network_sandbox_policy,
        &sandbox_policy_cwd,
        true,
        allow_network_for_proxy,
@@ -169,6 +200,59 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
    exec_or_panic(command);
 }

+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+struct EffectiveSandboxPolicies {
+    sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
+    file_system_sandbox_policy: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
+}
+
+fn resolve_sandbox_policies(
+    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
+    sandbox_policy: Option<SandboxPolicy>,
+    file_system_sandbox_policy: Option<FileSystemSandboxPolicy>,
+    network_sandbox_policy: Option<NetworkSandboxPolicy>,
+) -> EffectiveSandboxPolicies {
+    // Accept either a fully legacy policy, a fully split policy pair, or all
+    // three views together. Reject partial split-policy input so the helper
+    // never runs with mismatched filesystem/network state.
+    let split_policies = match (file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy) {
+        (Some(file_system_sandbox_policy), Some(network_sandbox_policy)) => {
+            Some((file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy))
+        }
+        (None, None) => None,
+        _ => panic!("file-system and network sandbox policies must be provided together"),
+    };
+
+    match (sandbox_policy, split_policies) {
+        (Some(sandbox_policy), Some((file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy))) => {
+            EffectiveSandboxPolicies {
+                sandbox_policy,
+                file_system_sandbox_policy,
+                network_sandbox_policy,
+            }
+        }
+        (Some(sandbox_policy), None) => EffectiveSandboxPolicies {
+            file_system_sandbox_policy: FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
+            network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
+            sandbox_policy,
+        },
+        (None, Some((file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy))) => {
+            let sandbox_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy
+                .to_legacy_sandbox_policy(network_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd)
+                .unwrap_or_else(|err| {
+                    panic!("failed to derive legacy sandbox policy from split policies: {err}")
+                });
+            EffectiveSandboxPolicies {
+                sandbox_policy,
+                file_system_sandbox_policy,
+                network_sandbox_policy,
+            }
+        }
+        (None, None) => panic!("missing sandbox policy configuration"),
+    }
+}
+
 fn ensure_inner_stage_mode_is_valid(apply_seccomp_then_exec: bool, use_bwrap_sandbox: bool) {
    if apply_seccomp_then_exec && !use_bwrap_sandbox {
        panic!("--apply-seccomp-then-exec requires --use-bwrap-sandbox");
@@ -177,12 +261,13 @@ fn ensure_inner_stage_mode_is_valid(apply_seccomp_then_exec: bool, use_bwrap_san

 fn run_bwrap_with_proc_fallback(
    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
-    sandbox_policy: &codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy,
+    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
+    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
    inner: Vec<String>,
    mount_proc: bool,
    allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
 ) -> ! {
-    let network_mode = bwrap_network_mode(sandbox_policy, allow_network_for_proxy);
+    let network_mode = bwrap_network_mode(network_sandbox_policy, allow_network_for_proxy);
    let mut mount_proc = mount_proc;

    if mount_proc && !preflight_proc_mount_support(sandbox_policy_cwd, sandbox_policy, network_mode)
@@ -200,12 +285,12 @@ fn run_bwrap_with_proc_fallback(
 }

 fn bwrap_network_mode(
-    sandbox_policy: &codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy,
+    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
    allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
 ) -> BwrapNetworkMode {
    if allow_network_for_proxy {
        BwrapNetworkMode::ProxyOnly
-    } else if sandbox_policy.has_full_network_access() {
+    } else if network_sandbox_policy.is_enabled() {
        BwrapNetworkMode::FullAccess
    } else {
        BwrapNetworkMode::Isolated
@@ -214,7 +299,7 @@ fn bwrap_network_mode(

 fn build_bwrap_argv(
    inner: Vec<String>,
-    sandbox_policy: &codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy,
+    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
    options: BwrapOptions,
 ) -> Vec<String> {
@@ -237,7 +322,7 @@ fn build_bwrap_argv(

 fn preflight_proc_mount_support(
    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
-    sandbox_policy: &codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy,
+    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
    network_mode: BwrapNetworkMode,
 ) -> bool {
    let preflight_argv =
@@ -248,7 +333,7 @@ fn preflight_proc_mount_support(

 fn build_preflight_bwrap_argv(
    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
-    sandbox_policy: &codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy,
+    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
    network_mode: BwrapNetworkMode,
 ) -> Vec<String> {
    let preflight_command = vec![resolve_true_command()];
@@ -358,15 +443,29 @@ fn is_proc_mount_failure(stderr: &str) -> bool {
            || stderr.contains("Permission denied"))
 }

-/// Build the inner command that applies seccomp after bubblewrap.
-fn build_inner_seccomp_command(
-    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
-    sandbox_policy: &codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy,
+struct InnerSeccompCommandArgs<'a> {
+    sandbox_policy_cwd: &'a Path,
+    sandbox_policy: &'a SandboxPolicy,
+    file_system_sandbox_policy: &'a FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
    use_bwrap_sandbox: bool,
    allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
    proxy_route_spec: Option<String>,
    command: Vec<String>,
-) -> Vec<String> {
+}
+
+/// Build the inner command that applies seccomp after bubblewrap.
+fn build_inner_seccomp_command(args: InnerSeccompCommandArgs<'_>) -> Vec<String> {
+    let InnerSeccompCommandArgs {
+        sandbox_policy_cwd,
+        sandbox_policy,
+        file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        network_sandbox_policy,
+        use_bwrap_sandbox,
+        allow_network_for_proxy,
+        proxy_route_spec,
+        command,
+    } = args;
    let current_exe = match std::env::current_exe() {
        Ok(path) => path,
        Err(err) => panic!("failed to resolve current executable path: {err}"),
@@ -375,6 +474,14 @@ fn build_inner_seccomp_command(
        Ok(json) => json,
        Err(err) => panic!("failed to serialize sandbox policy: {err}"),
    };
+    let file_system_policy_json = match serde_json::to_string(file_system_sandbox_policy) {
+        Ok(json) => json,
+        Err(err) => panic!("failed to serialize filesystem sandbox policy: {err}"),
+    };
+    let network_policy_json = match serde_json::to_string(&network_sandbox_policy) {
+        Ok(json) => json,
+        Err(err) => panic!("failed to serialize network sandbox policy: {err}"),
+    };

