Thread Windows metadata targets through sessions

codex-rs/cli/src/debug_sandbox.rs

@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ async fn run_command_under_windows_session(
             None,
             /*tty*/ false,
             /*stdin_open*/ true,
+            &[],
             config.permissions.windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
         )
         .await
@@ -386,6 +387,7 @@ async fn run_command_under_windows_session(
             None,
             /*tty*/ false,
             /*stdin_open*/ true,
+            &[],
             config.permissions.windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
         )
         .await

codex-rs/core/src/exec.rs

@@ -95,7 +95,8 @@ pub struct ExecParams {
     pub arg0: Option<String>,
 }
 
-/// Resolved filesystem overrides for the Windows sandbox backends.
+/// Layer: Windows adapter layer. Resolved filesystem overrides for the Windows
+/// sandbox backends.
 ///
 /// The unelevated restricted-token backend only consumes extra deny-write
 /// carveouts on top of the legacy `WorkspaceWrite` allow set. The elevated
@@ -109,6 +110,24 @@ pub(crate) struct WindowsSandboxFilesystemOverrides {
     pub(crate) read_roots_include_platform_defaults: bool,
     pub(crate) write_roots_override: Option<Vec<PathBuf>>,
     pub(crate) additional_deny_write_paths: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
+    pub(crate) protected_metadata_targets: Vec<WindowsProtectedMetadataTarget>,
+}
+
+/// Layer: Windows adapter layer. This is the Windows projection of
+/// `WritableRoot::protected_metadata_names` from `FileSystemSandboxPolicy`.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)]
+pub(crate) struct WindowsProtectedMetadataTarget {
+    pub(crate) path: AbsolutePathBuf,
+    pub(crate) mode: WindowsProtectedMetadataMode,
+}
+
+/// Layer: Windows adapter layer. The enforcement layer needs to know why a
+/// protected metadata path is absent instead of treating every missing path as
+/// an existing filesystem object.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)]
+pub(crate) enum WindowsProtectedMetadataMode {
+    ExistingDeny,
+    MissingCreationMonitor,
 }
 
 fn windows_sandbox_uses_elevated_backend(
@@ -388,39 +407,18 @@ pub fn build_exec_request(
             ExecRequest::from_sandbox_exec_request(request, options, windows_sandbox_policy_cwd)
         })
         .map_err(CodexErr::from)?;
-    let use_windows_elevated_backend = windows_sandbox_uses_elevated_backend(
-        exec_req.windows_sandbox_level,
-        exec_req.network.is_some(),
-    );
-    let sandbox_policy = exec_req.compatibility_sandbox_policy();
-    exec_req.windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides = if use_windows_elevated_backend {
-        resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
-            exec_req.sandbox,
-            &sandbox_policy,
-            &exec_req.file_system_sandbox_policy,
-            exec_req.network_sandbox_policy,
-            sandbox_cwd,
-            use_windows_elevated_backend,
-        )
-    } else {
-        resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
-            exec_req.sandbox,
-            &sandbox_policy,
-            &exec_req.file_system_sandbox_policy,
-            exec_req.network_sandbox_policy,
-            sandbox_cwd,
-            exec_req.windows_sandbox_level,
-        )
-    }
-    .map_err(CodexErr::UnsupportedOperation)?;
+    ensure_windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides(&mut exec_req)
+        .map_err(CodexErr::UnsupportedOperation)?;
     Ok(exec_req)
 }
 
 pub(crate) async fn execute_exec_request(
-    exec_request: ExecRequest,
+    mut exec_request: ExecRequest,
     stdout_stream: Option<StdoutStream>,
     after_spawn: Option<Box<dyn FnOnce() + Send>>,
 ) -> Result<ExecToolCallOutput> {
+    ensure_windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides(&mut exec_request)
+        .map_err(CodexErr::UnsupportedOperation)?;
     let sandbox_policy = exec_request.compatibility_sandbox_policy();
     let ExecRequest {
         command,
@@ -470,6 +468,36 @@ pub(crate) async fn execute_exec_request(
     finalize_exec_result(raw_output_result, sandbox, duration)
 }
 
