refactor(permissions): lower Linux enforcement from effective filesystem permissions

Co-authored-by: Codex noreply@openai.com
refactor(permissions): lower Seatbelt from effective filesystem permissions
2026-06-02 11:22:01 +00:00 · 2026-05-27 17:43:55 -07:00 · 2026-05-27 17:41:02 -07:00 · 2026-05-27 17:28:05 -07:00 · 2026-05-27 17:08:07 -07:00
15 changed files with 865 additions and 178 deletions
--- a/codex-rs/cli/src/debug_sandbox.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/cli/src/debug_sandbox.rs
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ use codex_core::spawn::CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR;
 use codex_core::spawn::CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED_ENV_VAR;
 use codex_protocol::config_types::SandboxMode;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
+#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
+use codex_sandboxing::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions;
+#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
+use codex_sandboxing::FilesystemPermissionsContext;
 use codex_sandboxing::landlock::allow_network_for_proxy;
 use codex_sandboxing::landlock::create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_permission_profile;
 #[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
@@ -260,13 +264,21 @@ async fn run_command_under_sandbox(
    let mut child = match sandbox_type {
        #[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
        SandboxType::Seatbelt => {
-            let file_system_sandbox_policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
-            let network_sandbox_policy = config.permissions.network_sandbox_policy();
+            let permission_profile = config.permissions.effective_permission_profile();
+            let network_sandbox_policy = permission_profile.network_sandbox_policy();
+            let effective_filesystem_permissions = EffectiveFilesystemPermissions::from_profile(
+                &permission_profile,
+                FilesystemPermissionsContext {
+                    policy_evaluation_cwd: &permission_profile_cwd,
+                },
+            )
+            .map_err(|err| {
+                anyhow::anyhow!("failed to derive effective filesystem permissions: {err}")
+            })?;
            let args = create_seatbelt_command_args(CreateSeatbeltCommandArgsParams {
                command,
-                file_system_sandbox_policy: &file_system_sandbox_policy,
+                effective_filesystem_permissions: &effective_filesystem_permissions,
                network_sandbox_policy,
-                sandbox_policy_cwd: permission_profile_cwd.as_path(),
                enforce_managed_network: false,
                network: network.as_ref(),
                extra_allow_unix_sockets: allow_unix_sockets,
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ impl ExecRequest {
            windows_sandbox_level,
            windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
            permission_profile,
+            effective_filesystem_permissions: _,
            file_system_sandbox_policy,
            network_sandbox_policy,
            arg0,
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/apply_patch.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/apply_patch.rs
@@ -46,7 +46,9 @@ use codex_protocol::models::FileSystemPermissions;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::EventMsg;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::FileChange;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::PatchApplyUpdatedEvent;
-use codex_sandboxing::policy_transforms::effective_file_system_sandbox_policy;
+use codex_sandboxing::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions;
+use codex_sandboxing::FilesystemPermissionsContext;
+use codex_sandboxing::policy_transforms::effective_permission_profile;
 use codex_sandboxing::policy_transforms::merge_permission_profiles;
 use codex_sandboxing::policy_transforms::normalize_additional_permissions;
 use codex_tools::ToolName;
@@ -224,8 +226,7 @@ fn to_abs_path(cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf, path: &Path) -> Option<AbsolutePathBuf> {

 fn write_permissions_for_paths(
    file_paths: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
-    file_system_sandbox_policy: &codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
-    cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
+    effective_filesystem_permissions: &EffectiveFilesystemPermissions,
 ) -> Option<AdditionalPermissionProfile> {
    let write_paths = file_paths
        .iter()
@@ -234,9 +235,7 @@ fn write_permissions_for_paths(
                .unwrap_or_else(|| path.clone())
                .into_path_buf()
        })
-        .filter(|path| {
-            !file_system_sandbox_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(path.as_path(), cwd.as_path())
-        })
+        .filter(|path| !effective_filesystem_permissions.can_write(path.as_path()))
        .collect::<BTreeSet<_>>()
        .into_iter()
        .map(AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path)
@@ -267,34 +266,46 @@ async fn effective_patch_permissions(
    turn: &TurnContext,
    action: &ApplyPatchAction,
    cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
-) -> (
-    Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
-    crate::tools::handlers::EffectiveAdditionalPermissions,
-    codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
-) {
+) -> Result<
+    (
+        Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
+        crate::tools::handlers::EffectiveAdditionalPermissions,
+        codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    ),
+    FunctionCallError,
+> {
    let file_paths = file_paths_for_action(action);
    let granted_permissions = merge_permission_profiles(
        session.granted_session_permissions().await.as_ref(),
        session.granted_turn_permissions().await.as_ref(),
    );
-    let base_file_system_sandbox_policy = turn.file_system_sandbox_policy();
-    let file_system_sandbox_policy = effective_file_system_sandbox_policy(
-        &base_file_system_sandbox_policy,
-        granted_permissions.as_ref(),
-    );
+    let effective_permission_profile =
+        effective_permission_profile(&turn.permission_profile(), granted_permissions.as_ref());
+    let file_system_sandbox_policy = effective_permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
+    let effective_filesystem_permissions = EffectiveFilesystemPermissions::from_profile(
+        &effective_permission_profile,
+        FilesystemPermissionsContext {
+            policy_evaluation_cwd: cwd,
+        },
+    )
+    .map_err(|err| {
+        FunctionCallError::RespondToModel(format!(
+            "failed to derive effective filesystem permissions for apply_patch: {err}"
+        ))
+    })?;
    let effective_additional_permissions = apply_granted_turn_permissions(
        session,
        cwd.as_path(),
        crate::sandboxing::SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
-        write_permissions_for_paths(&file_paths, &file_system_sandbox_policy, cwd),
+        write_permissions_for_paths(&file_paths, &effective_filesystem_permissions),
    )
    .await;

-    (
+    Ok((
        file_paths,
        effective_additional_permissions,
        file_system_sandbox_policy,
-    )
+    ))
 }

 #[async_trait::async_trait]
@@ -354,7 +365,7 @@ impl ToolExecutor<ToolInvocation> for ApplyPatchHandler {
            codex_apply_patch::MaybeApplyPatchVerified::Body(changes) => {
                let (file_paths, effective_additional_permissions, file_system_sandbox_policy) =
                    effective_patch_permissions(session.as_ref(), turn.as_ref(), &changes, &cwd)
-                        .await;
+                        .await?;
                match apply_patch::apply_patch(turn.as_ref(), &file_system_sandbox_policy, changes)
                    .await
                {
@@ -506,7 +517,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn intercept_apply_patch(
    {
        codex_apply_patch::MaybeApplyPatchVerified::Body(changes) => {
            let (approval_keys, effective_additional_permissions, file_system_sandbox_policy) =
-                effective_patch_permissions(session.as_ref(), turn.as_ref(), &changes, cwd).await;
+                effective_patch_permissions(session.as_ref(), turn.as_ref(), &changes, cwd).await?;
            match apply_patch::apply_patch(turn.as_ref(), &file_system_sandbox_policy, changes)
                .await
            {
--- a/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/apply_patch_tests.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/apply_patch_tests.rs
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
 use super::*;
 use codex_apply_patch::MaybeApplyPatchVerified;
 use codex_exec_server::LOCAL_FS;
+use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
+use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::FileChange;
 use core_test_support::PathBufExt;
 use core_test_support::PathExt;
@@ -27,6 +29,24 @@ fn sample_patch() -> &'static str {
 *** End Patch"#
 }

+fn effective_permissions(
+    sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
+) -> codex_sandboxing::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions {
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        sandbox_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+    )
+    .materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(std::slice::from_ref(cwd));
+    codex_sandboxing::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions::from_profile(
+        &permission_profile,
+        codex_sandboxing::FilesystemPermissionsContext {
+            policy_evaluation_cwd: cwd,
+        },
+    )
+    .expect("derive effective filesystem permissions")
+}
+
 async fn invocation_for_payload(payload: ToolPayload) -> ToolInvocation {
    let (session, turn) = make_session_and_context().await;
    ToolInvocation {
@@ -255,8 +275,9 @@ fn write_permissions_for_paths_skip_dirs_already_writable_under_workspace_root()
        /*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ true,
        /*exclude_slash_tmp*/ false,
    );
+    let effective_permissions = effective_permissions(&sandbox_policy, &cwd);

-    let permissions = write_permissions_for_paths(&[file_path], &sandbox_policy, &cwd);
+    let permissions = write_permissions_for_paths(&[file_path], &effective_permissions);

    assert_eq!(permissions, None);
 }
@@ -276,8 +297,9 @@ fn write_permissions_for_paths_keep_dirs_outside_workspace_root() {
        /*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ true,
        /*exclude_slash_tmp*/ true,
    );
+    let effective_permissions = effective_permissions(&sandbox_policy, &cwd_abs);