    let mut inner = vec![
        current_exe.to_string_lossy().to_string(),
@@ -382,6 +489,10 @@ fn build_inner_seccomp_command(
        sandbox_policy_cwd.to_string_lossy().to_string(),
        "--sandbox-policy".to_string(),
        policy_json,
+        "--file-system-sandbox-policy".to_string(),
+        file_system_policy_json,
+        "--network-sandbox-policy".to_string(),
+        network_policy_json,
    ];
    if use_bwrap_sandbox {
        inner.push("--use-bwrap-sandbox".to_string());
--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main_tests.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main_tests.rs
@@ -1,7 +1,13 @@
 #[cfg(test)]
 use super::*;
 #[cfg(test)]
+use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
+#[cfg(test)]
+use codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
+#[cfg(test)]
 use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
+#[cfg(test)]
+use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;

 #[test]
 fn detects_proc_mount_invalid_argument_failure() {
@@ -91,42 +97,66 @@ fn inserts_unshare_net_when_proxy_only_network_mode_requested() {

 #[test]
 fn proxy_only_mode_takes_precedence_over_full_network_policy() {
-    let mode = bwrap_network_mode(&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess, true);
+    let mode = bwrap_network_mode(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled, true);
    assert_eq!(mode, BwrapNetworkMode::ProxyOnly);
 }

 #[test]
 fn managed_proxy_preflight_argv_is_wrapped_for_full_access_policy() {
-    let mode = bwrap_network_mode(&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess, true);
+    let mode = bwrap_network_mode(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled, true);
    let argv = build_preflight_bwrap_argv(Path::new("/"), &SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess, mode);
    assert!(argv.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--"));
 }

 #[test]
 fn managed_proxy_inner_command_includes_route_spec() {
-    let args = build_inner_seccomp_command(
-        Path::new("/tmp"),
-        &SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
-        true,
-        true,
-        Some("{\"routes\":[]}".to_string()),
-        vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
-    );
+    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+    let args = build_inner_seccomp_command(InnerSeccompCommandArgs {
+        sandbox_policy_cwd: Path::new("/tmp"),
+        sandbox_policy: &sandbox_policy,
+        file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
+        network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+        use_bwrap_sandbox: true,
+        allow_network_for_proxy: true,
+        proxy_route_spec: Some("{\"routes\":[]}".to_string()),
+        command: vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
+    });

    assert!(args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--proxy-route-spec"));
    assert!(args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "{\"routes\":[]}"));
 }

+#[test]
+fn inner_command_includes_split_policy_flags() {
+    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+    let args = build_inner_seccomp_command(InnerSeccompCommandArgs {
+        sandbox_policy_cwd: Path::new("/tmp"),
+        sandbox_policy: &sandbox_policy,
+        file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
+        network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+        use_bwrap_sandbox: true,
+        allow_network_for_proxy: false,
+        proxy_route_spec: None,
+        command: vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
+    });
+
+    assert!(args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--file-system-sandbox-policy"));
+    assert!(args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--network-sandbox-policy"));
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn non_managed_inner_command_omits_route_spec() {
-    let args = build_inner_seccomp_command(
-        Path::new("/tmp"),
-        &SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
-        true,
-        false,
-        None,
-        vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
-    );
+    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+    let args = build_inner_seccomp_command(InnerSeccompCommandArgs {
+        sandbox_policy_cwd: Path::new("/tmp"),
+        sandbox_policy: &sandbox_policy,
+        file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
+        network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+        use_bwrap_sandbox: true,
+        allow_network_for_proxy: false,
+        proxy_route_spec: None,
+        command: vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
+    });

    assert!(!args.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--proxy-route-spec"));
 }
@@ -134,15 +164,71 @@ fn non_managed_inner_command_omits_route_spec() {
 #[test]
 fn managed_proxy_inner_command_requires_route_spec() {
    let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(|| {
-        build_inner_seccomp_command(
+        let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+        build_inner_seccomp_command(InnerSeccompCommandArgs {
+            sandbox_policy_cwd: Path::new("/tmp"),
+            sandbox_policy: &sandbox_policy,
+            file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
+            network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+            use_bwrap_sandbox: true,
+            allow_network_for_proxy: true,
+            proxy_route_spec: None,
+            command: vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
+        })
+    });
+    assert!(result.is_err());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn resolve_sandbox_policies_derives_split_policies_from_legacy_policy() {
+    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+
+    let resolved =
+        resolve_sandbox_policies(Path::new("/tmp"), Some(sandbox_policy.clone()), None, None);
+
+    assert_eq!(resolved.sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy);
+    assert_eq!(
+        resolved.file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy)
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        resolved.network_sandbox_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy)
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn resolve_sandbox_policies_derives_legacy_policy_from_split_policies() {
+    let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
+    let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy);
+    let network_sandbox_policy = NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy);
+
+    let resolved = resolve_sandbox_policies(
+        Path::new("/tmp"),
+        None,
+        Some(file_system_sandbox_policy.clone()),
+        Some(network_sandbox_policy),
+    );
+
+    assert_eq!(resolved.sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy);
+    assert_eq!(
+        resolved.file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        file_system_sandbox_policy
+    );
+    assert_eq!(resolved.network_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn resolve_sandbox_policies_rejects_partial_split_policies() {
+    let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(|| {
+        resolve_sandbox_policies(
            Path::new("/tmp"),
-            &SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
-            true,
-            true,
+            Some(SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy()),
+            Some(FileSystemSandboxPolicy::default()),
            None,
-            vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
        )
    });
+
    assert!(result.is_err());
 }