+pub(crate) fn ensure_windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides(
+    exec_req: &mut ExecRequest,
+) -> std::result::Result<(), String> {
+    let use_windows_elevated_backend = windows_sandbox_uses_elevated_backend(
+        exec_req.windows_sandbox_level,
+        exec_req.network.is_some(),
+    );
+    let sandbox_policy = exec_req.compatibility_sandbox_policy();
+    exec_req.windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides = if use_windows_elevated_backend {
+        resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
+            exec_req.sandbox,
+            &sandbox_policy,
+            &exec_req.file_system_sandbox_policy,
+            exec_req.network_sandbox_policy,
+            &exec_req.windows_sandbox_policy_cwd,
+            use_windows_elevated_backend,
+        )
+    } else {
+        resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
+            exec_req.sandbox,
+            &sandbox_policy,
+            &exec_req.file_system_sandbox_policy,
+            exec_req.network_sandbox_policy,
+            &exec_req.windows_sandbox_policy_cwd,
+            exec_req.windows_sandbox_level,
+        )
+    }?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 async fn get_raw_output_result(
     params: ExecParams,
     network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
@@ -628,6 +656,28 @@ async fn exec_windows_sandbox(
                 .collect::<Vec<_>>()
         })
         .unwrap_or_default();
+    let protected_metadata_targets = windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides
+        .map(|overrides| {
+            overrides
+                .protected_metadata_targets
+                .iter()
+                .map(|target| {
+                    let mode = match target.mode {
+                        WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::ExistingDeny => {
+                            codex_windows_sandbox::ProtectedMetadataMode::ExistingDeny
+                        }
+                        WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor => {
+                            codex_windows_sandbox::ProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor
+                        }
+                    };
+                    codex_windows_sandbox::ProtectedMetadataTarget {
+                        path: target.path.to_path_buf(),
+                        mode,
+                    }
+                })
+                .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+        })
+        .unwrap_or_default();
     let spawn_res = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
         if use_elevated {
             run_windows_sandbox_capture_elevated(
@@ -646,6 +696,7 @@ async fn exec_windows_sandbox(
                         elevated_read_roots_include_platform_defaults,
                     write_roots_override: elevated_write_roots_override.as_deref(),
                     deny_write_paths_override: &elevated_deny_write_paths,
+                    protected_metadata_targets: &protected_metadata_targets,
                 },
             )
         } else {
@@ -658,6 +709,7 @@ async fn exec_windows_sandbox(
                 env,
                 timeout_ms,
                 &additional_deny_write_paths,
+                &protected_metadata_targets,
                 windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
             )
         }
@@ -1131,7 +1183,9 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
         }
     }
 
-    if additional_deny_write_paths.is_empty() {
+    let protected_metadata_targets = windows_protected_metadata_targets(&split_writable_roots)?;
+
+    if additional_deny_write_paths.is_empty() && protected_metadata_targets.is_empty() {
         return Ok(None);
     }
 
@@ -1143,6 +1197,7 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
             .into_iter()
             .map(|path| AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(path).map_err(|err| err.to_string()))
             .collect::<std::result::Result<_, _>>()?,
+        protected_metadata_targets,
     }))
 }
 
@@ -1263,9 +1318,12 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
         Vec::new()
     };
 
+    let protected_metadata_targets = windows_protected_metadata_targets(&split_writable_roots)?;
+
     if read_roots_override.is_none()
         && write_roots_override.is_none()
         && additional_deny_write_paths.is_empty()
+        && protected_metadata_targets.is_empty()
     {
         return Ok(None);
     }
@@ -1276,9 +1334,36 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
         read_roots_override,
         write_roots_override,
         additional_deny_write_paths,
+        protected_metadata_targets,
     }))
 }
 
+fn windows_protected_metadata_targets(
+    writable_roots: &[codex_protocol::protocol::WritableRoot],
+) -> std::result::Result<Vec<WindowsProtectedMetadataTarget>, String> {
+    let mut targets = BTreeSet::new();
+    for writable_root in writable_roots {
+        for metadata_name in &writable_root.protected_metadata_names {
+            let path =
+                normalize_windows_override_path(writable_root.root.join(metadata_name).as_path())?;
+            let path = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(path).map_err(|err| err.to_string())?;
+            targets.insert(WindowsProtectedMetadataTarget {
+                mode: windows_protected_metadata_mode(&path),
+                path,
+            });
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(targets.into_iter().collect())
+}
+
+fn windows_protected_metadata_mode(path: &AbsolutePathBuf) -> WindowsProtectedMetadataMode {
+    if std::fs::symlink_metadata(path.as_path()).is_ok() {
+        return WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::ExistingDeny;
+    }
+
+    WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor
+}
+
 fn has_reopened_writable_descendant(
     writable_roots: &[codex_protocol::protocol::WritableRoot],
 ) -> bool {

