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4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
iceweasel-oai
9f21fad19e forgot to add new file 2026-01-29 14:33:57 -08:00
iceweasel-oai
7da1d3830d cargo fmt 2026-01-29 14:26:46 -08:00
iceweasel-oai
ba6600a93c do not ignore SID persistence failures 2026-01-29 14:25:36 -08:00
iceweasel-oai
a4356dee7b implement per-workspace capability SIDs for workspace specific ACLs 2026-01-29 14:20:11 -08:00
9 changed files with 278 additions and 92 deletions

View File

@@ -233,7 +233,9 @@ pub unsafe fn dacl_has_write_deny_for_sid(p_dacl: *mut ACL, psid: *mut c_void) -
| FILE_APPEND_DATA
| FILE_WRITE_EA
| FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES
| GENERIC_WRITE_MASK;
| GENERIC_WRITE_MASK
| DELETE
| FILE_DELETE_CHILD;
for i in 0..info.AceCount {
let mut p_ace: *mut c_void = std::ptr::null_mut();
if GetAce(p_dacl as *const ACL, i, &mut p_ace) == 0 {
@@ -477,7 +479,9 @@ pub unsafe fn add_deny_write_ace(path: &Path, psid: *mut c_void) -> Result<bool>
| FILE_APPEND_DATA
| FILE_WRITE_EA
| FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES
| GENERIC_WRITE_MASK;
| GENERIC_WRITE_MASK
| DELETE
| FILE_DELETE_CHILD;
explicit.grfAccessMode = DENY_ACCESS;
explicit.grfInheritance = CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE | OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE;
explicit.Trustee = trustee;

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ use rand::RngCore;
use rand::SeedableRng;
use serde::Deserialize;
use serde::Serialize;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::fs;
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
@@ -13,6 +14,13 @@ use std::path::PathBuf;
pub struct CapSids {
pub workspace: String,
pub readonly: String,
/// Per-workspace capability SIDs keyed by canonicalized CWD string.
///
/// This is used to isolate workspaces from other workspace sandbox writes and to
/// apply per-workspace denies (e.g. protect `CWD/.codex`)
/// without permanently affecting other workspaces.
#[serde(default)]
pub workspace_by_cwd: HashMap<String, String>,
}
pub fn cap_sid_file(codex_home: &Path) -> PathBuf {
@@ -30,8 +38,7 @@ fn make_random_cap_sid_string() -> String {
fn persist_caps(path: &Path, caps: &CapSids) -> Result<()> {
if let Some(dir) = path.parent() {
fs::create_dir_all(dir)
.with_context(|| format!("create cap sid dir {}", dir.display()))?;
fs::create_dir_all(dir).with_context(|| format!("create cap sid dir {}", dir.display()))?;
}
let json = serde_json::to_string(caps)?;
fs::write(path, json).with_context(|| format!("write cap sid file {}", path.display()))?;
@@ -52,6 +59,7 @@ pub fn load_or_create_cap_sids(codex_home: &Path) -> Result<CapSids> {
let caps = CapSids {
workspace: t.to_string(),
readonly: make_random_cap_sid_string(),
workspace_by_cwd: HashMap::new(),
};
persist_caps(&path, &caps)?;
return Ok(caps);
@@ -60,7 +68,30 @@ pub fn load_or_create_cap_sids(codex_home: &Path) -> Result<CapSids> {
let caps = CapSids {
workspace: make_random_cap_sid_string(),
readonly: make_random_cap_sid_string(),
workspace_by_cwd: HashMap::new(),
};
persist_caps(&path, &caps)?;
Ok(caps)
}
fn canonical_cwd_key(cwd: &Path) -> String {
let canonical = dunce::canonicalize(cwd).unwrap_or_else(|_| cwd.to_path_buf());
canonical
.to_string_lossy()
.replace('\\', "/")
.to_ascii_lowercase()
}
/// Returns the workspace-specific capability SID for `cwd`, creating and persisting it if missing.
pub fn workspace_cap_sid_for_cwd(codex_home: &Path, cwd: &Path) -> Result<String> {
let path = cap_sid_file(codex_home);
let mut caps = load_or_create_cap_sids(codex_home)?;
let key = canonical_cwd_key(cwd);
if let Some(sid) = caps.workspace_by_cwd.get(&key) {
return Ok(sid.clone());
}
let sid = make_random_cap_sid_string();
caps.workspace_by_cwd.insert(key, sid.clone());
persist_caps(&path, &caps)?;
Ok(sid)
}