--- a/codex-rs/protocol/src/protocol.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/protocol/src/protocol.rs
@@ -727,6 +727,22 @@ impl FromStr for SandboxPolicy {
    }
 }

+impl FromStr for FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
+    type Err = serde_json::Error;
+
+    fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
+        serde_json::from_str(s)
+    }
+}
+
+impl FromStr for NetworkSandboxPolicy {
+    type Err = serde_json::Error;
+
+    fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
+        serde_json::from_str(s)
+    }
+}
+
 impl SandboxPolicy {
    /// Returns a policy with read-only disk access and no network.
    pub fn new_read_only_policy() -> Self {
@@ -3177,6 +3193,7 @@ mod tests {
    use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
    use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
    use serde_json::json;
+    use std::path::PathBuf;
    use tempfile::NamedTempFile;
    use tempfile::TempDir;

--- a/codex-rs/tui/src/app.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/tui/src/app.rs
@@ -768,12 +768,47 @@ impl App {
    }

    async fn refresh_in_memory_config_from_disk(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
-        let mut config = self.rebuild_config_for_cwd(self.config.cwd.clone()).await?;
+        let mut config = self
+            .rebuild_config_for_cwd(self.chat_widget.config_ref().cwd.clone())
+            .await?;
        self.apply_runtime_policy_overrides(&mut config);
        self.config = config;
        Ok(())
    }

+    async fn refresh_in_memory_config_from_disk_best_effort(&mut self, action: &str) {
+        if let Err(err) = self.refresh_in_memory_config_from_disk().await {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                error = %err,
+                action,
+                "failed to refresh config before thread transition; continuing with current in-memory config"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn rebuild_config_for_resume_or_fallback(
+        &mut self,
+        current_cwd: &Path,
+        resume_cwd: PathBuf,
+    ) -> Result<Config> {
+        match self.rebuild_config_for_cwd(resume_cwd.clone()).await {
+            Ok(config) => Ok(config),
+            Err(err) => {
+                if crate::cwds_differ(current_cwd, &resume_cwd) {
+                    Err(err)
+                } else {
+                    let resume_cwd_display = resume_cwd.display().to_string();
+                    tracing::warn!(
+                        error = %err,
+                        cwd = %resume_cwd_display,
+                        "failed to rebuild config for same-cwd resume; using current in-memory config"
+                    );
+                    Ok(self.config.clone())
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
    fn apply_runtime_policy_overrides(&mut self, config: &mut Config) {
        if let Some(policy) = self.runtime_approval_policy_override.as_ref()
            && let Err(err) = config.permissions.approval_policy.set(*policy)
@@ -1482,6 +1517,8 @@ impl App {
    async fn start_fresh_session_with_summary_hint(&mut self, tui: &mut tui::Tui) {
        // Start a fresh in-memory session while preserving resumability via persisted rollout
        // history.
+        self.refresh_in_memory_config_from_disk_best_effort("starting a new thread")
+            .await;
        let model = self.chat_widget.current_model().to_string();
        let config = self.fresh_session_config();
        let summary = session_summary(
@@ -2078,19 +2115,17 @@ impl App {
                                return Ok(AppRunControl::Exit(ExitReason::UserRequested));
                            }
                        };
-                        let mut resume_config = if crate::cwds_differ(&current_cwd, &resume_cwd) {
-                            match self.rebuild_config_for_cwd(resume_cwd).await {
-                                Ok(cfg) => cfg,
-                                Err(err) => {
-                                    self.chat_widget.add_error_message(format!(
-                                        "Failed to rebuild configuration for resume: {err}"
-                                    ));
-                                    return Ok(AppRunControl::Continue);
-                                }
+                        let mut resume_config = match self
+                            .rebuild_config_for_resume_or_fallback(&current_cwd, resume_cwd)
+                            .await
+                        {
+                            Ok(cfg) => cfg,
+                            Err(err) => {
+                                self.chat_widget.add_error_message(format!(
+                                    "Failed to rebuild configuration for resume: {err}"
+                                ));
+                                return Ok(AppRunControl::Continue);
                            }
-                        } else {
-                            // No rebuild needed: current_cwd comes from self.config.cwd.
-                            self.config.clone()
                        };
                        self.apply_runtime_policy_overrides(&mut resume_config);
                        let summary = session_summary(
@@ -2165,6 +2200,8 @@ impl App {
                self.chat_widget
                    .add_plain_history_lines(vec!["/fork".magenta().into()]);
                if let Some(path) = self.chat_widget.rollout_path() {
+                    self.refresh_in_memory_config_from_disk_best_effort("forking the thread")
+                        .await;
                    // Fresh threads expose a precomputed path, but the file is
                    // materialized lazily on first user message.
                    if path.exists() {
@@ -5907,6 +5944,95 @@ mod tests {
        Ok(())
    }