codex-rs/core/src/exec_tests.rs

@@ -663,6 +663,20 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_supports_full_read_split_write_read_carveouts() {
             read_roots_include_platform_defaults: false,
             write_roots_override: None,
             additional_deny_write_paths: expected_deny_write_paths,
+            protected_metadata_targets: vec![
+                WindowsProtectedMetadataTarget {
+                    path: cwd.join(".agents"),
+                    mode: WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor,
+                },
+                WindowsProtectedMetadataTarget {
+                    path: cwd.join(".codex"),
+                    mode: WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor,
+                },
+                WindowsProtectedMetadataTarget {
+                    path: cwd.join(".git"),
+                    mode: WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor,
+                },
+            ],
         }))
     );
 }
@@ -700,6 +714,7 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_split_restricted_read_roots() {
             read_roots_include_platform_defaults: false,
             write_roots_override: None,
             additional_deny_write_paths: vec![],
+            protected_metadata_targets: vec![],
         }))
     );
 }
@@ -707,6 +722,9 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_split_restricted_read_roots() {
 #[test]
 fn windows_elevated_supports_split_write_read_carveouts() {
     let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
+    let expected_root = dunce::canonicalize(temp_dir.path())
+        .expect("canonical temp dir")
+        .abs();
     let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
     std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
     let expected_docs = dunce::canonicalize(&docs).expect("canonical docs");
@@ -757,6 +775,146 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_split_write_read_carveouts() {
                 codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(expected_docs)
                     .expect("absolute docs"),
             ],
+            protected_metadata_targets: vec![
+                WindowsProtectedMetadataTarget {
+                    path: expected_root.join(".agents"),
+                    mode: WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor,
+                },
+                WindowsProtectedMetadataTarget {
+                    path: expected_root.join(".codex"),
+                    mode: WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor,
+                },
+                WindowsProtectedMetadataTarget {
+                    path: expected_root.join(".git"),
+                    mode: WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor,
+                },
+            ],
+        }))
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn windows_metadata_plan_marks_existing_metadata_for_deny() {
+    let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
+    let cwd = dunce::canonicalize(temp_dir.path())
+        .expect("canonical temp dir")
+        .abs();
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(cwd.join(".git").as_path()).expect("create .git");
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
+        writable_roots: vec![],
+        network_access: false,
+        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
+        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
+    };
+    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
+        codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+            path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
+                value: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
+            },
+            access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
+        },
+        codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+            path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
+                value: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath::project_roots(
+                    /*subpath*/ None,
+                ),
+            },
+            access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
+        },
+    ]);
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
+            SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
+            &policy,
+            &file_system_policy,
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+            &cwd,
+            /*use_windows_elevated_backend*/ true,
+        ),
+        Ok(Some(WindowsSandboxFilesystemOverrides {
+            read_roots_override: None,
+            read_roots_include_platform_defaults: false,
+            write_roots_override: None,
+            additional_deny_write_paths: vec![],
+            protected_metadata_targets: vec![
+                WindowsProtectedMetadataTarget {
+                    path: cwd.join(".agents"),
+                    mode: WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor,
+                },
+                WindowsProtectedMetadataTarget {
+                    path: cwd.join(".codex"),
+                    mode: WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor,
+                },
+                WindowsProtectedMetadataTarget {
+                    path: cwd.join(".git"),
+                    mode: WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::ExistingDeny,
+                },
+            ],
+        }))
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn windows_metadata_plan_does_not_materialize_nested_missing_git() {
+    let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
+    let repo = dunce::canonicalize(temp_dir.path())
+        .expect("canonical temp dir")
+        .abs();
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(repo.join(".git").as_path()).expect("create parent .git");
+    let cwd = repo.join("child");
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(cwd.as_path()).expect("create child workspace");
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
+        writable_roots: vec![],
+        network_access: false,
+        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
+        exclude_slash_tmp: true,
+    };
+    let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
+        codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+            path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
+                value: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
+            },
+            access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
+        },
+        codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
+            path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
+                value: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath::project_roots(
+                    /*subpath*/ None,
+                ),
+            },
+            access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
+        },
+    ]);
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
+            SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
+            &policy,
+            &file_system_policy,
+            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+            &cwd,
+            /*use_windows_elevated_backend*/ true,
+        ),
+        Ok(Some(WindowsSandboxFilesystemOverrides {
+            read_roots_override: None,
+            read_roots_include_platform_defaults: false,
+            write_roots_override: None,
+            additional_deny_write_paths: vec![],
+            protected_metadata_targets: vec![
+                WindowsProtectedMetadataTarget {
+                    path: cwd.join(".agents"),
+                    mode: WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor,
+                },
+                WindowsProtectedMetadataTarget {
+                    path: cwd.join(".codex"),
+                    mode: WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor,
+                },
+                WindowsProtectedMetadataTarget {
+                    path: cwd.join(".git"),
+                    mode: WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor,
+                },
+            ],
         }))
     );
 }

codex-rs/core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ pub(crate) struct ExecServerEnvConfig {
     pub(crate) local_policy_env: HashMap<String, String>,
 }
 
-#[derive(Debug)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
 pub struct ExecRequest {
     pub command: Vec<String>,
     pub cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,

codex-rs/core/src/unified_exec/process_manager.rs

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ use tokio::time::Duration;
 use tokio::time::Instant;
 use tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken;
 
+#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
+use crate::exec::WindowsProtectedMetadataMode;
 use crate::exec_env::CODEX_THREAD_ID_ENV_VAR;
 use crate::exec_env::create_env;
 use crate::exec_policy::ExecApprovalRequest;
@@ -163,6 +165,45 @@ fn exec_server_params_for_request(
     }
 }
 