View File

@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ use anyhow::Result;
use codex_windows_sandbox::allow_null_device;
use codex_windows_sandbox::convert_string_sid_to_sid;
use codex_windows_sandbox::create_process_as_user;
use codex_windows_sandbox::create_readonly_token_with_cap_from;
use codex_windows_sandbox::create_workspace_write_token_with_cap_from;
use codex_windows_sandbox::create_readonly_token_with_caps_from;
use codex_windows_sandbox::create_workspace_write_token_with_caps_from;
use codex_windows_sandbox::get_current_token_for_restriction;
use codex_windows_sandbox::hide_current_user_profile_dir;
use codex_windows_sandbox::log_note;
@@ -20,7 +20,9 @@ use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::CloseHandle;
use windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::GetLastError;
use windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::LocalFree;
use windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::HANDLE;
use windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::HLOCAL;
use windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::CreateFileW;
use windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::FILE_GENERIC_READ;
use windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::FILE_GENERIC_WRITE;
@@ -48,7 +50,7 @@ struct RunnerRequest {
codex_home: PathBuf,
// Real user's CODEX_HOME for shared data (caps, config).
real_codex_home: PathBuf,
cap_sid: String,
cap_sids: Vec<String>,
command: Vec<String>,
cwd: PathBuf,
env_map: HashMap<String, String>,
@@ -112,27 +114,43 @@ pub fn main() -> Result<()> {
);
let policy = parse_policy(&req.policy_json_or_preset).context("parse policy_json_or_preset")?;
let psid_cap: *mut c_void = unsafe { convert_string_sid_to_sid(&req.cap_sid).unwrap() };
let mut cap_psids: Vec<*mut c_void> = Vec::new();
for sid in &req.cap_sids {
let Some(psid) = (unsafe { convert_string_sid_to_sid(sid) }) else {
anyhow::bail!("ConvertStringSidToSidW failed for capability SID");
};
cap_psids.push(psid);
}
if cap_psids.is_empty() {
anyhow::bail!("runner: empty capability SID list");
}
// Create restricted token from current process token.
let base = unsafe { get_current_token_for_restriction()? };
let token_res: Result<(HANDLE, *mut c_void)> = unsafe {
let token_res: Result<HANDLE> = unsafe {
match &policy {
SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly => create_readonly_token_with_cap_from(base, psid_cap),
SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly => create_readonly_token_with_caps_from(base, &cap_psids),
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. } => {
create_workspace_write_token_with_cap_from(base, psid_cap)
create_workspace_write_token_with_caps_from(base, &cap_psids)
}
SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess | SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { .. } => {
unreachable!()
}
}
};
let (h_token, psid_to_use) = token_res?;
let h_token = token_res?;
unsafe {
CloseHandle(base);
}
unsafe {
allow_null_device(psid_to_use);
for psid in &cap_psids {
allow_null_device(*psid);
}
for psid in cap_psids {
if !psid.is_null() {
LocalFree(psid as HLOCAL);
}
}
}
// Open named pipes for stdio.