+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn refresh_in_memory_config_from_disk_best_effort_keeps_current_config_on_error()
+    -> Result<()> {
+        let mut app = make_test_app().await;
+        let codex_home = tempdir()?;
+        app.config.codex_home = codex_home.path().to_path_buf();
+        std::fs::write(codex_home.path().join("config.toml"), "[broken")?;
+        let original_config = app.config.clone();
+
+        app.refresh_in_memory_config_from_disk_best_effort("starting a new thread")
+            .await;
+
+        assert_eq!(app.config, original_config);
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn refresh_in_memory_config_from_disk_uses_active_chat_widget_cwd() -> Result<()> {
+        let mut app = make_test_app().await;
+        let original_cwd = app.config.cwd.clone();
+        let next_cwd_tmp = tempdir()?;
+        let next_cwd = next_cwd_tmp.path().to_path_buf();
+
+        app.chat_widget.handle_codex_event(Event {
+            id: String::new(),
+            msg: EventMsg::SessionConfigured(SessionConfiguredEvent {
+                session_id: ThreadId::new(),
+                forked_from_id: None,
+                thread_name: None,
+                model: "gpt-test".to_string(),
+                model_provider_id: "test-provider".to_string(),
+                service_tier: None,
+                approval_policy: AskForApproval::Never,
+                sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
+                cwd: next_cwd.clone(),
+                reasoning_effort: None,
+                history_log_id: 0,
+                history_entry_count: 0,
+                initial_messages: None,
+                network_proxy: None,
+                rollout_path: Some(PathBuf::new()),
+            }),
+        });
+
+        assert_eq!(app.chat_widget.config_ref().cwd, next_cwd);
+        assert_eq!(app.config.cwd, original_cwd);
+
+        app.refresh_in_memory_config_from_disk().await?;
+
+        assert_eq!(app.config.cwd, app.chat_widget.config_ref().cwd);
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn rebuild_config_for_resume_or_fallback_uses_current_config_on_same_cwd_error()
+    -> Result<()> {
+        let mut app = make_test_app().await;
+        let codex_home = tempdir()?;
+        app.config.codex_home = codex_home.path().to_path_buf();
+        std::fs::write(codex_home.path().join("config.toml"), "[broken")?;
+        let current_config = app.config.clone();
+        let current_cwd = current_config.cwd.clone();
+
+        let resume_config = app
+            .rebuild_config_for_resume_or_fallback(&current_cwd, current_cwd.clone())
+            .await?;
+
+        assert_eq!(resume_config, current_config);
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn rebuild_config_for_resume_or_fallback_errors_when_cwd_changes() -> Result<()> {
+        let mut app = make_test_app().await;
+        let codex_home = tempdir()?;
+        app.config.codex_home = codex_home.path().to_path_buf();
+        std::fs::write(codex_home.path().join("config.toml"), "[broken")?;
+        let current_cwd = app.config.cwd.clone();
+        let next_cwd_tmp = tempdir()?;
+        let next_cwd = next_cwd_tmp.path().to_path_buf();
+
+        let result = app
+            .rebuild_config_for_resume_or_fallback(&current_cwd, next_cwd)
+            .await;
+
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn sync_tui_theme_selection_updates_chat_widget_config_copy() {
        let mut app = make_test_app().await;
--- a/codex-rs/tui/src/bottom_pane/mcp_server_elicitation.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/tui/src/bottom_pane/mcp_server_elicitation.rs
@@ -49,12 +49,14 @@ const MIN_OVERLAY_HEIGHT: u16 = 8;
 const APPROVAL_FIELD_ID: &str = "__approval";
 const APPROVAL_ACCEPT_ONCE_VALUE: &str = "accept";
 const APPROVAL_ACCEPT_SESSION_VALUE: &str = "accept_session";
+const APPROVAL_ACCEPT_ALWAYS_VALUE: &str = "accept_always";
 const APPROVAL_DECLINE_VALUE: &str = "decline";
 const APPROVAL_CANCEL_VALUE: &str = "cancel";
 const APPROVAL_META_KIND_KEY: &str = "codex_approval_kind";
 const APPROVAL_META_KIND_MCP_TOOL_CALL: &str = "mcp_tool_call";
 const APPROVAL_PERSIST_KEY: &str = "persist";
 const APPROVAL_PERSIST_SESSION_VALUE: &str = "session";
+const APPROVAL_PERSIST_ALWAYS_VALUE: &str = "always";

 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Default)]
 struct ComposerDraft {
@@ -181,29 +183,49 @@ impl McpServerElicitationFormRequest {
                    .and_then(Value::as_object)
                    .is_some_and(serde_json::Map::is_empty)
        });
+        let is_tool_approval_action =
+            is_tool_approval && (requested_schema.is_null() || is_empty_object_schema);