+fn prepare_exec_request_for_open_session(
+    request: &ExecRequest,
+) -> Result<ExecRequest, UnifiedExecError> {
+    let mut request = request.clone();
+    crate::exec::ensure_windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides(&mut request)
+        .map_err(UnifiedExecError::create_process)?;
+    Ok(request)
+}
+
+#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
+fn protected_metadata_targets_for_windows_session(
+    request: &ExecRequest,
+) -> Vec<codex_windows_sandbox::ProtectedMetadataTarget> {
+    request
+        .windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides
+        .as_ref()
+        .map(|overrides| {
+            overrides
+                .protected_metadata_targets
+                .iter()
+                .map(|target| {
+                    let mode = match target.mode {
+                        WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::ExistingDeny => {
+                            codex_windows_sandbox::ProtectedMetadataMode::ExistingDeny
+                        }
+                        WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor => {
+                            codex_windows_sandbox::ProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor
+                        }
+                    };
+                    codex_windows_sandbox::ProtectedMetadataTarget {
+                        path: target.path.to_path_buf(),
+                        mode,
+                    }
+                })
+                .collect()
+        })
+        .unwrap_or_default()
+}
+
 /// Borrowed process state prepared for a `write_stdin` or poll operation.
 struct PreparedProcessHandles {
     process: Arc<UnifiedExecProcess>,
@@ -870,6 +911,7 @@ impl UnifiedExecProcessManager {
         mut spawn_lifecycle: SpawnLifecycleHandle,
         environment: &codex_exec_server::Environment,
     ) -> Result<UnifiedExecProcess, UnifiedExecError> {
+        let request = prepare_exec_request_for_open_session(request)?;
         let inherited_fds = spawn_lifecycle.inherited_fds();
 
         #[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
@@ -885,6 +927,8 @@ impl UnifiedExecProcessManager {
                     "windows sandbox: failed to resolve codex_home: {err}"
                 ))
             })?;
+            let protected_metadata_targets =
+                protected_metadata_targets_for_windows_session(&request);
             let spawned = match request.windows_sandbox_level {
                 codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated => {
                     codex_windows_sandbox::spawn_windows_sandbox_session_elevated(
@@ -897,6 +941,7 @@ impl UnifiedExecProcessManager {
                         None,
                         tty,
                         tty,
+                        &protected_metadata_targets,
                         request.windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
                     )
                     .await
@@ -913,6 +958,7 @@ impl UnifiedExecProcessManager {
                         None,
                         tty,
                         tty,
+                        &protected_metadata_targets,
                         request.windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
                     )
                     .await
@@ -935,7 +981,7 @@ impl UnifiedExecProcessManager {
 
             let started = environment
                 .get_exec_backend()
-                .start(exec_server_params_for_request(process_id, request, tty))
+                .start(exec_server_params_for_request(process_id, &request, tty))
                 .await
                 .map_err(|err| UnifiedExecError::create_process(err.to_string()))?;
             spawn_lifecycle.after_spawn();

codex-rs/core/src/unified_exec/process_manager_tests.rs

@@ -135,6 +135,68 @@ fn exec_server_process_id_matches_unified_exec_process_id() {
     assert_eq!(exec_server_process_id(/*process_id*/ 4321), "4321");
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn open_session_prepares_windows_metadata_overrides_for_unified_exec() {
+    let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
+    let cwd: codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf = dunce::canonicalize(temp_dir.path())
+        .expect("canonical temp dir")
+        .try_into()
+        .expect("absolute temp dir");
+    let permission_profile = codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with(
+        &[],
+        codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
+        /*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ true,
+        /*exclude_slash_tmp*/ true,
+    );
+    let (file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy) =
+        permission_profile.to_runtime_permissions();
+    let request = ExecRequest {
+        command: vec![
+            "cmd.exe".to_string(),
+            "/c".to_string(),
+            "echo ok".to_string(),
+        ],
+        cwd: cwd.clone(),
+        env: HashMap::new(),
+        exec_server_env_config: None,
+        network: None,
+        expiration: crate::exec::ExecExpiration::DefaultTimeout,
+        capture_policy: crate::exec::ExecCapturePolicy::ShellTool,
+        sandbox: codex_sandboxing::SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
+        windows_sandbox_policy_cwd: cwd.clone(),
+        windows_sandbox_level: codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
+        windows_sandbox_private_desktop: false,
+        permission_profile,
+        file_system_sandbox_policy,
+        network_sandbox_policy,
+        windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides: None,
+        arg0: None,
+    };
+
+    let prepared = prepare_exec_request_for_open_session(&request).expect("prepare request");
+    let overrides = prepared
+        .windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides
+        .expect("metadata overrides");
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        overrides.protected_metadata_targets,
+        vec![
+            crate::exec::WindowsProtectedMetadataTarget {
+                path: cwd.join(".agents"),
+                mode: crate::exec::WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor,
+            },
+            crate::exec::WindowsProtectedMetadataTarget {
+                path: cwd.join(".codex"),
+                mode: crate::exec::WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor,
+            },
+            crate::exec::WindowsProtectedMetadataTarget {
+                path: cwd.join(".git"),
+                mode: crate::exec::WindowsProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor,
+            },
+        ]
+    );
+}
+
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn network_denial_fallback_message_names_sandbox_network_proxy() {
     let message = network_denial_message_for_session(/*session*/ None, /*deferred*/ None).await;

codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/elevated_impl.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ use std::collections::HashMap;
 use std::path::Path;
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 
+use crate::setup::ProtectedMetadataTarget;
+
 pub struct ElevatedSandboxCaptureRequest<'a> {
     pub policy_json_or_preset: &'a str,
     pub sandbox_policy_cwd: &'a Path,
@@ -16,6 +18,7 @@ pub struct ElevatedSandboxCaptureRequest<'a> {
     pub read_roots_include_platform_defaults: bool,
     pub write_roots_override: Option<&'a [PathBuf]>,
     pub deny_write_paths_override: &'a [PathBuf],
+    pub protected_metadata_targets: &'a [ProtectedMetadataTarget],
 }
 
 mod windows_impl {
@@ -64,6 +67,7 @@ mod windows_impl {
             read_roots_include_platform_defaults,
             write_roots_override,
             deny_write_paths_override,
+            protected_metadata_targets,
         } = request;
         let policy = parse_policy(policy_json_or_preset)?;
         normalize_null_device_env(&mut env_map);
@@ -86,6 +90,7 @@ mod windows_impl {
             read_roots_include_platform_defaults,
             write_roots_override,
             deny_write_paths_override,
+            protected_metadata_targets,
             proxy_enforced,
         )?;
         // Build capability SID for ACL grants.

codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/identity.rs

@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ pub fn require_logon_sandbox_creds(
     read_roots_include_platform_defaults: bool,
     write_roots_override: Option<&[PathBuf]>,
     deny_write_paths_override: &[PathBuf],
+    protected_metadata_targets: &[crate::setup::ProtectedMetadataTarget],
     proxy_enforced: bool,
 ) -> Result<SandboxCreds> {
     let sandbox_dir = crate::setup::sandbox_dir(codex_home);
@@ -202,6 +203,7 @@ pub fn require_logon_sandbox_creds(
                 read_roots_include_platform_defaults,
                 write_roots: Some(needed_write.clone()),
                 deny_write_paths: Some(deny_write_paths_override.to_vec()),
+                protected_metadata_targets: Some(protected_metadata_targets.to_vec()),
             },
         )?;
         identity = select_identity(network_identity, codex_home)?;
@@ -221,6 +223,7 @@ pub fn require_logon_sandbox_creds(
             read_roots_include_platform_defaults,
             write_roots: Some(needed_write),
             deny_write_paths: Some(deny_write_paths_override.to_vec()),
+            protected_metadata_targets: Some(protected_metadata_targets.to_vec()),
         },
     )?;
     let identity = identity.ok_or_else(|| {

codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/lib.rs

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ windows_modules!(
     path_normalization,
     policy,
     process,
+    protected_metadata,
     token,
     wfp,
     wfp_setup,
@@ -173,6 +174,10 @@ pub use session::spawn_windows_sandbox_session_elevated;
 #[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
 pub use session::spawn_windows_sandbox_session_legacy;
 #[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
+pub use setup::ProtectedMetadataMode;
+#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
+pub use setup::ProtectedMetadataTarget;
+#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
 pub use setup::SETUP_VERSION;
 #[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
 pub use setup::SandboxSetupRequest;
@@ -253,6 +258,7 @@ pub use stub::run_windows_sandbox_legacy_preflight;
 
 #[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
 mod windows_impl {
+    use super::ProtectedMetadataTarget;
     use super::acl::add_allow_ace;
     use super::acl::add_deny_write_ace;
     use super::acl::allow_null_device;
@@ -345,6 +351,7 @@ mod windows_impl {
             env_map,
             timeout_ms,
             &[],
+            &[],
             use_private_desktop,
         )
     }
@@ -359,6 +366,7 @@ mod windows_impl {
         mut env_map: HashMap<String, String>,
         timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
         additional_deny_write_paths: &[PathBuf],
+        _protected_metadata_targets: &[ProtectedMetadataTarget],
         use_private_desktop: bool,
     ) -> Result<CaptureResult> {
         let common = prepare_legacy_spawn_context(

codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/protected_metadata.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+#![allow(dead_code)]
+
+use crate::setup::ProtectedMetadataMode;
+use crate::setup::ProtectedMetadataTarget;
+use anyhow::Context;
+use anyhow::Result;
+use std::fs::Metadata;
+use std::io;
+use std::os::windows::fs::FileTypeExt;
+use std::os::windows::fs::MetadataExt;
+use std::path::Path;
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+use windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT;
+
+/// Layer: Windows enforcement layer. Existing metadata objects can be protected
+/// with ACLs; missing names are monitored and removed if the sandbox creates
+/// them.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub(crate) struct ProtectedMetadataGuard {
+    deny_paths: Vec<PathBuf>,
+    monitored_paths: Vec<PathBuf>,
+}
+
+impl ProtectedMetadataGuard {
+    pub(crate) fn deny_paths(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &PathBuf> {
+        self.deny_paths.iter()
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn cleanup_created_monitored_paths(&self) -> Result<Vec<PathBuf>> {
+        let mut removed = Vec::new();
+        for path in &self.monitored_paths {
+            let Some(existing_path) = existing_metadata_path(path)? else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            remove_metadata_path(&existing_path)
+                .with_context(|| format!("failed to remove protected metadata {}", path.display()))?;
+            removed.push(existing_path);
+        }
+        Ok(removed)
+    }
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn prepare_protected_metadata_targets(
+    targets: &[ProtectedMetadataTarget],
+) -> ProtectedMetadataGuard {
+    let mut deny_paths = Vec::new();
+    let mut monitored_paths = Vec::new();
+    for target in targets {
+        match target.mode {
+            ProtectedMetadataMode::ExistingDeny => {
+                deny_paths.extend(protected_metadata_existing_deny_paths(&target.path));
+            }
+            ProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor => {
+                monitored_paths.push(target.path.clone());
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    ProtectedMetadataGuard {
+        deny_paths,
+        monitored_paths,
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn protected_metadata_existing_deny_paths(path: &Path) -> Vec<PathBuf> {
+    if std::fs::symlink_metadata(path).is_ok() {
+        vec![path.to_path_buf()]
+    } else {
+        Vec::new()
+    }
+}
+
+fn existing_metadata_path(path: &Path) -> Result<Option<PathBuf>> {
+    match std::fs::symlink_metadata(path) {
+        Ok(_) => return Ok(Some(path.to_path_buf())),
+        Err(err) if err.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {}
+        Err(err) => {
+            return Err(err)
+                .with_context(|| format!("failed to inspect protected metadata {}", path.display()));
+        }
+    }
+
+    let Some(parent) = path.parent() else {
+        return Ok(None);
+    };
+    let Some(expected_name) = path.file_name().and_then(|name| name.to_str()) else {
+        return Ok(None);
+    };
+    let entries = match std::fs::read_dir(parent) {
+        Ok(entries) => entries,
+        Err(err) if err.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NotFound => return Ok(None),
+        Err(err) => {
+            return Err(err)
+                .with_context(|| format!("failed to scan protected metadata parent {}", parent.display()));
+        }
+    };
+
+    for entry in entries {
+        let entry = entry.with_context(|| {
+            format!(
+                "failed to read protected metadata parent entry {}",
+                parent.display()
+            )
+        })?;
+        if entry
+            .file_name()
+            .to_str()
+            .is_some_and(|name| name.eq_ignore_ascii_case(expected_name))
+        {
+            return Ok(Some(entry.path()));
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(None)
+}
+
+fn remove_metadata_path(path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
+    let metadata = match std::fs::symlink_metadata(path) {
+        Ok(metadata) => metadata,
+        Err(err) if err.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NotFound => return Ok(()),
+        Err(err) => {
+            return Err(err)
+                .with_context(|| format!("failed to inspect protected metadata {}", path.display()));
+        }
+    };
+    let file_type = metadata.file_type();
+    if is_directory_reparse_point(&metadata) || file_type.is_symlink_dir() {
+        std::fs::remove_dir(path)
+            .with_context(|| format!("failed to remove protected metadata {}", path.display()))?;
+    } else if file_type.is_symlink_file() {
+        std::fs::remove_file(path)
+            .with_context(|| format!("failed to remove protected metadata {}", path.display()))?;
+    } else if metadata.is_dir() {
+        std::fs::remove_dir_all(path)
+            .with_context(|| format!("failed to remove protected metadata {}", path.display()))?;
+    } else {
+        std::fs::remove_file(path)
+            .with_context(|| format!("failed to remove protected metadata {}", path.display()))?;
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn is_directory_reparse_point(metadata: &Metadata) -> bool {
+    metadata.is_dir() && (metadata.file_attributes() & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT) != 0
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::setup::ProtectedMetadataMode;
+    use crate::setup::ProtectedMetadataTarget;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn cleanup_created_monitored_paths_removes_case_variant() {
+        let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
+        let target = temp_dir.path().join(".git");
+        let created = temp_dir.path().join(".GIT");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&created).expect("create metadata");
+        let guard = prepare_protected_metadata_targets(&[ProtectedMetadataTarget {
+            path: target.clone(),
+            mode: ProtectedMetadataMode::MissingCreationMonitor,
+        }]);
+
+        let removed = guard.cleanup_created_monitored_paths().expect("cleanup");
+        assert_eq!(removed.len(), 1);
+        assert!(
+            removed[0]
+                .file_name()
+                .is_some_and(|name| name.eq_ignore_ascii_case(".git")),
+            "removed path should be a .git case variant: {}",
+            removed[0].display()
+        );
+        assert!(!target.exists());
+        assert!(!created.exists());
+    }
+}

codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/setup_main_win.rs

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ use base64::Engine;
 use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64;
 use codex_otel::StatsigMetricsSettings;
 use codex_windows_sandbox::LOG_FILE_NAME;
+use codex_windows_sandbox::ProtectedMetadataTarget;
 use codex_windows_sandbox::SETUP_VERSION;
 use codex_windows_sandbox::SetupErrorCode;
 use codex_windows_sandbox::SetupErrorReport;
@@ -87,6 +88,9 @@ struct Payload {
     write_roots: Vec<PathBuf>,
     #[serde(default)]
     deny_write_paths: Vec<PathBuf>,
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    #[serde(default)]
+    protected_metadata_targets: Vec<ProtectedMetadataTarget>,
     proxy_ports: Vec<u16>,
     #[serde(default)]
     allow_local_binding: bool,

codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/setup_orchestrator.rs

@@ -97,6 +97,24 @@ pub struct SetupRootOverrides {
     pub read_roots_include_platform_defaults: bool,
     pub write_roots: Option<Vec<PathBuf>>,
     pub deny_write_paths: Option<Vec<PathBuf>>,
+    pub protected_metadata_targets: Option<Vec<ProtectedMetadataTarget>>,
+}
+
+/// Layer: Windows enforcement request boundary. These targets are projected by
+/// the adapter layer before they reach the setup helper.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct ProtectedMetadataTarget {
+    pub path: PathBuf,
+    pub mode: ProtectedMetadataMode,
+}
+
+/// Layer: Windows enforcement request boundary. The helper must distinguish
+/// existing metadata objects from missing names that need create monitoring.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
+pub enum ProtectedMetadataMode {
+    ExistingDeny,
+    MissingCreationMonitor,
 }
 
 pub fn run_setup_refresh(
@@ -152,6 +170,7 @@ pub fn run_setup_refresh_with_extra_read_roots(
             read_roots_include_platform_defaults: false,
             write_roots: Some(Vec::new()),
             deny_write_paths: None,
+            protected_metadata_targets: None,
         },
     )
 }
@@ -169,6 +188,8 @@ fn run_setup_refresh_inner(
     }
     let (read_roots, write_roots) = build_payload_roots(&request, &overrides);
     let deny_write_paths = build_payload_deny_write_paths(&request, overrides.deny_write_paths);
+    let protected_metadata_targets =
+        build_payload_protected_metadata_targets(overrides.protected_metadata_targets);
     let network_identity =
         SandboxNetworkIdentity::from_policy(request.policy, request.proxy_enforced);
     let offline_proxy_settings = offline_proxy_settings_from_env(request.env_map, network_identity);
@@ -181,6 +202,7 @@ fn run_setup_refresh_inner(
         read_roots,
         write_roots,
         deny_write_paths,
+        protected_metadata_targets,
         proxy_ports: offline_proxy_settings.proxy_ports,
         allow_local_binding: offline_proxy_settings.allow_local_binding,
         otel: None,
@@ -419,6 +441,8 @@ struct ElevationPayload {
     write_roots: Vec<PathBuf>,
     #[serde(default)]
     deny_write_paths: Vec<PathBuf>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    protected_metadata_targets: Vec<ProtectedMetadataTarget>,
     proxy_ports: Vec<u16>,
     #[serde(default)]
     allow_local_binding: bool,
@@ -721,6 +745,8 @@ pub fn run_elevated_setup(
     })?;
     let (read_roots, write_roots) = build_payload_roots(&request, &overrides);
     let deny_write_paths = build_payload_deny_write_paths(&request, overrides.deny_write_paths);
+    let protected_metadata_targets =
+        build_payload_protected_metadata_targets(overrides.protected_metadata_targets);
     let network_identity =
         SandboxNetworkIdentity::from_policy(request.policy, request.proxy_enforced);
     let offline_proxy_settings = offline_proxy_settings_from_env(request.env_map, network_identity);
@@ -733,6 +759,7 @@ pub fn run_elevated_setup(
         read_roots,
         write_roots,
         deny_write_paths,
+        protected_metadata_targets,
         proxy_ports: offline_proxy_settings.proxy_ports,
         allow_local_binding: offline_proxy_settings.allow_local_binding,
         real_user: std::env::var("USERNAME").unwrap_or_else(|_| "Administrators".to_string()),
@@ -817,6 +844,12 @@ fn build_payload_deny_write_paths(
     deny_write_paths
 }
 
+fn build_payload_protected_metadata_targets(
+    explicit_targets: Option<Vec<ProtectedMetadataTarget>>,
+) -> Vec<ProtectedMetadataTarget> {
+    explicit_targets.unwrap_or_default()
+}
+
 fn expand_user_profile_root(roots: Vec<PathBuf>) -> Vec<PathBuf> {
     let Ok(user_profile) = std::env::var("USERPROFILE") else {
         return roots;
@@ -1328,6 +1361,7 @@ mod tests {
                 read_roots_include_platform_defaults: true,
                 write_roots: None,
                 deny_write_paths: None,
+                protected_metadata_targets: None,
             },
         );
         let expected_helper =
@@ -1375,6 +1409,7 @@ mod tests {
                 read_roots_include_platform_defaults: false,
                 write_roots: None,
                 deny_write_paths: None,
+                protected_metadata_targets: None,
             },
         );
         let expected_helper =

codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/spawn_prep.rs

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ use crate::policy::SandboxPolicy;
 use crate::policy::parse_policy;
 use crate::sandbox_utils::ensure_codex_home_exists;
 use crate::sandbox_utils::inject_git_safe_directory;
+use crate::setup::ProtectedMetadataTarget;
 use crate::token::convert_string_sid_to_sid;
 use crate::token::create_readonly_token_with_cap;
 use crate::token::create_workspace_write_token_with_caps_from;
@@ -264,6 +265,7 @@ pub(crate) fn prepare_elevated_spawn_context(
     cwd: &Path,
     env_map: &mut HashMap<String, String>,
     command: &[String],
+    protected_metadata_targets: &[ProtectedMetadataTarget],
 ) -> Result<ElevatedSpawnContext> {
     let common = prepare_spawn_context_common(
         policy_json_or_preset,
@@ -298,6 +300,7 @@ pub(crate) fn prepare_elevated_spawn_context(
         /*read_roots_include_platform_defaults*/ false,
         write_roots_override,
         &deny_write_paths,
+        protected_metadata_targets,
         /*proxy_enforced*/ false,
     )?;
     let caps = load_or_create_cap_sids(codex_home)?;

codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/unified_exec/backends/elevated.rs