View File

@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ mod windows_impl {
codex_home: PathBuf,
// Real user's CODEX_HOME for shared data (caps, config).
real_codex_home: PathBuf,
cap_sid: String,
cap_sids: Vec<String>,
request_file: Option<PathBuf>,
command: Vec<String>,
cwd: PathBuf,
@@ -239,14 +239,17 @@ mod windows_impl {
anyhow::bail!("DangerFullAccess and ExternalSandbox are not supported for sandboxing")
}
let caps = load_or_create_cap_sids(codex_home)?;
let (psid_to_use, cap_sid_str) = match &policy {
let (psid_to_use, cap_sids) = match &policy {
SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly => (
unsafe { convert_string_sid_to_sid(&caps.readonly).unwrap() },
caps.readonly.clone(),
vec![caps.readonly.clone()],
),
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. } => (
unsafe { convert_string_sid_to_sid(&caps.workspace).unwrap() },
caps.workspace.clone(),
vec![
caps.workspace.clone(),
crate::cap::workspace_cap_sid_for_cwd(codex_home, cwd)?,
],
),
SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess | SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { .. } => {
unreachable!("DangerFullAccess handled above")
@@ -294,7 +297,7 @@ mod windows_impl {
sandbox_policy_cwd: sandbox_policy_cwd.to_path_buf(),
codex_home: sandbox_base.clone(),
real_codex_home: codex_home.to_path_buf(),
cap_sid: cap_sid_str.clone(),
cap_sids: cap_sids.clone(),
request_file: Some(req_file.clone()),
command: command.clone(),
cwd: cwd.to_path_buf(),

View File

@@ -5,8 +5,20 @@ macro_rules! windows_modules {
}
windows_modules!(
acl, allow, audit, cap, dpapi, env, hide_users, identity, logging, policy, process, token,
winutil
acl,
allow,
audit,
cap,
dpapi,
env,
hide_users,
identity,
logging,
policy,
process,
token,
winutil,
workspace_acl
);
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
@@ -19,6 +31,8 @@ mod elevated_impl;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
mod setup_error;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub use acl::add_deny_write_ace;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub use acl::allow_null_device;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
@@ -36,6 +50,8 @@ pub use audit::apply_world_writable_scan_and_denies;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub use cap::load_or_create_cap_sids;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub use cap::workspace_cap_sid_for_cwd;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub use dpapi::protect as dpapi_protect;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub use dpapi::unprotect as dpapi_unprotect;
@@ -88,7 +104,9 @@ pub use token::convert_string_sid_to_sid;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub use token::create_readonly_token_with_cap_from;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub use token::create_workspace_write_token_with_cap_from;
pub use token::create_readonly_token_with_caps_from;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub use token::create_workspace_write_token_with_caps_from;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub use token::get_current_token_for_restriction;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
@@ -99,6 +117,12 @@ pub use windows_impl::CaptureResult;
pub use winutil::string_from_sid_bytes;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub use winutil::to_wide;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub use workspace_acl::canonicalize_path;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub use workspace_acl::is_command_cwd_root;
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub use workspace_acl::protect_workspace_codex_dir;
#[cfg(not(target_os = "windows"))]