-    let permissions = write_permissions_for_paths(&[file_path], &sandbox_policy, &cwd_abs);
+    let permissions = write_permissions_for_paths(&[file_path], &effective_permissions);
    let expected_outside =
        dunce::simplified(&outside.canonicalize().expect("canonicalize outside dir")).abs();

--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/bwrap.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/bwrap.rs
@@ -27,11 +27,8 @@ use std::process::Command;
 use codex_protocol::error::CodexErr;
 use codex_protocol::error::Result;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::is_protected_metadata_name;
-use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemAccessMode;
-use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemPath;
-use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
-use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSpecialPath;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::WritableRoot;
+use codex_sandboxing::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions;
 use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
 use globset::GlobBuilder;
 use globset::GlobSet;
@@ -233,16 +230,16 @@ impl SyntheticMountTarget {
 /// namespace restrictions apply while preserving full filesystem access.
 pub(crate) fn create_bwrap_command_args(
    command: Vec<String>,
-    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    effective_filesystem_permissions: &EffectiveFilesystemPermissions,
    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
    command_cwd: &Path,
    options: BwrapOptions,
 ) -> Result<BwrapArgs> {
-    let unreadable_globs =
-        file_system_sandbox_policy.get_unreadable_globs_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd);
    // Full disk write normally skips bwrap, but unreadable glob patterns still
    // need concrete bwrap masks for the matches expanded below.
-    if file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() && unreadable_globs.is_empty() {
+    if effective_filesystem_permissions.has_full_disk_write_access()
+        && effective_filesystem_permissions.unreadable_globs.is_empty()
+    {
        return if options.network_mode == BwrapNetworkMode::FullAccess {
            Ok(BwrapArgs {
                args: command,
@@ -257,7 +254,7 @@ pub(crate) fn create_bwrap_command_args(

    create_bwrap_flags(
        command,
-        file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        effective_filesystem_permissions,
        sandbox_policy_cwd,
        command_cwd,
        options,
@@ -296,7 +293,7 @@ fn create_bwrap_flags_full_filesystem(command: Vec<String>, options: BwrapOption
 /// Build the bubblewrap flags (everything after `argv[0]`).
 fn create_bwrap_flags(
    command: Vec<String>,
-    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    effective_filesystem_permissions: &EffectiveFilesystemPermissions,
    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
    command_cwd: &Path,
    options: BwrapOptions,
@@ -306,12 +303,12 @@ fn create_bwrap_flags(
        preserved_files,
        synthetic_mount_targets,
        protected_create_targets,
-    } = create_filesystem_args(
-        file_system_sandbox_policy,
+    } = create_effective_filesystem_args(
+        effective_filesystem_permissions,
        sandbox_policy_cwd,
        options
            .glob_scan_max_depth
-            .or(file_system_sandbox_policy.glob_scan_max_depth),
+            .or(effective_filesystem_permissions.glob_scan_max_depth),
    )?;
    let normalized_command_cwd = normalize_command_cwd_for_bwrap(command_cwd);
    let mut args = Vec::new();
@@ -364,22 +361,27 @@ fn create_bwrap_flags(
 ///    those writable roots so protected subpaths win.
 /// 6. Nested unreadable carveouts under a writable root are masked after that
 ///    root is bound, and unrelated unreadable roots are masked afterward.
-fn create_filesystem_args(
-    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+fn create_effective_filesystem_args(
+    effective_filesystem_permissions: &EffectiveFilesystemPermissions,
    cwd: &Path,
    glob_scan_max_depth: Option<usize>,
 ) -> Result<BwrapArgs> {
-    let unreadable_globs = file_system_sandbox_policy.get_unreadable_globs_with_cwd(cwd);
+    let unreadable_globs = effective_filesystem_permissions
+        .unreadable_globs
+        .iter()
+        .map(|glob| glob.pattern().to_string())
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
    // Bubblewrap requires bind mount targets to exist. Skip missing writable
    // roots so mixed-platform configs can keep harmless paths for other
    // environments without breaking Linux command startup.
-    let mut writable_roots = file_system_sandbox_policy
-        .get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd)
-        .into_iter()
+    let mut writable_roots = effective_filesystem_permissions
+        .writable_roots
+        .iter()
+        .cloned()
        .filter(|writable_root| writable_root.root.as_path().exists())
        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
    if writable_roots.is_empty()
-        && file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access()
+        && effective_filesystem_permissions.has_full_disk_write_access()
        && !unreadable_globs.is_empty()
    {
        writable_roots.push(WritableRoot {
@@ -388,42 +390,10 @@ fn create_filesystem_args(
            protected_metadata_names: Vec::new(),
        });
    }
-    let missing_auto_metadata_read_only_project_root_subpaths: HashSet<PathBuf> =
-        file_system_sandbox_policy
-            .entries
-            .iter()
-            .filter(|entry| entry.access == FileSystemAccessMode::Read)
-            .filter_map(|entry| {
-                let FileSystemPath::Special {
-                    value:
-                        FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots {
-                            subpath: Some(subpath),
-                        },
-                } = &entry.path
-                else {
-                    return None;
-                };
-                // Automatic repo-metadata read masks are skipped here so the
-                // metadata handling below can apply the root-scoped
-                // protection consistently for `.git`, `.agents`, and `.codex`.
-                // User-authored `read` rules for other subpaths and `none`
-                // rules should keep their normal bwrap behavior, which can mask
-                // the first missing component to prevent creation under writable
-                // roots.
-                let project_subpath = subpath.as_path();
-                if project_subpath != Path::new(".git")
-                    && project_subpath != Path::new(".agents")
-                    && project_subpath != Path::new(".codex")
-                {
-                    return None;
-                }
-                let resolved = AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(subpath, cwd);
-                (!resolved.as_path().exists()).then(|| resolved.into_path_buf())
-            })
-            .collect();
-    let mut unreadable_roots = file_system_sandbox_policy
-        .get_unreadable_roots_with_cwd(cwd)
-        .into_iter()
+    let mut unreadable_roots = effective_filesystem_permissions
+        .unreadable_roots
+        .iter()
+        .cloned()
        .map(AbsolutePathBuf::into_path_buf)
        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
    // Bubblewrap can only mask concrete paths. Expand unreadable glob patterns
@@ -437,7 +407,7 @@ fn create_filesystem_args(
    unreadable_roots.sort();
    unreadable_roots.dedup();

-    let args = if file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access() {
+    let args = if effective_filesystem_permissions.has_full_disk_read_access() {
        // Read-only root, then mount a minimal device tree.
        // In bubblewrap (`bubblewrap.c`, `SETUP_MOUNT_DEV`), `--dev /dev`
        // creates the standard minimal nodes: null, zero, full, random,
@@ -460,12 +430,13 @@ fn create_filesystem_args(
            "/dev".to_string(),
        ];

-        let mut readable_roots: BTreeSet<PathBuf> = file_system_sandbox_policy
-            .get_readable_roots_with_cwd(cwd)
-            .into_iter()
+        let mut readable_roots: BTreeSet<PathBuf> = effective_filesystem_permissions
+            .readable_roots
+            .iter()
+            .cloned()
            .map(PathBuf::from)
            .collect();
-        if file_system_sandbox_policy.include_platform_defaults() {
+        if effective_filesystem_permissions.include_platform_defaults {
            readable_roots.extend(
                LINUX_PLATFORM_DEFAULT_READ_ROOTS
                    .iter()
@@ -573,7 +544,6 @@ fn create_filesystem_args(
            .iter()
            .map(|path| path.as_path().to_path_buf())
            .filter(|path| !unreadable_paths.contains(path))
-            .filter(|path| !missing_auto_metadata_read_only_project_root_subpaths.contains(path))
            .collect();
        let protected_metadata_names = writable_root.protected_metadata_names.clone();
        append_metadata_path_masks_for_writable_root(
@@ -1324,6 +1294,61 @@ fn find_first_non_existent_component(target_path: &Path) -> Option<PathBuf> {
    None
 }