-        let (response_mode, fields) =
-            if requested_schema.is_null() || (is_tool_approval && is_empty_object_schema) {
-                let mut options = vec![McpServerElicitationOption {
-                    label: "Approve Once".to_string(),
-                    description: Some("Run the tool and continue.".to_string()),
-                    value: Value::String(APPROVAL_ACCEPT_ONCE_VALUE.to_string()),
-                }];
-                if meta
-                    .as_ref()
-                    .and_then(Value::as_object)
-                    .and_then(|meta| meta.get(APPROVAL_PERSIST_KEY))
-                    .and_then(Value::as_str)
-                    == Some(APPROVAL_PERSIST_SESSION_VALUE)
-                {
-                    options.push(McpServerElicitationOption {
-                        label: "Approve this Session".to_string(),
-                        description: Some(
-                            "Run the tool and remember this choice for this session.".to_string(),
-                        ),
-                        value: Value::String(APPROVAL_ACCEPT_SESSION_VALUE.to_string()),
-                    });
-                }
+        let (response_mode, fields) = if requested_schema.is_null()
+            || (is_tool_approval && is_empty_object_schema)
+        {
+            let mut options = vec![McpServerElicitationOption {
+                label: "Approve Once".to_string(),
+                description: Some("Run the tool and continue.".to_string()),
+                value: Value::String(APPROVAL_ACCEPT_ONCE_VALUE.to_string()),
+            }];
+            if is_tool_approval_action
+                && tool_approval_supports_persist_mode(
+                    meta.as_ref(),
+                    APPROVAL_PERSIST_SESSION_VALUE,
+                )
+            {
+                options.push(McpServerElicitationOption {
+                    label: "Approve this session".to_string(),
+                    description: Some(
+                        "Run the tool and remember this choice for this session.".to_string(),
+                    ),
+                    value: Value::String(APPROVAL_ACCEPT_SESSION_VALUE.to_string()),
+                });
+            }
+            if is_tool_approval_action
+                && tool_approval_supports_persist_mode(meta.as_ref(), APPROVAL_PERSIST_ALWAYS_VALUE)
+            {
+                options.push(McpServerElicitationOption {
+                    label: "Always allow".to_string(),
+                    description: Some(
+                        "Run the tool and remember this choice for future tool calls.".to_string(),
+                    ),
+                    value: Value::String(APPROVAL_ACCEPT_ALWAYS_VALUE.to_string()),
+                });
+            }
+            if is_tool_approval_action {
+                options.push(McpServerElicitationOption {
+                    label: "Cancel".to_string(),
+                    description: Some("Cancel this tool call".to_string()),
+                    value: Value::String(APPROVAL_CANCEL_VALUE.to_string()),
+                });
+            } else {
                options.extend([
                    McpServerElicitationOption {
                        label: "Deny".to_string(),
@@ -216,25 +238,26 @@ impl McpServerElicitationFormRequest {
                        value: Value::String(APPROVAL_CANCEL_VALUE.to_string()),
                    },
                ]);
-                (
-                    McpServerElicitationResponseMode::ApprovalAction,
-                    vec![McpServerElicitationField {
-                        id: APPROVAL_FIELD_ID.to_string(),
-                        label: String::new(),
-                        prompt: String::new(),
-                        required: true,
-                        input: McpServerElicitationFieldInput::Select {
-                            options,
-                            default_idx: Some(0),
-                        },
-                    }],
-                )
-            } else {
-                (
-                    McpServerElicitationResponseMode::FormContent,
-                    parse_fields_from_schema(&requested_schema)?,
-                )
-            };
+            }
+            (
+                McpServerElicitationResponseMode::ApprovalAction,
+                vec![McpServerElicitationField {
+                    id: APPROVAL_FIELD_ID.to_string(),
+                    label: String::new(),
+                    prompt: String::new(),
+                    required: true,
+                    input: McpServerElicitationFieldInput::Select {
+                        options,
+                        default_idx: Some(0),
+                    },
+                }],
+            )
+        } else {
+            (
+                McpServerElicitationResponseMode::FormContent,
+                parse_fields_from_schema(&requested_schema)?,
+            )
+        };

        Some(Self {
            thread_id,
@@ -247,6 +270,24 @@ impl McpServerElicitationFormRequest {
    }
 }

+fn tool_approval_supports_persist_mode(meta: Option<&Value>, expected_mode: &str) -> bool {
+    let Some(persist) = meta
+        .and_then(Value::as_object)
+        .and_then(|meta| meta.get(APPROVAL_PERSIST_KEY))
+    else {
+        return false;
+    };
+
+    match persist {
+        Value::String(value) => value == expected_mode,
+        Value::Array(values) => values
+            .iter()
+            .filter_map(Value::as_str)
+            .any(|value| value == expected_mode),
+        _ => false,
+    }
+}
+
 fn parse_fields_from_schema(requested_schema: &Value) -> Option<Vec<McpServerElicitationField>> {
    let schema = requested_schema.as_object()?;
    if schema.get("type").and_then(Value::as_str) != Some("object") {
@@ -856,6 +897,12 @@ impl McpServerElicitationOverlay {
                        APPROVAL_PERSIST_KEY: APPROVAL_PERSIST_SESSION_VALUE,
                    })),
                ),
+                Some(APPROVAL_ACCEPT_ALWAYS_VALUE) => (
+                    ElicitationAction::Accept,
+                    Some(serde_json::json!({
+                        APPROVAL_PERSIST_KEY: APPROVAL_PERSIST_ALWAYS_VALUE,
+                    })),
+                ),
                Some(APPROVAL_DECLINE_VALUE) => (ElicitationAction::Decline, None),
                Some(APPROVAL_CANCEL_VALUE) => (ElicitationAction::Cancel, None),
                _ => (ElicitationAction::Cancel, None),
@@ -1414,15 +1461,20 @@ mod tests {
        })
    }

-    fn tool_approval_meta(include_session_persist: bool) -> Option<Value> {
+    fn tool_approval_meta(persist_modes: &[&str]) -> Option<Value> {
        let mut meta = serde_json::Map::from_iter([(
            APPROVAL_META_KIND_KEY.to_string(),
            Value::String(APPROVAL_META_KIND_MCP_TOOL_CALL.to_string()),
        )]);
-        if include_session_persist {
+        if !persist_modes.is_empty() {
            meta.insert(
                APPROVAL_PERSIST_KEY.to_string(),
-                Value::String(APPROVAL_PERSIST_SESSION_VALUE.to_string()),
+                Value::Array(
+                    persist_modes
+                        .iter()
+                        .map(|mode| Value::String((*mode).to_string()))
+                        .collect(),
+                ),
            );
        }
        Some(Value::Object(meta))
@@ -1581,7 +1633,7 @@ mod tests {
            form_request(
                "Allow this request?",
                empty_object_schema(),
-                tool_approval_meta(false),
+                tool_approval_meta(&[]),
            ),
        )
        .expect("expected approval fallback");
@@ -1606,13 +1658,6 @@ mod tests {
                                description: Some("Run the tool and continue.".to_string()),
                                value: Value::String(APPROVAL_ACCEPT_ONCE_VALUE.to_string()),
                            },
-                            McpServerElicitationOption {
-                                label: "Deny".to_string(),
-                                description: Some(
-                                    "Decline this tool call and continue.".to_string(),
-                                ),
-                                value: Value::String(APPROVAL_DECLINE_VALUE.to_string()),
-                            },
                            McpServerElicitationOption {
                                label: "Cancel".to_string(),
                                description: Some("Cancel this tool call".to_string()),
@@ -1696,7 +1741,10 @@ mod tests {
            form_request(
                "Allow this request?",
                empty_object_schema(),
-                tool_approval_meta(true),
+                tool_approval_meta(&[
+                    APPROVAL_PERSIST_SESSION_VALUE,
+                    APPROVAL_PERSIST_ALWAYS_VALUE,
+                ]),
            ),
        )
        .expect("expected approval fallback");
@@ -1731,6 +1779,53 @@ mod tests {
        );
    }