pub use stub::apply_world_writable_scan_and_denies;
@@ -116,6 +140,7 @@ mod windows_impl {
use super::allow::compute_allow_paths;
use super::allow::AllowDenyPaths;
use super::cap::load_or_create_cap_sids;
use super::cap::workspace_cap_sid_for_cwd;
use super::env::apply_no_network_to_env;
use super::env::ensure_non_interactive_pager;
use super::env::normalize_null_device_env;
@@ -127,9 +152,13 @@ mod windows_impl {
use super::policy::SandboxPolicy;
use super::process::make_env_block;
use super::token::convert_string_sid_to_sid;
use super::token::create_workspace_write_token_with_caps_from;
use super::winutil::format_last_error;
use super::winutil::quote_windows_arg;
use super::winutil::to_wide;
use super::workspace_acl::canonicalize_path;
use super::workspace_acl::is_command_cwd_root;
use super::workspace_acl::protect_workspace_codex_dir;
use anyhow::Result;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::ffi::c_void;
@@ -229,15 +258,25 @@ mod windows_impl {
anyhow::bail!("DangerFullAccess and ExternalSandbox are not supported for sandboxing")
}
let caps = load_or_create_cap_sids(codex_home)?;
let (h_token, psid_to_use): (HANDLE, *mut c_void) = unsafe {
let (h_token, psid_generic, psid_workspace): (HANDLE, *mut c_void, Option<*mut c_void>) = unsafe {
match &policy {
SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly => {
let psid = convert_string_sid_to_sid(&caps.readonly).unwrap();
super::token::create_readonly_token_with_cap(psid)?
let (h, _) = super::token::create_readonly_token_with_cap(psid)?;
(h, psid, None)
}
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. } => {
let psid = convert_string_sid_to_sid(&caps.workspace).unwrap();
super::token::create_workspace_write_token_with_cap(psid)?
let psid_generic = convert_string_sid_to_sid(&caps.workspace).unwrap();
let ws_sid = workspace_cap_sid_for_cwd(codex_home, cwd)?;
let psid_workspace = convert_string_sid_to_sid(&ws_sid).unwrap();
let base = super::token::get_current_token_for_restriction()?;
let h_res = create_workspace_write_token_with_caps_from(
base,
&[psid_generic, psid_workspace],
);
windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::CloseHandle(base);
let h = h_res?;
(h, psid_generic, Some(psid_workspace))
}
SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess | SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { .. } => {
unreachable!("DangerFullAccess handled above")
@@ -261,29 +300,39 @@ mod windows_impl {
let persist_aces = is_workspace_write;
let AllowDenyPaths { allow, deny } =
compute_allow_paths(&policy, sandbox_policy_cwd, &current_dir, &env_map);
let canonical_cwd = canonicalize_path(&current_dir);
let mut guards: Vec<(PathBuf, *mut c_void)> = Vec::new();
unsafe {
for p in &allow {
if let Ok(added) = add_allow_ace(p, psid_to_use) {
let psid = if is_workspace_write && is_command_cwd_root(p, &canonical_cwd) {
psid_workspace.unwrap_or(psid_generic)
} else {
psid_generic
};
if let Ok(added) = add_allow_ace(p, psid) {
if added {
if persist_aces {
if p.is_dir() {
// best-effort seeding omitted intentionally
}
} else {
guards.push((p.clone(), psid_to_use));
guards.push((p.clone(), psid));
}
}
}
}
for p in &deny {
if let Ok(added) = add_deny_write_ace(p, psid_to_use) {
if let Ok(added) = add_deny_write_ace(p, psid_generic) {
if added && !persist_aces {
guards.push((p.clone(), psid_to_use));
guards.push((p.clone(), psid_generic));
}
}
}
allow_null_device(psid_to_use);
allow_null_device(psid_generic);
if let Some(psid) = psid_workspace {
allow_null_device(psid);
let _ = protect_workspace_codex_dir(&current_dir, psid);
}
}
let (stdin_pair, stdout_pair, stderr_pair) = unsafe { setup_stdio_pipes()? };