+#[cfg(test)]
+fn effective_test_filesystem_permissions(
+    file_system_sandbox_policy: &codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    cwd: &Path,
+) -> EffectiveFilesystemPermissions {
+    let cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd)
+        .unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("test policy cwd should be absolute: {err}"));
+    let file_system_sandbox_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy
+        .clone()
+        .materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(std::slice::from_ref(&cwd));
+    let permission_profile = codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+    );
+    codex_sandboxing::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions::from_profile(
+        &permission_profile,
+        codex_sandboxing::FilesystemPermissionsContext {
+            policy_evaluation_cwd: &cwd,
+        },
+    )
+    .unwrap_or_else(|err| {
+        panic!("test filesystem policy should yield effective permissions: {err}")
+    })
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+fn create_filesystem_args(
+    file_system_sandbox_policy: &codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    cwd: &Path,
+    glob_scan_max_depth: Option<usize>,
+) -> Result<BwrapArgs> {
+    let effective_filesystem_permissions =
+        effective_test_filesystem_permissions(file_system_sandbox_policy, cwd);
+    create_effective_filesystem_args(&effective_filesystem_permissions, cwd, glob_scan_max_depth)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+fn create_bwrap_command_args_for_policy(
+    command: Vec<String>,
+    file_system_sandbox_policy: &codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
+    command_cwd: &Path,
+    options: BwrapOptions,
+) -> Result<BwrapArgs> {
+    let effective_filesystem_permissions =
+        effective_test_filesystem_permissions(file_system_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd);
+    create_bwrap_command_args(
+        command,
+        &effective_filesystem_permissions,
+        sandbox_policy_cwd,
+        command_cwd,
+        options,
+    )
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
    use super::*;
@@ -1360,7 +1385,7 @@ mod tests {
    #[test]
    fn full_disk_write_full_network_returns_unwrapped_command() {
        let command = vec!["/bin/true".to_string()];
-        let args = create_bwrap_command_args(
+        let args = create_bwrap_command_args_for_policy(
            command.clone(),
            &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted(),
            Path::new("/"),
@@ -1379,7 +1404,7 @@ mod tests {
    #[test]
    fn full_disk_write_proxy_only_keeps_full_filesystem_but_unshares_network() {
        let command = vec!["/bin/true".to_string()];
-        let args = create_bwrap_command_args(
+        let args = create_bwrap_command_args_for_policy(
            command,
            &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted(),
            Path::new("/"),
@@ -1431,7 +1456,7 @@ mod tests {
        ]);
        let command = vec!["/bin/true".to_string()];

-        let args = create_bwrap_command_args(
+        let args = create_bwrap_command_args_for_policy(
            command.clone(),
            &policy,
            temp_dir.path(),
@@ -1479,7 +1504,7 @@ mod tests {
            },
        ]);

-        let args = create_bwrap_command_args(
+        let args = create_bwrap_command_args_for_policy(
            vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
            &policy,
            sandbox_policy_cwd.as_path(),
--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/landlock.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/landlock.rs
@@ -3,13 +3,12 @@
 //! Filesystem restrictions are enforced by bubblewrap in `linux_run_main`.
 //! Landlock helpers remain available here as legacy/backup utilities.
 use std::collections::BTreeMap;
-use std::path::Path;

 use codex_protocol::error::CodexErr;
 use codex_protocol::error::Result;
 use codex_protocol::error::SandboxErr;
-use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
+use codex_sandboxing::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions;
 use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;

 use landlock::ABI;
@@ -39,15 +38,13 @@ use seccompiler::apply_filter;
 /// - installing the network seccomp filter when network access is disabled.
 ///
 /// Filesystem restrictions are intentionally handled by bubblewrap.
-pub(crate) fn apply_permission_profile_to_current_thread(
-    permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
-    cwd: &Path,
+pub(crate) fn apply_effective_permissions_to_current_thread(
+    effective_filesystem_permissions: &EffectiveFilesystemPermissions,
+    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
    apply_landlock_fs: bool,
    allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
    proxy_routed_network: bool,
 ) -> Result<()> {
-    let (file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy) =
-        permission_profile.to_runtime_permissions();
    let network_seccomp_mode = network_seccomp_mode(
        network_sandbox_policy,
        allow_network_for_proxy,
@@ -59,7 +56,7 @@ pub(crate) fn apply_permission_profile_to_current_thread(
    // we avoid this unless we need seccomp or we are explicitly using the
    // legacy Landlock filesystem pipeline.
    if network_seccomp_mode.is_some()
-        || (apply_landlock_fs && !file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access())
+        || (apply_landlock_fs && !effective_filesystem_permissions.has_full_disk_write_access())
    {
        set_no_new_privs()?;
    }
@@ -68,18 +65,18 @@ pub(crate) fn apply_permission_profile_to_current_thread(
        install_network_seccomp_filter_on_current_thread(mode)?;
    }

-    if apply_landlock_fs && !file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() {
-        if !file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access() {
+    if apply_landlock_fs && !effective_filesystem_permissions.has_full_disk_write_access() {
+        if !effective_filesystem_permissions.has_full_disk_read_access() {
            return Err(CodexErr::UnsupportedOperation(
                "Restricted read-only access is not supported by the legacy Linux Landlock filesystem backend."
                    .to_string(),
            ));
        }

-        let writable_roots = file_system_sandbox_policy
-            .get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd)
-            .into_iter()
-            .map(|writable_root| writable_root.root)
+        let writable_roots = effective_filesystem_permissions
+            .writable_roots
+            .iter()
+            .map(|writable_root| writable_root.root.clone())
            .collect();
        install_filesystem_landlock_rules_on_current_thread(writable_roots)?;
    }
--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main.rs
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ use std::time::Duration;
 use crate::bwrap::BwrapNetworkMode;
 use crate::bwrap::BwrapOptions;
 use crate::bwrap::create_bwrap_command_args;
-use crate::landlock::apply_permission_profile_to_current_thread;
+use crate::landlock::apply_effective_permissions_to_current_thread;
 use crate::launcher::exec_bwrap;
 use crate::launcher::preferred_bwrap_supports_argv0;
 use crate::proxy_routing::activate_proxy_routes_in_netns;
@@ -29,7 +29,10 @@ use codex_protocol::error::Result as CodexResult;
 use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
+use codex_sandboxing::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions;
+use codex_sandboxing::FilesystemPermissionsContext;
 use codex_sandboxing::landlock::CODEX_LINUX_SANDBOX_ARG0;
+use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;

 static BWRAP_CHILD_PID: AtomicI32 = AtomicI32::new(0);
 static PENDING_FORWARDED_SIGNAL: AtomicI32 = AtomicI32::new(0);
@@ -166,6 +169,15 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
        file_system_sandbox_policy,
        network_sandbox_policy,
    } = resolve_permission_profile(permission_profile).unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("{err}"));
+    let policy_evaluation_cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(&sandbox_policy_cwd)
+        .unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("sandbox policy cwd should be absolute: {err}"));
+    let effective_filesystem_permissions = EffectiveFilesystemPermissions::from_profile(
+        &permission_profile,
+        FilesystemPermissionsContext {
+            policy_evaluation_cwd: &policy_evaluation_cwd,
+        },
+    )
+    .unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("failed to derive effective filesystem permissions: {err}"));
    ensure_legacy_landlock_mode_supports_policy(
        use_legacy_landlock,
        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
@@ -185,9 +197,9 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
            }
        }
        let proxy_routing_active = allow_network_for_proxy;
-        if let Err(e) = apply_permission_profile_to_current_thread(
-            &permission_profile,
-            &sandbox_policy_cwd,
+        if let Err(e) = apply_effective_permissions_to_current_thread(
+            &effective_filesystem_permissions,
+            network_sandbox_policy,
            /*apply_landlock_fs*/ false,
            allow_network_for_proxy,
            proxy_routing_active,
@@ -197,10 +209,10 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
        exec_or_panic(command);
    }

-    if file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() && !allow_network_for_proxy {
-        if let Err(e) = apply_permission_profile_to_current_thread(
-            &permission_profile,
-            &sandbox_policy_cwd,
+    if effective_filesystem_permissions.has_full_disk_write_access() && !allow_network_for_proxy {
+        if let Err(e) = apply_effective_permissions_to_current_thread(
+            &effective_filesystem_permissions,
+            network_sandbox_policy,
            /*apply_landlock_fs*/ false,
            allow_network_for_proxy,
            /*proxy_routed_network*/ false,
@@ -233,7 +245,7 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
        run_bwrap_with_proc_fallback(
            &sandbox_policy_cwd,
            command_cwd.as_deref(),
-            &file_system_sandbox_policy,
+            &effective_filesystem_permissions,
            network_sandbox_policy,
            inner,
            !no_proc,
@@ -242,9 +254,9 @@ pub fn run_main() -> ! {
    }