+    #[test]
+    fn empty_tool_approval_schema_always_allow_sets_persist_meta() {
+        let (tx, mut rx) = test_sender();
+        let thread_id = ThreadId::default();
+        let request = McpServerElicitationFormRequest::from_event(
+            thread_id,
+            form_request(
+                "Allow this request?",
+                empty_object_schema(),
+                tool_approval_meta(&[
+                    APPROVAL_PERSIST_SESSION_VALUE,
+                    APPROVAL_PERSIST_ALWAYS_VALUE,
+                ]),
+            ),
+        )
+        .expect("expected approval fallback");
+        let mut overlay = McpServerElicitationOverlay::new(request, tx, true, false, false);
+
+        if let Some(answer) = overlay.current_answer_mut() {
+            answer.selection.selected_idx = Some(2);
+        }
+        overlay.select_current_option(true);
+        overlay.submit_answers();
+
+        let event = rx.try_recv().expect("expected resolution");
+        let AppEvent::SubmitThreadOp {
+            thread_id: resolved_thread_id,
+            op,
+        } = event
+        else {
+            panic!("expected SubmitThreadOp");
+        };
+        assert_eq!(resolved_thread_id, thread_id);
+        assert_eq!(
+            op,
+            Op::ResolveElicitation {
+                server_name: "server-1".to_string(),
+                request_id: McpRequestId::String("request-1".to_string()),
+                decision: ElicitationAction::Accept,
+                content: None,
+                meta: Some(serde_json::json!({
+                    APPROVAL_PERSIST_KEY: APPROVAL_PERSIST_ALWAYS_VALUE,
+                })),
+            }
+        );
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn ctrl_c_cancels_elicitation() {
        let (tx, mut rx) = test_sender();
@@ -1886,7 +1981,7 @@ mod tests {
            form_request(
                "Allow this request?",
                empty_object_schema(),
-                tool_approval_meta(false),
+                tool_approval_meta(&[]),
            ),
        )
        .expect("expected approval fallback");
@@ -1899,14 +1994,17 @@ mod tests {
    }

    #[test]
-    fn approval_form_tool_approval_with_session_persist_snapshot() {
+    fn approval_form_tool_approval_with_persist_options_snapshot() {
        let (tx, _rx) = test_sender();
        let request = McpServerElicitationFormRequest::from_event(
            ThreadId::default(),
            form_request(
                "Allow this request?",
                empty_object_schema(),
-                tool_approval_meta(true),
+                tool_approval_meta(&[
+                    APPROVAL_PERSIST_SESSION_VALUE,
+                    APPROVAL_PERSIST_ALWAYS_VALUE,
+                ]),
            ),
        )
        .expect("expected approval fallback");
--- a/codex-rs/tui/src/bottom_pane/snapshots/codex_tui__bottom_pane__mcp_server_elicitationtestsmcp_server_elicitation_approval_form_with_session_persist.snap
+++ b/codex-rs/tui/src/bottom_pane/snapshots/codex_tui__bottom_pane__mcp_server_elicitationtestsmcp_server_elicitation_approval_form_with_session_persist.snap
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ expression: "render_snapshot(&overlay, Rect::new(0, 0, 120, 16))"
  Field 1/1                                                                                                             
  Allow this request?                                                                                                   
  › 1. Approve Once          Run the tool and continue.                                                                 
-    2. Approve this Session  Run the tool and remember this choice for this session.                                    
-    3. Deny                  Decline this tool call and continue.                                                       
+    2. Approve this session  Run the tool and remember this choice for this session.                                    
+    3. Always allow          Run the tool and remember this choice for future tool calls.                               
    4. Cancel                Cancel this tool call                                                                      
                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                        
--- a/codex-rs/tui/src/bottom_pane/snapshots/codex_tui__bottom_pane__mcp_server_elicitationtestsmcp_server_elicitation_approval_form_without_schema.snap
+++ b/codex-rs/tui/src/bottom_pane/snapshots/codex_tui__bottom_pane__mcp_server_elicitationtestsmcp_server_elicitation_approval_form_without_schema.snap
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ expression: "render_snapshot(&overlay, Rect::new(0, 0, 120, 16))"
  Field 1/1                                                                                                             
  Allow this request?                                                                                                   
  › 1. Approve Once  Run the tool and continue.                                                                         
-    2. Deny          Decline this tool call and continue.                                                               
-    3. Cancel        Cancel this tool call                                                                              
+    2. Cancel        Cancel this tool call                                                                              
+                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                        
--- a/codex-rs/tui/src/chatwidget/skills.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/tui/src/chatwidget/skills.rs
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ use crate::skills_helpers::skill_description;
 use crate::skills_helpers::skill_display_name;
 use codex_chatgpt::connectors::AppInfo;
 use codex_core::connectors::connector_mention_slug;
+use codex_core::mention_syntax::TOOL_MENTION_SIGIL;
 use codex_core::skills::model::SkillDependencies;
 use codex_core::skills::model::SkillInterface;
 use codex_core::skills::model::SkillMetadata;
@@ -296,8 +297,6 @@ pub(crate) struct ToolMentions {
    linked_paths: HashMap<String, String>,
 }

-const TOOL_MENTION_SIGIL: char = '$';
-
 fn extract_tool_mentions_from_text(text: &str) -> ToolMentions {
    extract_tool_mentions_from_text_with_sigil(text, TOOL_MENTION_SIGIL)
 }
--- a/codex-rs/tui/src/mention_codec.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/tui/src/mention_codec.rs
@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 use std::collections::VecDeque;