View File

@@ -6,18 +6,22 @@ use anyhow::Context;
use anyhow::Result;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64;
use base64::Engine;
use codex_windows_sandbox::canonicalize_path;
use codex_windows_sandbox::convert_string_sid_to_sid;
use codex_windows_sandbox::ensure_allow_mask_aces_with_inheritance;
use codex_windows_sandbox::ensure_allow_write_aces;
use codex_windows_sandbox::extract_setup_failure;
use codex_windows_sandbox::hide_newly_created_users;
use codex_windows_sandbox::is_command_cwd_root;
use codex_windows_sandbox::load_or_create_cap_sids;
use codex_windows_sandbox::log_note;
use codex_windows_sandbox::path_mask_allows;
use codex_windows_sandbox::protect_workspace_codex_dir;
use codex_windows_sandbox::sandbox_dir;
use codex_windows_sandbox::sandbox_secrets_dir;
use codex_windows_sandbox::string_from_sid_bytes;
use codex_windows_sandbox::to_wide;
use codex_windows_sandbox::workspace_cap_sid_for_cwd;
use codex_windows_sandbox::write_setup_error_report;
use codex_windows_sandbox::SetupErrorCode;
use codex_windows_sandbox::SetupErrorReport;
@@ -75,6 +79,7 @@ struct Payload {
offline_username: String,
online_username: String,
codex_home: PathBuf,
command_cwd: PathBuf,
read_roots: Vec<PathBuf>,
write_roots: Vec<PathBuf>,
real_user: String,
@@ -560,6 +565,11 @@ fn run_setup_full(payload: &Payload, log: &mut File, sbx_dir: &Path) -> Result<(
))
})?
};
let workspace_sid_str = workspace_cap_sid_for_cwd(&payload.codex_home, &payload.command_cwd)?;
let workspace_psid = unsafe {
convert_string_sid_to_sid(&workspace_sid_str)
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("convert workspace capability SID failed"))?
};
let mut refresh_errors: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
if !refresh_only {
let firewall_result = firewall::ensure_offline_outbound_block(&offline_sid_str, log);
@@ -609,12 +619,12 @@ fn run_setup_full(payload: &Payload, log: &mut File, sbx_dir: &Path) -> Result<(
let cap_sid_str = caps.workspace.clone();
let sandbox_group_sid_str =
string_from_sid_bytes(&sandbox_group_sid).map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
let sid_strings = vec![sandbox_group_sid_str, cap_sid_str];
let write_mask =
FILE_GENERIC_READ | FILE_GENERIC_WRITE | FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE | DELETE | FILE_DELETE_CHILD;
let mut grant_tasks: Vec<PathBuf> = Vec::new();
let mut seen_write_roots: HashSet<PathBuf> = HashSet::new();
let canonical_command_cwd = canonicalize_path(&payload.command_cwd);
for root in &payload.write_roots {
if !seen_write_roots.insert(root.clone()) {
@@ -628,7 +638,21 @@ fn run_setup_full(payload: &Payload, log: &mut File, sbx_dir: &Path) -> Result<(
continue;
}
let mut need_grant = false;
for (label, psid) in [("sandbox_group", sandbox_group_psid), ("cap", cap_psid)] {
let is_command_cwd = is_command_cwd_root(root, &canonical_command_cwd);
let cap_label = if is_command_cwd {
"workspace_cap"
} else {
"cap"
};
let cap_psid_for_root = if is_command_cwd {
workspace_psid
} else {
cap_psid
};
for (label, psid) in [
("sandbox_group", sandbox_group_psid),
(cap_label, cap_psid_for_root),
] {
let has = match path_mask_allows(root, &[psid], write_mask, true) {
Ok(h) => h,
Err(e) => {
@@ -667,7 +691,12 @@ fn run_setup_full(payload: &Payload, log: &mut File, sbx_dir: &Path) -> Result<(
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel::<(PathBuf, Result<bool>)>();
std::thread::scope(|scope| {
for root in grant_tasks {
let sid_strings = sid_strings.clone();
let is_command_cwd = is_command_cwd_root(&root, &canonical_command_cwd);
let sid_strings = if is_command_cwd {
vec![sandbox_group_sid_str.clone(), workspace_sid_str.clone()]
} else {
vec![sandbox_group_sid_str.clone(), cap_sid_str.clone()]
};
let tx = tx.clone();
scope.spawn(move || {
// Convert SID strings to psids locally in this thread.
@@ -758,6 +787,31 @@ fn run_setup_full(payload: &Payload, log: &mut File, sbx_dir: &Path) -> Result<(
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&legacy_users);
}
}
// Protect the current workspace's `.codex` directory from tampering (write/delete) by using a
// workspace-specific capability SID. If `.codex` doesn't exist yet, skip it (it will be picked
// up on the next refresh).
match unsafe { protect_workspace_codex_dir(&payload.command_cwd, workspace_psid) } {
Ok(true) => {
let cwd_codex = payload.command_cwd.join(".codex");
log_line(
log,
&format!(
"applied deny ACE to protect workspace .codex {}",
cwd_codex.display()
),
)?;
}
Ok(false) => {}
Err(err) => {
let cwd_codex = payload.command_cwd.join(".codex");
refresh_errors.push(format!("deny ACE failed on {}: {err}", cwd_codex.display()));
log_line(
log,
&format!("deny ACE failed on {}: {err}", cwd_codex.display()),
)?;
}
}
unsafe {
if !sandbox_group_psid.is_null() {
LocalFree(sandbox_group_psid as HLOCAL);
@@ -765,6 +819,9 @@ fn run_setup_full(payload: &Payload, log: &mut File, sbx_dir: &Path) -> Result<(
if !cap_psid.is_null() {
LocalFree(cap_psid as HLOCAL);
}
if !workspace_psid.is_null() {
LocalFree(workspace_psid as HLOCAL);
}
}
if refresh_only && !refresh_errors.is_empty() {
log_line(