    // Legacy path: Landlock enforcement only, when bwrap sandboxing is not enabled.
-    if let Err(e) = apply_permission_profile_to_current_thread(
-        &permission_profile,
-        &sandbox_policy_cwd,
+    if let Err(e) = apply_effective_permissions_to_current_thread(
+        &effective_filesystem_permissions,
+        network_sandbox_policy,
        /*apply_landlock_fs*/ true,
        allow_network_for_proxy,
        /*proxy_routed_network*/ false,
@@ -317,7 +329,7 @@ fn ensure_legacy_landlock_mode_supports_policy(
 fn run_bwrap_with_proc_fallback(
    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
    command_cwd: Option<&Path>,
-    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    effective_filesystem_permissions: &EffectiveFilesystemPermissions,
    network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
    inner: Vec<String>,
    mount_proc: bool,
@@ -331,7 +343,7 @@ fn run_bwrap_with_proc_fallback(
        && !preflight_proc_mount_support(
            sandbox_policy_cwd,
            command_cwd,
-            file_system_sandbox_policy,
+            effective_filesystem_permissions,
            network_mode,
        )
        .unwrap_or_else(|err| exit_with_bwrap_build_error(err))
@@ -348,7 +360,7 @@ fn run_bwrap_with_proc_fallback(
    };
    let mut bwrap_args = build_bwrap_argv(
        inner,
-        file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        effective_filesystem_permissions,
        sandbox_policy_cwd,
        command_cwd,
        options,
@@ -373,14 +385,14 @@ fn bwrap_network_mode(

 fn build_bwrap_argv(
    inner: Vec<String>,
-    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    effective_filesystem_permissions: &EffectiveFilesystemPermissions,
    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
    command_cwd: &Path,
    options: BwrapOptions,
 ) -> CodexResult<crate::bwrap::BwrapArgs> {
    let bwrap_args = create_bwrap_command_args(
        inner,
-        file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        effective_filesystem_permissions,
        sandbox_policy_cwd,
        command_cwd,
        options,
@@ -444,13 +456,13 @@ fn current_process_argv0() -> String {
 fn preflight_proc_mount_support(
    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
    command_cwd: &Path,
-    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    effective_filesystem_permissions: &EffectiveFilesystemPermissions,
    network_mode: BwrapNetworkMode,
 ) -> CodexResult<bool> {
    let preflight_argv = build_preflight_bwrap_argv(
        sandbox_policy_cwd,
        command_cwd,
-        file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        effective_filesystem_permissions,
        network_mode,
    )?;
    let stderr = run_bwrap_in_child_capture_stderr(preflight_argv);
@@ -460,13 +472,13 @@ fn preflight_proc_mount_support(
 fn build_preflight_bwrap_argv(
    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
    command_cwd: &Path,
-    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    effective_filesystem_permissions: &EffectiveFilesystemPermissions,
    network_mode: BwrapNetworkMode,
 ) -> CodexResult<crate::bwrap::BwrapArgs> {
    let preflight_command = vec![resolve_true_command()];
    build_bwrap_argv(
        preflight_command,
-        file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        effective_filesystem_permissions,
        sandbox_policy_cwd,
        command_cwd,
        BwrapOptions {
--- a/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main_tests.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/linux_run_main_tests.rs
@@ -23,6 +23,64 @@ fn read_only_file_system_policy() -> FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
    read_only_permission_profile().file_system_sandbox_policy()
 }