+use codex_core::mention_syntax::PLUGIN_TEXT_MENTION_SIGIL;
+use codex_core::mention_syntax::TOOL_MENTION_SIGIL;
+
 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub(crate) struct LinkedMention {
    pub(crate) mention: String,
    pub(crate) path: String,
 }

-const TOOL_MENTION_SIGIL: char = '$';
-
 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub(crate) struct DecodedHistoryText {
    pub(crate) text: String,
@@ -77,10 +78,7 @@ pub(crate) fn decode_history_mentions(text: &str) -> DecodedHistoryText {

    while index < bytes.len() {
        if bytes[index] == b'['
-            && let Some((name, path, end_index)) =
-                parse_linked_tool_mention(text, bytes, index, TOOL_MENTION_SIGIL)
-            && !is_common_env_var(name)
-            && is_tool_path(path)
+            && let Some((name, path, end_index)) = parse_history_linked_mention(text, bytes, index)
        {
            out.push(TOOL_MENTION_SIGIL);
            out.push_str(name);
@@ -105,6 +103,31 @@ pub(crate) fn decode_history_mentions(text: &str) -> DecodedHistoryText {
    }
 }

+fn parse_history_linked_mention<'a>(
+    text: &'a str,
+    text_bytes: &[u8],
+    start: usize,
+) -> Option<(&'a str, &'a str, usize)> {
+    // TUI writes `$name`, but may read plugin `[@name](plugin://...)` links from other clients.
+    if let Some(mention @ (name, path, _)) =
+        parse_linked_tool_mention(text, text_bytes, start, TOOL_MENTION_SIGIL)
+        && !is_common_env_var(name)
+        && is_tool_path(path)
+    {
+        return Some(mention);
+    }
+
+    if let Some(mention @ (name, path, _)) =
+        parse_linked_tool_mention(text, text_bytes, start, PLUGIN_TEXT_MENTION_SIGIL)
+        && !is_common_env_var(name)
+        && path.starts_with("plugin://")
+    {
+        return Some(mention);
+    }
+
+    None
+}
+
 fn parse_linked_tool_mention<'a>(
    text: &'a str,
    text_bytes: &[u8],
@@ -225,6 +248,35 @@ mod tests {
        );
    }

+    #[test]
+    fn decode_history_mentions_restores_plugin_links_with_at_sigil() {
+        let decoded = decode_history_mentions(
+            "Use [@sample](plugin://sample@test) and [$figma](app://figma-1).",
+        );
+        assert_eq!(decoded.text, "Use $sample and $figma.");
+        assert_eq!(
+            decoded.mentions,
+            vec![
+                LinkedMention {
+                    mention: "sample".to_string(),
+                    path: "plugin://sample@test".to_string(),
+                },
+                LinkedMention {
+                    mention: "figma".to_string(),
+                    path: "app://figma-1".to_string(),
+                },
+            ]
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn decode_history_mentions_ignores_at_sigil_for_non_plugin_paths() {
+        let decoded = decode_history_mentions("Use [@figma](app://figma-1).");
+
+        assert_eq!(decoded.text, "Use [@figma](app://figma-1).");
+        assert_eq!(decoded.mentions, Vec::<LinkedMention>::new());
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn encode_history_mentions_links_bound_mentions_in_order() {
        let text = "$figma then $sample then $figma then $other";
--- a/codex-rs/utils/pty/src/tests.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/utils/pty/src/tests.rs
@@ -130,52 +130,36 @@ async fn collect_output_until_exit(
 }

 async fn wait_for_python_repl_ready(
-    writer: &tokio::sync::mpsc::Sender<Vec<u8>>,
    output_rx: &mut tokio::sync::broadcast::Receiver<Vec<u8>>,
    timeout_ms: u64,
-    newline: &str,
+    ready_marker: &str,
 ) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
    let mut collected = Vec::new();
-    let marker = "__codex_pty_ready__";
    let deadline = tokio::time::Instant::now() + tokio::time::Duration::from_millis(timeout_ms);
-    let probe_window = tokio::time::Duration::from_millis(if cfg!(windows) { 750 } else { 250 });

    while tokio::time::Instant::now() < deadline {
-        writer
-            .send(format!("print('{marker}'){newline}").into_bytes())
-            .await?;
-
-        let probe_deadline = tokio::time::Instant::now() + probe_window;
-        loop {
-            let now = tokio::time::Instant::now();
-            if now >= deadline || now >= probe_deadline {
-                break;
-            }
-            let remaining = std::cmp::min(
-                deadline.saturating_duration_since(now),
-                probe_deadline.saturating_duration_since(now),
-            );
-            match tokio::time::timeout(remaining, output_rx.recv()).await {
-                Ok(Ok(chunk)) => {
-                    collected.extend_from_slice(&chunk);
-                    if String::from_utf8_lossy(&collected).contains(marker) {
-                        return Ok(collected);
-                    }
+        let now = tokio::time::Instant::now();
+        let remaining = deadline.saturating_duration_since(now);
+        match tokio::time::timeout(remaining, output_rx.recv()).await {
+            Ok(Ok(chunk)) => {
+                collected.extend_from_slice(&chunk);
+                if String::from_utf8_lossy(&collected).contains(ready_marker) {
+                    return Ok(collected);
                }
-                Ok(Err(tokio::sync::broadcast::error::RecvError::Lagged(_))) => continue,
-                Ok(Err(tokio::sync::broadcast::error::RecvError::Closed)) => {
-                    anyhow::bail!(
-                        "PTY output closed while waiting for Python REPL readiness: {:?}",
-                        String::from_utf8_lossy(&collected)
-                    );
-                }
-                Err(_) => break,
            }
+            Ok(Err(tokio::sync::broadcast::error::RecvError::Lagged(_))) => continue,
+            Ok(Err(tokio::sync::broadcast::error::RecvError::Closed)) => {
+                anyhow::bail!(
+                    "PTY output closed while waiting for Python REPL readiness: {:?}",
+                    String::from_utf8_lossy(&collected)
+                );
+            }
+            Err(_) => break,
        }
    }

    anyhow::bail!(
-        "timed out waiting for Python REPL readiness in PTY: {:?}",
+        "timed out waiting for Python REPL readiness marker {ready_marker:?} in PTY: {:?}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&collected)
    );
 }
@@ -254,10 +238,17 @@ async fn pty_python_repl_emits_output_and_exits() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        return Ok(());
    };