View File

@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ pub fn run_setup_refresh(
offline_username: OFFLINE_USERNAME.to_string(),
online_username: ONLINE_USERNAME.to_string(),
codex_home: codex_home.to_path_buf(),
command_cwd: command_cwd.to_path_buf(),
read_roots,
write_roots,
real_user: std::env::var("USERNAME").unwrap_or_else(|_| "Administrators".to_string()),
@@ -258,6 +259,7 @@ struct ElevationPayload {
offline_username: String,
online_username: String,
codex_home: PathBuf,
command_cwd: PathBuf,
read_roots: Vec<PathBuf>,
write_roots: Vec<PathBuf>,
real_user: String,
@@ -469,6 +471,7 @@ pub fn run_elevated_setup(
offline_username: OFFLINE_USERNAME.to_string(),
online_username: ONLINE_USERNAME.to_string(),
codex_home: codex_home.to_path_buf(),
command_cwd: command_cwd.to_path_buf(),
read_roots,
write_roots,
real_user: std::env::var("USERNAME").unwrap_or_else(|_| "Administrators".to_string()),

View File

@@ -282,17 +282,6 @@ unsafe fn enable_single_privilege(h_token: HANDLE, name: &str) -> Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
/// # Safety
/// Caller must close the returned token handle.
pub unsafe fn create_workspace_write_token_with_cap(
psid_capability: *mut c_void,
) -> Result<(HANDLE, *mut c_void)> {
let base = get_current_token_for_restriction()?;
let res = create_workspace_write_token_with_cap_from(base, psid_capability);
CloseHandle(base);
res
}
/// # Safety
/// Caller must close the returned token handle.
pub unsafe fn create_readonly_token_with_cap(
@@ -306,61 +295,63 @@ pub unsafe fn create_readonly_token_with_cap(
/// # Safety
/// Caller must close the returned token handle; base_token must be a valid primary token.
pub unsafe fn create_workspace_write_token_with_cap_from(
base_token: HANDLE,
psid_capability: *mut c_void,
) -> Result<(HANDLE, *mut c_void)> {
let mut logon_sid_bytes = get_logon_sid_bytes(base_token)?;
let psid_logon = logon_sid_bytes.as_mut_ptr() as *mut c_void;
let mut everyone = world_sid()?;
let psid_everyone = everyone.as_mut_ptr() as *mut c_void;
let mut entries: [SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES; 3] = std::mem::zeroed();
// Exact set and order: Capability, Logon, Everyone
entries[0].Sid = psid_capability;
entries[0].Attributes = 0;
entries[1].Sid = psid_logon;
entries[1].Attributes = 0;
entries[2].Sid = psid_everyone;
entries[2].Attributes = 0;
let mut new_token: HANDLE = 0;
let flags = DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE | LUA_TOKEN | WRITE_RESTRICTED;
let ok = CreateRestrictedToken(
base_token,
flags,
0,
std::ptr::null(),
0,
std::ptr::null(),
3,
entries.as_mut_ptr(),
&mut new_token,
);
if ok == 0 {
return Err(anyhow!("CreateRestrictedToken failed: {}", GetLastError()));
}
set_default_dacl(new_token, &[psid_logon, psid_everyone, psid_capability])?;
enable_single_privilege(new_token, "SeChangeNotifyPrivilege")?;
Ok((new_token, psid_capability))
}
/// # Safety
/// Caller must close the returned token handle; base_token must be a valid primary token.
pub unsafe fn create_readonly_token_with_cap_from(
base_token: HANDLE,
psid_capability: *mut c_void,
) -> Result<(HANDLE, *mut c_void)> {
let new_token = create_token_with_caps_from(base_token, &[psid_capability])?;
Ok((new_token, psid_capability))
}
/// Create a restricted token that includes all provided capability SIDs.
///
/// # Safety
/// Caller must close the returned token handle; base_token must be a valid primary token.