+fn effective_permissions_for_policy(
+    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    cwd: &Path,
+) -> codex_sandboxing::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions {
+    let cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd)
+        .unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("test policy cwd should be absolute: {err}"));
+    let file_system_sandbox_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy
+        .clone()
+        .materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(std::slice::from_ref(&cwd));
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+    );
+    codex_sandboxing::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions::from_profile(
+        &permission_profile,
+        codex_sandboxing::FilesystemPermissionsContext {
+            policy_evaluation_cwd: &cwd,
+        },
+    )
+    .unwrap_or_else(|err| {
+        panic!("test filesystem policy should yield effective permissions: {err}")
+    })
+}
+
+fn build_bwrap_argv_for_policy(
+    inner: Vec<String>,
+    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
+    command_cwd: &Path,
+    options: BwrapOptions,
+) -> codex_protocol::error::Result<crate::bwrap::BwrapArgs> {
+    let effective_filesystem_permissions =
+        effective_permissions_for_policy(file_system_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd);
+    build_bwrap_argv(
+        inner,
+        &effective_filesystem_permissions,
+        sandbox_policy_cwd,
+        command_cwd,
+        options,
+    )
+}
+
+fn build_preflight_bwrap_argv_for_policy(
+    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
+    command_cwd: &Path,
+    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    network_mode: BwrapNetworkMode,
+) -> codex_protocol::error::Result<crate::bwrap::BwrapArgs> {
+    let effective_filesystem_permissions =
+        effective_permissions_for_policy(file_system_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd);
+    build_preflight_bwrap_argv(
+        sandbox_policy_cwd,
+        command_cwd,
+        &effective_filesystem_permissions,
+        network_mode,
+    )
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn detects_proc_mount_invalid_argument_failure() {
    let stderr = "bwrap: Can't mount proc on /newroot/proc: Invalid argument";
@@ -50,7 +108,7 @@ fn ignores_non_proc_mount_errors() {
 #[test]
 fn inserts_bwrap_argv0_before_command_separator() {
    let file_system_sandbox_policy = read_only_file_system_policy();
-    let mut argv = build_bwrap_argv(
+    let mut argv = build_bwrap_argv_for_policy(
        vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
        Path::new("/"),
@@ -94,7 +152,7 @@ fn inserts_bwrap_argv0_before_command_separator() {
 #[test]
 fn rewrites_inner_command_path_when_bwrap_lacks_argv0() {
    let file_system_sandbox_policy = read_only_file_system_policy();
-    let mut argv = build_bwrap_argv(
+    let mut argv = build_bwrap_argv_for_policy(
        vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
        Path::new("/"),
@@ -163,7 +221,7 @@ fn rewrites_bwrap_helper_command_not_nested_user_command_when_current_exe_appear
 #[test]
 fn inserts_unshare_net_when_network_isolation_requested() {
    let file_system_sandbox_policy = read_only_file_system_policy();
-    let argv = build_bwrap_argv(
+    let argv = build_bwrap_argv_for_policy(
        vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
        Path::new("/"),
@@ -182,7 +240,7 @@ fn inserts_unshare_net_when_network_isolation_requested() {
 #[test]
 fn inserts_unshare_net_when_proxy_only_network_mode_requested() {
    let file_system_sandbox_policy = read_only_file_system_policy();
-    let argv = build_bwrap_argv(
+    let argv = build_bwrap_argv_for_policy(
        vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
        Path::new("/"),
@@ -263,7 +321,7 @@ fn managed_proxy_preflight_argv_is_wrapped_for_full_access_policy() {
        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
        /*allow_network_for_proxy*/ true,
    );
-    let argv = build_preflight_bwrap_argv(
+    let argv = build_preflight_bwrap_argv_for_policy(
        Path::new("/"),
        Path::new("/"),
        &FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted(),
--- a/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/effective_filesystem_permissions.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/effective_filesystem_permissions.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
+use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath;
+use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxKind;
+use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
+use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath;
+use codex_protocol::permissions::ReadDenyMatcher;
+use codex_protocol::permissions::project_roots_glob_pattern;
+use codex_protocol::protocol::WritableRoot;
+use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
+use std::fmt;
+use std::path::Path;
+
+/// Context needed to evaluate an already-materialized filesystem policy.
+pub struct FilesystemPermissionsContext<'a> {
+    /// Resolves cwd-sensitive policy mechanics such as filesystem root and
+    /// relative candidate paths. It is not workspace-root authority.
+    pub policy_evaluation_cwd: &'a AbsolutePathBuf,
+}
+
+/// The outer filesystem access mode represented by effective permissions.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum FilesystemPermissionsMode {
+    Restricted,
+    Unrestricted,
+    External,
+}
+
+/// A deny-read glob retained in effective filesystem enforcement inputs.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ValidatedDenyGlob {
+    pattern: String,
+}
+
+impl ValidatedDenyGlob {
+    pub fn pattern(&self) -> &str {
+        &self.pattern
+    }
+}
+
+/// Effective filesystem enforcement facts derived from a permission profile.
+///
+/// This internal representation centralizes effective roots, writable carveouts,
+/// protected metadata, and read-deny matching before platform-specific lowering.
+pub struct EffectiveFilesystemPermissions {
+    pub mode: FilesystemPermissionsMode,
+    pub readable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
+    pub writable_roots: Vec<WritableRoot>,
+    pub unreadable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
+    pub unreadable_globs: Vec<ValidatedDenyGlob>,
+    pub include_platform_defaults: bool,
+    pub glob_scan_max_depth: Option<usize>,
+    file_system_policy: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    policy_evaluation_cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
+    read_deny_matcher: Option<ReadDenyMatcher>,
+}
+
+impl fmt::Debug for EffectiveFilesystemPermissions {
+    fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        formatter
+            .debug_struct("EffectiveFilesystemPermissions")
+            .field("mode", &self.mode)
+            .field("readable_roots", &self.readable_roots)
+            .field("writable_roots", &self.writable_roots)
+            .field("unreadable_roots", &self.unreadable_roots)
+            .field("unreadable_globs", &self.unreadable_globs)
+            .field("include_platform_defaults", &self.include_platform_defaults)
+            .field("glob_scan_max_depth", &self.glob_scan_max_depth)
+            .finish_non_exhaustive()
+    }
+}
+
+impl EffectiveFilesystemPermissions {
+    /// Derives effective filesystem enforcement facts for platform consumers.
+    ///
+    /// Callers must pass an effective `PermissionProfile` after runtime grants and
+    /// runtime workspace roots have been applied. Symbolic workspace-root entries
+    /// are rejected at this boundary rather than resolved from a working directory.
+    pub fn from_profile(
+        permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
+        context: FilesystemPermissionsContext<'_>,
+    ) -> Result<Self, FilesystemPermissionsError> {
+        let file_system_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
+        if contains_unmaterialized_workspace_roots(&file_system_policy) {
+            return Err(FilesystemPermissionsError::UnmaterializedWorkspaceRoots);
+        }
+        // Direct enforcement queries have historically failed closed for malformed
+        // deny patterns. Platform lowering that expands concrete targets can still
+        // validate the patterns before acting on the filesystem.
+        let read_deny_matcher =
+            ReadDenyMatcher::new(&file_system_policy, context.policy_evaluation_cwd.as_path());
+        let mode = match file_system_policy.kind {
+            FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted => FilesystemPermissionsMode::Restricted,
+            FileSystemSandboxKind::Unrestricted => FilesystemPermissionsMode::Unrestricted,
+            FileSystemSandboxKind::ExternalSandbox => FilesystemPermissionsMode::External,
+        };
+        let readable_roots =
+            file_system_policy.get_readable_roots_with_cwd(context.policy_evaluation_cwd.as_path());
+        let writable_roots =
+            file_system_policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(context.policy_evaluation_cwd.as_path());
+        let unreadable_roots = file_system_policy
+            .get_unreadable_roots_with_cwd(context.policy_evaluation_cwd.as_path());
+        let unreadable_globs = file_system_policy
+            .get_unreadable_globs_with_cwd(context.policy_evaluation_cwd.as_path())
+            .into_iter()
+            .map(|pattern| ValidatedDenyGlob { pattern })
+            .collect();
+        let include_platform_defaults = file_system_policy.include_platform_defaults();
+        let glob_scan_max_depth = file_system_policy.glob_scan_max_depth;
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            mode,
+            readable_roots,
+            writable_roots,
+            unreadable_roots,
+            unreadable_globs,
+            include_platform_defaults,
+            glob_scan_max_depth,
+            file_system_policy,
+            policy_evaluation_cwd: context.policy_evaluation_cwd.clone(),
+            read_deny_matcher,
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Returns whether a read is permitted after applying explicit read denies.
+    pub fn can_read(&self, path: &Path) -> bool {
+        self.file_system_policy
+            .can_read_path_with_cwd(path, self.policy_evaluation_cwd.as_path())
+            && !self.is_read_denied(path)
+    }
+
+    /// Returns whether a write is permitted, including protected metadata rules.
+    pub fn can_write(&self, path: &Path) -> bool {
+        self.file_system_policy
+            .can_write_path_with_cwd(path, self.policy_evaluation_cwd.as_path())
+    }
+
+    /// Returns whether `path` is matched by an explicit deny-read entry.
+    pub fn is_read_denied(&self, path: &Path) -> bool {
+        self.read_deny_matcher
+            .as_ref()
+            .is_some_and(|matcher| matcher.is_read_denied(path))
+    }
+
+    pub fn has_full_disk_read_access(&self) -> bool {
+        self.file_system_policy.has_full_disk_read_access()
+    }
+
+    pub fn has_full_disk_write_access(&self) -> bool {
+        self.file_system_policy.has_full_disk_write_access()
+    }
+}
+
+/// An error deriving filesystem enforcement facts from a permission profile.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum FilesystemPermissionsError {
+    UnmaterializedWorkspaceRoots,
+    InvalidDenyGlob(String),
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for FilesystemPermissionsError {
+    fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            Self::UnmaterializedWorkspaceRoots => formatter.write_str(
+                "effective filesystem permissions require workspace roots to be materialized from runtime workspace roots",
+            ),
+            Self::InvalidDenyGlob(message) => formatter.write_str(message),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::error::Error for FilesystemPermissionsError {}
+
+fn contains_unmaterialized_workspace_roots(file_system_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy) -> bool {
+    let workspace_glob_prefix = project_roots_glob_pattern(Path::new(""));
+    file_system_policy
+        .entries
+        .iter()
+        .any(|entry| match &entry.path {
+            FileSystemPath::Special {
+                value: FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots { .. },
+            } => true,
+            FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { pattern } => pattern.starts_with(&workspace_glob_prefix),
+            FileSystemPath::Path { .. } | FileSystemPath::Special { .. } => false,
+        })
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+#[path = "effective_filesystem_permissions_tests.rs"]
+mod tests;
--- a/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/effective_filesystem_permissions_tests.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/effective_filesystem_permissions_tests.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+use super::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions;
+use super::FilesystemPermissionsContext;
+use super::FilesystemPermissionsError;
+use super::FilesystemPermissionsMode;
+use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
+use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode;
+use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath;
+use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
+use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxKind;
+use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
+use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
+use codex_protocol::permissions::ReadDenyMatcher;
+use codex_protocol::permissions::project_roots_glob_pattern;
+use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
+use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
+use std::path::Path;
+use tempfile::TempDir;
+
+fn absolute_path(path: &Path) -> AbsolutePathBuf {
+    AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(path).expect("absolute path")
+}
+
+fn derive_effective(
+    permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
+    cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
+) -> super::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions {
+    EffectiveFilesystemPermissions::from_profile(
+        permission_profile,
+        FilesystemPermissionsContext {
+            policy_evaluation_cwd: cwd,
+        },
+    )
+    .expect("valid effective filesystem permissions")
+}
+
+fn assert_projected_fields_match_policy(
+    permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
+    cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
+) -> super::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions {
+    let effective = derive_effective(permission_profile, cwd);
+    let policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
+    let expected_mode = match policy.kind {
+        FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted => FilesystemPermissionsMode::Restricted,
+        FileSystemSandboxKind::Unrestricted => FilesystemPermissionsMode::Unrestricted,