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ use crate::ipc_framed::FramedMessage;
 use crate::ipc_framed::Message;
 use crate::ipc_framed::SpawnRequest;
 use crate::runner_client::spawn_runner_transport;
+use crate::setup::ProtectedMetadataTarget;
 use crate::spawn_prep::prepare_elevated_spawn_context;
 use anyhow::Result;
 use codex_utils_pty::ProcessDriver;
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_windows_sandbox_session_elevated(
     timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
     tty: bool,
     stdin_open: bool,
+    protected_metadata_targets: &[ProtectedMetadataTarget],
     use_private_desktop: bool,
 ) -> Result<SpawnedProcess> {
     let elevated = prepare_elevated_spawn_context(
@@ -38,6 +40,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_windows_sandbox_session_elevated(
         cwd,
         &mut env_map,
         &command,
+        protected_metadata_targets,
     )?;
 
     let spawn_request = SpawnRequest {

codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/unified_exec/backends/legacy.rs

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ use crate::process::StderrMode;
 use crate::process::StdinMode;
 use crate::process::read_handle_loop;
 use crate::process::spawn_process_with_pipes;
+use crate::setup::ProtectedMetadataTarget;
 use crate::spawn_prep::LocalSid;
 use crate::spawn_prep::allow_null_device_for_workspace_write;
 use crate::spawn_prep::apply_legacy_session_acl_rules;
@@ -289,6 +290,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_windows_sandbox_session_legacy(
     timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
     tty: bool,
     stdin_open: bool,
+    _protected_metadata_targets: &[ProtectedMetadataTarget],
     use_private_desktop: bool,
 ) -> Result<SpawnedProcess> {
     let common = prepare_legacy_spawn_context(

codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/unified_exec/session.rs

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 
 mod backends;
 
+use crate::setup::ProtectedMetadataTarget;
 use anyhow::Result;
 use codex_utils_pty::SpawnedProcess;
 use std::collections::HashMap;
@@ -25,6 +26,7 @@ pub async fn spawn_windows_sandbox_session_legacy(
     timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
     tty: bool,
     stdin_open: bool,
+    protected_metadata_targets: &[ProtectedMetadataTarget],
     use_private_desktop: bool,
 ) -> Result<SpawnedProcess> {
     backends::legacy::spawn_windows_sandbox_session_legacy(
@@ -37,6 +39,7 @@ pub async fn spawn_windows_sandbox_session_legacy(
         timeout_ms,
         tty,
         stdin_open,
+        protected_metadata_targets,
         use_private_desktop,
     )
     .await
@@ -53,6 +56,7 @@ pub async fn spawn_windows_sandbox_session_elevated(
     timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
     tty: bool,
     stdin_open: bool,
+    protected_metadata_targets: &[ProtectedMetadataTarget],
     use_private_desktop: bool,
 ) -> Result<SpawnedProcess> {
     backends::elevated::spawn_windows_sandbox_session_elevated(
@@ -65,6 +69,7 @@ pub async fn spawn_windows_sandbox_session_elevated(
         timeout_ms,
         tty,
         stdin_open,
+        protected_metadata_targets,
         use_private_desktop,
     )
     .await

codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/unified_exec/tests.rs

@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ fn legacy_non_tty_cmd_emits_output() {
             Some(5_000),
             /*tty*/ false,
             /*stdin_open*/ false,
+            &[],
             /*use_private_desktop*/ true,
         )
         .await
@@ -202,6 +203,7 @@ fn legacy_non_tty_powershell_emits_output() {
             Some(5_000),
             /*tty*/ false,
             /*stdin_open*/ false,
+            &[],
             /*use_private_desktop*/ true,
         )
         .await
@@ -426,6 +428,7 @@ fn legacy_tty_powershell_emits_output_and_accepts_input() {
             Some(10_000),
             /*tty*/ true,
             /*stdin_open*/ true,
+            &[],
             /*use_private_desktop*/ true,
         )
         .await
@@ -474,6 +477,7 @@ fn legacy_tty_cmd_emits_output_and_accepts_input() {
             Some(10_000),
             /*tty*/ true,
             /*stdin_open*/ true,
+            &[],
             /*use_private_desktop*/ true,
         )
         .await
@@ -525,6 +529,7 @@ fn legacy_tty_cmd_default_desktop_emits_output_and_accepts_input() {
             Some(10_000),
             /*tty*/ true,
             /*stdin_open*/ true,
+            &[],
             /*use_private_desktop*/ false,
         )
         .await