+    let ready_marker = "__codex_pty_ready__";
+    let args = vec![
+        "-i".to_string(),
+        "-q".to_string(),
+        "-c".to_string(),
+        format!("print('{ready_marker}')"),
+    ];
    let env_map: HashMap<String, String> = std::env::vars().collect();
    let spawned = spawn_pty_process(
        &python,
-        &[],
+        &args,
        Path::new("."),
        &env_map,
        &None,
@@ -269,7 +260,7 @@ async fn pty_python_repl_emits_output_and_exits() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    let newline = if cfg!(windows) { "\r\n" } else { "\n" };
    let startup_timeout_ms = if cfg!(windows) { 10_000 } else { 5_000 };
    let mut output =
-        wait_for_python_repl_ready(&writer, &mut output_rx, startup_timeout_ms, newline).await?;
+        wait_for_python_repl_ready(&mut output_rx, startup_timeout_ms, ready_marker).await?;
    writer
        .send(format!("print('hello from pty'){newline}").into_bytes())
        .await?;
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Ahmed Ibrahim	e0dbee9c61	codex: stabilize PTY Python REPL test	2026-03-07 21:30:03 -08:00
Michael Bolin	46b8d127cf	sandboxing: preserve denied paths when widening permissions (#13451 ) ## Why After the split-policy plumbing landed, additional-permissions widening still rebuilt filesystem access through the legacy projection in a few places. That can erase explicit deny entries and make the runtime treat a policy as fully writable even when it still has blocked subpaths, which in turn can skip the platform sandbox when it is still needed. ## What changed - preserved explicit deny entries when merging additional read and write permissions into `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` - switched platform-sandbox selection to rely on `FileSystemSandboxPolicy::has_full_disk_write_access()` instead of ad hoc root-write checks - kept the widened policy path in `core/src/exec.rs` and `core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs` aligned so denied subpaths survive both policy merging and sandbox selection - added regression coverage for root-write policies that still carry carveouts ## Verification - added regression coverage in `core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs` showing that root write plus carveouts still requires the platform sandbox - verified the current PR state with `just clippy` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13451). * #13453 * #13452 * __->__ #13451 * #13449 * #13448 * #13445 * #13440 * #13439 --------- Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>	2026-03-08 04:29:35 +00:00
Michael Bolin	07a30da3fb	linux-sandbox: plumb split sandbox policies through helper (#13449 ) ## Why The Linux sandbox helper still only accepted the legacy `SandboxPolicy` payload. That meant the runtime could compute split filesystem and network policies, but the helper would immediately collapse them back to the compatibility projection before applying seccomp or staging the bubblewrap inner command. ## What changed - added hidden `--file-system-sandbox-policy` and `--network-sandbox-policy` flags alongside the legacy `--sandbox-policy` flag so the helper can migrate incrementally - updated the core-side Landlock wrapper to pass the split policies explicitly when launching `codex-linux-sandbox` - added helper-side resolution logic that accepts either the legacy policy alone or a complete split-policy pair and normalizes that into one effective configuration - switched Linux helper network decisions to use `NetworkSandboxPolicy` directly - added `FromStr` support for the split policy types so the helper can parse them from CLI JSON ## Verification - added helper coverage in `linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main_tests.rs` for split-policy flags and policy resolution - added CLI argument coverage in `core/src/landlock.rs` - verified the current PR state with `just clippy` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13449). * #13453 * #13452 * #13451 * __->__ #13449 * #13448 * #13445 * #13440 * #13439 --------- Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>	2026-03-07 19:40:10 -08:00
Matthew Zeng	a4a9536fd7	[elicitations] Support always allow option for mcp tool calls. (#13807 ) - [x] Support always allow option for mcp tool calls, writes to config.toml. - [x] Fix config hot-reload after starting a new thread for TUI.	2026-03-08 01:46:40 +00:00
sayan-oai	590cfa6176	chore: use @plugin instead of $plugin for plaintext mentions (#13921 ) change plaintext plugin-mentions from `$plugin` to `@plugin`, ensure TUI can correctly decode these from history. tested locally, added/updated tests.	2026-03-08 01:36:39 +00:00
Michael Bolin	bf5c2f48a5	seatbelt: honor split filesystem sandbox policies (#13448 ) ## Why After `#13440` and `#13445`, macOS Seatbelt policy generation was still deriving filesystem and network behavior from the legacy `SandboxPolicy` projection. That projection loses explicit unreadable carveouts and conflates split network decisions, so the generated Seatbelt policy could still be wider than the split policy that Codex had already computed. ## What changed - added Seatbelt entrypoints that accept `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and `NetworkSandboxPolicy` directly - built read and write policy stanzas from access roots plus excluded subpaths so explicit unreadable carveouts survive into the generated Seatbelt policy - switched network policy generation to consult `NetworkSandboxPolicy` directly - failed closed when managed-network or proxy-constrained sessions do not yield usable loopback proxy endpoints - updated the macOS callers and test helpers that now need to carry the split policies explicitly ## Verification - added regression coverage in `core/src/seatbelt.rs` for unreadable carveouts under both full-disk and scoped-readable policies - verified the current PR state with `just clippy` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13448). * #13453 * #13452 * #13451 * #13449 * __->__ #13448 * #13445 * #13440 * #13439 --------- Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>	2026-03-08 00:35:19 +00:00