+        FileSystemSandboxKind::ExternalSandbox => FilesystemPermissionsMode::External,
+    };
+
+    assert_eq!(effective.mode, expected_mode);
+    assert_eq!(
+        effective.readable_roots,
+        policy.get_readable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.as_path())
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        effective.writable_roots,
+        policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.as_path())
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        effective.unreadable_roots,
+        policy.get_unreadable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.as_path())
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        effective
+            .unreadable_globs
+            .iter()
+            .map(|glob| glob.pattern().to_string())
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>(),
+        policy.get_unreadable_globs_with_cwd(cwd.as_path())
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        effective.include_platform_defaults,
+        policy.include_platform_defaults()
+    );
+    assert_eq!(effective.glob_scan_max_depth, policy.glob_scan_max_depth);
+    assert_eq!(
+        effective.has_full_disk_read_access(),
+        policy.has_full_disk_read_access()
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        effective.has_full_disk_write_access(),
+        policy.has_full_disk_write_access()
+    );
+
+    effective
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn effective_access_modes_preserve_builtin_profile_semantics() {
+    let temp_dir = TempDir::new().expect("temp dir");
+    let cwd = absolute_path(temp_dir.path());
+
+    let read_only = assert_projected_fields_match_policy(&PermissionProfile::read_only(), &cwd);
+    assert_eq!(read_only.mode, FilesystemPermissionsMode::Restricted);
+    assert_eq!(read_only.can_read(cwd.as_path()), true);
+    assert_eq!(read_only.can_write(cwd.as_path()), false);
+
+    let unrestricted = assert_projected_fields_match_policy(&PermissionProfile::Disabled, &cwd);
+    assert_eq!(unrestricted.mode, FilesystemPermissionsMode::Unrestricted);
+    assert_eq!(unrestricted.can_write(cwd.as_path()), true);
+
+    let external = assert_projected_fields_match_policy(
+        &PermissionProfile::External {
+            network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+        },
+        &cwd,
+    );
+    assert_eq!(external.mode, FilesystemPermissionsMode::External);
+    assert_eq!(external.has_full_disk_write_access(), true);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn effective_workspace_permissions_reject_unmaterialized_runtime_workspace_roots() {
+    let temp_dir = TempDir::new().expect("temp dir");
+    let cwd = absolute_path(temp_dir.path());
+    let unresolved_exact = PermissionProfile::workspace_write();
+    let unresolved_glob_policy =
+        FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+            path: FileSystemPath::GlobPattern {
+                pattern: project_roots_glob_pattern(Path::new("**/*.env")),
+            },
+            access: FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
+        }]);
+    let unresolved_glob = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &unresolved_glob_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+    );
+
+    for profile in [&unresolved_exact, &unresolved_glob] {
+        let error = EffectiveFilesystemPermissions::from_profile(
+            profile,
+            FilesystemPermissionsContext {
+                policy_evaluation_cwd: &cwd,
+            },
+        )
+        .expect_err("unresolved runtime workspace roots should fail");
+        assert_eq!(
+            error,
+            FilesystemPermissionsError::UnmaterializedWorkspaceRoots
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn effective_workspace_permissions_preserve_materialized_workspace_roots() {
+    let temp_dir = TempDir::new().expect("temp dir");
+    let cwd = absolute_path(temp_dir.path());
+    let first_root = cwd.join("first");
+    let second_root = cwd.join("second");
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::workspace_write()
+        .materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(&[first_root.clone(), second_root.clone()]);
+    let effective = assert_projected_fields_match_policy(&permission_profile, &cwd);
+
+    assert_eq!(effective.can_write(first_root.join("src").as_path()), true);
+    assert_eq!(effective.can_write(second_root.join("src").as_path()), true);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn effective_permissions_preserve_nested_carveouts_and_read_denies() {
+    let temp_dir = TempDir::new().expect("temp dir");
+    let cwd = absolute_path(temp_dir.path());
+    let workspace = cwd.join("workspace");
+    let read_only_child = workspace.join("generated");
+    let denied_child = workspace.join("private");
+    let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
+        FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+            path: FileSystemPath::Path {
+                path: workspace.clone(),
+            },
+            access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
+        },
+        FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+            path: FileSystemPath::Path {
+                path: read_only_child.clone(),
+            },
+            access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
+        },
+        FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+            path: FileSystemPath::Path {
+                path: denied_child.clone(),
+            },
+            access: FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
+        },
+    ]);
+    let permission_profile =
+        PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(&policy, NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted);
+    let effective = assert_projected_fields_match_policy(&permission_profile, &cwd);
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        effective.can_write(workspace.join("file.txt").as_path()),
+        true
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        effective.can_write(read_only_child.join("file.txt").as_path()),
+        false
+    );
+    assert_eq!(effective.can_write(workspace.join(".git").as_path()), false);
+    assert_eq!(
+        effective.can_read(denied_child.join("secret.txt").as_path()),
+        false
+    );
+}
+
+#[cfg(unix)]
+#[test]
+fn effective_permissions_preserve_symlinked_writable_roots() {
+    let temp_dir = TempDir::new().expect("temp dir");
+    let cwd = absolute_path(temp_dir.path());
+    let target = cwd.join("target");
+    let link = cwd.join("linked-workspace");
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(target.as_path()).expect("create target");
+    std::os::unix::fs::symlink(target.as_path(), link.as_path()).expect("create symlink");
+    let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+        path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: link.clone() },
+        access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
+    }]);
+    let permission_profile =
+        PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(&policy, NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted);
+    let effective = assert_projected_fields_match_policy(&permission_profile, &cwd);
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        effective.can_write(link.join("file.txt").as_path()),
+        policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(link.join("file.txt").as_path(), cwd.as_path())
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn effective_permissions_preserve_accepted_deny_glob_matching() {
+    let temp_dir = TempDir::new().expect("temp dir");
+    let cwd = absolute_path(temp_dir.path());
+    let pattern = cwd.join("secret[.txt").to_string_lossy().into_owned();
+    let denied_path = cwd.join("secret[.txt");
+    let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
+        FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+            path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: cwd.clone() },
+            access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
+        },
+        FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+            path: FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { pattern },
+            access: FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
+        },
+    ]);
+    let permission_profile =
+        PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(&policy, NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted);
+    let effective = assert_projected_fields_match_policy(&permission_profile, &cwd);
+    let current_matcher = ReadDenyMatcher::try_new(&policy, cwd.as_path())
+        .expect("accepted pattern")
+        .expect("deny matcher");
+
+    assert_eq!(effective.is_read_denied(denied_path.as_path()), true);
+    assert_eq!(
+        effective.is_read_denied(denied_path.as_path()),
+        current_matcher.is_read_denied(denied_path.as_path())
+    );
+    assert_eq!(effective.can_read(denied_path.as_path()), false);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn effective_permissions_fail_closed_for_malformed_deny_globs() {
+    let temp_dir = TempDir::new().expect("temp dir");
+    let cwd = absolute_path(temp_dir.path());
+    let readable_path = cwd.join("readable.txt");
+    let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
+        FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+            path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: cwd.clone() },
+            access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
+        },
+        FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+            path: FileSystemPath::GlobPattern {
+                pattern: format!("{}/**/[z-a]", cwd.as_path().display()),
+            },
+            access: FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
+        },
+    ]);
+    let permission_profile =
+        PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(&policy, NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted);
+    let effective = derive_effective(&permission_profile, &cwd);
+
+    assert_eq!(effective.is_read_denied(readable_path.as_path()), true);
+    assert_eq!(effective.can_read(readable_path.as_path()), false);
+}
--- a/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/lib.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/lib.rs
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
 mod bwrap;
+mod effective_filesystem_permissions;
 pub mod landlock;
 mod manager;
 pub mod policy_transforms;
@@ -10,6 +11,11 @@ pub mod seatbelt;
 pub use bwrap::find_system_bwrap_in_path;
 #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
 pub use bwrap::system_bwrap_warning;
+pub use effective_filesystem_permissions::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions;
+pub use effective_filesystem_permissions::FilesystemPermissionsContext;
+pub use effective_filesystem_permissions::FilesystemPermissionsError;
+pub use effective_filesystem_permissions::FilesystemPermissionsMode;
+pub use effective_filesystem_permissions::ValidatedDenyGlob;
 pub use manager::SandboxCommand;
 pub use manager::SandboxExecRequest;
 pub use manager::SandboxManager;
@@ -35,6 +41,12 @@ impl From<SandboxTransformError> for CodexErr {
            SandboxTransformError::MissingLinuxSandboxExecutable => {
                CodexErr::LandlockSandboxExecutableNotProvided
            }
+            SandboxTransformError::InvalidPermissionProfileCwd(message) => {
+                CodexErr::UnsupportedOperation(message)
+            }
+            SandboxTransformError::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions(err) => {
+                CodexErr::UnsupportedOperation(err.to_string())
+            }
            #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
            SandboxTransformError::Wsl1UnsupportedForBubblewrap => {
                CodexErr::UnsupportedOperation(crate::bwrap::WSL1_BWRAP_WARNING.to_string())
--- a/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/manager.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/manager.rs
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+use crate::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions;
+use crate::FilesystemPermissionsContext;
+use crate::FilesystemPermissionsError;
 #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
 use crate::bwrap::WSL1_BWRAP_WARNING;
 #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
@@ -80,6 +83,7 @@ pub struct SandboxExecRequest {
    pub windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
    pub windows_sandbox_private_desktop: bool,
    pub permission_profile: PermissionProfile,
+    pub effective_filesystem_permissions: EffectiveFilesystemPermissions,
    pub file_system_sandbox_policy: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
    pub network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
    pub arg0: Option<String>,
@@ -106,6 +110,8 @@ pub struct SandboxTransformRequest<'a> {
 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub enum SandboxTransformError {
    MissingLinuxSandboxExecutable,
+    InvalidPermissionProfileCwd(String),
+    EffectiveFilesystemPermissions(FilesystemPermissionsError),
    #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
    Wsl1UnsupportedForBubblewrap,
    #[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
@@ -118,6 +124,8 @@ impl std::fmt::Display for SandboxTransformError {
            Self::MissingLinuxSandboxExecutable => {
                write!(f, "missing codex-linux-sandbox executable path")
            }
+            Self::InvalidPermissionProfileCwd(message) => f.write_str(message),
+            Self::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions(err) => write!(f, "{err}"),
            #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
            Self::Wsl1UnsupportedForBubblewrap => write!(f, "{WSL1_BWRAP_WARNING}"),
            #[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
@@ -186,6 +194,15 @@ impl SandboxManager {
            effective_permission_profile(permissions, additional_permissions.as_ref());
        let (effective_file_system_policy, effective_network_policy) =
            effective_permission_profile.to_runtime_permissions();
+        let policy_evaluation_cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(sandbox_policy_cwd)
+            .map_err(|err| SandboxTransformError::InvalidPermissionProfileCwd(err.to_string()))?;
+        let effective_filesystem_permissions = EffectiveFilesystemPermissions::from_profile(
+            &effective_permission_profile,
+            FilesystemPermissionsContext {
+                policy_evaluation_cwd: &policy_evaluation_cwd,
+            },
+        )
+        .map_err(SandboxTransformError::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions)?;
        let mut argv = Vec::with_capacity(1 + command.args.len());
        argv.push(command.program);
        argv.extend(command.args.into_iter().map(OsString::from));
@@ -200,9 +217,8 @@ impl SandboxManager {