pub unsafe fn create_workspace_write_token_with_caps_from(
base_token: HANDLE,
psid_capabilities: &[*mut c_void],
) -> Result<HANDLE> {
create_token_with_caps_from(base_token, psid_capabilities)
}
/// Create a restricted token that includes all provided capability SIDs.
///
/// # Safety
/// Caller must close the returned token handle; base_token must be a valid primary token.
pub unsafe fn create_readonly_token_with_caps_from(
base_token: HANDLE,
psid_capabilities: &[*mut c_void],
) -> Result<HANDLE> {
create_token_with_caps_from(base_token, psid_capabilities)
}
unsafe fn create_token_with_caps_from(
base_token: HANDLE,
psid_capabilities: &[*mut c_void],
) -> Result<HANDLE> {
if psid_capabilities.is_empty() {
return Err(anyhow!("no capability SIDs provided"));
}
let mut logon_sid_bytes = get_logon_sid_bytes(base_token)?;
let psid_logon = logon_sid_bytes.as_mut_ptr() as *mut c_void;
let mut everyone = world_sid()?;
let psid_everyone = everyone.as_mut_ptr() as *mut c_void;
let mut entries: [SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES; 3] = std::mem::zeroed();
// Exact set and order: Capability, Logon, Everyone
entries[0].Sid = psid_capability;
entries[0].Attributes = 0;
entries[1].Sid = psid_logon;
entries[1].Attributes = 0;
entries[2].Sid = psid_everyone;
entries[2].Attributes = 0;
// Exact order: Capabilities..., Logon, Everyone
let mut entries: Vec<SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES> =
vec![std::mem::zeroed(); psid_capabilities.len() + 2];
for (i, psid) in psid_capabilities.iter().enumerate() {
entries[i].Sid = *psid;
entries[i].Attributes = 0;
}
let logon_idx = psid_capabilities.len();
entries[logon_idx].Sid = psid_logon;
entries[logon_idx].Attributes = 0;
entries[logon_idx + 1].Sid = psid_everyone;
entries[logon_idx + 1].Attributes = 0;
let mut new_token: HANDLE = 0;
let flags = DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE | LUA_TOKEN | WRITE_RESTRICTED;
let ok = CreateRestrictedToken(
@@ -370,14 +361,20 @@ pub unsafe fn create_readonly_token_with_cap_from(
std::ptr::null(),
0,
std::ptr::null(),
3,
entries.len() as u32,
entries.as_mut_ptr(),
&mut new_token,
);
if ok == 0 {
return Err(anyhow!("CreateRestrictedToken failed: {}", GetLastError()));
}
set_default_dacl(new_token, &[psid_logon, psid_everyone, psid_capability])?;
let mut dacl_sids: Vec<*mut c_void> = Vec::with_capacity(psid_capabilities.len() + 2);
dacl_sids.push(psid_logon);
dacl_sids.push(psid_everyone);
dacl_sids.extend_from_slice(psid_capabilities);
set_default_dacl(new_token, &dacl_sids)?;
enable_single_privilege(new_token, "SeChangeNotifyPrivilege")?;
Ok((new_token, psid_capability))
Ok(new_token)
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
use crate::acl::add_deny_write_ace;
use anyhow::Result;
use std::ffi::c_void;
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
pub fn canonicalize_path(path: &Path) -> PathBuf {
dunce::canonicalize(path).unwrap_or_else(|_| path.to_path_buf())
}
pub fn is_command_cwd_root(root: &Path, canonical_command_cwd: &Path) -> bool {
canonicalize_path(root) == canonical_command_cwd
}
/// # Safety
/// Caller must ensure `psid` is a valid SID pointer.
pub unsafe fn protect_workspace_codex_dir(cwd: &Path, psid: *mut c_void) -> Result<bool> {
let cwd_codex = cwd.join(".codex");
if cwd_codex.is_dir() {
add_deny_write_ace(&cwd_codex, psid)
} else {
Ok(false)
}
}