                let mut args = create_seatbelt_command_args(CreateSeatbeltCommandArgsParams {
                    command: os_argv_to_strings(argv),
-                    file_system_sandbox_policy: &effective_file_system_policy,
+                    effective_filesystem_permissions: &effective_filesystem_permissions,
                    network_sandbox_policy: effective_network_policy,
-                    sandbox_policy_cwd,
                    enforce_managed_network,
                    network,
                    extra_allow_unix_sockets: &[],
@@ -253,6 +269,7 @@ impl SandboxManager {
            windows_sandbox_level,
            windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
            permission_profile: effective_permission_profile,
+            effective_filesystem_permissions,
            file_system_sandbox_policy: effective_file_system_policy,
            network_sandbox_policy: effective_network_policy,
            arg0: arg0_override,
--- a/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/manager_tests.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/manager_tests.rs
@@ -217,6 +217,18 @@ fn transform_additional_permissions_preserves_denied_entries() {
        })
        .expect("transform");

+    assert_eq!(
+        exec_request
+            .effective_filesystem_permissions
+            .can_write(allowed_path.as_path()),
+        true
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        exec_request
+            .effective_filesystem_permissions
+            .can_read(denied_path.as_path()),
+        false
+    );
    assert_eq!(
        exec_request.file_system_sandbox_policy,
        FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
--- a/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/seatbelt.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/seatbelt.rs
@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
+use crate::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions;
+use crate::FilesystemPermissionsContext;
 use codex_network_proxy::NetworkProxy;
 use codex_network_proxy::PROXY_URL_ENV_KEYS;
 use codex_network_proxy::has_proxy_url_env_vars;
 use codex_network_proxy::proxy_url_env_value;
+use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::PROTECTED_METADATA_PATH_NAMES;
@@ -404,9 +407,8 @@ fn seatbelt_protected_metadata_name_regex(root: &AbsolutePathBuf, name: &str) ->
 }

 fn protected_metadata_names_for_writable_root(
-    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    effective_filesystem_permissions: &EffectiveFilesystemPermissions,
    writable_root: &WritableRoot,
-    cwd: &Path,
 ) -> Vec<String> {
    let mut names = writable_root.protected_metadata_names.clone();
    for name in PROTECTED_METADATA_PATH_NAMES {
@@ -414,7 +416,7 @@ fn protected_metadata_names_for_writable_root(
            continue;
        }
        let path = writable_root.root.join(*name);
-        if !file_system_sandbox_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(path.as_path(), cwd) {
+        if !effective_filesystem_permissions.can_write(path.as_path()) {
            names.push((*name).to_string());
        }
    }
@@ -422,25 +424,24 @@ fn protected_metadata_names_for_writable_root(
 }

 fn build_seatbelt_unreadable_glob_policy(
-    file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
-    cwd: &Path,
+    effective_filesystem_permissions: &EffectiveFilesystemPermissions,
 ) -> String {
    // Seatbelt does not understand the filesystem policy's glob syntax directly.
    // Convert each unreadable pattern into an anchored regex deny rule and apply
    // it to both reads and unlink-style writes so a denied path cannot be probed
    // through destructive filesystem operations.
-    let unreadable_globs = file_system_sandbox_policy.get_unreadable_globs_with_cwd(cwd);
-    if unreadable_globs.is_empty() {
+    if effective_filesystem_permissions.unreadable_globs.is_empty() {
        return String::new();
    }

    let mut policy_components = Vec::new();
-    for pattern in unreadable_globs {
+    for glob in &effective_filesystem_permissions.unreadable_globs {
+        let pattern = glob.pattern();
        let mut regexes = BTreeSet::new();
-        if let Some(regex) = seatbelt_regex_for_unreadable_glob(&pattern) {
+        if let Some(regex) = seatbelt_regex_for_unreadable_glob(pattern) {
            regexes.insert(regex);
        }
-        if let Some(pattern) = canonicalize_glob_static_prefix_for_sandbox(&pattern)
+        if let Some(pattern) = canonicalize_glob_static_prefix_for_sandbox(pattern)
            && let Some(regex) = seatbelt_regex_for_unreadable_glob(&pattern)
        {
            regexes.insert(regex);
@@ -573,15 +574,31 @@ fn create_seatbelt_command_args_for_legacy_policy(
    enforce_managed_network: bool,
    network: Option<&NetworkProxy>,
 ) -> Vec<String> {
+    let legacy_workspace_root = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(sandbox_policy_cwd)
+        .unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("sandbox policy cwd should be absolute: {err}"));
    let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd(
        sandbox_policy,
        sandbox_policy_cwd,
+    )
+    .materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(std::slice::from_ref(&legacy_workspace_root));
+    let network_sandbox_policy = NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(sandbox_policy);
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        network_sandbox_policy,
    );
+    let effective_filesystem_permissions = EffectiveFilesystemPermissions::from_profile(
+        &permission_profile,
+        FilesystemPermissionsContext {
+            policy_evaluation_cwd: &legacy_workspace_root,
+        },
+    )
+    .unwrap_or_else(|err| {
+        panic!("legacy filesystem policy should yield effective permissions: {err}")
+    });
    create_seatbelt_command_args(CreateSeatbeltCommandArgsParams {
        command,
-        file_system_sandbox_policy: &file_system_sandbox_policy,
-        network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(sandbox_policy),
-        sandbox_policy_cwd,
+        effective_filesystem_permissions: &effective_filesystem_permissions,
+        network_sandbox_policy,
        enforce_managed_network,
        network,
        extra_allow_unix_sockets: &[],
@@ -591,9 +608,8 @@ fn create_seatbelt_command_args_for_legacy_policy(
 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub struct CreateSeatbeltCommandArgsParams<'a> {
    pub command: Vec<String>,
-    pub file_system_sandbox_policy: &'a FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    pub effective_filesystem_permissions: &'a EffectiveFilesystemPermissions,
    pub network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
-    pub sandbox_policy_cwd: &'a Path,
    pub enforce_managed_network: bool,
    pub network: Option<&'a NetworkProxy>,
    pub extra_allow_unix_sockets: &'a [AbsolutePathBuf],
@@ -602,18 +618,16 @@ pub struct CreateSeatbeltCommandArgsParams<'a> {
 pub fn create_seatbelt_command_args(args: CreateSeatbeltCommandArgsParams<'_>) -> Vec<String> {
    let CreateSeatbeltCommandArgsParams {
        command,
-        file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        effective_filesystem_permissions,
        network_sandbox_policy,
-        sandbox_policy_cwd,
        enforce_managed_network,
        network,
        extra_allow_unix_sockets,
    } = args;

-    let unreadable_roots =
-        file_system_sandbox_policy.get_unreadable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd);
+    let unreadable_roots = effective_filesystem_permissions.unreadable_roots.clone();
    let (file_write_policy, file_write_dir_params) =
-        if file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() {
+        if effective_filesystem_permissions.has_full_disk_write_access() {
            if unreadable_roots.is_empty() {
                // Allegedly, this is more permissive than `(allow file-write*)`.
                (
@@ -635,14 +649,14 @@ pub fn create_seatbelt_command_args(args: CreateSeatbeltCommandArgsParams<'_>) -
            build_seatbelt_access_policy(
                "file-write*",
                "WRITABLE_ROOT",
-                file_system_sandbox_policy
-                    .get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd)
-                    .into_iter()
+                effective_filesystem_permissions
+                    .writable_roots
+                    .iter()
+                    .cloned()
                    .map(|root| SeatbeltAccessRoot {
                        protected_metadata_names: protected_metadata_names_for_writable_root(
-                            file_system_sandbox_policy,
+                            effective_filesystem_permissions,
                            &root,
-                            sandbox_policy_cwd,
                        ),
                        root: root.root,
                        excluded_subpaths: root.read_only_subpaths,
@@ -652,7 +666,7 @@ pub fn create_seatbelt_command_args(args: CreateSeatbeltCommandArgsParams<'_>) -
        };

    let (file_read_policy, file_read_dir_params) =
-        if file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access() {
+        if effective_filesystem_permissions.has_full_disk_read_access() {
            if unreadable_roots.is_empty() {
                (
                    "; allow read-only file operations\n(allow file-read*)".to_string(),
@@ -677,9 +691,10 @@ pub fn create_seatbelt_command_args(args: CreateSeatbeltCommandArgsParams<'_>) -
            let (policy, params) = build_seatbelt_access_policy(
                "file-read*",
                "READABLE_ROOT",
-                file_system_sandbox_policy
-                    .get_readable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd)
-                    .into_iter()
+                effective_filesystem_permissions
+                    .readable_roots
+                    .iter()
+                    .cloned()
                    .map(|root| SeatbeltAccessRoot {
                        excluded_subpaths: unreadable_roots
                            .iter()
@@ -705,9 +720,8 @@ pub fn create_seatbelt_command_args(args: CreateSeatbeltCommandArgsParams<'_>) -
    let network_policy =
        dynamic_network_policy_for_network(network_sandbox_policy, enforce_managed_network, &proxy);

-    let include_platform_defaults = file_system_sandbox_policy.include_platform_defaults();
-    let deny_read_policy =
-        build_seatbelt_unreadable_glob_policy(file_system_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd);
+    let include_platform_defaults = effective_filesystem_permissions.include_platform_defaults;
+    let deny_read_policy = build_seatbelt_unreadable_glob_policy(effective_filesystem_permissions);
    let mut policy_sections = vec![
        MACOS_SEATBELT_BASE_POLICY.to_string(),
        file_read_policy,
--- a/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/seatbelt_tests.rs
+++ b/codex-rs/sandboxing/src/seatbelt_tests.rs
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ use codex_network_proxy::NetworkProxyConfig;
 use codex_network_proxy::NetworkProxyConstraints;
 use codex_network_proxy::NetworkProxyState;
 use codex_network_proxy::build_config_state;
+use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath;
 use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
@@ -50,6 +51,30 @@ fn absolute_path(path: &str) -> AbsolutePathBuf {
    AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(Path::new(path)).expect("absolute path")
 }

+fn effective_permissions(
+    file_system_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
+    cwd: &Path,
+) -> crate::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions {
+    let policy_evaluation_cwd =
+        AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd).expect("absolute sandbox policy cwd");
+    let file_system_policy = file_system_policy
+        .clone()
+        .materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(std::slice::from_ref(
+            &policy_evaluation_cwd,
+        ));
+    let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
+        &file_system_policy,
+        NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+    );
+    crate::EffectiveFilesystemPermissions::from_profile(
+        &permission_profile,
+        crate::FilesystemPermissionsContext {
+            policy_evaluation_cwd: &policy_evaluation_cwd,
+        },
+    )
+    .expect("derive effective filesystem permissions")
+}
+
 fn seatbelt_policy_arg(args: &[String]) -> &str {
    let policy_index = args
        .iter()
@@ -198,12 +223,12 @@ fn explicit_unreadable_paths_are_excluded_from_full_disk_read_and_write_access()
            access: FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
        },
    ]);
+    let effective_permissions = effective_permissions(&file_system_policy, Path::new("/"));

    let args = create_seatbelt_command_args(CreateSeatbeltCommandArgsParams {
        command: vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
-        file_system_sandbox_policy: &file_system_policy,
+        effective_filesystem_permissions: &effective_permissions,
        network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
-        sandbox_policy_cwd: Path::new("/"),
        enforce_managed_network: false,
        network: None,
        extra_allow_unix_sockets: &[],
@@ -270,12 +295,12 @@ fn explicit_unreadable_paths_are_excluded_from_readable_roots() {
            access: FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
        },
    ]);
+    let effective_permissions = effective_permissions(&file_system_policy, Path::new("/"));

    let args = create_seatbelt_command_args(CreateSeatbeltCommandArgsParams {
        command: vec!["/bin/true".to_string()],
-        file_system_sandbox_policy: &file_system_policy,
+        effective_filesystem_permissions: &effective_permissions,
        network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
-        sandbox_policy_cwd: Path::new("/"),
        enforce_managed_network: false,
        network: None,
        extra_allow_unix_sockets: &[],
@@ -374,8 +399,9 @@ fn unreadable_glob_policy_includes_canonicalized_static_prefix() {
        path: FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { pattern },
        access: FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
    });
+    let effective_permissions = effective_permissions(&policy, temp_dir.path());

-    let seatbelt_policy = build_seatbelt_unreadable_glob_policy(&policy, temp_dir.path());
+    let seatbelt_policy = build_seatbelt_unreadable_glob_policy(&effective_permissions);

    assert!(
        seatbelt_policy.contains(&format!(r#"(deny file-read* (regex #"{expected_regex}"))"#)),
@@ -573,12 +599,12 @@ fn create_seatbelt_args_allowlists_explicit_unix_socket_paths_without_proxy() {
        &SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
        cwd.path(),
    );
+    let effective_permissions = effective_permissions(&file_system_policy, cwd.path());
    let extra_allow_unix_sockets = vec![absolute_path("/tmp/codex-browser-use")];
    let args = create_seatbelt_command_args(CreateSeatbeltCommandArgsParams {
        command: vec!["/usr/bin/true".to_string()],
-        file_system_sandbox_policy: &file_system_policy,
+        effective_filesystem_permissions: &effective_permissions,
        network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
-        sandbox_policy_cwd: cwd.path(),
        enforce_managed_network: false,
        network: None,
        extra_allow_unix_sockets: &extra_allow_unix_sockets,
@@ -613,6 +639,7 @@ async fn create_seatbelt_args_merges_proxy_and_explicit_unix_socket_paths() -> a
        &SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
        cwd.path(),
    );
+    let effective_permissions = effective_permissions(&file_system_policy, cwd.path());
    let network_socket = "/tmp/codex-proxy-use";
    let explicit_socket = "/tmp/codex-browser-use";
    let mut network_config = NetworkProxyConfig::default();
@@ -634,9 +661,8 @@ async fn create_seatbelt_args_merges_proxy_and_explicit_unix_socket_paths() -> a

    let args = create_seatbelt_command_args(CreateSeatbeltCommandArgsParams {
        command: vec!["/usr/bin/true".to_string()],
-        file_system_sandbox_policy: &file_system_policy,
+        effective_filesystem_permissions: &effective_permissions,
        network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
-        sandbox_policy_cwd: cwd.path(),
        enforce_managed_network: false,
        network: Some(&network_proxy),
        extra_allow_unix_sockets: &extra_allow_unix_sockets,
@@ -672,12 +698,12 @@ fn create_seatbelt_args_preserves_full_network_with_explicit_unix_socket_paths()
        &SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
        cwd.path(),
    );
+    let effective_permissions = effective_permissions(&file_system_policy, cwd.path());
    let extra_allow_unix_sockets = vec![absolute_path("/tmp/codex-browser-use")];
    let args = create_seatbelt_command_args(CreateSeatbeltCommandArgsParams {
        command: vec!["/usr/bin/true".to_string()],
-        file_system_sandbox_policy: &file_system_policy,
+        effective_filesystem_permissions: &effective_permissions,
        network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
-        sandbox_policy_cwd: cwd.path(),
        enforce_managed_network: false,
        network: None,
        extra_allow_unix_sockets: &extra_allow_unix_sockets,
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
viyatb-oai	2ab25cb2c5	refactor(permissions): lower Linux enforcement from effective filesystem permissions Co-authored-by: Codex noreply@openai.com	2026-05-27 17:43:55 -07:00
viyatb-oai	0dc8cf86c9	refactor(permissions): lower Seatbelt from effective filesystem permissions Co-authored-by: Codex noreply@openai.com	2026-05-27 17:41:02 -07:00
viyatb-oai	4418bce894	refactor(permissions): use effective filesystem permissions for enforcement preflight Co-authored-by: Codex noreply@openai.com	2026-05-27 17:28:05 -07:00
viyatb-oai	e7864acdbe	feat(permissions): introduce effective filesystem permissions Co-authored-by: Codex noreply@openai.com	2026-05-27 17:08:07 -07:00